People that count : changing savings and credit practices in Ambon, Indonesia = Mensen tellen : veranderende spaar- en kredietpraktijken op Ambon, Indonesie by Hospes, O.
People That Count 
Changing Savings and Credit Practices 
in Ambon, Indonesia 
Olio Hospes 
T H E S I S P U B L I S H E R S A M S T E R D A M 
People That Count 
promotor: dr. F. von Benda-Beckmanrt 
hoogleraar recht, in het bijzonder het agrarisch recht van de 
niet-westerse gebieden, 
Landbouw Universiteit Wageningen 
People That Count 
Changing Savings and Credit Practices 
in Ambon, Indonesia 
Mensen Tellen 
Veranderende Spaar- en 
Kredietpraktijken op Ambon, Indonesië 
(met een Nederlandse samenvatting) 
Proefschrift 
ter verkrijging van de graad van 
doctor in de landbouw- en milieuwetenschappen 
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus 
prof.dr. CM. Karssen, 
in het openbaar te verdedigen 
op vrijdag 1 maart 1996 des namiddags te vier uur in de 
Aula van de Landbouwuniversiteit te Wageningen 
door Otto Hospes 
geboren op 29 mei 1963 te Sneek. 
CIP-DATA KONINKLIJKE BIBLIOTHEEK, DEN HAAG 
Hospes, Otto 
People that count: changing savings and credit practices in Ambon, Indonesia/ Otto 
Hospes : [photo's of the author]. -
Wagerdngen : CERES. - Fig., maps, photos, tab. - (CERES-series : no. 3) 
Thesis Wagerdngen Agricultural University - With ref. - With summary in Dutch. 
ISBN 90-5485-503-7 
NUGI 652/682 
Subject headings: Ambon; social-economic development / rural finance ; Indonesia. 
Coverdesign: Mirjam Bode 
Photographs: Otto Hospes 
© 1996 Otto Hospes 
In so far as it is permitted to make copies from this publication under the provision of 
article 16B and 17 of the Auteurswet 1912 (Copyright Act), you are obliged to make 
the payments required by law to the Stichting Reprorecht (Repro Law Foundation) 
P.O. Box 882, 1180 AW Amstelveen, the Netherlands. To use any part or parts of this 
publication in anthologies, readers and other compilations (article 16 Auteurswet 
1912) you are obliged to contact the publisher. 
People of substance, savings in kind. A young Butonese girl standing next to one of 
the seven sacks of nutmeg stored in the house. 
CERES Series no. 3. 
This publication has been prepared as a part of CERES Research School for Resource 
Studies for Development. The Wageningen Agricultural University (WAU) and the 
Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO) have 
participated in funding the research. 
Contents 
List of Tables, Appendices, Figure and Maps 
Preface 
1 Introduction 
Diverging Perspectives, 1 
The Cacophony on Rural Finance and Development, 3 
An Actor-Structure Perspective, 6 
Chapters of a Myriad: Ambon Island, 10 
Methodologically Speaking, 15 
2 The Agrarian Question of Financial Landscapes: 
The Case of Ambon 
Out of the Question: Agrarian Contexts 
of Savings and Credit, 21 
The Significance of the Agro-Ecological Complex 
of Rural Ambon, 25 
The Uncaptured Paradise Under Different 
Political-Economic Regimes, 29 
Changing Positions in the Markets 
of Money and Trees, 32 
Lessons and a Look for 'Localization', 37 
3 Social Changes in a Place Where Money Grows: 
The Village of Tulehu 
Old and New Neighbors, 45 
Houses with Concrete Walls, 56 
Higher Education and Close Kin, 62 
Civil Servants Spending Future Income, 69 
Cash Crops, Money Needs and Migrants, 79 
Fishery, Fish Trade and Migrants, 88 
Shops, Economic Survival and Migrants, 96 
Buses and Bosses, 103 
Some Final Conclusions, 107 
viii 
4 Evolving Forms of Informal Finance 
in an Indonesian Town 
Economic Change, 134 
Clove Harvesting, 134 
The Clove Trade, 135 
Fishing Business, 136 
Goverment Employees, 137 
ROSCAs, 138 
Multiple Funds, 141 
An Evolving Group, 141 
Money Guards, 142 
Conclusions, 143 
133 
5 People That Count: The Forgotten Faces of 
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations in Indonesia 145 
Studies of ROSCAs in Indonesia, 149 
Different Comparative Studies, 157 
Different Backgrounds and Roles of 
ROSCAs in a Moluccan Town, 161 
The Use and Relative Importance of ROSCAs, 167 
6 Women's Differential Use of ROSCAs in Indonesia 171 
Comparative Studies, 172 
Studies of ROSCAs in Indonesia, 174 
The Background to Women's Differential Use of 
ROSCA: The Case of Tulehu, 180 
Women's Differential Use of ROSCAs: 
Some Case Studies, 185 
7 The Struggle for Cooperatives 189 
When the First Western European Cooperative 
Movements Emerged, 193 
Cooperatives in Colonized Economies, 195 
Post-Colonial History and Debate 
of Cooperatives, 197 
Conclusions, 209 
ix 
8 The Struggle for Cloves: The Case of Ambon 213 
Clove Marketing Chains in the Central Moluccas, 217 
The Use of State Cooperatives: 
Cengkeh Murni Mixed With Cengkeh Toko, 219 
Traders from Tulehu, 228 




About the Author 281 
X 
List of Tables, Appendices, Figure and Maps 
Tables 
3.1 Features of houses of three blocks in Tulehu 57 
3.2 Retail prices of a sheet of zinc in the period 1982-1989 57 
3.3 Retail prices (in Rp.) of cement per bag (40 kgs.) 58 
3.4 Number of children (of 46 fathers and mothers) 
who have finished, are busy with or have given up 
their studies, classified according to sex 63 
3.5 Distribution of 113 children who have ever studied, 
according to their ranking as oldest child, second 
oldest, etc. 64 
3.6 Distribution of students according to price of 
semester money (in Rp.) 64 
3.7 Distribution of students according to costs of 
transport (in Rp.) 65 
3.8 Number and features of supporters who finance 
costs of higher education 66 
3.9 Sources of funding for those supporting 
higher education 66 
3.10 Number of civil servants per office 
located in Tulehu 70 
3.11 Monthly instalments collected from local 
government agencies by the BRI village unit of Tulehu 72 
3.12 Monthly repayment, total repayment and loan volume 
of debtors of the BRI as administered through the 
office of the Sub-district Salahutu 76 
3.13 Monthly instalments, total repayment and loan volume 
of clients of toko Modern Baru as administered 
through the office of the Sub-district Salahutu 77 
3.14 Number of canoes in Tulehu per Kampong 89 
3.15 Number of existing shops (as per November 1989) 
per year of establishment and per ethnic category 
in Tulehu 97 
3.16 Number of existing shops (as per November 1989) in 
Tulehu according to daily turnover and ethnicity 98 
3.17 Income and expenditure accounts of a bus (in Rp.) 105 
4.1 Member arisan encountered in Tulehu in 1989 138 
8.1 Number of member-KUDs, KUDs that sold at auction 
(PUSKUD, Ambon City) and auction days 221 
8.2 Turnover at auction floor and export of cloves 
from Ambon (in tons of cloves) 222 
xi 
8.3 An example of the distribution of profits between 
a KUD and a private entrepreneur after the auction 
of cloves at the PUSKUD (with prices in Rp/kg) 227 
8.4 Levies on cooperative clove trade by local 
government agencies 228 
8.5 Numbers of shopkeepers-cum-customers of Pak Su 
in 1989-1990 according to ethnic background 235 
8.6 The number of bags of cloves and coconut that 
have been bought by Pak Su in the period between 
9 September and 16 December 1989 236 
Appendices 
3.1 Amounts of mixed cargo, copra, cloves and nutmeg 
(in tons); wood (in cubic meter) imported at the 
quay of Tulehu; and number of passengers arriving 
at the quay of Tulehu from 1980 till April 1987 111 
3.2 Amounts of mixed cargo, cement and rice (in tons); 
and number of passengers departing from the quay 
of Tulehu from 1980 till April 1987 115 
3.3 An inquiry on daily expenditures and income of 
households and their members in Tulehu 119 
Table A: Total expenditures of households (in Rp), 
household composition, and income of wife and of 
husband during a number of days between 15 February 
and 2 April 1990 121 
Table B: Share of different expenses (in percentages) 
of total daily expenses of respondent-households 123 
Outline C: Features of the various income-generating 
activities of the husbands (he) and wives (she) 128 
3.4 Number of postal remittances cashed in the 
post office of Tulehu sent by relatives living 
in the Netherlands or outside Tulehu in Indonesia 131 
8.1 Market prices of cloves (in Rp/kg) in 1980-1989 
at Ambon City level 253 
8.2 Market prices of cloves in Tulehu (in Rp/kg) 
in 1985-1990 254 
8.3 An outline of debtors of and their debts (in Rupiah) 
to a professional agricultural trader during one month 
of the clove harvest season in 1987 255 
Figure 
8.1 Clove trade networks in the Central Moluccas 218 
xii 
Maps of Indonesia, Central and Southeast Moluccas 
and Ambon island 
Preface 
It is hard to say when exactly the production of this book started. Various 
thoughts and threads that are interwoven in the book had been of my 
concern before I started to work on this particular research project. The 
research proposal to legitimize my field work on "Changing Credit Relations 
in Rural Ambon, Indonesia" with a view to contribute to the policy and 
scientific discussion on rural finance in developing countries, was drafted in 
the beginning of 1987 and submitted to the Netherlands Foundation for the 
Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO) in May 1987. The proposal was 
an advanced summary of my Master of Science thesis (April 1987) entitled 
"Credit in Relations: Some Implications of Fundamental Aspects of Social 
Theory for the Analysis of Credit and Credit Relations" (my translation). This 
thesis was an attempt to unravel backgrounds and analytical-methodological 
biases on which my field research activities in 1985 on urban credit societies 
and indigenous savings clubs in rural Sangli, India, was based. In my view 
the research in India — and the research of many others in the field of rural 
finance — lacked an actor-structure perspective to broaden the analysis of the 
significance and change of institutions. 
My encounters with the local culture and economy of rural Sangli also 
definitively put me on the track of rotating and accumulating savings and 
credit associations (see Bouman 1977, 1989, 1990 and 1994) that I much later 
and much more explicitly conceptualized as expressions of self-regulation 
and mirrors of socio-economic change — again inspired by an actor-structure 
perspective. Another field of research in rural Sangli that has been taken up 
again as part of my doctoral research project in Indonesia concerns the 
relationship between agro-economic change and financial landscapes. In 
Sangli, public and private investment in irrigation, sugar factories and cane 
cultivation stimulated a local sugar boom in the 1950s with banks, 
cooperatives, moneylenders, pawnbrokers and particularly savings and credit 
associations dramatically increasing in numbers (Bouman 1989). All these 
different suppliers of financial services were much more active in the green 
belt than in those areas not enjoying irrigation facilities. However, I also 
learnt that agro-ecological conditions could not explain how an individual 
supplier of financial services was managed. The best managed Non-
agricultural Credit Society attracting many visitors from all over the region, 
for instance, was situated in a dry area. People from a minority caste used 
this Society to demonstrate their management abilities vis-a-vis people from 
the majority caste and all others who wrongly believed that they were 
incapable and powerless. This case somehow increased my eagerness to 
study complexities, minorities and migrants, and to view finance as a human 
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affair emphasizing that, "Finance often seems to be all in numbers, but it is 
fundamentally social rather than mathematical. Like language, finance is a 
product of society" (Von Pischke 1991: 41). 
A number of people have played a very distinctive role in the production 
of this book. The first to mention is F.J.A. Bouman, retired senior lecturer of 
the Department of Agrarian Law. He not only stimulated me to undertake 
doctoral research in Indonesia but also wrote many detailed letters 
challenging me to discover what is nice to know. He edited every chapter of 
the book, dwelling on each word and warning against too grandiose and 
unfair criticism. His worldwide reputation as an authority on informal 
finance only became clear to me when I was introduced to his colleagues and 
friends all over the world, among them two eminent economists: Dale W. 
Adams and J.D. Von Pischke. A rather unique but valuable asset of F.J.A. 
Bouman, which I consider important as part of my pursuit of 
interdisciplinarity or genre-mixing (Benda-Beckmann 1990a: 51-52), is that he 
is one of the few sociologists who is on speaking terms with economists 
specialized in rural finance. 
Dale W. Adams, retired professor of Agricultural Economics and Rural 
Sociology at the Ohio State University, accepted Frits Bouman's suggestion to 
invite me instead of him to present a paper at the international conference on 
"Informal Finance in Low-Income Countries" in October 1989 in Washington 
D.C. This provided me with an opportunity to present some first results of 
my yet unfinished field research and thereby to follow the main objective of 
the research, that is, to contribute to the policy and scientific discussion on 
rural finance in developing countries. Dale W. Adams edited my paper. He 
much improved my English, reducing the number of pages by one third, and 
added conclusions on general features of informal financial systems that 
could be grafted onto formal finance programs to improve their performance. 
Chapter 4 is the result, bearing the imprint of a modest, yet ambitious and 
dedicated man. 
Another economist who has inspired me greatly is J.D. Von Pischke, 
formerly senior financial analyst of the World Bank, now senior manager of 
the Policy Economics Group, KPMG Peat Marwick, Washington D.C. He 
edited all the chapters that have been previously published as an article or 
chapter in a book. A very fine expression of his curiosity is his interest in 
insights from other disciplines. He has even included, for instance, 
anthropological notions on "personal hierarchies of creditors" (Shipton 1992: 
28) into his sophisticated assessment of debt capacity and risk management 
(Von Pischke 1994: 63-64). Also, he sometimes explained to me how a 
particular type of behavior described in one of my cases is characterized in 
economic theory, elsewhere adding "whatever that may be" (ibid: 4). 
In November 1992 F.JA. Bouman, Dale W. Adams, J.D. Von Pischke and 
many other colleagues and friends, participated in the international 
conference "Financial Landscapes Reconstructed", held in Wageningen, 
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organized by the Department of Agrarian Law. A volume edited by Bouman 
and myself, entitled Financial Landscapes Reconstructed: The Fine Art of Mapping 
Development (1994), including Chapter 2 of this book was the result. The 
volume contains views and experiences regarding the reconstruction of 
financial landscapes in developing countries in both the analytical-descriptive 
and normative-political sense. Maybe it has been rather foolish to organize 
such a conference and to edit 20 papers whilst working on a dissertation. 
However, I thought it worthwile to 'situate' the specific features of my 
Ambon case and, more basically, to contribute to the policy and scientific 
discussion on rural finance by organizing a seminar and through "reflexive 
monitoring" (Giddens 1979: 43) of papers. The volume outlines issues and 
landscapes of rural finance that have not been and/or could not have been 
outlined in this book. One central concern, however, connects the two: to 
develop approaches and concepts going beyond structural-functionalistic 
analyses of institutions. The metaphor of financial landscapes and the 
spelling of multiple contracts and contexts affecting savings and credit 
behavior are expressions of this concern in both publications. De facto, the 
volume and book are part of one and the same doctoral project. In a way 
they complement each other, yet they can absolutely not be seen as complete 
works, only providing contours of complexity of financial landscapes and 
their cultivators. 
Shirley Ardener and Sandra Burman, senior staff members of the Centre 
for Cross-Cultural Research on Women, University of Oxford, were kind 
enough to invite me to present a paper at a seminar on "Women's Use of 
Rotating Credit Associations", held in Oxford, January 7-9, 1991. In 1995 my 
contribution appeared in nicely edited form in Money-Go-Rounds: Women's 
Use ofROSCAs. The editors, Shirley Ardener and Sandra Burman, had earlier 
accepted that the paper that I had presented in Oxford would be published 
in an integral form in 1992 in the Journal of Savings and Development -
provided, for their purpose and book, that I would shorten the policy and 
general discussion on ROSCAs and provide more cases from Ambon on 
women's use of ROSCAs. Chapters 5 and 6 are the result. These two 
chapters, like the others, illustrate that, "A text is therefore not to be regarded 
as a "fixed form", which is then somehow related en bloc to particular 
intentions; it should be studied as the concrete medium and outcome of a 
process of production, reflexively monitored by its author or reader" 
(Giddens 1979: 43). 
Franz von Benda-Beckmann, professor of the Department of Agrarian Law, 
helped me to draft the research proposal and taught me how to come to 
grips with social theory and interventionistic flunking from a legal-
anthropological perspective. It is amazing how great the similarities are 
between debates on rural finance and development and debates on law and 
development, both full of dualistic thinking, mechanistic notions, formula 
shopping and blind promotion of technologies, whether government-
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regulated or 'market-driven' (cf. Benda-Beckmann 1981, 1983a, 1983b, 1985, 
1989 and 1993). A legal-anthropological perspective can be extremely useful 
to identify the shortcomings of such debates and to develop a better 
understanding of complexes that regulate savings, credit and insurance 
behavior of people. Many of my choices of concept and approaches have 
been inspired by the legal-anthropological works of Franz von Benda-
Beckmann. I also much enjoyed his turning up-side-down of the 'normality' 
of rulers and raiders in village politics at the university. 
A person who has been like three professors for me (and many others) is 
Abraham van Eldijk, staff member of the Department of Agrarian Law. His 
strategic thinking and ability to discover interrelationships between social 
practices that seem worlds apart, have very much impressed me. I am also 
very grateful that he and his colleagues of the Department of Agrarian Law 
allowed me - even stimulated me - to undertake the field research on 
Ambon starting January 1989 as a newly appointed staff member of their 
Department. In addition, they provided me with valuable information on 
how to combine my teaching and writing efforts after the field work period 
ended in April 1990. More than five, quite intensive, years followed, in which 
I combined office and non-office activities: writing, teaching, organizing an 
international seminar, editing a voluminous book, serving for two years as 
the departmental secretary, acting for four years as a member of a local 
church council, monitoring financial-political affairs as treasurer of the 
International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development, and drafting new 
research proposals. Members of the Department of Agrarian Law, with 
cheerful and supportive people like Lida Menkman and Ellen Wegkamp, 
have enabled me to do so. They sustain a place where informality and 
initiative are highly regarded, strategic and 'independent' thinking are well-
developed and the fine art of mapping development is learnt. 
The field research period consisted of two parts separated by a period of 
teaching at the Wageningen Agricultural University: January till April 1989 
and July 1989 till April 1990. I am grateful for the financial support provided 
by the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research 
(WOTRO) and the help of the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIFT) in 
getting together the necessary documents from many Indonesian authorities 
that allowed me to undertake the field research. After my first rounds of 
introduction with Indonesian officials at the national, provincial, district and 
sub-district level, a wonderful period of research and living in the village of 
Tulehu began. 
Speaking the Indonesian language, learning the basics of the local one, 
living in one of the central quarters of the village, and participating in many 
events, I was soon considered orang Tulehu, a man from Tulehu. What 
happened was that many 'informants' and 'interviewees' became like kin and 
friends, such as neighbors, my research assistant, market women, fish 
traders, the chairman of the village cooperative, bus drivers and many 
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migrants. As a migrant myself, I was given a lot of space to interact with 
different categories of village society: men and women, migrants and natives, 
with diverse social-economic positions varying from bus entrepreneur to 
sago tree cutter and from regional clove trader to street vendor. On some 
occasions — usually in government offices and banks — I too easily assumed 
possibilities for communication, as when I directly adressed the treasurer of a 
government office. His superior felt passed over and immediately called me 
to his room. He wanted letters from this person who seemed not to be aware 
of how one properly makes a request for information. When I asked him 
what kind of letters, he responded angrily: "from anywhere". Fortunately, I 
happened to carry eight official 'letters' with me and at the view of the first 
letter he was already satisfied. The boss became a very pleasant person and 
called his treasurer to provide the very detailed information I was looking 
for. 
Someone who is not immediately satisfied at the view of a bundle of letters 
is Ann Long, who much improved the English of a major part of the thesis. I 
would also like to express my gratitude towards Jaap Bijkerk, who was 
prepared to draft complex figures for this book at any time of the day. 
Finally, I want to thank my wife Yolanda and my son Stefan for 
accompanying me to Indonesia, often changing my academic discourse to 
words that make sense and anticipating events I much later observed. They -
- and my daughters Marlou and Laura — have constantly reminded me that 
one day still does not count more than 24 hours and that one life has but 




This thesis is about the impact of agro-ecological conditions and increase of 
money circulation during tine last 20 to 25 years on savings and credit 
arrangements of villagers of Tulehu, Ambon, an island of Indonesia. The 
main objective of the thesis is to contribute to the political and scientific 
debates on rural finance in developing countries on the basis of an actor-
structure perspective, and field research on Ambon in which this analytical-
methodological perspective was used. A secondary objective of the thesis is 
to contribute to a better knowledge of social-economic changes in rural 
Ambon during the last 20 to 25 years. The thesis is a compilation of five 
papers, published earlier in different books and a journal, and two lengthier 
descriptive accounts. They are now seven chapters to the book, like seven 
shoots of a tree, with their leaves providing together a structured pattern of 
shades. 
Diverging Perspectives 
To introduce the undercurrents of this thesis and to refer to broader, 
normative-intellectual struggles that sustain and change different 
'reproduction regimes' of social-scientific labor on rural development in 
African, Asian and Latin-American countries, I want to briefly characterize 
two basic perspectives here: reductionistic versus anti-reductionistic 
perspectives. They explain fundamentally different views on why and how to 
document various domains of social life. 
Those taking a reductionistic perspective easily accept the adagium of 
'other things being equal'. Homogeneity of man and nature is often 
symbolized in their figures and projected 'overhead', which literally means 
'over people'. Dichotomous notions characterize their discourse, dividing the 
world into modern and traditional, sustainable and unsustainable, developed 
and underdeveloped sectors. Popularity in policy circles is often their 
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purpose and prize. Government regimes, reforms and regulation are among 
their major concerns or are their points of reference as highly normative 
and /or static concepts such as 'good governance', 'good institutions' and 'the 
formal sector' suggest. Their mission is usually wrapped up in mechanistic 
terms, reducing normative-political problems to an objective-technical affair. 
Social-scientific labor and its organization should be directed at the question 
of how to make 'it' work, leaving non-experts wondering what works and 
who works. 
Those taking an anti-reductionistic perspective would feel embarrassed to 
accept any ceteris paribus clause. Heterogeneity of man and nature is unfolded 
in their endless reconstruction of histories. Dialectial views on structure and 
agency, actors and institutions, shape their discourse, characterized by words 
of duality, like enabling and constraining relations, continuity and change of 
normative structures, processes of globalization and relocalization, conceived 
as the products and counterproducts of one action or series of actions. If they 
are on speaking terms with policymakers at all, they emphasize the 
importance of political-economic, agro-ecological and social-legal conditions 
(see Chapter 2) instead of universal formula, often making themselves even 
less popular in policy circles. They are not looking for shortcuts to progress 
but for a greater understanding of different normative-cognitive and 
materialized lifeworlds of people using different rules and resources to 
introduce and adapt to changing conditions. It is the combination and 
interwovenness of different regulative complexes that is their interest. Social-
scientific labor and its organization should enable the study of these 
lifeworlds and complexes, explaining why 'interdisciplinarity' is often the 
Utopian mission of those taking a non-reductionistic perspective. 
The distinction between those taking a reductionistic and non-
reductionistic perspective, does not correspond to a distinction between the 
bad and the good guys — if possible to define at all. For instance, 
interdisciplinarity is one of the most charming but exclusive tools in social 
science. Also, those who might be praised for views based on either a 
reductionistic or anti-reductionistic perspective in one particular debate, 
might very well be accused of expressing too limited or too comprehensive a 
view in another, though telling the same history or showing the same 
overhead sheet. Finally, the perspectives might concern or tear apart the 
mind of a person, as he /she switches from one to the other perspective 
through time or believes that both perspectives should be used 
simultaneously. 
This thesis takes an anti-reductionistic perspective, but reproduces several 
reductionistic notions. A number of factors explain this paradox: first, 
beyond every unit of analysis there is another one, forcing researchers to 
make choices and to leave a number of black boxes unopened. Second, 
reference to reductionistic thinking and notions is necessary if one wants to 
be on speaking terms with their users, to demonstrate the clumsy character 
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of their analytical tools, to describe complex situations and prepare better-
informed policymaking. The use of reductionistic notions implies 
confirmation and change of their significance. My purpose has been to 
critically and constructively contribute to reductionistic thinking, showing 
what is assumed and easily overlooked, and what are its many constraints if 
one wishes to get a better understanding of social practices related to savings 
and credit and/or improve conditions of those with limited access to 
financial resources. 
The Cacophony on Rural Finance and Development 
Rural finance is about the complex of decisions of individuals and groups 
regarding savings, financing and insurance; institutionalization of financial 
services; and changing relations and conditions that affect the decisions and 
institutional arrangements of people related to savings, financing and 
insurance (cf. Schmidt and Kropp 1987). Most of the discussions on rural 
finance, however, have concentrated on the institutionalization of financial 
services — and, as such, in very odd ways. The quests for sustainable formal 
financial institutions (Adams, Graham and Von Pischke 1984; Adams and 
Fitchett 1991), replicability of successful credit schemes (Hulme 1992), 
linkage-building between formal and informal financial intermediaries (Seibel 
1985; Seibel and Marx 1987) and good institutions (Krahnen and Schmidt 
1994) are examples of the dominant interest in institution building. Repeated 
discussion on the pros and cons of cheap credit, easy money, savings 
mobilization and different mechanisms of allocation of financial resources 
result from these quests and explain the cacophony that exists on rural 
finance and development, to which scholars as well as representatives of 
many international funding agencies like the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank, Food and Agriculture 
Organization, International Fund for Agricultural Development and a 
growing number of non-governmental organisations contribute. I will not 
deal with every issue of their debates in detail here but articulate a number 
of basic features and fallacies that characterize most of their discussions on 
rural finance and development. 
First, it is hardly recognized that the debates on rural finance and 
development, in which many speak of 'policies', 'technologies', 'guidelines' 
and lessons' on how to provide credit to the poor masses without going 
bankrupt, are very much a normative-political affair. Many participants of 
these debates assume that development is something equal to improvement 
and expansion of the formal banking sector. This might be even the main 
reason to study and learn from 'informal finance' (see Chapter 2; Adams and 
Fitchett 1992), which is a cover term referring to a wide variety of financial 
and quasi-financial arrangements based on self-regulation. Others conceive 
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development primarily in terms of financial integration and economic 
growth, presupposing monetization (and thus standardization and indirect 
control) of labor output as well as better possibilities to mobilize (monetary) 
savings. They recommend that these savings are mediated by banks to those 
'in need of capital', which is very difficult to define indeed. What usually 
happens is that, 
Bulk of these resources, however, are generally invested in urban sectors — 
away from the rural community which provides the savings. It is also 
known that, being risk averse, the extent of agricultural credit offered by 
formal financial institutions continues to be marginal. Many commercial 
banks prefer to hold their surplus assets in very liquid form with no return 
or in Treasury Bills and government securities with low return (World 
Bank 1991: 10). 
Still, Krahnen and Schmidt (1994), inspired by the economics of 
information of Stiglitz (1986) and others, believe that "economic development 
depends more on the availability of 'good institutions' than on anything else; 
institutions are called good if they provide the type of incentives which 
promote savings, capital accumulation and allocation in such a way that they 
lead to growth" (p.22). This brings us to a second general feature of the 
debates on rural finance and development. 
Institutionalization of financial services very much seems to be a matter of 
planning in the debates on rural finance and development, and finding the 
right incentive structure for people to behave according to the plan or 
institutional model. Market-based rates of interest have been traditionally 
promoted as the right incentive for people to save money, to put it in a bank 
and/or to use bank loans for productive purposes (see Chapter 2). For 
managers of development and commercial banks such rates of interest are 
supposed to stimulate their eagerness to mobilize savings and organize 
effective repayment mechanisms. In many of these incentive structures, the 
image of the rational peasant (Popkin 1979), the calculating micro 
entrepreneur wishing to become a large one (Reed and Befus 1994) or the 
free rider is somehow included. Human behavior is qualified or quantified as 
a quasi-constant which is predictable and fixed; if plans do not succeed, 
another plan is designed (cf. Benda-Beckmann 1993: 116-117) or more 
framing is organized for people to 'understand' the institutional model. 
I am not sure whether economists who take a new look at rural 
organization and claim to go beyond the traps of neo-classical economic 
models (assuming that all individuals have the same information and that 
there are no transaction costs, Hoff and others 1993: 2) offer a much broader 
perspective in this connection, better recognizing the complexity of human 
behavior and the very diverse conditions under which they live. Their 
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quantitative methodologies are very abstract whereas many of their 
conclusions seem either outdated or common sense to me. 1 Their interest in 
different types of institutions, such as "markets and property rights, systems 
of land tenure, obligations of mutual insurance within lineage groups, and 
other systems of exchange that are determined by implicit contracts or social 
norms" (ibid: 1) is exciting, but their disqualification of diversity of rights on 
land and trees and of sources of savings and credit hampering development, 
is old-fashioned and disappointing. Development is then narrowly defined in 
terms of planned commoditization and monetization 2 and thus increased 
possibilities for indirect control and 'optimal' redistribution of scarce 
resources. Economics of rural organization runs the risk of evolving as an 
ordinary branch of legal engineering whose fallacies have been articulated by 
legal anthropologists for a decade or two (see Benda-Beckmann 1983b, 1992 
and 1993; Trubek and Galanter 1974). 
A third general feature of the debates on rural finance and development is 
the underestimation of the significance of what might be called 'multiple 
contexts' (cf. Bouman and Hospes 1994) of transactions of individuals and 
institutional actors regarding savings, financing and insurance. These 
contexts include relational, social-spatial and (other) transactional contexts 
such as kinship, friendship, neighborhood, an office, buying and selling 
transactions (see Chapters 3, 6 and 8). Also, normative-cognitive and 
authority structures, such as distribution of rights on land and trees, 
consumption standards, subsistence and commercial ethics, provide contexts 
of transactions regarding savings, financing and insurance (see Chapter 2). 
Finally, multiple contexts refer to broader material and societal conditions 
such as agro-ecological environment, physical infrastructure, economic 
change and poHtical-administrative regimes (see Chapters 2 and 4). All these 
contexts affect transactions of individuals and institutional actors regarding 
savings, financing and insurance and, herewith, the institutionalization of 
financial services. Such institutionalization thus refers to very complex 
processes that are structured by many different actors, their transactions and 
contexts. The price of not taking such a broad view on institutionalization of 
financial services but assuming separability and timelessness of savings and 
credit transactions instead (Crow 1994), are simple classifications and static 
1. And I am not the only one. Three economists who have devoted a lot of their time to develop 
economics of rural organization admit that, "It has long been remarked how uncommon 
common sense is, and perhaps nowhere this is more true than in economics (Hoff, Braverman 
and Stiglitz 1993: 22). 
2. "Commoditization is the historical process by which exchange-value comes to assume an 
increasingly important role in economies. This normally implies monetization since the 
development of commodity exchange leads to the necessity to fix a universal form of value 
representing the general social estimation of particular commodities" (Long et al. 1986: 9). 
6 People That Count 
views of institutions or institutional arrangements with a financial 
(intermediary) function (contrast Chapter 5), our fourth feature of the debate 
on rural finance and development. 
Many researchers and policymakers on rural finance and development 
make the distinction between informal and formal suppliers of financial 
services — whereby informal finance is usually defined as something like "all 
financial transactions, loans and deposits, occuring outside the regulation of 
a central monetary or financial market authority" (Adams and Fitchett 1992: 
2). This definition leads one easily to ignore important indirect effects of the 
regulative practices of these authorities. When the Central Bank changes its 
directives on interest and branching policies, most of the managers of 
development and commercial banks take notice, possibly affecting the 
financial arrangements of friends, relatives, traders, money guards, landlords, 
pawnshops, members of savings and credit associations. Also, two specific 
institutions that are both called a credit union or rotating savings and credit 
association might only have their official and/or local titles in common (cf. 
Chapter 6) — adapting to member preferences and wider contexts in totally 
different ways. Reference to a central monetary or financial market authority 
is only one of the many ways to classify institutions with a savings, 
insurance and/or credit function. 
Furthermore, to speak of 'dual' or 'segmented' financial markets is 
misleading as it directs our attention away from existing, direct and indirect 
relations between so-called informal and formal suppliers of financial 
services. Examples include traders who on-lend money from banks to 
farmers (Harriss 1994), members of savings associations who deposit their 
accumulating fund at a bank that happens to be nearby and reliable, and 
micro-entrepreneurs who have feet in T)oth camps' (McLeod 1980). Finally, 
concepts such as formal and informal are often wrongly situated in a spatial 
sense, suggesting that informal transactions take place in dark alleys and 
formal ones in offices only. This is misleading as many important 'formal' 
decisions are made at parties or in corridors, based on hidden agendas 
and/or the outcome of political negotiation. Besides, government offices 
might very well be the scene of savings and credit associations that are or are 
not part of official mandates (see Chapters 4 and 5; Baydas et al. 1993, 
Hospes 1994). 
An Actor-Structure Perspective 
To circumvent many of the shortcomings in the debate on rural finance 
and development, I have used an actor-structure perspective inspired by the 
structuration theory of Giddens (1979). The structuration theory is not a 
substantial theory that outlines how society evolves or should evolve — based 
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on a set of empirical generalizations, reconstruction of historical change 
and/or a more or less sophisticated ideology. It is a formal theory that 
logically conceptualizes social action. The central message is that human 
action and structure presuppose each other: structures enable and constrain 
human action whereas human action sustains and changes structures. 
Giddens thought it necessary to elaborate such a common thought into a 
sophisticated theory on the basis of his study of nineteenth century social 
science. According to him, the great divide of this century concerned 
voluntaristic, subjectivistic or actor-centered interpretations of social reality 
on the one hand and deterministic, objectivistic or structure-centered 
interpretations on the other (Munters et al. 1985, Spaargaren et al. 1986). 
Giddens wanted to go beyond these one-sided perspectives that have much 
affected scientific labor and its organization far into the twentieth century. 
He characterized his structuration theory as a non-functionalist manifesto (1979: 
7) to undermine dualistic views and concepts resulting from use of 
structural-functionalist perspectives, like objective and subjective, culture and 
structure, idealism and materialism, macro and micro, structure and action, 
'Erklaren' and 'Verstehen'. Also, in much of the post-colonial development 
studies, dualistic concepts have been very popular: top-down and bottom-up 
planning, formal and informal markets, urban and rural development, 
modern and traditional law. 
Here I want to briefly characterize a number of central concepts of the 
structuration theory that I found inspiring in order to provide a fundamental 
critique on the debates on rural finance and development. First of all, 
Giddens conceptualizes human beings as Tcnowledgeable actors' with 
'transformative capacities', which neither means that they know or can 
explain everything nor that all their ambitions and plans come true. Giddens' 
qualifications should not be taken too literally (and too quickly used for 
action-research purposes) as they are abstract methodological notions. 
Knowledgeability refers to different sources of knowledge that are used in 
human action, such as routines, intuition, short-term or long-term exposure 
to specific problems and/or dramatic events, memories, orders. As a result of 
this use, social relationships and patterns of social interaction are sustained 
and transformed. Because human beings are neither able to rationalize 
and /or articulate all consequences of their action, nor their behavior as 
'automatic pilots' in particular situations (following a 'discursive conscience'), 
unintended consequences of human action result. Also, intuitive action as 
well as changing conditions for actions, including those of others, affect the 
'outcome' of human action. 
A second set of logical assumptions of the structuration theory concerns 
social systems and structures. Human beings do not act in a vacuum but 
participate in a multitude of - what Giddens describes as — interactional or 
social systems with different time-spatial dimensions. These social systems 
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vary from a queue of people lining up in a refugee camp to a queue of 
friends and relatives congratulating the just married couple; from a group of 
kin living in one house to a group of contract employees temporarily 
working in an office; from the Dutch colonial administration to the post-
colonial United Nations. While shuffling after each other, living in a 
particular space, or being employed by whatever administration, people 
somehow refer to different and possibly contradictory regulative complexes 
(cf. Benda-Beckmann 1993) on how to behave, how to think, what to 
disqualify and whom to obey, or to borrow from Giddens' discourse: people 
use a plurality of normative-cognitive and power structures. This does not 
mean that these structures live their own life and remain constant. Structures 
— or as Giddens puts it more precisely: the structural properties of social 
systems — are both sustained and changed when they are used (cf. Moore 
1973). Also, relationships that are involved are subject to continuity and 
change. Increasing and decreasing regularities of interactions between 
individual actors ('social integration and disintegration') and between 
institutional actors ('system integration and disintegration') characterize 
structuration processes. 
If we now screen popular discourse and common views on rural finance 
and development with insights from the structuration theory, we can easily 
identify their lacunae and conclude the following: 
1. It is misleading to assume that financial technology development (and any 
other technology development) is based on something like objective 
criteria. Such technology development reproduces normative-cognitive (see 
Benda-Beckmann 1989 and 1990c) and power structures (see for instance, 
Quarles van Ufford et al. 1988), such as the view reproduced in knowledge 
networks and employer-employee relations of poverty-oriented bankers, 
economists and consultants, that development equals expansion of the 
formal banking sector or a commercial ethic. 
2. Human beings can certainly not be conceptualized as machines or 
Pavlovian dogs that only need the right stimuli or incentive structure to 
respond in the proper way. They cultivate and combine knowledge 
systems about various domains of social life (see Benda-Beckmann and 
Velde 1992; A. and N. Long 1992). Ignoring knowledge of human beings 
on possibilities and functions of savings and credit, or isolating this 
knowledge from other sets, is to do violence to social reality. 
3. A multitude of structures and systems constrain and enable savings 
and credit transactions of individual and institutional actors (cf. Bouman 
and Hospes 1994). Such transactions imply the start, consolidation as well 
as erosion of different social relationships (see Chapters 2 and 5). It also 
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means, to refer to a more concrete problem from the world of development 
finance, that those targeted by international lending agencies, assess 
possible changes and continuity of social relationships when offered an 
alternative credit facility or facing claims of different creditors and other 
pressures on their scarce resources. 
4. Structuralism and functionalism are easy to disregard, yet prominent 
structural features of networks, seminars, research schools and other social 
systems, sustain debates on rural finance and development. 3 Quite 
deterministic views on incentive structures and the application of financial 
technology as well as mono-functional qualification (such as contribution to 
economic growth, capacity of term transformation) and one-dimensional 
classification (such as formal versus informal) of different and changing 
suppliers of financial services, illustrate this point. 
One might say that insights from structuration theory have been part of 
my 'practical conscience' when assessing the debates on rural finance and 
development. I have articulated some fallacies of these debates referring to 
structuration theory. However, it is much more difficult to say how and 
when I have used insights from structuration theory during the interpretative 
collection of 'data' during my field research on Ambon. A theory does not 
speak and unfold itself, let alone a formal social theory that cannot be 
'applied' or 'tested' in a mechanical way. Besides, structuration theory does 
not 'stand alone' and has or has not been incorporated by other authors 
whose analytical-methodological constructs have influenced my works, like 
the semi-autonomous social field of Moore (1973), the actor-oriented 
paradigm of Norman Long (1989; 1992) and the social-scientific studies of 
law of Franz von Benda-Beckmann (see References for a selection). 
The methodological concept of the semi-autonomous social field has 
certainly needed further refinement, recognizing much more legal pluralism 
and the multiple contexts of social groups (Benda-Beckmann 1983b: 9-10; 
Bouman and Hospes 1994), but it has provided a basis for a dynamic 
perspective on law and institutional development, referring to rule 
generating processes of social fields and their vulnerability to "rules and 
decisions and other forces emanating from the larger world by which it is 
surrounded" (Moore 1973: 720). The concept of the semi-autonomous social 
field sustains dualistic notions but makes one 'sensitive' to, for instance, 
3. Benda-Beckmann (1993) comes to a similar conclusion when reviewing debates on law and 
development that much resemble those about rural finance and development. According to 
him, "structural-functionalism is not only an (inadequate) scientific model but also an 
important folk model in the social groups which they study" (p.118). 
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parallel or symbiotic systems such as public and private forms of cooperation 
in the field of agricultural trade (see Chapter 8; K von Benda-Beckmann 
1987). The actor-oriented paradigm mirrors the more system-oriented 
perspective of Moore and enables one to differentiate and recognize the 
significance of 'interaction settings' in which various 'knowledge systems' are 
produced and reproduced (see, for instance, Chapter 5; Hobart 1993; A. and 
N. Long 1992). Social-scientific studies of law have combined and further 
refined both system and actor analysis (Benda-Beckmann 1983b; Benda-
Beckmann et al. 1989: 205-220) - helping one to go beyond dualistic divides 
of financial landscapes; to assume combinations of club law, local 
government directives, commercial ethic and religious concerns as regulative 
complexes of savings and credit associations; and to understand why law — 
whether definitions of how to assess a loan application, pre-harvest 
arrangements or illiqüidity preferences4 — does not behave. 
This all means that a combination of more or less abstract notions has been 
part of my practical and/or discursive conscience when assuming 'the field 
of research' on Ambon, looking at people and their situation, interpreting 
what they are doing, not yet doing or not doing anymore. In addition, the 
restructuring of data in writing efforts has been much colored by my 
presentation of research findings from Ambon at international seminars 
elsewhere, organized by people with their own definitions of central 
problems. Still, I think that in many chapters of this book insights from 
structuration theory can be recognized, as they have been implicitly used to 
formulate a methodological argument that is substantiated with data from 
my field research on Ambon. 
Chapters of a Myriad: Ambon Island 
Very few social-scientific studies have been done on Ambon in the post-
colonial era (Fraassen 1972; Benda-Beckmann 1990a, 1991, 1992), none of 
them taking rural finance as the main entry. Rural finance studies from 
Indonesia are mostly Java-based (McLeod 1980 and 1992; Moll 1989 and 
1995), which is a pity as very interesting places characterized by dramatic 
changes and /or location-specific conditions of the financial landscape, are 
situated outside Java. One of these places is Ambon island, Central Moluccas, 
where a number of mutually reinforcing processes have taken place during 
the last 20 to 25 years that are directly related to the circulation of money, 
4. "Dliquidiry preferences refer to savings practices that constitute a socially acceptable argument 
to deny claims for financial assistance from people belonging to the same social or socio-
spatial unit (household, clan, lineage, neighborhood)" (Hospes 1994b: 8). 
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financial needs and supply of financial means. Generally speaking, 
possibilities to get money have increased enormously, while changes of 
consumption standards have implied an increased use of money. Villages 
and villagers have not been similarly involved in the general increase of 
money circulation. An important parameter in this connection has been the 
position of a particular place in evolving regional transport and trade 
networks. 
Another reason why Ambon is a particularly interesting scene to study the 
'structuration' of savings and credit arrangements, has to do with its specific 
agro-ecological conditions, of soils and forests where a unique combination 
of pure subsistence and pure cash crops grows. These conditions have very 
much affected perceptions and possibilities of rural people to make particular 
savings and credit arrangements. To a large extent the natural resource 
'structures' of Ambon also explain the unintended consequences and changes 
of plans of the official lending agencies that have tried to improve the lot of 
the rural population of Ambon during the last 15 years. 
Finally, the tiny island of Ambon, that covers not more than 800 square 
kilometer, hosts different religious and ethnic communities. Most Moslim 
villages are located in the northern hemisphere or peninsula, whereas most 
Christian villages are situated in the southern one. Animist beliefs may well 
be mixed up with Christian and Moslim beliefs, activated at home 
celebrations to honor the ancestors or for other Tioly missions' such as the 
killing of a neighboring villager who is accused of breaking the rules on use 
of their land and trees. Also, ethnically speaking, Ambon and its villages are 
spatially congregated and segregated. Ambonese live in one or more core 
quarters, with some Chinese, Javanese and/or Sumatran shopkeepers living 
among them. A very large ethnic minority, that traditionally lives on the 
fringes of the village areas, consists of Butonese migrants who make up 
about one third of the total rural population. 
Villages and villagers have been differently involved and affected by 
economic change, natural resource conditions and socio-legal structures. 
Small-scale diversity and variation characterize rural Ambon. To provide 
some insights into the interrelated effects of increased money circulation and 
agro-ecological conditions on the making and remaking of savings and credit 
arrangements of Ambonese and migrants, enjoying 'structurally' different 
rights on land and trees to make a living, I conducted field research (starting) 
in the village of Tulehu. Tulehu has been extraordinarily involved in wide 
time-spatial processes of commoditization and monetization. It is situated on 
the northeastern coast of Ambon island, counts large numbers of shops, 
schools and offices, and connects Ambon City with the islands of Ceram, 
Haruku, Saparua and Nusalaut. Tulehu is an Islamic village with numerous 
mosques, Islamic classes for children, praying groups of elderly and an 
Islamic faculty. There are three Ambonese core quarters (where also 
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Sumatran, Chinese and Javanese entrepreneurs work and live), three 
Butonese quarters at some distance from the Ambonese ones, and two 
quarters of mixed Ambonese-Butonese composition in between. 
The following chapters contain some results from my field research. I will 
introduce them now — outlining how they relate and what are the 
methodological arguments vis-a-vis the debate on rural finance and 
development. I will also — if possible and appropriate — sum up changes of 
social practices in an abstract way, using the perspective language of 
structuration theory. 
Chapter 2 explains why the relationship between particular agro-ecological 
conditions on the one hand, and savings strategies, credit transactions and 
protection against risk of all sorts on the other, has been so poorly adressed 
in policy discussions on agricultural credit and rural financial markets. My 
argument is that this poor handling is one of the consequences of the 
institutional and instrumentalist bias of the participants of these discussions. 
I suggest developing 'integrated approaches' and looking at the impact of 
location-specific agro-ecological conditions on savings and borrowing 
behavior in a double sense, that is, strictly speaking and in relation to 
(changing) legal, institutional, social and economic contexts. The chapter 
contains the case study of Ambon, providing its own and specific answers to 
this two-fold 'agrarian question' of financial landscapes. The particular 
combination of sago and clove cultivation has implied labor and loan 
arrangements that greatly differ from similar arrangements in rice producing 
areas and also, other silvicultures, such as rubber and coconut. Sago trees 
provide a minimal basis in terms of food security and housing, and can be 
harvested every day of the year. Cloves are a pure cash crop and have a 
production cycle in which bumper harvests occur every three to four years. 
The non-mechanized collection of sago as well as the harvest of cloves by 
Ambonese requires rather ad-hoc forms of cooperation, reproducing broader 
social relations between relatives, neighbors and friends. As a result of the 
dramatic increase of money circulation and changes of consumption 
standards during the last two decades, traditional forms of cooperative food 
collection and house construction among Ambonese have eroded. Parallel to 
this development, new types of relationships and forms of cooperation have 
emerged, including credit relations between Ambonese and Butonese, 
savings and credit associations among different ethnic and/or economic 
segments of village society (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6), and networks of official 
clove-trade agencies, Chinese shopkeepers, professional agricultural traders 
and Butonese tenants (see Chapter 8). As such, these processes are examples 
of social and system (dis)integration (Giddens 1979). 
Chapter 3 provides a more detailed 'photograph' of processes of 
commoditization and monetization involving villagers of Tulehu. Different 
ways villagers get and use money at a time of enormously increased money 
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circulation and money needs on Ambon, are dealt with. The chapter shows 
how the various ways of getting and using money reflect different and 
changing social relationships, that become more or less multiplex. These 
ways include different ways of saving and sources of credit, that likewise, 
mirror social change. Numerous case studies from different domains of social 
life show that the meaning of saving, borrowing and lending depends on the 
type of relationship and transaction in which saving, borrowing and/or 
lending takes place. Chapter 3 is much lengthier than other chapters, of 
which all but Chapter 8, have been published earlier as articles. Such 
publication does not usually allow extensive description of various domains 
of social life or much ethnographical detail. Chapter 3 (and also Chapter 8) 
fill this gap to some extent. 
Chapter 4 briefly outlines different economic sub-sectors in which villagers 
of Tulehu have become increasingly involved, no longer relying on the 
forests to guarantee food security and housing. Economic change in Tulehu 
has not only convinced bank officials to open a village unit in this T)oom 
town' but has also directly and indirectly spurred different forms of mutual 
finance and types of money guards - meeting illiquidity preferences, 
insurance needs and needs for small loans. It is concluded that three of the 
most impressive features of informal financial systems of Tulehu are their 
flexibility, proximity and the fact that these 'systems' have been entirely 
designed to meet the needs of their users. It is suggested that these and other 
features of informal financial systems should be grafted onto formal finance 
programs to enhance the chances of improving the performance of these 
programs. The case of a rotating fund of a praying society of women teaches 
us, however, that one should not overlook or underestimate the significance 
of existing social and/or economic relations for providing a basis for (new) 
savings and credit activities. Whether financial technologies or services can 
be stripped from these relations to be inserted into formal-bureaucratic 
structures, is highly questionable. 'Informal financial systems' (but also 
formal financial systems) cannot be defined in terms of technologies or 
services only. Financial systems are social systems sustained by actors who 
are not only participants of these systems but also of other social systems, 
such as an ethnic community, an extension program, an office, a 
neighborhood, a religious society, a group of entrepreneurs, that affect or 
somehow embed 'financial systems' - as shown in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Chapter 5 and 6 are twins, both providing more background and details of 
forms of mutual finance dealt with in Chapter 4 and of 'other forms of 
cooperation' drawn attention to in Chapter 7. Chapter 5 explains why the 
apparent praise of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) has to 
be interpreted with great caution. It is not the self-regulative, savings and 
organizational capacities of people that are acclaimed but rather the ROSCA 
as a model or mechanism to mobilize rural savings. To circumvent such a 
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reductionistic perspective on the significance and dynamics of ROSCAs, I 
suggest that we conceive ROSCAs as products and producers of different 
time-spatial processes of social transformation, as flexible forms of 
cooperation reproducing social relations in changing contexts. I also 
emphasize that actor analysis cannot be ignored or bracketed (Giddens 1979) 
when doing an institutional analysis of ROSCAs (cf. Ardener 1964). One 
should not underestimate the self-regulative character of ROSCAs: their 
participants make rules, adapt rules and compare rules and resources of 
different savings and credit arrangements. An outline of the different 
backgrounds and roles of rotating savings and credit associations in Tulehu 
and relative importance of these associations vis-á-vis other arrangements for 
the Sumatran community of Tulehu, illustrate my point that a contextual 
analysis of ROSCAs can be a very interesting methodology to explore societal 
change as well as financial infrastructure, financial needs, and the changing 
roles of the different suppliers of financial services in particular. 
Chapter 6 explains that one of the consequences of the lack of an actor 
perspective in the analysis and promotion of ROSCAs as a model or 
mechanism, is the production of quite general and simplistic ideas on the 
significance of rotating savings and credit associations for particular groups 
or categories of people. Probably the most dramatic example in this 
connection concerns women, or rather different classes or categories of 
women. My cases from Tulehu show that the study of women's use of 
rotating savings and credit associations is an exciting but demanding attempt 
to understand change and continuity within different sets of relationships — 
migrants and their hosts, government employees and their clients, and small-
scale entrepreneurs and their relatives. 
The earlier versions of Chapters 7 and 8 were part of one paper, in which 
the first half provided a general background for the second half which 
focussed on cooperative marketing of cloves on Ambon. Chapter 7 
emphasizes that cooperatives should be conceived as historical and location-
specific products. It is concluded that the identification of the essentials of 
'the cooperative' is a dubious affair that tells us more about the interests and 
ideas of those who try to do so than diverse forms of cooperation and 
practices of cooperative managers and members. Our limited understanding 
of the location-specific significance of cooperatives will be greatly improved 
if we study the struggle of different interest groups using 'cooperatives' as a 
bundle of rights, privileges and resources to further public and private goals. 
Chapter 8 explains why village cooperatives of the Central Moluccas have 
failed to realize their official mandate: to buy cloves from farmers at a fixed 
price. Excessive and standard amounts of bank credit to buy cloves from 
farmers, not taking into account the irregularity and spatial variation of clove 
production, partly explain this failure. Also, farmers' distrust of state 
cooperatives and their pre-harvest arrangements with private buyers-cum-
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lenders have long declared the mandate of cooperatives a mission 
impossible. To be able to offer cloves at the auction organized by the central 
cooperative of Ambon city, many chairmen of village cooperatives have 
made deals with urban wholesalers. These wholesalers are top players in 
chains of buyers and sellers from the village up to Ambon city level. A 
number of wholesalers are prepared to supply cloves to the auction in the 
name of a village cooperative. 
The final chapter also relates changes of credit relationships to changing 
conditions of clove marketing. As a result of the increase of transport 
facilities and money circulation in the Central Moluccas during the last two 
decades, the possibilities of private traders and shopkeepers to secure the 
output of cloves with the supply of credit to farmers have eroded. Credit is 
no longer the instrument to control relations and realize monopoly profits 
but rather a resource to sustain working relations with a selected number of 
people, farmers or small buyers of cloves. 
Methodologically Speaking 
Methodologically speaking, three spheres can be distinguished in my 
works 'contributing' to the debates on rural finance and development, and 
gathering data from rural Ambon for that purpose. The first is the attempt to 
relate insights from social theory to debates on rural finance and 
development, and to practical research. The second has been my participation 
in international conferences (see Adams and Fitchett 1992; Ardener and 
Burman 1995) and in organizing one myself (see Bouman and Hospes 1994), 
presenting findings from Ambon, shortcomings of the debate on rural 
finance and development and features of actor-context or actor-structure 
perspectives. The third sphere of methodological encounters concerns the 
practical research. I want to share here some field research experiences. The 
other two spheres have been dealt with above or elsewhere (ibid). 
To obtain a deeper understanding of social practices related to savings and 
credit transactions, I thought it unwise to pay short visits to a large number 
of villages interviewing some officials, like the chairman of a village 
cooperative, village head or branch manager of a bank. I thought it more 
appropriate to live in a village, to see and talk with people, women and men, 
natives and migrants, old and young, as they harvested crops, transported 
agricultural produce to a village market, moved to a new house, took care of 
the ill and old, went to school and/or participated in the annual meeting of 
the village cooperative, etc. This did not mean that I stayed the full 14 
months of research in 1989-1990 in Tulehu. Villagers were involved in 
different economic activities and networks stretching beyond village 
boundaries. Neither did the choice of a village-based study imply that I 
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would be able to collect 'all available data' about Tulehu and its more than 
12,000 inhabitants, living in eight different quarters and participating in 
various social, economic and religious systems. 
The empirical knowledge and personal comments of F.J.A Bouman on 
where to assume particular savings and credit arrangements and/or types of 
financial intermediation were very helpful in starting concrete research 
activities. My earlier experience with collecting data about rotating savings 
and credit associations proved very useful with regards to my research on 
arisan, Indonesian vernacular for such associations. I had consumed, as it 
were, the questionnaire of Ardener (1964) that enables one to systematically 
research institutional characteristics of rotating savings and credit 
associations. As a result, it was not necessary to walk around with long 
questionnaires. Besides, the members and meetings of these associations 
proved very accessible (in contrast to official lending agencies, like the 
village unit of the BRI), enabling one to correct, complete or differentiate data 
at any time. Much more difficult was my task to reconstruct the different 
backgrounds and changes of rotating savings and credit associations. The 
methodological idea that the development and diversity of these associations 
mirror different time-spatial processes of social transformation was, however, 
helpful in assuming these associations in very different places. Village 
administrators who were sure that there were no arisan on the vegetable and 
fish markets right behind their office, did not convince me. Indeed, many 
fish traders and market women confirmed my intuition. 
A very important resource person at the research location was the 
chairman of the village cooperative of Tulehu. He showed me the way to 
many different actors of clove marketing chains. I visited the secondary 
cooperative of Ambon city, urban wholesalers, high officials in Ambon city 
working on the problem, and representatives of kretek cigarette companies. 
Nowhere did I appear with or used a questionnaire. Only on one occasion 
was I thrown out within two minutes by a high official, putting my nose into 
this very delicate affair. My neighbors and research assistant brought me to 
the few women who still change cloth for cloves, or one of the many who 
used to do so. At the level of Tulehu, I also frequently visited professional 
agricultural traders and Butonese tenants to discuss their role and place in 
clove trade networks. 
Getting insights into the 'agrarian question' and 'the struggle for cloves', 
presupposed, among other things, data collection from Butonese migrants. 
Because I assumed Butonese, who do not enjoy traditional ownership rights 
on land and trees and also have few political rights, to be extra wary of 
paperwork and officials, I did not consider structured interview lists when 
approaching them, but posed a number of related questions about one of 
their common practices: the buying of rights to harvest trees from Ambonese. 
Quite paradoxically, my visits to their houses occasionally evoked quantative 
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data. Some of the Butonese migrants, the larger traders, became like friends 
for me. They entrusted their written records (see Chapters 3 and 8) to me, 
spelling details of their pre-harvest arrangements with Ambonese. These 
Tiard' data and estimates from other Butonese and Ambonese on the 
percentage of trees in particular gardens that are leased by Butonese (varying 
from 40 to 100 percent), taught me that many Ambonese conclude pre-
harvest arrangements with Butonese. Also, observations like those of the 
chairman of the village cooperative pointed in that direction, saying: "Wait 
and see a good harvest season: our gardens will be full of Butonese". 
However, it was not possible to document the many (tree-specific and term-
specific) pre-harvest arrangements of Butonese and Ambonese of Tulehu, 
which made me wary of drawing firm generalizations. Besides, averages and 
overall figures hide diversity and change, in which I am basically interested. 
In this connection the hesitations of many Butonese, for instance, to buy the 
rights to trees for a number of good seasons were very telling: these feelings 
pointed to changes in their perception of risks and relationships with the 
Ambonese from Tulehu. 
For my on-going investigation of different economic activities and 
expenditures of villagers, I happened or planned to meet many different 
people in many different places. For the analysis of the financing of the 
purchase of luxury goods, I collected documents from offices, a village unit 
of a bank and a consortium of urban shopkeepers. Structured interviews 
were held in the field of higher education, housing, shops and smoking of 
tuna fish. Participatory observation of fishermen and fish traders was very 
exciting - leading one far beyond village boundaries. Frequent travelling and 
visits to owners of buses provided much insight into the financing of bus 
enterprises and the dangers involved. Very fine sources of information 
proved to be my neighbors and friends - both Ambonese and migrants. 
Through personal observation, daily conversation, structured inquiries and 
working with them, they provided me with a wealth of information. They 
kept asking me ke mana? (where are you going?) with me responding: ke sana 
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The Agrarian Question of Financial 
Landscapes: The Case of Ambon1 
Every agro-ecological situation implies a specific pattern of production and 
a particular combination of savings, borrowing and insurance behavior of 
producers. Likewise, the strategies and services of agricultural traders and other 
financial intermediaries depend very much on the agro-ecological situation. Soil 
conditions, cropping patterns, water supply and drought might have a strong 
impact on the nature and number of financial services in rural areas of 
developing countries. Predictability, periodicity and diversity of agricultural 
production directly affect decisions of producers related to savings, borrowing 
and insurance. 
Platteau and Abraham (1987) argue that credit has evolved as a hunger 
insurance mechanism in fishing communities in India as a result of daily 
fluctuations of fishing incomes: a fisherman with surplus income lends money 
to his less fortunate fellow fishermen, who are supposed to help him in return 
when short of money and food. Southwold (1990) describes how coconut 
evolved as the major form of collateral for credit for securing food in a period 
of drought, failure of the paddy crop and restricted money circulation in rural 
Sri Lanka. The regular and relatively predictable income from coconut proved 
a solid base for copra traders and shopkeepers to supply credit in cash or goods 
to farmers. Borren (1986) reports the existence of different flows and forms of 
credit in three ecological zones in the Great Scarries Area of Sierra Leone, each 
characterized by a particular cropping pattern. Van Nieuwkoop (1986) finds that 
in Malaysia, "Paddy farmers who have an income that is generated only once 
or twice a year use more informal credit than rubber farmers who have a much 
more regular income" (p.60). 
1. Originally published in the book of F.J.A. Bouman and Otto Hospes (eds.), Financial 
Landscapes Reconstructed: The Fine Art of Mapping Development, pp. 223-248. Reprinted with 
permission of Westview Press. 
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These observations would lead one to expect that the relationship between 
particular agro-ecological conditions and savings strategies, credit transactions 
and redistribution of risk, has been the subject of much research and policy 
debate. However, only a few empirical studies have explored this relationship, 
and it is questionable whether their findings have influenced policy debate at 
all. Of course, this question is only one of many issues which arise in the field 
of rural finance, that is, the complex of decisions of individuals and groups 
regarding insurance, savings and credit; services of financial intermediaries; and 
existing relations and conditions that affect these decisions and services (cf. 
Schmidt and Kropp 1987). 
However, even at a time when the role of agricultural credit as a development 
tool was widely discussed, this 'agrarian question' was hardly addressed (AID 
Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit 1973). Yet the considerable difficulties in 
defining 'the small farmer' would have provided ample reason to do so. Rice 
(1973) mentions that, "no single satisfactory definition is available to distinguish 
small farmers from medium and large farmers in all parts of the world" (p.3). 
However, this conclusion was not followed by a call for a more contextual 
approach of the credit problematic that takes into account location-specific 
ecological and agro-economic environments. Instead, Rice reassures us that: 
The small farmer syndrome is generally recognized — families owning or leasing small, 
often discontinuous plots and trading in a local village market without access to 
supplies and services essential to modern technologies, without expectations of living 
much above the subsistence level, and without political influence. The problems are 
sufficiently similar to justify a common research program and look for transferable 
lessons (Rice 1973: 3). 
Only in a rather casual way he finally adds, "But heterogeneity must be 
recognized: a 20 acre rainfed maize farmer on a Brazilian hillside is a different 
economic animal than a half acre Bengali paddy farmer on the flood plain of 
Bangladesh" (Rice 1973: 3). Yet the notion that specific agro-ecological 
conditions, and agro-economic changes, explain variation of savings and 
borrowing patterns among the heterogeneous farm households, has not been 
worked out. Neither do more recent policy-oriented studies suggest taking a 
close look at agro-ecological conditions and savings and credit behavior. For 
instance, Quinones' APRACA paper (1985), called "An Overview of Agricultural 
Credit Systems in Selected Asian Countries", concentrates on agricultural credit 
policies and institutional systems for agricultural credit. He does make a very 
general distinction between cereal production and other sub-sectors of 
agriculture in Asia, but even this distinction is not part of his further analysis 
of appropriate credit policies. 
This paper addresses the agrarian question of financial landscapes of 
developing countries from both an analytical-methodological and descriptive-
analytical point of view. My first objective is to explain why this agrarian 
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question has been dealt with so poorly in policy discussions on agricultural 
credit and rural financial markets. This poor handling has a wider background 
and is one of the consequences of the institutional and instrumentalist bias of 
participants of these discussions. My argument is that integrated approaches are 
needed that look at the impact of location-specific agro-ecological conditions on 
savings and borrowing behavior in a double sense, that is, strictly speaking and 
in relation to (changing) legal, institutional, social and economic contexts. The 
use of the metaphor of 'financial landscapes' is meant to stimulate a more 
environmental approach to borrowing, saving and lending behavior of 
institutions and individuals. 2 
My second objective is to describe and analyze the impact of agro-ecological 
conditions of rural Ambon, Indonesia, on savings strategies and credit 
transactions. This island is characterized by a particular combination of food 
and cash cropping that has strongly affected social life and economic 
development. Of course, one cannot assume simple and straightforward cause-
effect relations. The agro-ecological environment is just one of the many 
contexts of savings and credit transactions, which in turn are just some of the 
many types of human interaction. Therefore, my case study of rural Ambon 
includes descriptive analyses of how political-institutional, economic and socio-
legal developments have weakened, reinforced, transformed or differentiated 
the impact of agro-ecological conditions on savings and borrowing strategies. 
Out of the Question: 
Agrarian Contexts of Savings and Credit 
In this section I review the policy discussion on small farmer credit and its 
follow-up on the construction of sustainable rural financial markets. Both 
discussions are characterized by more or less similar questions and perspectives, 
such as the price of credit and its impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
supplying financial services to the poor. 
In the early seventies the United States Agency for International Development 
(AID) collected project information on the history of its investments in 
agricultural credit since the early fifties. These project files provided the basis 
for the voluminous Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit (1973). The collection 
of source material focussed on three principal themes: "(1) the role of 
institutional credit in small farmer development, (2) the major institutional 
alternatives for delivering small farmer credit, and (3) certain policy issues, such 
as interest rates, that appear to be critical to the success of these programs" (Rice 
1973: 5). The general idea, with respect to agricultural development, was that 
2. For a broader assessment of the metaphor of financial landscapes: see Bouman and Hospes, 1994: 
3-16. 
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credit is supplied in the first place to be used for the purchase of Wgh-jdelding 
inputs, so that small farmers can overcome their poverty themselves. As a result 
of the strong emphasis on credit as a tool to upgrade the small farmers' sector 
in the "general direction of modernization" (Geertz 1962), little attention was 
paid to the diversity of agro-ecological contexts and its implications for credit 
programs. Even worse, the debate on the role of credit was based on a specific 
type of agro-ecological context. The most important features of this context are: 
the small-farmer population is primarily concerned with the production of food-
cum-cash crops (like e.g. rice). The agricultural cycle is characterized by regular, 
but inadequate and insecure food production, with one annual harvest preceded 
by a difficult period of shortage of food and/or money. This agro-ecological 
context has seldom been questioned in the debate on the role of agricultural 
credit, and has been wrongly assumed to be a kind of constant. For a number 
of reasons, the rate of interest on loans, rather than different and changing 
agrarian contexts, became the main variable in this debate. 
The Price of Credit 
During the AID Spring Review (1973) the growing concern about the need for 
and policy of providing loans at low rates of interest to small farmers was 
strongly expressed. The Review triggered a long series of publications that 
disqualified this cheap credit policy as a 'grant theory' that was neither of help 
to small farmers nor conducive to building sustainable and efficient financial 
intermediaries. The case against cheap credit shows a high internal consistency 
and is easy to summarize: low rates of interest on loans from specialized farm 
credit institutions (SFCIs) create an artificial credit demand among the well-to-
do. Bank managers and credit agents are very much inclined to meet this 
demand and discriminate against small farmers: they face low incomes from 
low rates of interest and ration their loan portfolio because it is much cheaper 
to provide one large loan rather than a hundred small ones. The distribution of 
cheap credit implies great losses to the SFCIs: default is high because cheap 
credit is easily mistaken for a grant. The demise and resurrection of SFCIs 
through new financial injections is the result. The limited possibilities of 
mobilizing rural savings, as a result of low rates of interest on savings, further 
reinforce financial dependency from above. 
Although the case against cheap credit has become the basis of a follow-up 
discussion on the construction of sustainable rural financial markets, the case 
itself is quite narrow and needs to be critically reviewed from both actor- and 
environmental perspectives: 
First, the case seems to be based on the assumption that rural people behave 
more or less according to a universal and uniform (high) price-elasticity of the 
supply and demand of capital. However, the rate of interest is only one of the 
determinants of savings and borrowing behavior: many rural people associate 
banks primarily with complex procedures, hard collateral requirements, many 
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photocopies, limited opening hours, bribery and so on. Therefore, one might 
better speak or calculate - if quantifiable at all - in terms of "service elasticity" 
(cf. Huppi and Feder 1989: 49) and expect the significance of such elasticity to 
be great for rural poor. Even in economic terms, when we take total borrowing 
costs into account, it is hard to consider the rate of interest as the major 
determinant of savings and borrowing behavior. Also, the inverse expectation 
underlying the case against cheap credit, that rates of interest at market levels 
would make banks eager to lend to small farmers, is over-optimistic. It expects 
banks to do the impossible, as McLeod argues elsewhere in this volume (p.87): 
"banks simply are not good at competing for this kind of business." Even worse, 
the differential response to changes in rates of interest and the relative 
importance of those rates versus other financial services has been very poorly 
researched and documented from an actor perspective. 
Second, the case against cheap credit has long directed the attention of 
policymakers and researchers away from the different and changing 
environments of rural financial intermediation (cf. Schmidt and Kropp 1987:49-
55) and how these environments affect people's decisions on monetary and non-
monetary forms of savings, borrowing and repayment. Fortunately, many rural 
producers seem to have developed comprehensive views and practices with 
respect to official credit programs, agricultural price policies and monetary 
instability. Two examples suffice. 
The first example concerns agricultural price policies. Although it is 
recognized that the cheap credit policy is meant to compensate small farmers 
for low agricultural prices, this insight (Adams 1986) has long been ignored by 
national governments and has hardly been further developed in research on 
institutional sustainability of rural financial agencies. Gentil (1991), who briefly 
describes the background of quasi-groups of borrowers and their default 
behavior, suggests that peasants have a more comprehensive view in this 
respect: "In the eyes of the peasants, it is nothing more than a simple form of 
recovery from the outside of a part of the surplus that has been withheld from 
them through taxes, the price system and other forms of levying" (p.4, my 
translation). 
The second example is the disregard of one of the main features of many 
developing economies: high inflation (cf. World Bank 1989). Inflation makes the 
almost axiomatic recommendation for savings mobilization programs 
contestable: high inflation implies a sharp reduction of purchasing power of 
those who save in cash. When inflation soars, conversion of savings in cash into 
savings in kind might result. However, the background and motives for 
conversion of money into valuables, grain, house construction material or cattle 
have been largely ignored, or disqualified as hampering development of the 
financial infrastructure: 
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Even the poorer members of the population, surprising as it may seem, have savings 
which they hold either as real assets or in monetary form. Usually, however, their 
savings are not placed at the disposal of others for investment purposes and, if the 
households have no investment opportunities, remain unused, or are even squandered 
for economically and socially dubious purposes. At the same time, there are 
individuals with investment opportunities and a desire to invest who, however, lack 
the financial means because their own resources are insufficient. The lack of capital for 
investment in the presence of unused capital which could be invested is a sign of an 
underdeveloped financial infrastructure (Schmidt and Kropp 1987: 7). 
For these poorer members of the population, however, savings in kind make 
sense when facing high inflation. Besides, savings in kind serve as a protection 
against family claims or as a bank of last resort in case of emergencies. It is 
misleading to emphasize the need of savings mobilization in cash and to blame 
people who save in kind for the underdevelopment of a financial infrastructure, 
when these same people simply adapt their decisions to insecure economic and 
demanding social environments. 
My conclusion is that the debate on agricultural credit and rural financial 
markets has not only distracted attention away from the significance of agro-
ecological conditions, but has also largely failed to assess the differential impact 
of (changing) political, economic and socio-legal conditions on borrowing and 
lending behavior. Not surprisingly, the discussions on the role of agricultural 
credit and financial institutions as instruments of development have constantly 
fostered the need to 'look for generalizations' during the last two decades (cf. 
Rice 1973; Adams and Fitchett 1992: 355), calling for sound policies or winning 
formulas of financial intermediation that should preferably be appropriate under 
any circumstance. Because of this call for generalizations, descriptive case 
studies that include contextual analyses of financial intermediaries (Platteau and 
Abraham 1987; Bouman 1989; Southwold 1990) are easily neglected. Maybe even 
worse — at least from the point of view of policymaking — is that the search for 
the winning formula erodes abilities and knowledge to develop location-specific 
approaches to location-specific problems. 
The now popular call for 'sustainable' or 'durable' financial markets among 
policymakers and policy-oriented researchers might have similar effects. My 
impression is that sustainability or durability are usually treated as an 'internal' 
affair of a financial institution or market. Such an approach is to close one's eyes 
to changing and location-specific conditions of financial intermediaries, at the 
expense of exploring ways to increase their diversity, flexibility and 
adaptability. 
From Institutional to Integrated Approaches 
To circumvent the inherent shortcomings in the discussion of the price of 
agricultural credit and the need for sustainable rural financial markets, the 
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development of more integrated approaches to savings and credit behavior is 
needed. An integrated approach does not reduce rural actors to interest-led 
supernumeraries, but recognizes different types and combinations of savings, 
borrowing and lending preferences. It combines actor and institutional analysis, 
but leaves open whether and where the demand and supply of different 
financial services meet. One of the main reasons to study savings and credit 
transactions from both actor and institutional perspectives is that "not every 
financial decision of rural households and enterprises leads directly to a 
demand for the services of financial institutions" (Schmidt and Kropp 1987: 25). 
An integrated approach to savings, borrowing and lending behavior includes 
analysis of the background and motives for non-monetary transactions and the 
conversion of cash to kind and vice versa. An integrated approach does not 
analyze savings, borrowing and lending decisions of actors and institutions in 
isolation, but in relation to (changing) legal-institutional, social-economic and 
agro-ecological environments. 
The Significance of the Agro-Ecological 
Complex of Rural Ambon 
Since the sixteenth century the economy of rural Ambon has been 
characterized by a specific combination of subsistence-oriented and 
(world)market-oriented production. Sago and fish are the most important 
subsistence crops; cloves are the main cash crops. This combination has strongly 
affected processes of monetization and commoditization under different 
political-economic systems. Somehow, the early exposure of the Ambonese 
population to merchants and the proceeds of clove sales did not result in a 
smooth and quick incorporation into capitalist world economies. Although 
Ambon island has been part of national and international trade networks for 
centuries, it was not until recently that for many rural people making money 
has become more important than gathering subsistence goods like sago and fish. 
Knaap (1981a) argues that the traditional economy, in particular sago and 
fishing, remained the backbone of economic life in Ambon in spite of the 
introduction of clove cultivation and linking-up with the world economy in the 
sixteenth century. One might say that agro-ecological conditions have retarded 
and filtered processes of monetization and commoditization of rural Ambon and 
many other parts of the Moluccan archipelago. 
To get an insight into the 'internal' mechanisms that have affected these long-
term and uneven processes, I will describe the main features of the agro-
ecological complex of rural Ambon and its general implications for food 
security, housing, organization of labor, intensification and marketing of 
produce. This suggests an outline of the basic patterns of non-monetized 
agrarian relations and forms of cooperation that have regulated the demand and 
supply of labor for traditional house construction, food collection and harvesting 
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of cloves. One further step is to explain the absence of credit (in monetary form) 
as a hunger insurance mechanism, credit as a labor-tying device and — until 
recently — credit as an output-securing device (cf. Platteau and Abraham 1987). 
Admittedly, this descriptive analysis from 'within' results in a somewhat static 
and one-sided explanation of retarded 'processes' of commoditization and 
monetization in rural Ambon. However, it might well complement the more 
historical description of 'external' mechanisms of the same retarded processes 
in the next section. Both sections together form an excellent starting point for 
describing the social dynamics related to the recent erosion of non-monetized 
agrarian relations, and the sudden increase of credit needs and the emergence 
of savings and credit groups, and production-specific credit transactions as 
output-securing devices — all in monetary form. 
Soils and Silviculture 
In contrast to Java, the soils of the Ambon islands have limited fertility, which 
reduces technical options for agricultural development. According to Knaap 
(1981b), Ambonese soil is not appropriate for export-oriented agriculture on a 
large scale. He concludes that silviculture, that does not affect the soil fertility 
in a dramatic way, offers the best opportunities given the environmental 
constraints. Moreover, the planting of trees enables soils to recover from the 
cultivation of tuberous plants that exhaust the soil rapidly. In the ecological 
system of Ambon only clove and nutmeg trees were successfully introduced, 
primarily because they seemed to fit soil conditions. 
The most salient feature of the agro-ecological complex of rural Ambon is the 
forests that cover nearly the whole area. These forests have a great cultural and 
economic significance. In fact, rural Ambon might be conceived as a silviculture 
including different sets of rights on trees and land as main determinants of 
social and economic life (cf. Benda-Beckmann 1990a; Benda-Beckmann and Taale 
1992). The production features of the two main crops, cloves and sago, are a 
second important element of the agro-ecological complex that has far-reaching 
socio-cultural and economic consequences. In this article I concentrate on the 
specific production features of these main crops, together with their contrasting 
roles as cash or subsistence crops. 
Cloves are a perennial crop that takes five years to reach maturity. However, 
this is not the beginning of a rather constant and predictable pattern of annual 
or two-monthly yields, such as with coconut production. On the contrary, the 
production of cloves is irregular and almost unpredictable. Godoy and Bennett 
(1990) note that, "cloves have a production cycle in which bumper harvests 
occur every three to four years, with insignificant yields between bumper 
harvests" (p.63). In addition, large variations in production can occur in a small 
area, even within village boundaries. The clove buds ripen between August and 
December, but again there is much variation in dates. Picked clove buds, 
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however, properly dried, are not perishable and can be stored for years without 
losing much of their aromatic quality. 
The production features of sago trees differ sharply from those of other food 
crops like rice and maize. Sago trees have no annually recurrent growth pattern. 
After 20 to 30 years sago trees have reached maturity. Mature trees are not 
harvested annually but simply cut down to collect the pith of the tree. Properly 
processed sago pith can be kept for many years. Another important feature of 
sago is that mature trees can be harvested all through the year and the 
collection of sago is, therefore, considered part of the gathering economy (Taale 
1988: 5). 
Sago is a subsistence crop involved only in regional barter networks (Taale 
1988) and not a commodity — such as rice or maize — to be sold at regional or 
national market places. In contrast to sago, cloves are a pure cash crop initially 
exclusively produced for the world market. During the last 40 years cloves have 
been produced mainly for the national Indonesian market as an ingredient of 
the very popular kretek cigarettes. The contrasting roles of cloves and sago 
together explain the dualistic or 'janus-faced' economy of rural Ambon. 
Food Security and Housing 
The basic food products of the Moluccan archipelago, sago and fish, guarantee 
a minimal subsistence basis in food and housing. The sago palm in particular 
is a blessing: its pith is used to make porridge and bread. The long nerves of 
the palm and its huge leaves are useful for building walls and a roof that need 
no repair for at least five years. The lack of protein and taste of sago flour are 
compensated for by fish, copra and chillies. The most important feature of sago 
production is the absence of a particular harvest season. As a consequence, there 
is no hunger period nor a shortage of house construction material. This explains 
the absence of bridging loans or types of credit and credit relations used as food 
security mechanisms in the sago economy of Ambon. Also, there is no tradition 
of daily savings among women as there is in rice growing areas in Indonesia 
where women used to save a spoonful of rice each day for the difficult period 
preceding the harvest. 
Organization of Labor 
The processing of sago does not demand a large labor input. In one week a 
group of six persons is able to collect a three months sago supply. The 
construction of sago houses also does not require much labor input. With the 
help of relatives, neighbors, and friends, a house can be built in one day. 
Cooperative building of sago houses (masohi) takes place on demand and lacks 
a distinct rotation pattern and regular intervals. The paradise-like availability 
and durability of sago provides no reason to sustain daily labor groups and to 
develop highly institutionalized forms of cooperation. There are virtually no 
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"risks of falling short of the required labor" (Platteau and Abraham 1987: 473) 
and, consequently, no need to develop mechanisms to ensure "ready availability 
of labor in times of peak operations" (Platteau and Abraham 1987: 473) because 
peak seasons simply do not occur. The harvest of sago palms is not seen as a 
question of organizing people at the right time and the right place because — to 
speak in abstract terms — scarcity of time and places is hardly felt. Strangely 
enough, this also applies to a large extent to traditional low-technology fishing. 
Although the availability of fish is insecure and subject to fluctuation, it is still 
considered large enough over time to meet subsistence requirements. Chauvel 
(1981) speaks of "little efforts that are required to meet daily needs of sago, fish 
and vegetables" (p.33, my translation). As a consequence, there is no need for 
intensification of fishing technology and labor relations, and credit which serves 
to tie labor has not been developed as a necessary device to organize the harvest 
of sago and fish. 
In contrast to sago, cloves cannot be harvested every day of the year. Just 
before the clove trees begin to blossom, the many bundles of cloves have to be 
picked one by one to maintain their aromatic value. Intensive production of 
cloves suggests the existence of more or less sophisticated mechanisms to 
commit labor in peak times and/or highly institutionalized forms of cooperation 
among owners of clove trees. However, production of cloves is subject to large 
and uneven fluctuation. As a result, there is hardly any possibility to organize 
and sustain cooperative labor groups, in which participants help each other on 
a balanced reciprocal basis, to harvest their cloves. In the harvest season the 
labor of relatives, neighbors and friends is mobilized. The collective harvest 
does not so much reproduce specific labor relations, but rather more 
encompassing social relations between these relatives, neighbors and friends. It 
is exactly this family mode of collection that also characterizes the harvest of 
subsistence goods, like sago and fish. 
Intensification and Marketing of Natural Produce 
Sago and clove production do not require capital-intensive inputs pre-
financed by agricultural traders. The most important tools for the sago harvest 
are an axe to cut down the palm and a special hatchet to cut its pith. The 
cultivation of cloves requires only choppers to cut brushwood between the trees 
from time to time. The most important tools for the harvest are ladders and 
baskets. Sago needs no fertilizers because of the large number of sago palms 
and the absence of seasonal blossoming. 
The relative abundance of sago trees or — to put it differently — the absence 
of a particular harvest season, do not necessitate the use of credit to secure its 
marketing. Quite the opposite applies to the harvest of cloves that should take 
place at the right moment in the right place. However, the use of credit to 
secure the output of clove trees is of recent origin. It was simply not necessary 
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during the long colonial period when rulers used force, monopoly and 'slash-
and-burn' policies to control the production of cloves. 
The Uncaptured Paradise Under 
Different Political-Economic Regimes 
In this section the case of rural Ambon is put in a historical perspective to 
yield insights into how political-institutional and economic developments have 
constrained or enlarged money circulation. This historical description serves 
several purposes: it is useful to broadly assess the significance of the agro-
ecological complex under different pohtical-economic rule and economic change. 
Further, it provides a necessary background to reconstruct the impact of money 
circulation on the evolution of forms of savings and credit. This will enable us 
to comprehensively deal with the question of the impact of agro-ecological 
conditions on these forms in the next section. 
The political-economic history of Ambon can be roughly divided into four 
parts: the period preceding the hegemony of the Dutch East Indies Company 
in the Moluccas, the period of Dutch monopolistic policy for clove cultivation 
that began in 1656 and remained in effect till 1863, the late colonial period from 
1864 till 1950, and independent Indonesian rule. 
Small, Short and Insecure 
With regard to the first period, Knaap (1981a) mentions that, 
The Dutch, through the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC), aimed to control the 
whole clove trade and for this purpose made contracts with local authorities to 
stipulate that the entire harvest be sold to the VOC against a price yet to be 
determined. [...] The price that the VOC wished to pay would turn out to be a constant 
source of conflict. The VOC was the first in the spice trade to pay their suppliers in 
cash. However, these suppliers were not prepared to pay for the rice and textile sold 
by the VOC because of its poor quality. The money in the hands of the Ambonese 
attracted Javanese and Makassar merchants and their goods to the Ambon Islands 
(p.27, my translation). 
In spite of the contact of the Moluccan population with traders and their 
money, the traditional economy was not transformed into a cash economy. 
Knaap assumes that the trade with foreign merchants was subject to sharp 
fluctuations because of the irregular production of cloves. He therefore believes 
that the traditional economy and dependence on sago cultivation in most parts 
of the Ambon islands was not affected. Knaap also notes that the supply of rice 
to the islands was relatively insignificant in the seventeenth century. Therefore, 
it is unlikely that the rural population became dependent on imported rice, 
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which might have kick-started monetization, as rice was and is not cultivated 
on rural Ambon. Finally, the largest share of the money ended up in the hands 
of local authorities: "The producer did not enjoy the largest share, because the 
headmen dominated the trade" (Knaap 1981a: 27). Probably, monetization did 
not take place on a large scale among masses of people but was stifled — in an 
abstract sense — in the exchequer of the local head. 
In 1656 the clove monopoly was established by the Dutch VOC. After many 
years of struggle, this Company with strong military powers had definitively 
broken the resistance of Makassar and Portuguese traders and their coalitions 
with local rulers. The VOC forced the population to sell cloves to the Company 
only. In return, the Company offered to buy all cloves at a fixed price. During 
the seventeenth century this price was set at 56 rixdollars per bahar (550 
pounds): five for the local rulers, one for transport and 50 for the producer 
(Knaap 1981b). This meant that the producer should be paid about 45 cents per 
kg of cloves. The farmgate price remained about the same during the whole 
seventeenth and eighteenth century and was, for instance, 48 cents per kg in 
1824 (Knaap 1981b: 18). To get an idea of the exchange value of cloves and rice 
at that time, the following figures are illustrative: in 1824 50 clove trees, together 
yielding 500 kg of cloves, would buy more than four tons of rice that, in turn, 
might feed 20 people for one year. 3 The annual import of rice in Ambon was 
not more than five to seven hundred tons, to feed not more than 3,500 people 
for one year. 
In principle, a lot of money could be earned by owners of clove trees from the 
sale of their produce. However, it is not clear whether the prescribed price of 
50 rixdollars was actually paid to the producers and how much income was 
extracted as a result of unfair weighing practices (cf. Knaap 1981b). Also, the 
clove production policy of the VOC was responsible for a fluctuating and 
uncertain income for producers: the VOC ordered the planting of clove trees 
when prices were high and their burning when prices were low. Because of a 
time lag of about five years between the planting and maturity, this drastic 
policy was an inappropriate response to international price developments. This 
policy only aggravated the uncertainties of irregular clove production, 
reinforced the subsistence orientation of the rural population, and confirmed 
sago instead of rice as the standard staple. The circulation of Dutch guilders, 
cloves and rice was simply too small, too concentrated with a few people, and 
too irregular to replace fishing and the collection of sago as the bases of rural 
life. 
In 1863 the VOC was forced to abolish its clove policy because international 
market prices had sharply decreased, as a result of the expansion of clove areas 
3. The table of Taale (1988:182) with annual prices of rice in the period 1744 to 1863, shows that 100 
kg of rice in Ambon cost 5.77 Dutch guilders in 1824. In 1744 the price was 4.05 guilders, whereas 
in the first half of the eighteenth century the price varied between 3.19 and 10.61 guilders. 
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outside Indonesia. One of the consequences was that the rural population no 
longer faced the insecurity related to the 'slash-and-burn' policy of the VOC but, 
instead, new insecurity as a result of the strong fluctuation of prices of spices. 
Spices could not provide a stable economic basis. Basic life needs were easily 
met in Ambon, and spices were sold only to meet "small money needs" 
(Chauvel 1981: 35). The basis of the economy remained unchanged. "At the end 
of the colonial era, no one had found the key to escaping the pattern of sago, 
fish and coconut" (Chauvel 1981: 35, my translation). 
The change of political leadership as a result of independence did not turn the 
subsistence economy of Ambon upside down. Until 1965 Ambon was rather the 
stage for political turmoil and guerilla war. Ambonese emigrants, who had 
enjoyed higher education in the Netherlands, declared the South Moluccan 
Republic (RMS) shortly after returning to Ambon, causing military intervention 
by the national government. According to Fraassen (1981: 31) the RMS was "an 
economic disaster". The political turmoil did not stimulate the national 
government to invest in peripheral Ambon, while conflicting views among 
Ambonese people about a Moluccan republic were a further impediment for 
regional economic growth. Again, the significance of sago and fish as 
subsistence crops and their profound effects on rural life were not reduced, but 
rather reinforced. 
The Increase in Money Circulation 
During the last 25 years a number of mutually dependent changes occurred 
that are directly related to the circulation of money, financial needs and access 
to financial means. These changes strongly affected the subsistence economy of 
rural Ambon, which for centuries had remained a basically unchanged and 
uncaptured paradise, in spite of early exposure to international commodity 
markets. In the first place, money now circulates faster and among many more 
people than 25 years ago. Possibilities to earn money from farm and off-farm 
activities have greatly improved, due to both an increase in the area of cash 
crops and an expansion of government staff and the number of commercial 
enterprises. Sharply increased prices of cloves have resulted in enormous cash 
flows into village economies. Up to the 1960s (cf. Fraassen 1972) cloves yielded 
prices equal to only a few 10-cent pieces per kg. However, in the seventies the 
price of cloves soared, until 1 kg yielded 30 Dutch guilders in 1976 (Fraassen 
1981), or about 100 times the pre-war price. Secondly, the supply of money to 
villagers by (semi-)government credit institutions has increased enormously. In 
the seventies the People's Bank of Indonesia (BRI) launched a credit program 
for the intensification of clove production (KIC), and in the eighties a program 
(KUPEDES) of special credit facilities for small entrepreneurs and government 
employees. Thirdly, the demand for money has increased, too: for daily 
consumption, housing, school expenditures and the pilgrimage to Mecca. The 
restrictive codes on consumption behavior that, for instance, once allowed only 
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village heads to wear shoes, have faded (Fraassen 1981). Access to schools is no 
longer a privilege of a tiny elite. 
One cannot underestimate the significance of changes in the consumption 
standards of rural Ambon. The use of sago trees for housing and food, in fact, 
maintained the agrarian relations and forms of cooperation of a subsistence 
economy, and did not involve money transactions. Now that rice and concrete 
houses have become the new consumption standards of most Ambonese, the 
key to escaping the pattern of sago, fish and coconut — to speak in Chauvel's 
terms — has been found. It is in the minds of the people themselves who are 
much more concerned with earning and spending money than was possible in 
the colonial era. Face consumption necessitates small daily cash flows. The 
construction of a concrete house requires a huge amount of money, equal to the 
proceeds of a good clove harvest. 
Large-scale and regular money flows in and through rural communities are 
part of monetization and commoditization processes that can hardly be 
compared with the colonial era, when rural money flows were relatively small, 
short and insecure. Because of the central role of sago for traditional food 
supply and housing, the change of consumption preferences has had a dramatic 
impact on rural life. New consumption standards and related money needs have 
implied the erosion of traditional Ambonese patterns of cooperative food 
collection and house construction. Parallel to this break-down of traditional 
agrarian relations, new types of relationships and forms of cooperation between 
villagers have emerged, that include new and different forms of savings and 
credit (cf. Chapters 4, 5 and 6). 
Changing Positions in the Market 
of Money and Trees 
The general processes of monetization and commoditization did not affect all 
rural Ambonese in the same way, but went hand in hand with more social-
economic differentiation among villages and villagers. The position of a village 
in regional trade networks proved an important factor in this respect. At intra-
village level, the different positions of villagers in terms of rights to land and 
trees explained and reinforced the differentiating impact of the increase of 
money circulation. 
One of those places in rural Ambon where money circulation has 
extraordinarily increased and has much affected intra-village relationships is 
Tulehu. In this section, I will concentrate on changing social and economic 
relations between Butonese migrants and their Ambonese hosts, and their credit 
relations in particular. In Tulehu these migrants have become important as 
traders and credit suppliers in the market of cloves and nutmeg. My purpose 
is to analyze how the combination of economic change, different rights on land 
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and trees, and location-specific cropping patterns have affected Ambonese-
Butonese relations, including their credit arrangements. 
A Place Where Money Grows 
The village of Tulehu is situated on the Northeastern coast of Ambon island. 
It has evolved in the last 20 years as a regional transport and trade center, 
linking the city of Ambon and the hinterland of the Central Moluccas. It attracts 
many people who want to earn an income or enroll in classes at one of the 
many schools. Local officials even say that Tulehu now belongs to the urban 
society. This would have been an unrealistic statement 20 years ago when 
Tulehu did not differ much from other villages. Students describe the local 
economy as a cash economy where money has to be paid for school fees, 
breakfast snacks and transportation. Farmers have their own way to describe 
complex processes of commoditization and monetization: biar daun kasbi, bawa 
ke pasar, jadi uang (even casbee leaves turn into money when you bring them to 
the market). Adults complain that young boys now demand payment in cash 
for plucking their coconut trees. 
Nowadays, even those families who are still primarily involved in sago 
cultivation and subsistence fishing, spend at least Rp.3,000 (or US$1.70 in 1989) 
per day to buy rice, some vegetables, a few cigarettes, pay school fees and — if 
necessary — buy fish. Fortunately, Tulehu offers many opportunities to earn 
money: street vending, bus driving, fish trading, boat driving, vegetable selling, 
and loading and unloading busses and boats. The villagers speak of cari uang, 
which literally means searching money, as if the money is already there but 
only has to be found, like the many sago and fruit trees that have only to be 
located and harvested. 
Invisible Hands 
Kennedy (1950: 25) described Tulehu as "the biggest negeri population in 
Ambon" of about four thousand people. According to the local government, 
Tulehu had nearly 12,000 inhabitants in 1990 and is the largest village of 
Ambon. Villagers agree that Tulehu has become densely populated. The actual 
number might even be a few thousand higher because it is rather doubtful that 
all Butonese migrants are included in the official count. 
Upon their arrival on Ambon, Butonese migrants settled at the fringes of the 
villages and became subsistence farmers and fishermen like many of their 
Ambonese hosts. The paradise-like Ambon islands have been a popular 
destination of many Butonese, who have migrated from the rocky and barren 
areas of Southeast Sulawesi since the end of the last century. Today, they form 
about one third of the rural population. Many of the Butonese migrants are now 
entrepreneurs who dominate non-mechanized and mechanized sago processing, 
as well as fishing and the clove trade. 
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Migrants, such as the Butonese, have no local-traditional land use rights: they 
are not allowed to cultivate perennial crops, like cloves and nutmeg, or to build 
concrete houses on land owned by Ambonese clans. According to customary 
law, such actions would imply more or less irreversible ownership rights on the 
land. Therefore, many Butonese typically live in simple wooden houses and 
cultivate annual crops, like tuberous plants and vegetables. 
The particular role of Butonese in clove production and trade on rural Ambon 
is very much dependent on location-specific relationships with the Ambonese. 
A major determinant of the nature and change of these relationships has been 
the enormous increase in the circulation of money. In Tulehu this increase has 
led to disintegration of agrarian relations and of cooperation among the 
Ambonese. Parallel to this development, the Ambonese and Butonese seem to 
have become closer in a two-fold sense. First, the economic position of many 
Butonese has improved vis-a-vis Ambonese in terms of investment capacities, 
bargaining power and ownership rights. The growing importance of Butonese 
tenants and traders as moneylenders has reduced the 'distance' between the 
privileged and powerful Ambonese land owners and the landless, submissive 
Butonese migrants. Butonese and Ambonese have also become closer in a spatial 
sense. Whereas the early settlers were allowed to build small and simple houses 
only in the hills, current generations of Butonese migrants encroach on the 
Ambonese center of the village. Many of them build concrete houses that match 
Ambonese standards. 
The enormous increase of money circulation and money needs on Ambon has 
affected the social-economic life of the Butonese in many ways. First, the typical 
subsistence production of the Butonese has obtained an extra dimension. It is 
no longer a survival strategy only: the Butonese, through frugal living, 
succeeded in saving much money. My cashflow research among Butonese and 
Ambonese indicates that average daily expenses of Butonese are structurally 
lower than those of Ambonese. 
Further, social-economic differentiation has taken place among the Butonese 
themselves. Most of the migrants started on Ambon as subsistence farmers and 
fishermen; now the Butonese have developed other agro-economic activities as 
well. Some, especially those who live close to small rivers and large sago 
forests, have recently specialized in mechanized sago processing. Others have 
built large wooden fishing rafts (bagan) or have become important clove traders. 
Although there still is a large class of survival-oriented farmers and fishermen, 
it would be wrong to consider the Butonese as a homogeneous class of people 
in terms of agro-economic activities. In every kampong the Butonese have 
exploited the particular opportunities of nearby natural resources, roads and 
rivers. 
The role of the Butonese in clove production and marketing has drastically 
altered. Whereas in earlier times they only helped to process cloves {bantu petik) 
in the gardens, they are now the largest category of itinerant buyers of cloves 
and credit suppliers of rural Ambon. According to the chairman of the village 
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cooperative of Tulehu that is officially in charge of the purchase of cloves from 
the farmers since 1980, the need of Ambonese to sell the usufructuary rights of 
their clove trees, arose in the seventies when periods between bumper harvests 
increased. The increase of money needs as a result of new housing and food 
standards only reinforced this need. The Butonese met this demand and quickly 
became popular tenants-cum-creditors. Their activities soon began to yield 
financial benefits. In 1974 the Butonese migrants bought the first pieces of land 
to build concrete houses and so consolidate ownership rights. The Butonese also 
started at that time to fish with the quite expensive wooden rafts (bagan). Both 
the concrete houses and the wooden rafts can be seen as turning points in the 
economic position and activities of the Butonese migrants of Tulehu. 
Finance and Risk-Minimizing Strategies 
of Butonese Clove Traders 
Butonese traders employ various strategies to buy cloves from Ambonese 
owners of clove trees. In the Indonesian language they are called beli cupa, panjar 
uang, beli buah and sexva pohon. 
Beli cupa literally means 'to buy a tin', and refers to the purchase of fresh 
cloves using an old tin of condensed milk as the standard unit. After the 
purchase, the Butonese dry the cloves in the sun: 12 to 14 tins of fresh cloves 
yield about 6 to 7 tins of dried cloves, or 1 kg. As the drying process only takes 
one or two days, the buyers hardly bear the risk of a fall of prices. The profit 
margins are usually small, but keen entrepreneurs can make a handsome profit. 
In general, Butonese women seem to be the primary buyers of cloves. They live 
close to the clove gardens and can simply wait for the Ambonese farmers to 
come down from their gardens to the village. They also move in small groups 
to those gardens where a harvest takes place. There are distinct advantages in 
selling the freshly picked cloves right away to the Butonese women. After a 
hard day's work it is very satisfying to cash your cloves immediately and not 
to worry about the drying. Also, money is easier to hide from greedy relatives 
than some buckets of cloves. 
Panjar uang means 'to advance money'. According to La Macid, who is 
reputed to be the largest Butonese clove trader of Tulehu, panjar uang is similar 
to cengkeh kilo, which means a kilogram of cloves. It refers to a relatively low 
fictive price of cloves, used to calculate the amount of cloves needed to repay 
the advance at a future date. In rather isolated villages on the large island of 
Ceram, small shopkeepers supply advances based on a similar agreement. 
However, it is not money that is supplied in advance, but consumer goods. 
Beli buah means 'to buy the fruit'. It refers to a pre-harvest arrangement in 
which the right to harvest a tree is bought when or after the very first signs of 
the inflorescence of a clove tree are visible. These signs, very small and light-
green leaves, are visible about seven to eight months before the harvest and 
show which trees might produce well. 
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Sewa pohon is also a pre-harvest arrangement, and means 'to lease a tree' 
through buying the usufructuary rights of one or more good seasons. Another 
main difference with belt buah is that sewa pohon implies the purchase of one or 
more good harvest seasons. In fact, the lessee provides a medium- to long-term 
credit to the owner of the clove trees. The arrangement implies that the creditor 
does not have to accept a poor harvest as repayment of the loan, only a good 
season counts. In case of not easily definable harvests, the lessee and owner 
usually agree to share the yield on an equal basis. Both parties might also agree 
to define a poor or moderate harvest as repayment of a Tialf season'. These 
rules and decisions are ways to deal with the risks related to the fluctuating and 
unpredictable production of cloves. 
There are some other interesting differences between sewa pohon and beli buah. 
They all refer to an inverse relation between risk and profit-making in the clove 
trade. According to La Batini, a very knowledgeable and respected Butonese 
farmer, the following rule of thumb applies to beli buah. A tree that will 
probably yield about 10 kg of cloves should be bought for the price of 8 to 9 kg; 
in case of sewa pohon one does not pay more than the price of 3 to 4 kg. Other 
Butonese farmers suggest that the price of a sewa contract should not exceed 
half the expected yield, to cover all the costs (maintenance of the clove garden 
and hire of harvest laborers) and make a small profit. One explained that "we 
have already won" at a price of one million rupiah to lease 50 trees with an 
average yield of 7 kg per tree and a current market price of Rp.7,000 per kg. In 
comparison to beli buah, sewa pohon represents a much larger price and yield 
risk, but also the promise of a larger profit. The risks of sewa pohon, however, 
are differently assessed by Butonese farmers. La Batini, for instance, describes 
sewa pohon as to save in a tree. According to him, one cannot make a loss with 
sewa contracts. It is very striking that La Batini calculates in absolute terms and 
not on a time basis (cf. Shipton 1992). 
Butonese traders seem very aware of the uncertainties and risks in clove 
production. The location-specific and evolving credit or credit-like arrangements 
with the Ambonese tree owners, mirror these uncertainties and risks, making 
them resort to additional adaptations in strategies. The working area of 
Butonese clove traders is not necessarily restricted to their own neighborhood. 
Just before and during the harvest period they can be found at places where 
bumper harvests are expected, and making long term pre-harvest arrangements 
with owners living in another village or even sub-district. Some Butonese 
migrants have become much more reluctant to make long term pre-harvest 
agreements after clove prices started to fall dramatically in the second half of 
the eighties. Others emphasize that such a development only requires an 
adjustment of the price in a new agreement. 
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Lessons and a Look for 'Localization' 
Agro-ecological conditions and economic change in rural Ambon have not 
only affected the historical development of Butonese migrants and their lending 
strategies in particular, but those of other marketing agencies and financial 
intermediaries as well, like village cooperatives and rural banks. In this final 
section I will describe quasi-official adjustments and informal practices of 
bankers and cooperative chairmen, who have realized that the implementation 
of the official standard programs is not possible. In my view, disregard of the 
specific agro-ecological conditions explains much of their problems. National 
planners ignore these specific conditions, and so frustrate the rural bankers and 
cooperative chairmen, who are supposed to finance the clove production and 
buy cloves directly from farmer members. I believe that a closer look at agro-
ecological conditions might produce useful insights to make location- or region-
specific credit programs and so save a lot of money. 
However, it should be emphasized that this brief analysis is not another 
attempt to extract a financial technology that guarantees the success of rural 
banks or cooperatives as official suppliers of financial services. Their success, 
defined in terms of either internal sustainability or delivery of financial services 
to rural poor, depends not only on agro-ecological conditions, but also, for 
instance, on pohtical-administrative and economic environments. I also do not 
want to suggest that official suppliers of financial services are the sole agents 
of change of financial landscapes, and would only need the proper technology 
to bring prosperity to the poor. One should have few expectations of the effect 
and use of 'appropriate' financial technologies in official policies and programs. 
Adams's 20 years of experience with problems in rural financial markets taught 
him that the attempts to establish sustainable agricultural credit programs in the 
past two decades have largely failed "despite the tens of billions of dollars 
committed to hundreds of these efforts" (Adams 1992: 5). He also found that 
these generous financial commitments sharply contrast with the piecemeal use 
of new insights in rural financial markets. 
Lessons 
Since 1980, village cooperatives (KUDs) have the official mandate to buy 
cloves directly from the farmers for a fixed price. The province of Ambon 
belongs to the six provinces officially classified as clove producing areas in 1980. 
During the last decade this number has grown to 14. Several agencies are 
supposed to provide supportive services to the KUDs, such as control of the 
quality and the marketing of cloves at district level, horticultural extension and 
the supply of working capital. The Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) is responsible 
for supplying financial services. Just before the harvest season, the BRI lends the 
so-called Kredit Tata Niaga Cengkeh (TNC) to individual cooperatives, to be 
repaid at the latest three months after the harvest season that ends in January. 
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In the first half of the eighties, cooperatives borrowed enormous amounts of 
money, that is, 90 to 120 million rupiah or US$50,000 to 70,000 per cooperative. 
However, many cooperatives were unable to buy the equivalent in cloves and 
to wield their monopoly powers in the clove market. The first cooperative 
managers, who were only familiar with village shopkeeping — if at all — lacked 
the management capacities to run a million enterprise. Private traders were 
much better equipped and/or better informed. In addition, many traders offered 
credit as part of a pre-harvest arrangement. As a result, cooperatives were 
unable to increase their market share to more than a few percent (cf. Godoy and 
Bennett 1990). Last but not least, there were simply not enough cloves to buy 
in the own village area of the cooperative during the slack seasons between 
bumper harvests. To sum up, the BRI had overestimated the entrepreneurial 
capacities of cooperative officials and had been unaware of, or at least had 
underestimated, risks related to marketing of cloves as a result of its irregular 
production. In addition, embezzlement of excessive credit took place on a large 
scale. The result was that many cooperatives got heavily indebted. 
The directors of the BRI of Ambon have lost faith in the cooperatives, and 
have adjusted their lending strategies accordingly. New credit applications from 
heavily indebted cooperatives are now simply refused. According to cooperative 
officials, more than one third of the 72 registered cooperatives of the Central 
Moluccas belonged to this category in 1990. Next, the volume of the Kredit TNC 
has been reduced to 8 to 12 million rupiah per cooperative. More importantly, 
the BRI has put more faith and finance in urban shopkeepers and wholesalers 
involved in clove marketing. 
The failure of the direct financing of clove farmers by the BRI has led to a 
similar response. The program Kredit Ihtensifikasi Cengkeh (KIC), meant to 
increase clove production in Indonesia, started in Ambon in 1975. The BRI 
supplied credit to smallholders 4 in cash and kind with the help of the 
horticultural department. A farmer borrowed a standard amount of money and 
fertilizer per tree to be repaid after the harvest. However, the use of fertilizer 
did not lead to an increase in production and, more importantly, did not end 
the irregular production. As a result, repayment records were embarrassingly 
poor. The decision in 1980 to make KUDs responsible for the collection of cloves 
and the repayment of loans also did not work out very well and, in the end, the 
program was stopped in 1983. The 'target group' that has proved most attractive 
to the BRI are private traders, that is, professional traders and shopkeepers who 
are typically part of family businesses, or family-like trade networks that 
combine urban and rural areas. 
4. According to Godoy and Bennett (1990) in 1983, "The area under cloves was less than one hectare 
for 96 percent of all Indonesian clove smallholders, and for 95 percent of clove smallholders in 
Maluku. The average number of trees per household was 62 nationally, and 76 for Maluku" (p. 
66). 
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The village cooperatives, that is, the chairmen and their assistants, have also 
been much more inchned to develop sound working relations with private 
traders than with farmer members living in their own village. The opportunities 
for cooperative officials to develop stable working relations with farmers are 
very much restricted, due to the irregular production of cloves and its very 
labor-extensive cultivation outside the harvest season. The working area of 
private traders is not restricted or bound to a village area. As a result, traders 
are much more able to secure the supply of cloves than are cooperatives. 
Wholesalers sell their cloves at the central cooperative (PUSKUD) via the KUDs, 
at times when market prices are much lower than the standard price offered by 
the PUSKUD. Some cooperatives even place their Kredit TNC at the disposal 
of these wholesalers. Other cooperatives imitate the strategies of private traders 
and have started to operate in a larger area, contacting farmers of other villages 
and buying their cloves well in advance. 
To Look for 'Localization' 
A closer look at specific agro-ecological conditions is not to produce 
generalizations that might be useful to policymakers calling for formulas that 
cut across countries. Many generalizations do not take into account location-
specific variations in the pohtical-administrative, socio-legal, economic and agro-
ecological conditions that affect financial decisions of individuals and 
institutions. Therefore, I expect that the 20-years-old litany on the failures of 
governments to establish sustainable credit programs to the benefit of rural 
poor, will be heard for the next 20 years as well. To draw generalizations from 
case studies of financial intermediaries as a way out of these failures, will at 
best lead to substitution of formulas, but will not stimulate a better analysis and 
understanding of location-specific situations and problems. Therefore, I believe 
that what is needed in policymaking and research is not the pursuit of 
generalization but the pursuit of localization'. 
With regard to policymaking, localization' implies that national plans are 
adjusted to regional or local conditions, including agro-ecological conditions. 
'Localization' also suggests decentralization of planning, down to lower levels 
of aclnunistration, such as provincial and district levels. If there is to be an 
interest among researchers in studying agro-ecological conditions, with the 
specific aim of drawing lessons for policymaking on rural financial 
intermediation, this study should include the analysis of processes of 
poHcymaking and its poUtical-administrative constraints. It is quite 
embarrassing to find that policy-oriented research has hardly given any 
attention to these processes of and barriers to poHcymaking. 
From an analytical point of view, I feel that the pursuit of localization' fits 
perfectly in the broad concept of rural finance outlined by Schmidt and Kropp 
(1987). Such a pursuit would question how agro-ecological conditions affect the 
financial decisions of individuals and institutions in a particular area or 
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'locality'. It also raises the question how (changing) economic, political-
administrative and socio-legal conditions affect these decisions, and at the same 
time weaken, reinforce, transform or differentiate the impact of agro-ecological 
conditions. 
The case of Ambon provides its own and specific answers to this two-fold 
agrarian question of financial landscapes: the particular combination of sago and 
clove cultivation has implied labor and loan arrangements that greatly differ 
from similar arrangements in rice producing areas (cf. Ghate 1992: 43-57) and 
also, other silvicultures, like rubber and coconut. Cloves are a pure cash crop 
and have a production cycle in which bumper harvests occur every three to four 
years, with insignificant yields in between. In addition, large variations in 
production can occur in a small area. As a result, highly institutionalized forms 
of cooperation among owners of clove trees, and the use of credit as a labor-
tying device, have not been feasible. The processing of sago does not demand 
a large labor input and provides a minimal basis in terms of food security and 
housing. Furthermore, there is no particular sago harvest season. As a result, 
types of credit and credit relations that either guarantee food security or ensure 
ready availability of labor, have been absent in the sago economy of Ambon. 
The non-mechanized collection of sago as well as the harvest of cloves by 
Ambonese required rather ad-hoc forms of cooperation, reproducing broader 
social relations between relatives, neighbors and friends. 
The cultivation and consumption of sago have structured rural life on Ambon 
for centuries, and have proved very important in times of hardship. Under 
different colonial regimes, the subsistence role of sago, in combination with fish 
and coconut, was not weakened, but rather reinforced. Rigid clove-production 
policies caused relatively small, short and insecure income flows that could not 
provide a stable economic basis. In the post-colonial period, however, the 
subsistence-oriented economy was turned upside down. As a result of the 
dramatic increase in the money circulation and changes of consumption 
standards during the last two decades, the subsistence role of sago weakened. 
The sharp increase of clove prices in the seventies provided a major impulse in 
this connection. Concrete houses and rice became the new consumption 
standards. Consequently, traditional forms of cooperative food collection and 
house construction among Ambonese eroded. Parallel to this development, new 
types of relationships and forms of cooperation emerged, including credit 
relations between Ambonese and Butonese. Butonese migrants quickly 
responded to the increase of money needs of Ambonese and supplied credit in 
exchange for the right to harvest their clove trees. In this connection, these 
trader-cum-moneylenders have done much better than official cooperatives, who 
have failed to gain a large share in the marketing of cloves. This is largely due 
to the diverse financial and risk-minimizing strategies of Butonese, who have 
developed much better insights into location specific agro-ecological conditions 
than have cooperative officials. 
3 
Social Changes in a Place 
Where Money Grows: 
The Village of Tulehu 
Tulehu is located on the north-eastern coast of Ambon island, Central 
Moluccas, Indonesia. Social-economic life in Tulehu, as in many other coastal 
villages of the Central Moluccas, has been affected by its agrarian base, 
characterized by a specific combination of subsistence- and market-oriented 
production. 1 Sago palm trees and fish are the most important subsistence 
crops, guaranteeing minimal subsistence in terms of food and housing. 
Cloves are the most important cash crop with bumper harvests taking place 
once every two or three years. The production patterns of sago and cloves 
sharply differ: sago palm trees can be harvested all through the year whereas 
the production of cloves is irregular and almost unpredictable. This irregular 
production of cloves has been of a special concern to many Ambonese since 
the 1970s, when the price of cloves per kilogramme soared, enabling people 
to finance a journey to Mecca or the construction of a house made of 
concrete. The production pattern of cloves has even a decisive influence on 
the regional economy as a whole explaining why farmers, tenants and 
shopkeepers speak of periods of (temporarily) economic decline following 
periods of economic growth. 
The increase in money circulation as a result of the 'clove boom' in the 
1970s, in combination with increased possibilities to transport people and 
goods in the Central Moluccan archipelago, clearly affected the social-
economic life of villagers and those of Tulehu in particular. Generally 
speaking, these processes implied a complex restructuration of villagers' 
relations and their use of natural resources. New consumption standards and 
1. See chapter 2 for a more comprehensive account. 
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possibilities to earn money evolved. Also, more sodal-economic 
differentiation among villages, taking different positions in regional trade 
and transport networks, occurred. 
Unlike most other coastal villages, Tulehu evolved as a regional centre in 
terms of trade, transport, administration and education. It is now a large and 
densely populated village with 12,000 people. 2 The head of the subdistrict 
Salahutu, who has his office in Tulehu proudly says that Tulehu already 
belongs to the urban zone. Nearly 90 private bus companies connect this 
small town with Ambon City; there are about 120 shops, wholesale as well as 
retail, that stock consumer goods; also, consumers and village shopkeepers 
from the other side of the bay frequently visit the large shopkeepers of 
Tulehu. Large ships, small motorized vessels and speedboats connect Tulehu 
through one of its two major harbors with villages of the islands of Ceram, 
Haruku and Saparua. According to the statistics of the harbor master of 
Tulehu, about 10,000 people arrive by ship at the newest and largest harbor 
of Tulehu every month — equalling the number of passengers that embarks 
at Tulehu port (see Appendices 3.1 and 3.2). More than ten thousand tons of 
copra, cloves, nutmeg, wood and mixed cargo are imported at Tulehu every 
month; similar amounts of cement, rice and mixed cargo are exported from 
Tulehu (ibid) — with two labor groups of 25 men loading and unloading the 
ships. In the old harbor of Tulehu large ships bring tuna fish while the 
smaller ships and speedboats supply small fish on the shores to be sold in 
Tulehu and/or Ambon City. The old harbor and its alleys are also the scene 
where professional agricultural traders buy cloves (see Chapter 8) from 
visiting fanners from the region.3 
The hospital, the 18 public and Islamic schools from primary to university 
level, and a dozen district government services are located at a respectful 
distance from the two harbors but also attract many people from the region 
in search of treatment, education, permits and jobs. 4 Right behind the old 
2. In 1949-1950 Tulehu was recorded as having about 4,000 inhabitants (Kennedy 1950: 25). 
Fraassen (1972: 74) estimated their number at 5,500 in the early 1970s. According to the Office 
of Statistics of the District of the Central Moluccas, the small town numbered 11,775 
inhabitants in 1988 (Kecamatan Salahutu Dalam Angka 1988). 
3. Kennedy (1950) reported of Tulehu that, "There is no market place here and there are no 
travelling traders. There are no large boats that sail to distant ports" (p.101). Shops were few 
and mostly in the hands of ethnic minorities: "The six toko in Tulehu are owned by Chinese, 
one Arab, and one local shopkeeper. There are no other local businesses" (p.208). 
4. In 1949-50 "in the big kampong of Tulehu, there is only one school and it is very poor" 
noted Kennedy (1950: 57), who further concluded that Christian villages were much better off. 
About two decades later Fraassen (1972) observed that access of Ambonese Muslims to 
educational facilities had been improved but was still worse than those of Ambonese 
Christians: "Only recently the urban Islamic movement has gained powers with the strong 
support of forces from outside; large numbers of Ambonese Muslims have just started to 
follow higher education and to compete for middle class positions in the city" (p.260, my 
Social Changes in a Place Where Money Grows 43 
harbor, bus station and vegetable market, the village government and the 
largest mosque of Tulehu are situated. They are both without a head, that is, 
there is no raja (with a local-traditional authority) or village head (since 1987) 
nor an imam (since 1981). Potential candidates and ex-rulers have instead 
devoted much of their time and energy to pursuing an academic career 
elsewhere, trying to give new economic life to the village cooperative, or 
earning a lot of money in Tulehu by renting places to migrant shopkeepers, 
running a movie theater and transporting people in speedboats. 
This chapter provides a picture of the processes of commoditization and 
monetization involving villagers of Tulehu. It is of a photographical nature, 
based on my field research in 1989-1990, describing 'outcomes' and 
'expressions' of dramatic processes of commoditization and monetization that 
have taken place since the 1970s. Different ways for villagers to get money 
and to use money at a time of enormously increased money circulation and 
money needs on rural Ambon, are dealt with. The neutral concept of 'getting 
money' has been chosen to include transactions that can best be described as 
the exchange of kind for cash as well as other ways of getting money such as 
earning money as a civil servant, borrowing money from a bank and making 
money as a petty capitalistic entrepreneur. 'Using money 7 is also a broad 
concept and includes connotations and practices such as spending money for 
daily subsistence, investing money, giving money, lending money and even 
saving money. My purpose is to demonstrate that although in an abstract 
sense one could say that money "is a means of bracketing time and so of 
lifting transactions out of particular milieux of exchange" (Giddens 1990: 24), 
both the getting and using of money in contemporary Ambon have different 
purposes and meanings, varying from securing daily subsistence (can hidup) 
to daily capital accumulation, from providing social security to avoiding the 
money claims of relatives. I would argue that the various ways of getting 
and using money reflect different and changing social relationships, that 
become more or less multiplex, involving people living in the same 
neighborhood but also those living at greater distance from each other. These 
ways include different ways of saving and different sources of credit, that 
likewise, mirror social change. A specific objective of this chapter is to show 
that the meaning of saving, borrowing and lending depends on the type of 
relationship and transaction in which saving, borrowing and/or lending 
takes place. 
The getting and using of money often refers to two sides of one transaction 
or relationship, like those of borrower-lender, employer-employee, caretaker-
ill, migrant-native, husband-wife, trader-farmer, shopkeeper-customer - also 
translation). With regards to wage-earners of Tulehu, Kennedy (1950) remarked that, "Perhaps 
not more than two percent of the population work for wages" (p.208). 
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explaining the actual non-fluent character of money 'circulation'.5 The using 
and getting of money can also refer to the respective input and output of an 
investment object of one particular person, such as the harvest rights of trees, 
a sago processing machine, fish, a fishing boat, a shop or a minibus. And, of 
course, using money simply presupposes getting it. This implies that a 
change of actor perspective or time interval is enough to change from 
describing ways of getting money to ways of using money and vice versa. It 
also means that the starting points for my description of these ways are 
rather arbitrary. Despite this, the chapter has been organized as follows: 
First, I describe the different ways in which Ambonese people living in one 
neighborhood, most of them kin, get and use money. This description not 
only allows me to analyze social and social-spatial impacts of such financial 
ways but also contains starting or reference points for the following sections 
in which I describe social processes and networks involved in various 
domains of social-economic life, such as house construction, higher 
education, civil service, harvest arrangements of crops, fishery, shops and 
shopkeepers, and transport businesses. 
The description of different sources to finance the construction of a new 
house with concrete walls and a roof of zinc, follows after my case studies of 
a group of neighbors and kin: financing of such a house proves to be one of 
their main concerns. Next, I deal with higher education because it is a 
popular investment priority of Ambonese, along with housing, forcing 
parents to make a choice or develop a long-term perspective for their 
investments. Civil servants and their popularity as borrowers from banks 
and shops, are the subject of the following section, as many Ambonese 
youngsters follow higher education and want to become white collar workers 
earning a regular income. This section also provides a wider background to 
one of the case studies of 'Old and New Neighbors' dealt with earlier. The 
same applies to the harvest arrangements for crops, such as nutmeg and 
sago, of which fragments have been included in the case studies on 'Old and 
New Neighbors'. The significance of these arrangements both in the 
practical-financial and social sense, are dealt with in a special section. The 
following sections on fishery, shopkeepers and owners of minibuses include 
more regular ways of getting money, contrasting with the once-only ones 
that characterize the sale of the (right to harvest) trees. 
The final section pulls some lines together — based on the domain-specific 
conclusions drawn in the other sections. To put the recent changes of social 
relationships as described in these sections into a longer term perspective on 
social change, I relate my findings with those of Fraassen (1974) who some 
5. Giddens (1990: 25) citing RS. Sayen "No asset is in action as a medium of exchange except in 
the very moment of being transferred from one ownership to another, in settlement of some 
transaction." 
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25 years ago met the inhabitants of Ambon island and Tulehu, and depicted 
for us their ecological conditions, economic development and cultural 
change. 
Old and New Neighbors 
'Neigborhood' and 'kinship' bring to mind images of social or social-spatial 
proximity, and they often refer to daily interaction and mutual help. But 
neighborhood and kinship do not automatically imply such interaction and 
mutual help. On the contrary, neighbors and kin might increasingly 'live 
together' in separate lifeworlds and do their best to deny the claims and 
rights of other neighbors and kin in need of care, labor, pocket money 
and/or large sums of cash. Some patterns of interaction (or the lack of it) 
might erode and change the meaning of particular neighborhood and kinship 
relations of a person or group of persons, while other patterns for the same 
person or group of persons might simultaneously give a quasi-kin dimension 
to non-relatives making money in a market place (see also pp. 88-96: 
'Fishery, Fish Trade and Migrants'). 
The traditionally collective harvest of sago palm trees and the cooperative 
building of sago palm houses have long confirmed relations of kinship and 
neighborhood among Ambonese villagers of Tulehu. These relationships, 
however, have been strongly affected now that rice consumption and 
concrete houses with zinc roofs have become the new consumption standards 
(see Chapter 2). Many mothers buy snacks early in the morning for breakfast 
and give their children uang jajan to buy sweets during a break at school 
instead of eating a self-made meal at home or taking such a meal to school. 
Also, many more people, both young and old, are busy looking for money in 
and/or outside Tulehu - sometimes leading to new quasi-kin relationships. 
The following cases 6 illustrate the social impact of these wider changes on 
brother-sister, parent-child, husband-wife and neighborhood relationships. 
Pak Achmad Ohorella and Ibu Ja. Pak Achmad Ohorella is 34 years old 
and head of the library of Universitas Pattimura. He travels almost every 
working day to his office in Poka with a minibus and is proud of going there 
wearing his official suit. His wife, Ibu Ja, is a civil servant too, but seldomly 
goes to her office. They have five children, all of them at school in Tulehu, 
except the youngest. 
Pak Achmad earns Rp. 122.750 per month and the monthly salary of Ibu Ja 
is Rp. 92.000 (see Case 6 of Appendix 3.3). In addition, they get 50 and 10 
6. The case studies of this section concern my neighbors when I lived in kampong Bara at the 
time of the field research. For an overview and impression of household budgets and the 
contributions of husbands and wives to the household income, see Appendix 3.3. 
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kuograrrtrnes of rice per month respectively. Every month Pak Achmad gives 
his parents and parents-in-law 10 kilogramme of rice each. Pak Achmad 
raises cattle too. When the respected father of a former raja of Tulehu died, 
he sold one of his cows to the organizers of the funeral ceremony at a low 
price (Rp. 300,000). He had bought the bull-calf two years earlier for Rp. 
50,000. 
Artisans built Achmad's new house. He did not mobilize mutual support 
systems of relatives and neighbors (called masohi) for this purpose because he 
thinks they are not qualified enough to build a house with concrete walls 
and a zinc roof. Also, he is not supposed to reprimand relatives and 
neighbors if they have built something wrong. Besides, organizing a working 
party among family members is not much cheaper than hiring artisans: the 
monetary payments are low but the cost of food, drinks and cigarettes can be 
quite substantial. Finally, a working party of 10 to 20 people is not efficient. 
For these reasons Achmad has chosen to hire two to three artisans who only 
have to be paid their piece-wages, are quite good at their work and do not 
argue so much. He estimates the total cost of house construction materials 
and labor for his new house to be Rp. 5 million. He and his wife saved 
money while living at their old sago palm house from their income as civil 
servants and the sale of agricultural produce and cattle. In addition, they 
have led a rather sober life during the last six years. The house construction 
material was bought in bits and pieces. 
The old house of Pak Achmad was situated right behind the (concrete) 
house of his parents in one of the core Ambonese wards: kampong Baru. 
Further down the alley from the street to the shore, the sago palm houses of 
his older brother and parents-in-law were located. The new house of Pak 
Achmad has been built in kampong Pahlawan. It is a new kampong situated in 
between the rather peripheral Butonese kampong, called Air Panas, and 
kampong Baru. Both Ambonese and Butonese have moved into kampong 
Pahlawan building houses with concrete walls. 
Pak Achmad is the second man on the committee to collect money from 
the local community and mobilize labor for the construction of a mosque in 
kampong Pahlawan. The chairman is the secretary of the village government. 
Inhabitants of the kampong, Ambonese and Butonese, were helping to build 
the mosque. 
Shortly after moving to kampong Pahlawan, Pak Achmad lent Rp. 10,000 to 
one of his Butonese neighbors. The man offered to pay back Rp. 11,000 but 
Achmad accepted Rp. 10,000 only. He has never borrowed money from or 
lent money to one of his colleagues at the library of Universitas Pattimura. 
But he and five of his colleagues, three men. and three women, monthly 
contribute Rp. 25,000 to an arisan, a rotating savings and credit association 
(see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). According to Achmad, their father is approached 
first when he or his brothers or sisters are in need of money. Small amounts 
of money do not have to be paid back. Amounts of more then Rp. 10,000 can 
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be repaid when money becomes available. Every now and then Achmad 
borrows money from his youngest sister Salma who is a petrol vendor in the 
old harbor of Tulehu. 
Ibu Jija is an elder sister of Pak Achmad. She is 41 years old and lives in 
the house of her parents together with these parents and her five children, 
three girls and two boys. She speaks of herself as a widow because her 
husband, called "the father of his children", left her a few years previously to 
work as a driver in Saudi-Arabia. According to rumours he has married 
another woman. 
Although she speaks of herself as a widow, her far-distant husband sends 
her money every now and then. He sent her a cheque of USD 700 in 
February 1990. She immediately bought 40 bags of cement (at a price of Rp. 
6,100 per bag) and hired two carpenters (at a price of Rp. 300,000) from a 
neighboring village, called Tengah-Tengah, to plaster the walls of the future 
house of Oki, her oldest but yet unmarried daughter. The house is situated 
next to the new house of her brother Achmad in kampong Pahlawan. In 1988 
her ex-husband had sent her USD 1,000 to 1,250 every three months. She 
used the money to build the foundation, walls and roof of the new house. 
(Small amounts of these 'remittances' were used by Ibu Jija to buy clothes for 
her children and herself). She also has once borrowed Rp. 200,000 from her 
younger brother Achmad for the construction of the new house. 
The household consumption of rice is 1.5 kilogrammes per day, that is, 45 
kilogrammes per month at a market price of Rp. 27,000. Her children are the 
largest consumers. Ibu Jija and her parents usually eat sago porridge or a 
tuberous plant (ubi kayu or ubi jalar). She does not buy one big lump (tumang) 
of sago flour, which would be enough to feed all household members for one 
month, but "takes so long to consume". Instead, she buys sago porridge 
packed in banana leaf at the vegetable market. A big lump is about Rp. 2,000 
whereas the snack costs Rp. 50. 
Her children, the youngest one in particular, called Bea, can be quite 
demanding with regards to pocket money. Once I found Ibu Jija resting in 
the house of one of her neighbors because she could not stand Bea crying all 
the time: the little girl was angry because she was not given money (uang 
jajari) to buy sweets, snacks and what else besides. 
To meet daily food expenditures, Ibu Jija (Case 4 of Appendix 3.3) often 
smokes tuna fish (asar ikon) at the homestead. It is one of the few income-
generating activities that can be combined with her role as primary caretaker 
of her parents and children. Still, sometimes Ibu Jija is too late buying fish 
when washing clothes has taken too much of her time. Also, when a close 
relative has died, she helps at the funeral ceremony instead of smoking fish. 
She brings home fish to smoke when the supply is not too large, enabling 
her to make a profit. She pays her regular supplier, shortly after selling the 
fish, usually within one day. The mother of Ibu Jija and the mother of one of 
her suppliers are sisters. The net income of Ibu Jija varies between Rp. 3,000-
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7,000 per smoking session, but can be much more when she goes to Ambon 
City to sell her fish. Once, Ibu Jija bought 45 tuna fish at Rp. 600 each in the 
late afternoon and smoked them in four and a half hours. At night she 
travelled to Ambon City to sell the fish. She came back in the early morning, 
paid her supplier, and realized a net profit of Rp. 18,000. 
Every now and then relatives give Ibu Jija the opportunity to make use of 
the ownership or user rights of her Tiusband'. An older brother of her 
husband asked Ibu Jija to guard the durum trees situated on tanah pusuka 
(inherited land) for one night during which the fruits began to fall from the 
high trees, which meant they were ripe.7 The heavy and thorny durian fruit 
smells terrible but is a delicacy in the Moluccas. That night Ibu Jija and four 
of her children collected 50 fruits. In the early morning Butonese women, 
passing their plot with baskets, offered to buy all the durian at Rp. 1,000 for 
six pieces. However, she did not want to sell to them. She wanted to give a 
number of fruits to acquaintances who had asked for them. Others she 
would sell directly in front of her house at Rp. 1,000 for four pieces. 
Her closest kin do not so much provide her with opportunities to make 
money but give her food and assistance to ease her role as the primary 
caretaker of her parents: every month her parents are given 10 kilogrammes 
of rice from their son Achmad. Before the fasting month, Ibu Jija is given a 
lot of rice, onions, wheat, white sugar and canned milk from relatives, and 
from her brothers and sisters in particular. When her father got ill during the 
fasting month in 1989, her oldest sister, Ibu Amina, came to help Ibu Jija in 
the house. Her oldest brother, Pak Nasar, who is a blue-cap soldier of the 
presidential guard, even came to fetch his mother and sick father for a long 
stay on Java. 
The 'ugly duck', Pak Arib, the second oldest of the six brothers and sisters 
of Ibu Jija, lives in a shack behind the house of his parents. His children have 
physical handicaps and look very neglected. His wife cannot handle money 
adequately and is not entrepreneurial. Pak Arib cultivates tuberous plants, 
some vegetables and maintains clove gardens. He is also one of the few 
Ambonese who regularly cut sago trees to sell the produce. Per working day 
he collects 2 to 3 buckets that are worth about Rp. 2,000 each. Pak Arib also 
makes plates of atop to be sold at a price of Rp. 125 to 150 per plate. Every 
now and then he is paid money to make bricks. Although his house is very 
close to the shore, he is not a fisherman. He built the house (of wood and 
sago leaves) himself. He did not mobilize masdhi for this purpose because 
that would have been too costly in his eyes. 
7. The fruit season begins in March-April every year and lasts a few months; not only do durian 
trees fruit in that period but also mangistan, lansa and pacang trees. According to local wisdom, 
a good fruit season means that a good clove season can be expected. 
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Our neighbors nenek Sitti Kotta and Pak Ibrahim Laguama (Case 12 of 
Appendix 3.3) are of the same generation as the parents of Ibu Jija. However, 
there is no one in the house to take care of them. Pak Ibrahim is more than 
80 years old and is nearly deaf. He was in the military but does not enjoy 
pension rights as he left the army without permission in order to take care 
for his sick mother. Now he spends most of his time visiting the big mosque 
in the centre of Tulehu and making atop roof plates at home. Nenek Sitti buys 
groundnuts at the shore and sells them in front of her house untuk hidup, that 
is, to finance daily food requirements. Every now and then she borrows 
some money from heir neighbor across the street. She calls it uang gampang, 
that is, easy money to supplement daily income. She borrows small amounts 
of rice from a nearby shop. 
1 . ; r î , . ' - . - , i . . .. 
Photograph: An old Ambonese man is making roof plates from sago palm leaves to 
be sold for Rp. 125 a piece. 
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Another source to finance food needs are nutmeg trees. The old couple 
pawned 13 nutmeg trees to the Butonese La Batini (see pp. 79-88: 'Cash 
Crops') at a price of Rp. 40,000 for a period of three years from May 1986 
onwards to buy food only (untuk makan saja). Pak Ibrahim is too old to 
harvest the nutmeg trees and their one and only son lives in Kailolo, Haruku 
island. They extended the contract by three years till May 1992 for another 
Rp. 40,000. 
The son of nenek Sitti and Pak Ibrahim is a primary school teacher. From 
his modest income of Rp. 115,000 per month, he also financially supports his 
parents. He pays their electricity bill and gives them household money every 
now and then. In 1990 he borrowed Rp. 1,500,000 from the Bank 
Pembangunan Dearah Maluku (BPDM) to buy a TV, some furniture and to 
financially support his poor parents. Every fasting month nenek Sitti and Pak 
Ibrahim enjoy the presence and help of their son, his wife and three children. 
Ibu Muna and Pak Ucu have four children and are expecting a fifth. Their 
house is one of the funniest of Tulehu and consists of a mixture of sago palm 
stalks (gaba-gaba) and lime walls, with zinc and sago palm leaves (atop) on 
top of them. It cannot better express the very diverse sources of food, income 
and relations used by Ibu Muna and Pak Ucu to make a living (see also Case 
1 of Appendix 3.3). 
For a while Pak Ucu was a sailor on a 500 ton Taiwanese fishing boat. 
Because he thought he was paid too little and missed his wife and children, 
he resigned in 1989, just before the fasting month. He immediately started to 
make atop plates to replace older ones. Pak Ucu and Ibu Muna have to 
continue their search for money during the fasting month in contrast to the 
'old days' when the cost of living was still minimal and everyone could 
indeed rest and fast. The fasting month is a difficult period, particularly as 
their children keep on begging for uang jajan, money to buy sweets. New 
clothes for their children and expensive food should also be bought. 
According to local rules with regard to the religious alms (zakat), Pak Ucu 
and his wife should give 2.25 kilogrammes of rice per household member to 
the poor and needy. However, because they feel they are not able (mampu) to 
do so, they buy only one portion and ceremonially hand it over from the 
eldest to the youngest of their household. The latter then gives the zakat to 
the head of the big mosque of Tulehu who is supposed to distribute all zakat 
among widows, orphans and other needy people. 
Pak Ucu helps to construct houses on a piece rate basis or goes fishing in a 
canoe with fish lines or a net. Relatives and friends provide Pak Ucu with 
the means to fish: a son of an adik (younger brother or sister) of the mother 
of his wife financially helped Pak Ucu to buy a large canoe (koli-koli) and a 
net on the promise of a fifty-fifty share in the harvest. Another canoe used 
by Pak Ucu is owned by a Butonese friend who also 'lent' him four fishing 
lines. A third but smaller canoe next to the house of Pak Ucu belongs to an 
Ambonese friend. Finally, Pak Ucu wanted to buy a small motor boat from a 
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friend in Ambon City at a price of Rp. 750,000 to trade fish and wood 
between Ceram and Ambon island, suggesting that he and Ibu Muna repay 
the debt in monthly instalments of Rp. 50,000. 
Pak Ucu and Ibu Muna mobilize the help of relatives also for other 
purposes. Sometimes Pak Ucu simply sends his children to one of their 
uncles or aunts to ask for money for school or food expenditures. One uncle 
always buys new shoes for the children. Pak Ucu has a younger sister who is 
a primary school teacher, and an older brother who is employed as a driver 
by the Office for Religious Affairs. Ibu Muna has one brother who is a 
subsistence fisherman, and five sisters married respectively to a soldier, the 
captain of a fishing boat, the driver of a truck transporting fuel, and a civil 
servant working at the Office of the Governor. While we did not use or 
discuss the concept at all during our conversation, Pak Ucu concluded after 
some reflection about the help of their friends and relatives: "yes indeed, 
there is still gotong royong here". 8 Ibu Muna added in this connection that her 
mother who is a widow living in Tulehu, owns a house in Ambon City that 
she rents out for Rp. 750,000 per year. Part of this sum she uses to financially 
support her daughter. 
Through the sale of self-made cookies and fish (caught by Pak Ucu) Ibu 
Muna every now and then supplements the household income. When three 
of her chidren were in hospital, she had to use her savings from the petty 
trade of cloves (beli cupa) to pay the bill. When her husband was ill for some 
time, she intensified the sale of self-made cookies. Petty but still important 
activities of Pak Ucu are raising goats and collecting honey. The next 
subsidiary activity of Pak Ucu will be to show up at regular intervals at an 
office somewhere in Ambon City: the kin of his wife have arranged letters 
that will enable him to become a civil servant. Pak Ucu does not care where 
he is stationed but he thinks a regular though minimal income is important. 
Pak Mad and Ibu lea (Case 5 of Appendix 3.3) have nine children: seven 
boys and two girls. The four oldest are married and live elsewhere. The 
married boys live in Tulehu, the girls on other islands. The five youngest 
children still live at home. One of them is married but still lives in his 
parents' house with his wife. 
Somewhere in the kitchen Ibu lea keeps seeds of durian in a basket. 
According to her, these seeds are good enough substitutes for groundnuts if 
you clean, dry and roast them. However, she apologized saying that it was 
the food of the poor. likewise, the juice of belimbing fruits (carambola) is her 
substitute for asam, "which I then do not have to buy in the shop". Every 
8. The common translation of gotong royong is mutual assistance. John Bowen (1986) warns, 
however, that the concept of gotong royong has "entered into local category systems with a 
highly specific meaning (obligatory labor), in striking contrast to the all-encompassing sense 
(mutual assistance) given to it in national discourse" (p.549). 
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now and then Ibu lea sells cigarettes and home-made cookies in front of her 
house. She cannot smoke fish behind the house anymore because her 
(married) daughters now live elsewhere. Her youngest two boys are not of 
much help to her. Jamilu, the married son who still lives in their house, is 
also not very helpful. Sometimes he works as an assistant on a minibus but 
this is not to financially support his mother. Another son of about 14 years 
once used the canoe of one of their neighbors to catch fish, without 
informing the owner. The man got really furious and Pak Mad had to step 
in, explaining that his son was only can hidup, which literally means 'to 
search to live'. 
The married son Hasim, who lives one block further, is a fisherman. Every 
now and then he brings fish to his mother. More importantly, he and his 
wife take care of their grandmother. Hasim is a very active fisherman who 
earned more than Rp. 100,000 in three weeks from the sale of fish. In the 
same period his wife earned Rp. 60,000 as a fish trader. Another child of Ibu 
lea is also helpful: before the fasting month her daughter Awia who married 
a primary school teacher of Kulur, sent her several fruits, coconuts, tuberous 
roots, a bag of rice, wood and some money. Finally, her eldest son, Yakhya, 
sometimes gives his mother a share of his income from the harvesting of 
sago trees. 
The husband of Ibu lea, Pak Mad, primarily makes money from harvesting 
of sago trees. He has worked together with his neighbor Pak Lem, his son 
Yakhya and the Butonese La Pari (who was adopted by an Ambonese when 
he was still a child). It takes (at least) two to do the job: one for cutting the 
tree, one for washing its pith. The owner of the trees gets two fifths of the 
total harvest. The rest is for the contract laborers. When Pak Mad and his 
partner have produced five baskets, they go home to rest from the hard 
work. Most of the buyers of their share come from the neighboring village of 
Tengah-Tengah. One basket costs Rp. 2,000 to Rp. 2,250. 
Pak Mad is a fisherman, too. One cannot continuously cut sago trees as 
this is too exhausting. He was once a crew member of a fishing boat but was 
fired by the owner who accused him of theft. With a canoe, fishing line and 
sometimes a fishing net, he catches small fish not far from the shore. The 
owner of the net is one of his relatives. The front room of the house of Pak 
Mad is completely covered with another, thick and huge net. He bought it 
many years ago with credit from his brothers at a price of Rp. 2 million. On 
very rare occasions Pak Mad used this net, keeping him much indebted to 
his brothers. 
Not only his unmarried children, but his married ones also give him 
concern every now and then — forcing him to suspend his search for money 
and/or to find extra ways to make money. When his daughter on Ceram 
was seriously ill (malaria), he fetched her to rest in his house. We gave her 
our strongest medicines and, fortunately, she gained some of her strengths. 
After a few days at home, Pak Mad brought her to the nearby hospital to 
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recover. A few months previously she also paid a visit to her parents: she 
had delivered a baby but unfortunately her child had died after a week and 
was buried next to the house. 
His son Jamilu wanted a divorce from his wife as he had found another 
lover. Jamilus wife was furious and hurt the new lover very badly. Four lads 
carried the wounded woman to the house of Pak Mad. The local police put 
Jamilu instead of his wife into prison because "we cannot jail a lady". Pak 
Mad asked Jamilu who still lived in the house of his parents to make up his 
mind and proposed to him that he should go to his uncle in Ujang Pandang. 
Pak Mad sold tanah pusuka for Rp. 700,000 to finance the journey and the cost 
of living expenses of his son and new lover in Ujang Pandang. This sale 
greatly upset his younger brother, Pak Mance, as he was not informed at all. 
Photograph: Pak Mad is repairing the sago roof of his house with the help of two of 
his sons and one of their friends. 
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Pak Mance knew everything about his brother, Pak Mad, as he used to live 
directly behind him. However, not long before Pak Mance, his wife Ibu 
Radia (Case 3 of Appendix 3.3) and their five young children, had moved to 
a new concrete and zinc roofed house in kampong Pahlawan, mirroring the 
growing social distance between the two brothers. Pak Mance is very often 
on the road as a driver, reducing his contacts with his brother to a minimum. 
Pak Mance used to a be a bus driver bringing home 'shopping money for 
mother' every working day and a large sum at the end of the month. Now 
he is the chauffeur of the Head of the Sub-district Salahutu, the Carnal, and 
gets Rp. 6,000 to 10,000 per day. 
Ibu Radia is a fish trader earning about Rp. 6,000 per working day. She 
seems to know how to make and save money as the financing of her new 
house illustrates. Ibu Radia estimates the total costs of the nearly finished 
house (excluding sand, cigarettes and food) to be in the region of Rp. 4 
million. For this purpose she has saved money in a tin, kept underground, 
with which she has bought construction materials every now and then. Ibu 
Radia is also a member of an arisan of 11 women who trade in fish or 
vegetables. All members, except one who has two shares, contribute Rp. 
2,000 per day to a fund that is distributed every 5 days. When she draws her 
lot (amounting to Rp. 120,000 every 60 days in 1989), she largely uses it to 
buy house construction materials. From the start of this arisan, she has 
received the fund seven times. 
Ibu Radia is very business-like. This does not mean, however, that kinship 
relations not longer matter. On her way from the shores and old harbor of 
Tulehu to her new house, she often passes her old neighborhood to chat with 
relatives and to discuss business with her niece, Ibu Jija, who is one of her 
regular retailers. 
Conclusions 
The different ways of getting and using money, resulting in differences in 
living conditions, and related processes of social integration and 
désintégration of these neighbors and kin are striking. Whereas Pak Achmad 
has moved to a new house with concrete walls and proudly walks around in 
his official suit, his older brother Pak Arib seems not to have the financial 
means to pay costs involved in the traditionally cooperative construction of a 
sago palm house or to replace his worn out clothes and those of his children. 
Both brothers get money through a combination of activities that, however, 
sharply differ: Pak Arib sells subsistence goods and his labor on an ad-hoc 
basis whereas Pak Achmad raises cattle and is a civil servant earning a 
monthly income and payment in rice. Their wives are even more of a 
contrast: Ibu Ja 'works' as a civil servant and acts penny-wise whereas the 
wife of Pak Arib does not even sell home-made cookies on the street and, 
according to her neighbors, only wastes the little income from her husband. 
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Pak Achmad and his wife seem to have understood how to save and invest 
money — avoiding or rninimizing the money claims of relatives by 
transferring money into house construction materials and by participating in 
a savings club. Pak Arib and his wife are not able to put effective money 
claims on Pak Achmad or his wife, but neither they do want only to live a 
'pure ' subsistence life harvesting and eating fish and sago. They are selling 
sago produce more as a means to survive in an evolving money economy. 
The ways of getting and using money of the brothers Pak Mance and Pak 
Mad also greatly differs. Pak Mance earns a daily income as a driver whereas 
Pak Mad sells subsistence goods and jointly owned land without even 
consulting his brother Mance, symbolizing the growing social distance 
between the two. Ibu Radia, the wife of Pak Mance, earns a daily income as 
a fish trader and accumulates money as a participant of a savings club. Ibu 
lea, the wife of Pak Mad, only occasionally sells cigarettes and cookies in 
front of the house. Pak Mance and Ibu Radia have regularly invested in 
house construction material, like Pak Achmad and Ibu Ja. Both these two 
thriving and team-like couples have moved from an Ambonese core quarter 
to a new Butonese-Ambonese one as if to distance themselves (potentially) 
demanding kin and subsistence-based life-styles. The refusal of Pak Achmad 
to accept the interest payment from a new neighbor, a Butonese, suggests 
that Pak Achmad wants to develop friendly and 'equal' relations with his 
Butonese neighbors. Generally speaking, this refusal reflects the wider 
processes of social-spatial integration taking place among the Butonese and 
Ambonese of Tulehu. 
The ways of getting and using money of the 'movers' seem to differ 
greatly from those of the 'stayers'. Ibu Jija has also invested a lot in house 
construction material, using remittances from her ex-husband to build a 
house for her yet unmarried oldest daughter (see Appendix 3.4 for an 
overview of postal remittances from relatives living elsewhere in Indonesia 
or in the Netherlands). At convenient times she smokes fish behind her 
house. Her ways of getting and using money much reflect her role as the 
caretaker of her old parents and young children. Relatives enable her to fulfil 
this social security function: brothers and sisters, including a 'mover' like Pak 
Achmad, provide food and/or domestic help; relatives of her ex-husband 
give her temporary harvest rights; and her niece, Ibu Radia, who is another 
'mover', provides her with fish to smoke at home. 
Other 'stayers' are the two old people, nenek Sitti and Pak Ibrahim, who do 
not enjoy the presence of relatives nearby. They make a little money 
themselves selling peanuts and atop leaves. They also borrow money from 
neighbors, buy goods on credit from shopkeepers and sell the right to 
harvest their nutmeg trees to a Butonese. Their one and only son, who is a 
civil servant, gives them regular financial support and has given his parents 
a part of his bank loan. 
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A final 'character' in terms of getting money and mobilizing social 
networks is Pak Ucu, another stayer. He is a jack-of-all-trades, fishing at sea, 
laboring as a carpenter, collecting honey for sale, and joining the ranks of 
civil service, without knowing where he will be working. He borrows fishing 
equipment from relatives and Butonese friends living in other quarters. Some 
of his relatives, and those of his wife, provide Pak Ucu and his wife with 
money to pay for food and school expenses, and they have helped Pak Ucu 
to become a civil servant. 
Relations of kinship and neighborhood, of autonomy and dependency, 
have been restructured as a result of the different ways villagers get and use 
money. It would be a mistake to conclude that general processes of 
commoditization and monetization have reduced the significance of social 
relations of kin and of contacts between neighbors to nil. The social and 
socio-spatial impacts of these processes can, however, not be denied. For 
some villagers, getting and using money has implied a strengthening and 
greater dependency on kin and friendship relations at a time of increased 
money circulation and money needs. Other villagers have developed ways of 
getting and using money that result in decreasing dependency on kin-cum-
neighbors. 
I would argue that the ways of getting and using money of the neighbors 
and kin described in this section give a fairly good impression of the variety 
of such ways among Ambonese villagers of Tulehu. Still, there are some 
large omissions — again underlining the endless ways of Tulehu villagers to 
get money. First, a very small minority of well-to-do Ambonese involved in 
transport has not been included (see pp. 103-107: 'Buses and Bosses'). Second, 
the cases lack data on migrants who together make up about one third to a 
half of the village population and are very active in agricultural trade, 
mechanized sago processing, fishery, shopkeeping and transport (see pp. 79-
107). 
Houses with Concrete Walls 
One of the largest expenditures for the villagers of Tulehu is the 
construction of a house with concrete walls and zinc roof. This section 
outlines the different sources and strategies of Ambonese to finance the 
construction of such a house, including some of the more recent and rather 
unique ones in Tulehu, and summarizes their social implications. 
Whereas some 20 to 25 years ago nearly all villagers lived in a house with 
walls of gaba-gaba (sago palm stalks) and a roof of atop (sago palm leaves), 
nowadays many more people live in houses with concrete walls and zinc 
roof as Table 3.1 illustrates. I have arbitrarily selected three blocks of houses 
in three Ambonese quarters: kampong Baru, kampong Tenggah and kampong 
Lama. Every block is bordered by a street or small river. 
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Table 3.1: Features of houses of three blocks in Tulehu 1 
Walls/roof Block I Block II Block III Totals 
C / Z 16 21 26 63 
G /A 20 8 20 48 
C / A 9 9 14 32 
G / Z 1 0 0 1 
totals 46 38 60 144 
1 C means concrete and/or lime-stone walls; Z means zinc roofs; G means 
gaba-gaba walls (sago palm stalks); A means atop roofs (sago palm leaves). 
Source: Own field research. 
The combination of concrete and/or lime-stone walls with a zinc roof is 
the most popular. Most walls are made of concrete or lime-stone. Lime-stone 
walls can be 30 to 40 years old and, more importantly, made of locally 
available material. Walls of gaba-gaba last no more than 5 to 10 years. The 
most popular material for the construction of a roof is still atop. 
For a common house with concrete walls and a roof of zinc, one needs 100 
to 150 bags of cement and 100 to 150 plates of zinc. This implies that total 
costs for cement and zinc (in 1989) varied between Rp. 1,250,000 and Rp. 
1,850,000 (see Table 3.2 and Table 3.3). The total will amount to a few 
millions more when one has paid the artisans and the next phases of the 
Table 3.2: Retail prices of a sheet of zinc in the period 1982-1989 
Year 18 mm 20 mm 22 mm 35 mm 
1982 1,750 1,800 1,900 2,750 
1983 1,750 1,850 1,900 2,900 
1984 2,100 2,200 2,300 3,500 
1985 2,850 3,000 3,150 4,300 
1986 3,200 3,250 3,400 5,000 
1987 4,000 4,200 4,500 6,500 
1988 5,000 5,200 5,650 8,250 
19891 oop 2 6,100 6,750 oop 
1 1989 means November 1989; all other years: January. 
2 'oop' means out of production; the sheet of 22 millimetre was to be 
replaced by a sheet of 25 mm. 
Source: The administration of an ironware store, Jalan AV Patty, Ambon City. 
58 People That Count 








Source: The accounts of ironware store owners of Ambon City, except the 
figure for 1982 that was mentioned by a villager of Tulehu who built his 
house in that year. 
house construction, such as the plastering of the walls, the laying of a 
concrete or tiled floor, ceiling, window-frames and doors. 
Two students assisted me in interviewing 29 owners of houses with 
concrete walls and a roof of zinc. All couples living in these houses were 
Ambonese except in six cases: in five of these cases both husband and wife, 
or one of them, was Butonese. In one case a Sumatran man lived in the 
house with a Chinese women. Only 12 of the 29 houses were finished 
completely. In the other houses the ceiling had still to be constructed (17 
cases), the walls plastered (9 cases), window frames put in place (7 cases), 
floor yet laid (7 cases) and in one case even zinc plates were not put on top 
of the house. Still, the construction of most houses had started more than a 
few years ago: eight owners started in the 1970s, ten in the first half of the 
1980s, ten in the second half (one in 1986, five in 1987, four in 1989) and one 
in 1990. The average number of bags of cement bought per house is about 
137 whereas the average number of zinc plates bought per house is about 
122. None of the 29 owners, except one, had borrowed the house 
construction material from the supplier (in contrast to the Sumatran 
shopkeepers) but had paid in cash. However, the material was bought in 
piecemeal and, consequently, the house was built in phases. 
Finance Strategies 
At least seven sources and strategies can be distinguished among the 
Ambonese to finance the construction of a new house, of which I suspect at 
least three to be more widespread in Tulehu than in other villages: the sale 
of agricultural produce (notably cloves), the sale of the right to harvest clove 
trees for a number of 'good seasons' (see Chapter 2) to Butonese migrants, 
the sale of land, Dutch salaries or social security payments, the hiring of 
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houses to students, daily income from non-agricultural activities, and the 
hiring of houses to Sumatran and Chinese shopkeepers. The latter three 
sources seem typical for Tulehu, as it hosts many migrants, students and 
opportunities to earn a daily income from non-agricultural activities. I will 
now provide some cases of the (combined) use of sources to finance house 
construction and then provide more details about two typical sources in 
Tulehu. 
The following three cases illustrate the different ways of financing house 
construction by people living next to each other. Pak Hassan Tuasalamony 
has been working on his 'new' house on a step-by-step basis since 1977. It is 
the first house after the pillars that welcome you to Tulehu village. The 
ceiling, floor, windows and plastering on the walls are still lacking. Now 
three students from the Kei islands live in the house and each pay a rent of 
Rp. 6,000 per month. To buy construction material he sold the right to 
harvest clove trees to Butonese and, after consultation with his brother, some 
of their land (tanah pusaka). The building of the house has cost him Rp. 3.5 
million. Pak Hasan is now repairing engines of minibuses. 
The house next to Pak Hassan was built in 1980. The owners have eight 
children and are both teachers. The construction of their house cost Rp. 3 
million. In 1979 they had a very good clove harvest: they sold four bags of 
cloves (60 kilogrammes each) at a price of Rp. 11,000 per kilogramme, 
totalling about Rp. 2,640,000. 
The next house belongs to Pak Hi. Kadir. He is 70 years old and has been 
to Mecca seven times. He was born in the neigbouring village of Tengah-
Tengah but did not return to his birth place after his stay of nearly 40 years 
in the Netherlands. He does not want to live too close to his relatives 
because then 'gossip will start'. His house is a small palace, locally called a 
rumah Belanda. It has cost him about Rp. 15 million. In 1980 he came back 
from the Netherlands with Dfl. 13,000 to build his house. He now enjoys two 
pensions (one as a former KNIL-soldier, one as a former employee of a 
Dutch industrial plant) and his wife also has a pension, together these 
amount to Dfl. 2,000 per month. 
Step-By-Step House Construction 
The overall picture from the interviews with the 29 owners is that their 
daily income from non-agricultural activities is either the one and only 
source to finance house construction or is the main source of income next to 
income from the sale of agricultural produce, that is, cloves and in one case, 
nutmeg. This is surely a shift from the time when for many villagers the 
clove harvest provided the single opportunity to buy all the material to 
construct a new house. The following case provides an illustration of an 
increasingly common practice. 
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Pak Ibrahim Ohorella and his wife are living in a new house with concrete 
walls and a zinc roof. They tore down their old sago palm house and 
employed artisans to build a new house on the same site. The house is not 
yet finished: the walls have still to be plastered and there is neither a ceiling 
nor concrete or tiled floor. Step-by-step the house is being constructed. Their 
strategy has been to make and save money for a while, then to buy house 
construction material (to be stored for quite some time in their house), and 
finally to hire artisans to build first the foundation, then the walls, roof or an 
inner part of the house. The wife of Pak Ibrahim smokes fish to be sold at 
the fish market of Ambon City. Pak Ibrahim collects coconut bast for the 
smoking activities of his wife. "We have to work very hard to pay for the 
house" says Pak Ibrahim whereas, according to him, the owner of the 
concrete house right across the street had only to change currencies. It is a 
so-called rumah Belanda, a house of an Ambonese woman living in the 
Netherlands. The couple are also very outspoken about masdhi: "this mutual 
support system only gives you a head-ache. The helpers do not work 
efficiently, make a lot of noise and can hardly stand comments. Besides, the 
expenses for food and cigarettes are quite substantial." 
Hosting Shopkeepers 
Not only Butonese but also Sumatran, Javanese and Chinese migrants play 
an important role in financing the construction or rather the upgrading of 
houses of Ambonese people. These other ethnic minorities are the largest 
shopkeepers of the village (see pp. 96-103) in need of a proper place to live 
and to work. In return for the right to live and work in the house of an 
Ambonese, the guest shopkeeper must repair the house-cum-shop and/or 
put zinc plates on the roof. The owner and shopkeeper agree on a Active 
annual rent and then calculate for how many years the rent has been paid on 
the basis of the price of house construction material used. This contract is 
very common and should be seen as an alternative way for the Ambonese of 
Tulehu to make money and sustain a new standard of living in times of a 
conjunctural decline of the agrarian economy with meagre clove harvests and 
low prices (see also Chapter 2). 
In nearly all cases of renting and upgrading of houses by Sumatran 
entrepreneurs, their Chinese wholesaler is indirectly involved. He gives the 
bags of cement or zinc plates to his clients on credit up to Rp. 1.5 million at a 
zero rate of interest. What he expects, of course, is that the borrower will 
continue buying goods from him. One of these borrowers is Pak Yan. This 
Sumatran man and his wife settled in Tulehu few years ago. They started a 
shop and rented a house for this purpose. Recently, they replaced the atop 
roof with about 100 plates of zinc of Rp. 6,250 each. The annual rent was set 
at Rp. 125,000, which means that the rent has been paid for five years. The 
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Sumatran couple were provided the plates by their Chinese supplier, Pak 
Yau. 
Ambonese also rent their places to meet quite large and more incidental 
money needs. They do not want to get paid at fixed intervals as the 
following cases demonstrate. 
Pak Sum and his wife run a shop in a rented house. The Sumatran 
shopkeepers did not have to upgrade the house when they moved in six 
years ago. Instead when the owner is in need of money, he comes to their 
shop to ask for a rent payment. 
The mother-in-law of Ibrahim Tuasomony is a widow. She was the fifth 
wife of her late husband. Her husband had been to Mecca but she did not 
want to go. She preferred to invest in the house from the sale of cloves, 
coconut and tubers. When the new house, built next to the old one, was 
finished her husband died. Now she rents the place to Sumatran shopkeepers 
and when she is need of money she asks them to pay the rent. Twice a 
Chinese shopkeeper has approached her to buy land but she has refused. She 
considers ownership of the land more imporant than buying, for instance, a 
car from the sale of it. According to her, such a consumer item will break 
down and then she and her children will have nothing left. 
The next cases suggest that renting of a house to migrant shopkeepers 
might not be a strategy to upgrade a house or be a source of income for the 
Ambonese for very long. 
Pak Upik Wir is a Sumatran shopkeeper. His wife runs their first shop 
while Pak Wir is in the second one. They have rented the elderly house 
(rumah pusuka) of Ambonese people for seven years. He does not pay a 
monthly rent but has replaced the atop roof with plates of zinc at a price of 
Rp. 1.5 million. He bought the plates on credit from his wholesaler, the 
Chinese Pak Yau, and repaid the sum along with his regular payments for 
goods. Pak Wir does not want to rent the place forever. His plan is to buy 
land (to build his own house) when the contract is over. 
Ibu Suarso lived 20 years in Ambon City and 7 years now in Tulehu. Ibu 
Suarso and her husband run a popular restaurant. In Tulehu they first rented 
a house paying the owner in kind: they replaced the atop roof with zinc 
plates. Some years ago they bought land and built their own house. 
Conclusions 
The Ambonese of Tulehu have different options to get money to finance 
the construction of a house with concrete walls, that are not limited to the 
sale of agricultural produce or rights to harvest clove trees to Butonese 
traders. Some rent their houses to migrant shopkeepers or to students, others 
undertake non-agricultural activities enabling them to build a new house 
piecemeal. None of them seem to resort to bank loans to buy house 
construction material although investigation among civil servants indicated 
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that some of them do indeed do so (see pp. 69-79: 'Civil Servants Spending 
Future Income'). 
One might distinguish two general and social implications of these ways of 
the Ambonese to finance, construct or upgrade a house. First, in many 
instances, house construction has implied closer contact between Ambonese 
and migrants (traders, shopkeepers, students) by concluding long-term 
contracts with each other. Second, non-agricultural activities (in trade, 
transport and civil service) have dramatically affected mutual relations 
between Ambonese villagers. In contrast to the other sources, these activities 
do not allow for instantaneous financing of a new house. What happens is 
that villagers periodically transfer their daily cash savings or part of their 
monthly income into house construction material. This strategy is not only 
practical but also quite effective in neutralizing money claims of relatives and 
friends. Both this 'illiquidity' strategy, besides the refusal to accept the labor 
input of relatives for the construction of a house with concrete walls, has 
implied the erosion of social bonds among relatives and friends. 
Higher Education and Close Kin 
The investment in the education of one's childeren is given high priority 
by many Ambonese. Although it is difficult to generalize as to a ranking 
order of priorities for the village population — also because expenditure 
patterns differ from investment to investment in terms of volume and 
periodicity — one can say that higher education and housing are popular 
investment priorities that increasingly force parents to make a choice. 
Because new houses are more and more financed and built in stages, 
investment in houses increasingly competes with investment in higher 
education, which also demands quite substantial amounts of money at 
regular intervals. 9 
Tulehu offers much as an educational centre. There are 10 primary schools 
with about 2,700 pupils, 2 junior high schools (SMP), 1 secondary high school 
(SMA with 910 pupils in October 1989, of which 705 were Islamic and 205 
Christian), a school for religious teachers (PGA), an Islamic faculty (IAIN) 
and a general university on Islamic grounds. Also, Ambon City and the 
University of Pattimura are within easy reach. This section reviews the 
participation and investment in higher education of Tulehu youngsters, that 
is, beyond high school: the Islamic faculty and general university of Tulehu 
but, more often, universities outside Tulehu, like those of Ambon City, Ujung 
9. Not surprisingly, the chairman of the village cooperative advised harbor laborers, who 
were the shareholders of one of his cooperative shops, to concentrate on housing when their 
children were still young and then to invest in higher education. 
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Pandang and Jakarta. 1 0 It is based on structured interviews held by two 
students with 46 fathers and mothers, who live in one of the three core 
kampong of Tulehu. The 46 couples together had 288 living children of whom 
were 155 boys and 133 girls; 46 children had died. The average number of 
(living) children per (nuclear) family was 6.3; out of every seven children 
that born, one died. Of the total number of 288 children 68 are now at 
primary or high school and 113 are either enjoying higher education, have 
graduated or stopped their studies, with salient differences according to sex 
as Table 3.4 shows. 
The total number of boys who have ever studied is nearly twice as high as 
the number of girls. Possibly, parents regard investment in the education of 
their sons more important or appropriate than investment in the education of 
their daughters. Knowing that the average number of children per (nuclear) 
family is 6.3 in our sample, we can conclude from Table 3.5 that parents 
prefer (or are able) to invest (more) in the higher education of elder children. 
Table 3.4: Number of children (of 46 fathers and mothers) who have finished, 








girls 9 24 6 39 
boys 23 30 21 74 
totals 32 54 u 2 7 113 
Source: Own field research. 
10. This is not to say that primary and high school are not interesting in financial and 
educational respects. The monthly school fee at the primary level (SD) is Rp. 600 and Rp. 300 
per month for every following child belonging to the same family. Monthly school fees at 
junior high school (SMP) and secondary high school (SMA) are respectively Rp. 1,300 and Rp. 
2,500 per child. In addition, a school uniform is supposed to be worn by every pupil. The 
costs of material vary from Rp. 10,000 (SD) to 25,000 (SMA) per person and a village tailor 
charges Rp. 5,000 per uniform. Finally, many children demand pocket money (Rp. 50 to 100) 
from their parents to buy sweets, ice or snacks. Parents who have four children going to 
school are not unusual in Tulehu. Such parents face daily expenditures of up to Rp. 400, 
monthly ones of up to about Rp. 7,600 and annual costs of close to Rp. 100,000. 
11. The following reasons were given for quiting: boredom resulting in failure (8 cases); lack of 
money (6 cases); marriage (5 cases); got a job (5 cases); others (3 cases). Lack of money is 
neither the only nor the most frequent answer given by the respondents. 
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Table 3.5: Distribution of 113 children who have ever studied according to 
their ranking as oldest child, second oldest, etc. 
Ranking Number of children 
no. 1 25 
no. 2 23 
no. 3 21 
no. 4 18 
no. 5 11 
no. 6 9 
no. 7 4 
no. 8 2 
no. 9 0 
no. 10 0 
total 113 
Source: Own field research. 
Table 3.6: Distribution of students according to price of semester money (in 
Rp.) 
Price of semester money1 Number of students 




equal to or more than 175,000 4 
unknown 9 
total 113 
1 Prices have not been indexed to inflation. 
Source: Own field research. 
Expenses 
The largest single expenditure per half year is the semester money (see 
Table 3.6). A very costly daily expenditure concerns transport. In Table 3.7 an 
overview is given of these costs calculated on a monthly basis. Only a 
limited number of students hired a room at annual prices of up to Rp. 
100,000 (14 cases), between Rp. 100,000 and Rp. 300,000 (5 cases) and more 
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Table 3.7: Distribution of students according to costs of transport (in Rp.) 
Monthly expenditures for transport1 Number of students 




45,000 or more 19 
no details 42 
total 113 
1 Prices have not been indexed to inflation. 
Source: Own field research. 
than Rp. 300,000 (5 cases). With regard to the costs for the practical training 
(Kuliah Kerja Nyata) at the end of the study very often no details were 
provided: only in 35 out of 113 cases of students, could data be given or 
were remembered: in 22 cases the KKN costed between Rp. 50,000 and Rp. 
100,000. Eight students had to pay between Rp. 100,000 and Rp. 150,000 and 
five had to pay more than Rp. 150,000. In a few cases 'other costs' were 
extremely high. A thesis cost Rp. 350,000 to Rp. 500,000. In many cases 'other 
costs' varied between Rp. 25,000 and 50,000 per month but were not 
specified. 
Financial Supporters 
With regard to financing education the following picture emerges: parents 
and older sisters or brothers are the main 'investors' (see Table 3.8). On 
average there were two types of financial supporters involved in financing 
the education of the children of a 'nuclear family'. Table 3.9 provides an 
overview of the sources of income that were mobilized by the supporters to 
finance higher education. One can conclude that on average nearly three 
sources of funding were mobilized. 
The following case demonstrates how much the funding of higher 
education depends on personal and changing circumstances: Gustama 
Ohorella studied economics at Universitas Pattimura from 1981 to 1987. His 
older brother financed his education until Gustama married in 1983. He then 
had to look for money himself and worked occasionally as a conductor on a 
minibus. His wife started selling vegetables at the market place of Tulehu. 
The school fee (uang semester) was about Rp. 12,000 per half year. 
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Table 3.8: Number and features of supporters who finance costs of higher 
education 
Type of financial supporter Number of cases1 
parents 43 
older brother of sister of student 22 
older brother of sister of parent(s) 8 
self 7 
government support 7* 
total 87 
1 
1 One case refers to a 'nuclear family' with one or more (former) students. 
2 The seven cases include two cases in which support (beasisrva) was provided 
on a monthly basis (respectively Rp. 60,000 and 35,000 per month) and five 
cases in which a subsidy was given for the practical work involved (DIP, 
Daftar Isian Proyek). 
Source: Own field research. 
Table 3.9: Sources of funding for those supporting higher education 
Sources of funding by supporters Number of cases1 
Salary from civil service 26 
Sale of agricultural produce 23 
Income as an entrepreneur 2 22 
Income as a wage labourer 2 14 
Sale of right to harvest clove trees 13 
Pension payments 12 
Loan of parent from bank 4 
Sale of fish 2 
Remittances from relatives in the Netherlands 2 
Loan of parent from boss 1 
119 
1 One case refers to the different sources of a father and mother (and in case 
of death of only one of them) for one or more (former) students. 
2 I define here an 'entrepreneur' as a self-employed person running a bus 
company or selling petrol, fish or vegetables whereas a 'wage labourer' is 
defined as someone who is employed by a large entrepreneur, like an owner 
of a bus or a speedboat. 
Source: Own field research. 
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Costs of transportation by bus were Rp. 1,000 per day. The fee for the 
practical period (KKN) at the end of the study was Rp. 75,000. If Gustama 
went to university four days a week, 40 weeks a year in a period of six 
years, his total costs would have been more than Rp. 1 million. Very often, 
however, Gustama saved on his largest expenditure, that is transportation, by 
sitting in the back of a truck or not going at all. 
The profile of those financially supporting higher education is that of a 
very close relative who enjoys a regular income as an active or retired civil 
servant (together 38 cases) and /or as a self-employed person or wage 
labourer (together 36 cases). Another important but less regular and 
predictable source of income of this close relative is the sale of agricultural 
produce or the rights to harvest such produce (together 36 cases), as the 
following transaction shows. In 1985 Pak Serapudin Umarella leased some 
clove trees (for five good seasons at a price of Rp. 200,000) to the Butonese 
La Macid to finance the higher education of a child of his brother. According 
to him, 75 percent of the owners lease their trees for this purpose. 
In 25 out of 46 cases 'mother' makes money from the sale of home-made 
snacks or as a very small shopkeeper. However, this activity is not 
mentioned as a source to finance higher education. Making clothes, trading 
cloth, fish or vegetables are mentioned as the job or activity by which 
mothers make money in 10 cases. In two cases the mother is a primary 
school teacher. In the remaining cases 'mother' was classified as a house 
wife, a farmer or considered jobless. 
In only one case 'mother' is mentioned as the one and only supporter 
because 'father' had died long ago. The standard and most common response 
to who paid the expenses for higher education was 'parents'. It would, 
however, be too easy to conclude that mothers and their economic activities 
do not play a role in the financing of the education of their children. The 
cases of fish trader Ibu Radia (see p. 54 of 'Old and New Neighbors'; pp. 88-
96: Tishery, Fish Trade and Migrants') and the entrepreunerial wife of 
teacher Nahumarury (see pp. 69-79: 'Civil Servants Spending Future Income') 
suggest that those women who are active as petty traders, selling vegetables, 
fish or cloth, in fact, provide additional income enabling the financing of the 
education of their children. Possibly, the common response of 'parents' 
implies that father and mother do not consider the financing of the higher 
education as the financial responsibility of either one of them. Another 
implication might be that financing is being paid from a 'common pof to 
which both father and mother contribute (see also Appendix 3.3, Outline C). 
Although one of the basic motives for investing in the education of one's 
children is probably to enable them to get a well-paid job and/or a job with 
a regular income, also with a view to guaranteeing old age security (see pp. 
45-56: 'Old and New Neighbors'; F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1995), 
higher education is not the one and only stepping stone as the following 
cases demonstrate. 
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Ibu Hi. Seri has eight children. The youngest four go to school: two to 
junior high school (SMP) and two to secondary high school (SMA). Total 
school fees are Rp. 7,000 per month. She buys the school uniforms from the 
head of the school who acts as an intermediary in the sale of uniforms. The 
uniforms are paid in three monthly instalments. None of her four eldest 
children have studied at a university: one is a civil servant at the Office for 
Education and Culture in Tulehu, another is a policeman on Irian Jaya, the 
third and fourth work on Java for respectively Garuda airways and an 
industrial company. 
Mochtar is one of the sons of Pak Ibrahim Pary and his first wife Ibu Sitti 
Lestaluhu. He has been in college at Darussalum University for five years 
but recently had to stop because of lack of money. His older brother who 
studies mathematics at Universitas Pattimura has been given the opportunity 
to continue. Mochtar does not care much: his theory is that it is much easier 
to find a job with an SMA certificate than with a university degree. Within 
two months he will start working at the Office of the Governor in Ambon 
City. His father and brother work at the Sub-district Office for Education and 
Culture. 
Conclusions 
The financing of higher education is a matter for close kin: fathers and 
mothers and /or a brother or sister of the student finance his or her costs of 
education. Non-agricultural sources of income are very important not only to 
actually finance the higher education, but also to enable a student to continue 
studies when the clove harvest is disappointing, clove prices are low (as in 
the second half of the 1980s in Tulehu and many other villages) and/or 
income from the sale of rights to harvest trees has been already spent. 
The common practice of parents to financially support higher education of 
their children, and their sons in particular, suggests that many Ambonese 
want their children to become white-collar workers, in contrast to the much-
heard view among youngsters that private jobs are much better than the civil 
service because of daily income flow. Probably, many parents are much more 
aware of the value of a job that provides a minimal but secure income that 
can always be supplemented with income from 'private' work (see the case 
of Pak Ucu on pp. 50-51). Not only the child or children might profit from 
this secure income (in cash and rice) but the parent(s) in old age as well, 
enjoying financial support and rice gifts from their children (see pp. 45-56: 
'Old and New Neighbors'). A diploma is sometimes not even necessary to 
become a civil servant. Whereas students are dependent on their parents and 
brothers and sisters for the financing of the costs of higher education, they 
have to rely on a wider social network of relatives and acquantainces to get a 
job as a civil servant (with a degree or not). 
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Civil Servants Spending Future Income 
When I asked three young Ambonese men about what they would 
consider the most ideal job, they instantly replied 'private jobs' because "in 
that case you get money every day". However, the old Pak Hi. Nahumarury, 
who owns a few buses and is fully aware of the uncertainties related to his 
private enterprise, swears by the job of a civil servant. And he has sound 
reasons for it. The salary of a civil servant implies a low but regular income 
for a person (and his or her household) as well as a basic food supply. 
A young civil servant (rank 1A) earns about Rp. 25,000 per month. A 
senior servant (rank 4A) earns around Rp. 200,000. The wage of a male civil 
servant is increased five percent when he is married and by two percent for 
every child — with six percent as the maximum. A civil servant not only 
receives a regular wage but also ten kilogrammes of rice per month per 
household member up to a maximum of three children. Tulehu has 376 civil 
servants (see Table 3.10), many of whom live in Tulehu. 
The rather low income of a civil servant implies that a white collar job can 
only be one source of income for an individual or household member who 
wants to make ends meet. Strangely enough, the rather secure income of a 
civil servant implies a dependency on other sources of income and/or other 
household members making money (see above and also: Benda-Beckmann et 
al., 1994). A civil servant might also have to borrow money or buy goods on 
credit to meet specific needs. Banks and shopkeepers are very TielpfuT in 
this connection. They consider civil servants as a reliable category of 
borrowers because of their regular income. 
Village shopkeepers. My survey among 54 shopkeepers of Tulehu indicated 
that 20 of them regularly provided goods on credit for between 2 to 10 civil 
servants. Neither the Ambonese nor the migrant shopkeepers could be said 
to have a particularly strong interest or an outright reservation in providing 
goods on credit to civil servants. Ambonese shopkeepers can hardly resist the 
claims of relatives, irrespective of their occupation. Migrant shopkeepers are 
generally very hesitant to provide consumer goods on credit to Tulehu 
villagers as there are so many shops in Tulehu and nearby Ambon City to 
which borrowers-cum-customers can resort — not repaying their debt. Only 
women who buy a few kilogrammes of rice on credit to make rice snacks, 
are trusted by some migrant shopkeepers. Short-term transactions are 
involved: the next day the debt is repaid and often a new loan is offered. 
(For more data on shopkeepers: see pages 90-97). 
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Table 3.10: Number of civil servants per office located in Tulehu 
Name of government service Number of employees 
Subdistrict Office (kantor Camat) 17 
Village government 5 
Police 59 
Military 4 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia 1 
PLN (electricity) 4 
Harbor Office 5 
Post Office 4 
Dolog (rice procurement) unk 
Agricultural Office 6 
Horticultural Office 4 
Public Hospital 13 
Health Centre (Puskesmas) 5 
Office for Religious Affairs 7 
Office for Education 0?K) 41 
Child care (TK) 1 
Primary School (SD) I 5 
Primary School (SD) II 5 
Primary School (SD) in 9 
Primary School (SD) IV 4 
Primary School (SD) V 8 
Primary School (SD) VI 2 
Primary School (SD) W 3 
Primary School (SD) VHI 3 
Primary School (SD) IX 6 
Islamic Primary School (Madrasa) 2 
Junior High School I (SMP) 22 
SMP (private) 11 
Secondary High School II (SMA) 63 
MTSN 16 
PGA 16 
University of Darussalam (UD) 18 
Islamic Faculty (IAIN) 7 
total 376 
Explanation: MTN: Madrasa Ibtidaiya Negeri (primary school level); MT: Madrasa 
Tsanawiya (junior high school level); PGA: Pendudukan Guru Agama (secondary 
high school level); IAIN: Institut Agama Islam Negeri (faculty level); UD: the 
University of Darussalam is a university on a religious basis (yayasan islam). 
Source: Data collected by field assistant (August 1989) who visited every office. 
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The Village Unit of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia. One of the five target 
groups 1 2 of the general credit program for villages (KUPEDES) of the BRI 
are salaried people (pegarvai yang berhasil tetap). The BRI unit in Tulehu 
village that was opened on August 15, 1987, has provided most of its loans 
to civil servants: in January 1990 more than 90 percent of the borrowers of 
this BRI unit 1 3 were government employees. Loans are to be repaid in 12 
monthly instalments with an interest of 2.0 percent per month. A quarter of 
this interest is paid back and put into an individual savings account if the 
borrower has repaid principal and interest within one year. 
Financial controllers or treasurers of government agencies play a key role 
in the repayment of loans to the BRI unit in Tulehu. The bank agrees with its 
client that the financial controller gets the right to deduct monthly 
repayments from the pay-roll to be paid to the bank. Maybe even more 
important, at least from the point of view of the bank, is that the 
administrative handling of the repayment by the financial controllers saves 
the bank a lot of overhead costs. 
The BRI unit in Tulehu does not only concentrate its lending efforts on 
civil servants working in Tulehu or Salahutu sub-district. In January 1990 the 
bank supplied credit to 822 civil servants working in 67 schools and offices 
on Ceram (Kecamatan Haruku, Saparua, Nusa Laut (Pulau-Pulau Lease) and 
Ambon island (Kecamatan Salahutu) (see Table 3.11). 
Although it is very difficult to assess how bank loans are actually being 
used, the following information from the borrowers and/or their superiors 
provides some clues. What makes the data reliable is that the offices employ 
only a limited number of employees who seem to know about each other's 
home situation and debts — especially those from the BRI that are written 
down for an office as a whole by their financial controller on a monthly 
basis. 
1Z The others are: trade, industry, agriculture and services. If one applies for a loan from the 
BRI for one of these activities, one needs to submit copies of: a trade licence, the licence of 
your office or shop, ownership titles of either movables such as a speedboat or immovables 
such as land or buildings and a personal identification card. You also need to submit a letter 
of recommendation from the village head and a proof of payment of the land and building 
tax. 
13. See chapter 4 for more information about this village unit of the BRI and its savings 
program in particular. 
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Table 3.11: Monthly instalments collected from local government agencies by 
the BRI village unit of Tulehu 1 





MT Tulehu 15 516,701 124,099 640,800 
Guru TK Nusaniwe 2 104,167 25,033 129,200 
SD 12 Ambon 5 187,500 45,000 232,500 
SD Waimahu 5 212,533 50,967 263,500 
SD Seriawan 5 162,533 38,967 201,500 
SD Tihulale 4 112,567 27,033 139,600 
SD 1/2 Hutawa 20 658,201 158,099 816,310 
SD 1 Kamarian 9 291,700 70,000 361,700 
SD 2 Kamarian 5 141,733 33,967 175,700 
SD 1 Oma 12 341,634 82,066 423,700 
SD2 0ma 7 216,666 51,934 268,600 
SD Kailolo 6 191,634 46,066 237,700 
SD 2 Pelau 4 112,433 26,967 139,400 
SD 1 Haruru Sameth 6 179,134 43,066 222,200 
SD Al Khairatory 5 158,266 37,934 196,200 
SD 2 Porto 6 275,000 66,000 341,000 
SD 2 Waimital3 5 183,267 44,033 227,300 
SD Inpres Waimital4 8 237,400 57,000 294,400 
SD Inpres Pakarena 2 104,167 25,033 129,200 
SD Inpr Rumah Tiga 4 245,833 58,967 304,800 
SD Inpr 2 Rohomony 5 145,801 35,099 180,900 
SD Inpres Kairatu 9 354,134 85,066 439,200 
SMP Tulehu 19 416,635 100,165 516,800 
SMP Tulehu 12 301,504 72,299 373,800 
SMP 2 Thamahu 29 766,402 184,198 950,600 
SMP 1 Pelau-Kariu5 23 579,069 139,231 718,300 
SMP 2 Pelau-Kariu6 13 399,936 96,264 496,200 
SMPSaparua 12 412,534 99,066 511,600 
SMP 3 Saparua 23 583,369 140,231 723,600 
SMP Kairatu 23 675,069 162,231 837,300 
SMP 5 Kairatu 7 158,267 38,033 196,300 
SMP Waai 10 233,334 56,066 289,400 
SMPSuli 19 587,500 141,000 728,500 
sub-total 339 
1 Loans were disbursed between June 1989 and January 1990 to serve the fifth target group of 
the KUPEDES, that is, regular wage earners. 
2 The instalment is a cumulative figure of all monthly instalments of those employees of a 
particular government agency (column 1) who are indebted with the BRI village unit of Tulehu. 
3 Loan volume: Rp. 2,200,000. 
4 Loan volume: Rp. 2,500,000. 
5 Loan volume: Rp. 7,350,000. 
6 Loan volume: Rp. 4,800,000. 
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Table 3.11 (continued) 
Local govemment agency Number of Principal Interest Instalment 
debtors payment 
SMPSuli 21 649,167 155,833 805,000 
SMP Oma 23 633,268 152,132 785,400 
SMP Aboru 5 183,332 43,868 227,200 
SMP Titawai 8 266,668 64,132 330.800 
SMP 2 Ihamahu 7 212,467 51,033 263,500 
SMA Pelau Kanu7 14 399,967 96,033 496,000 
SMAKairatu 16 520,800 125,000 645,800 
SMA Tulehu 41 1,493,794 358,536 1,852,330 
ST Saparua 18 687,433 164,967 852,400 
ST Saparua 19 729,100 175,000 904,100 
SKBKairatu 3 116,667 28,033 144,700 
PGA 89 Ambon 9 281,667 67,633 349,300 
Kantor Kec Salahutu 87 2,722,273 654,027 3,376,300 
Kantor P&K Kec. Kairatu 13 325,001 78,099 403,100 
Dep P&K Kec Saparua 16 541,664 130,136 671,800 
P&K Kec. Salahutu 17 456,601 109,699 566,300 
Poires PP. Ambon & Lease 34 1,015,700 243,800 1,259,500 
KODIM 1504 (SARBINI) 7 354,168 85,132 439,300 
Pelabuhan Waipirit 5 183,333 43,967 227,300 
Pelabuhan Hunimua 7 237,467 57,033 294,500 
Kanwil Perhubungan Darat 22 695,767 167,033 862,800 
Puslat Pur/Dodiklat Suli 6 250,001 60,099 310,100 
LLAJR Kodya Ambon 14 391,634 94,066 485,700 
KPLP Pos Pelabuhan 4 170,034 40,866 210,900 
Kantor Syahbandar Tulehu 4 166,668 40,132 206,800 
Balai Pom Ambon 2 108,333 25,967 134,300 
Kantor Pos dan Giro 3 291,666 69,934 361,600 
Tulehu 
RSU Tulehu 11 358,301 86,099 444,400 
Puskesmas Kairatu 4 145,867 35,033 180,900 
Kanwil Pertanian Tg. F 4 unknown unknown unknown 
Rutan Saparua 4 108,333 25,967 134,300 
Disbun Promal 14 425,067 102,033 527,100 
Dinas PU Promal 7 183,201 44,099 227,300 
Kejari CAB Saparua 4 104,200 25,000 129,200 
sub-total 483 
total 822 
7 Loan volume: Rp. 4,800,000. 
8 Only total loan volume was included in the report: Rp. 1,550,000. 
Source: BRI unit of Tulehu, monthly report of instalments of January 1990. 
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The compound of the local police consists of 59 policemen of whom 20 are 
indebted to the BRI (as per November 1989). Some policemen frankly and 
quickly specified the use of the loans as follows: 
- motor-bike 5 persons 
- marriage 5 persons 
- holidays 4 persons 
- working capital 2 persons 
- education 2 persons 
- medicines for parents 2 persons 
According to the Catnat of Sub-district Salahutu, his 17 clerks, who have all 
been indebted to the BRI, used their loans for the following purposes: 
- to supplement their salary 7 persons 
- house construction 4 persons 
- education 3 persons 
- working capital 2 persons 
- marriage 1 person 
Nine out of 13 employees of the hospital of Tulehu were indebted to the BRI 
in December 1989. According to the business manager they used the loans 
for the following purposes: 
- house construction 5 persons 
- medicines 2 persons 
- holidays 1 person 
- baptism 1 person 
According to the head of the Sub-District Office for Education and Culture, 
25 out of the 41 employees of his office were indebted to the BRI (in January 
1990). The most popular uses of the loans were payment of house 
construction materials, education and medicines. 
Toko Modern Baru. Civil servants are also an important target group of 
toko Modern Baru, a family consortium of Chinese shopkeepers based in 
Ambon City. Their 'units' sell luxury consumer goods (motors, scooters, 
fridges, furniture, TVs, radios) as well as house construction material. Goods 
are repaid in 6 (house construction material), 10 (radios, TVs) or 36 monthly 
instalments (motor, scooter). Their huge pile of computer printouts listing all 
debtors, and the codes used to classify offices and their employees, suggest 
that this shop supplies goods on credit on a large scale. A clerk of the 
consortium informed me that toko Modern Baru serves 325 offices and 
schools. 
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However, debtors are simply called buyers and interest rates are hidden as 
instalments do not specify principal and interest. Also, an unspecified 
number of cash loans are provided, to be repaid in 10 monthly instalments 
against an interest rate of 4.5 percent per month. One of the directors of the 
consortium explained that this rather high rate of interest is necessary 
because no hard collateral is included in cash loans to civil servants. 
Information from customers who have bought a motorbike or scooter at toko 
Modern Baru suggests that the monthly repayment for such a vehicle 
includes an interest rate of about 1.5 percent per month. 
Kantor Catnat 
The financial controller of the Office of Sub-district Salahutu is responsible 
for the aclministration of the salaries of the 17 employees of this Office and 
the 291 primary school teachers of the Sub-district (who are all paid from an 
account at the Bank Pembangunan Daerah Maluku). She also plays a key role 
in the repayment of the loans of these civil servants to the BR1 unit of Tulehu 
and toko Modern Baru of Ambon City. Her list of debtors to the BRI credit 
program KUPEDES as per December 1989 consists of 93 persons (see Table 
3.12): 3 civil servants of the Office and 90 primary school teachers of the Sub-
district, that is, 66 women and 27 men. 
Bank criteria prescribe that the monthly instalments may not exceed one 
third of the monthly salary. This implies that more than 50 percent of the 
civil servants of Table 3.12 earn less than Rp. 95.000 per month; more than 90 
percent earn less than Rp. 160,000 per month. 
The primary school teachers of the Sub-district of Salahutu are also 
popular with toko Modern Baru. According to the computer printouts of the 
monthly instalments, 81 primary school teachers from Salahutu Sub-district 
were indebted to this shop as per December 1989 (see Table 3.13). In total 251 
of the 291 primary school teachers (86.25 percent) have at some time or other 
borrowed luxury goods or money from toko Modern Baru. 
The Carnal or adrrunistrative head of the Sub-district Salahutu is another 
key player in the provision of loans to civil servants working in his Sub-
district He has to sign a letter stating that the borrower from the BRI is a 
civil servant. Toko Modern Baru uses another incentive to guarantee 
repayment both the Camat and his financial controller get two percent of the 
total amount repaid each month. They each got a bonus of Rp. 82,580 in 
December 1989. According to the Camat, the bonus was much larger in the 
past amounting Rp. 140,000 per month. The letter of guarantee and the bonus 
payments mean that credit transactions of civil servants reinforce relations of 
mutual dependency between the Camat and his financial controller on the 
one hand and his servants on the other. 
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Table 3.12: Monthly repayment, total repayment and loan volume of debtors 
of the BRI as administered through the Office of the Sub-district Salahutu 
Monthly payment of Total repayment Loan volume Number of 
principal and (in 12 monthly debtors 
interest instalments) 
17,600 211,200 170,400 1 
20,700 248,600 200,004 16 
22,800 273,600 220,800 1 
24,800 279,600 240,000 1 
25,800 309,600 249,600 11 
29,000 348,000 280,800 1 
31,000 372,000 300,000 18 
36,200 434,400 350,040 2 
41,300 495,600 399,996 12 
46,500 558,000 450,000 3 
51,700 620,400 500,004 20 
62,000 744,000 600,000 1 
77,500 930,000 750,000 3 
103,300 1,239,600 999,996 3 
93 
Source: Angsuran Kredit Umum Pedesaan (KUPEDES) Untuk Pegawai 
Berpenghasilan Tetap, The Office of the Sub-district of Salahutu, December 
1989. 
A comparison of the list of the BRI (December 1989) and the list of toko 
Modern Baru (December 1989) shows that quite a few civil servants, mostly 
school teachers, borrow from toko Modern Baru as well as the BRI: the first 
and last name are the same on both lists in 20 cases. 1 4 Maybe they took a 
second loan because they were confronted with a sudden expenditure after 
they had taken the first loan. Possibly, one of their relatives has asked them 
to borrow money on their behalf from the BRI and/or toko Modern Baru. 
Finally, borrowing from two sources might also be a short-term strategy 
directed at fulfilling one debt with another. 
14. This includes the Camat himself. He has borrowed Rp. 1 million from the BRI to. finish the 
construction of his house. He has also borrowed Rp. 200,000 from toko Modern Baru to be 
repaid in 10 instalments of Rp. 29,000 each. This means that the rate of interest charged by 
this shop is three times the rate of interest of the BRI. However, the Camat emphasized that 
toko Modern Baru supplies credit within one day whereas the procedure of the BRI takes 
more than one week. 
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Table 3.13: Monthly instalments, total repayment and loan volume of clients 
of toko Modern Baru as administered through the Office of the Sub-district 
Salahutu 
Monthly Total repayment (in Loan volume4 Number of 
instalment 10 instalments) debtors 
22,000 220,000 150,000 2 
22,500 ^ 5 , 0 0 0 175,000 1 
29,000 290,000 200,000 16 
32,000 320,000 220,000 1 
36,500 365,000 250,000 8 
43,500 435,000 300,000 18 
50,000 500,000 340,000 1 
51,000 510,000 350,000 2 
58,000 580,000 400,000 9 
60,425 2725,100 5 no calc 1 
65,500 655,000 450,000 2 
66,750 3333,750 270,000 1 
72,500 725,000 500,000 11 
87.000 870,000 600,000 6 
108,750 1,087,500 750,000 1 
116,000 1,160,000 800,000 1 
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1 In 6 monthly instalments. 
2 In 12 monthly instalments. 
3 In 5 monthly instalments. 
4 The column on loan volumes has been deducted from the available data on 
total debt and number of instalments; the rate of interest is assumed to be 4.5 
percent per month leading to rounded figures in all but 18 contracts. In 14 of 
these 18 contracts Rp. 2,500 seems to have been added to the total sum to be 
repaid — making this sum a rounded figure. 
5 No calculation: the monthly rate of interest of 4.5 percent cannot be used to 
derive the original loan volume. 
Source: The Office of Sub-district Salahutu, Daftar Tagihan Angsuran Per 
Instansi: S.D. Kec. Salahutu (December 1989) issued by toko Modern Baru, 
Ambon City. 
Whether two loans or one, the monthly and automatic repayment of 
instalments implies that the civil servant and other members of his/her 
household have to economize on daily expenses and/or sustain other money-
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generating activities during the repayment period, as in most cases the loans 
are not used to finance investments that generate income (during the 
repayment period of one year). Borrowing money or goods is to mobilize 
future income that simply cannot be spent twice. The following case (no. 2 of 
Appendix 3.3) provides an example of how civil servants and their 
husbands/wives face the debt period. 
Pak Guru Nahumarury is head of one of the nine primary schools of 
Tulehu. He has nine colleagues of which only one is a man. Three of his 
colleagues borrow at the BRI and three at the shop Modern Baru. 
More than three years ago he bought a scooter at Modern Baru to be 
repaid in 36 monthly instalments of Rp. 63,850 each, totalling Rp. 2,298,600. If 
the scooter was quite cheap and cost about Rp. 1,500,000, then the (flat) rate 
of interest was close to 1.5 percent per month. Currently, he is indebted to 
this shop for a 10-months loan of Rp. 500,000. The monthly instalment is Rp. 
72,500 (including an interest payment of 4,5 percent flat rate per month). 
The school teacher has a monthly wage of Rp. 279,000. Still, this is not 
enough to cover the monthly school expenses of his children (Rp. 90,000), 
food expenses (Rp. 5,000 per day), repayment of debts (Rp. 72,500 per 
month), an insurance premium, and other expenses, such as funeral and 
marriage gifts. Besides, he is being regularly approached by parents of his 
pupils to pay the school fees. 
His wife works at the vegetable market and sells cooked banana every now 
and then. She describes her activities as bantu suami, that is, to help my 
husband. Ibu Guru buys vegetables from Butonese living up the hills and 
bananas from Butonese traders at the shore. She does not want to cultivate 
vegetables herself because then "I do not have a daily income to give uang 
jajan to my children". Pak Guru and his wife have seven children including 
two students. 
A final source of income for Pak Guru and his wife is to rent a house to 
migrants. Pak Guru owns the land on which a Chinese shopkeeper built a 
new shop-cum-house. The investment of the Chinese in the construction of 
the house counts as payment of the rent for 10 years. They also once rented 
some space to a professional agricultural trader for one year. 
Newest Credit Facilities in Tulehu for Civil Servants 
On December 15, 1989, the managers of toko Modern Baru opened a Bank 
Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR) in Tulehu, called 'Modern Express'. The 
management had decided that cash loans would no longer be provided 
through their shops in Ambon City. At the time only civil servants could 
borrow from the bank. Loans were disbursed for 10, 12 or 15 months against 
a flat rate of 3 percent per month. The first 155 borrowers were primary 
school teachers of Ambon City, that is, known customers of their shops. The 
bank manager wanted to compete with the local BRI unit desa by offering 
Social Changes in a Place Where Money Grows 79 
better services. The BPR was open from 9.00 to 13.00 hours and requires the 
signatures of the head of the primary school, financial controller and a high 
official as well as photocopies of an identity card and labor contract, before it 
could process a loan application. 
Conclusions 
The daily presence of more than 350 civil servants in Tulehu, their 
widespread use of bank loans and loans from an urban shopkeeper, and the 
increase of bank credit facilities, can be seen as 'expressions' and 'outcomes' 
of increased money circulation affecting the village life of Tulehu and its 
inhabitants. The group-wise distribution of loans of the village unit of the 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia and an urban-based consortium of Chinese 
shopkeepers to civil servants have intensified relations of dependency 
between the head of the Sub-district Salahutu and his financial controller and 
civil servants of this Sub-district. Credit transactions have reinforced patron-
client dimensions of relations between high- and low-ranking civil servants. 
Another social field where relations of autonomy and dependency have 
changed as a result of credit transactions concerns the household. Civil 
servants indicate that they use bank loans for very different purposes 
including daily expenditures; investment in 'human capital' (medicines, 
education), housing and working capital for petty trade; life-cycle events; 
holidays; and luxury goods. Borrowing from toko Modern Baru serves a 
more restricted range of purposes: the purchase of luxury goods or house 
construction material to be paid in monthly instalments. The general picture, 
however, is that the use of the loans does not generate an income flow 
during the repayment period. An unintended consequence is greater 
dependency on other members of the household and/or income-generating 
activities to 'carry' the burden of debt. 
Cash Crops, Money Needs and Migrants 
A rather unique but very important source of income for the Ambonese is 
the sale of rights to harvest trees to migrants. In this section I concentrate on 
three main types of trees: clove, nutmeg and sago trees (exduding coconut 
trees that are rardy leased). The cases relate to the harvest and pre-harvest 
arrangements of nutmeg and sago trees as the pre-harvest arrangements of 
clove trees have been extensively described in Chapters 2 and 8 and are also 
dealt with in the sections on housing (pp. 56-62) and higher education (pp. 
62-68). 
Because of the specific patterns of production of each type of tree, the type 
and terms of harvest arrangements vary. Clove trees, for instance, yield 
abundantly once once every two or three years, with huge variations from 
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village to village, and from garden to garden. Pre-harvest arrangements span 
one or more seasons and might be qualified as long-term but open-ended 
credit transactions as only a 'good' season counts as repayment (see also 
Chapter 2). Nutmeg trees show a much more regular pattern of production 
than clove trees and can be harvested two or three times per year. Pre-
harvest arrangements span one or more years and can be characterized as 
lease contracts with terms stipulated and regular 'use' of the nutmeg trees. 
Sago trees can be harvested every day of the year. The whole tree is cut 
which means that too heavy an exploitation of sago forests will put their 
subsistence and financial functions under pressure. Those who buy the rights 
to harvest trees, harvest almost immediately after the payment. The trees are 
bought, cut and carried away. A sago harvest arrangement is thus something 
close to a buying transaction. 
Because the (potential) income from the harvest varies according to the 
type of tree, the sale of the harvest rights also has a different 'meaning' for 
the owner in terms of meeting specific money needs. A bumper harvest in a 
garden with 50 clove trees yields millions of rupiah. 1 5 Many Ambonese own 
only a few nutmeg trees. Twenty nutmeg trees will yield no more than a few 
hundred thousand rupiah in three years. A transaction over sago trees 
usually involves not more than five trees at a price of Rp. 5,000 to 25,000 
each. What these sales of (the right to harvest) trees have in common, is the 
once-only payment to the owner, in contrast to the regular income sources 
from the civil service, fish trade and many other non-agricultural activities. 
Cloves are an ingredient of the popular kretek cigarette. As a result, cloves 
are a national commodity. Large interests are at stake in the marketing and 
pricing of this cash crop, involving various public and private agencies (see 
Chapters 2, 4 and 8) with offices up to national level. Ln contrast to cloves, 
the marketing and pricing of nutmeg are not subject to public regulation. The 
trade in nutmeg is of secondary importance compared to that of cloves. 
During the harvest season of cloves, the price of nutmeg usually decreases 
because agricultural traders and shopkeepers prefer to buy cloves. In contrast 
to cloves and nutmeg, sago is a food crop. It is not a part of inter-island 
trade in the Indonesian archipelago. But what the buying transactions of 
these three types of crops in the Central Moluccas have in common is that 
Butonese migrants are substantially and increasingly involved as the primary 
buyers. 
15. According to Godoy and Bennett (1990), the average number of clove trees per 
household is 76 for the Moluccas as a whole. Because their data do not classify these 
households according to different ownership and usufructuray rights (individually owned 
land, jointly inherited land, clan-owned land, village land; sewa pohon, beli buah), it is difficult 
to say who and how many people enjoy or share the income from the harvest 
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Large Money Needs and Clove Trees 
The construction of a house with concrete walls and a zinc roof, a journey 
to Mecca and the education of children at the university level, have been 
popular investments for clove trees owners after a bumper harvest or the sale 
of a number of 'good' seasons to a Butonese migrant. However, the new 
wariness of Butonese to make long-term contracts as a result of decreasing 
clove prices in the second half of the 1980s in combination with increasing 
prices of house construction material, expenses to go to Mecca (Ongkos Naik 
Haji) and university fees, have reduced the possibilities for Ambonese to 
make these large expenditures by exploiting their ownership rights to clove 
trees. In Tulehu other sources of income are increasingly turned to as has 
been shown above (in the sections on higher education and housing, pp. 56-
68). 
Small Money Needs and Nutmeg Trees 
The decrease of clove prices during the second half of the 1980s and the 
lack of bumper harvests in the Tulehu area since 1985, have not made life 
easier. One of the consequences has been that many Ambonese have decided 
to sell the right to harvest nutmeg trees to Butonese migrants. 
One of the largest tenants of nutmeg trees of Tulehu is the Butonese La 
Batini. He is about 35 years old and is married to Wa Hanira. They have 
seven children: the oldest five are at school (primary, junior high and 
secondary high level). They live very close to the shore in a simple wooden 
house in the small Butonese kampong Air Panas. La Batini wants to buy the 
land on which he has built the house. He had already paid Rp. 100,000 (of a 
total amount of Rp. 350,000) to a certain Ambonese but stopped payment 
when another Ambonese also claimed to be the owner of the land. Valuable 
assets in the sober house of La Batini and Wa Hanira are a TV and seven 
huge sacks of nutmeg (see the first photograph in this book). 
La Batini 'inherited' a strong position in the trade of nutmeg from his 
father who had moved to Tulehu when both his shops in Ambon City 
burned down and he was forced to sell his house. With the financial help of 
his former 'colleagues', Chinese shopkeepers of Ambon City, he started to 
buy cashcrops and the rights to harvest nutmeg and clove trees. After he 
died, the Ambonese in need of money came to La Batini instead. 
La Batini and Wa Hanira came to Tulehu in 1979 and now lease 22 gardens 
(dusun). In the period between April 1986 and January 1990 La Batini bought 
the rights to harvest 339 nutmeg trees from 16 different persons for a total of 
57 years at a price of Rp. 1,620,000. In the same period he also paid Rp. 
1,680,000 for the right to harvest seven clove gardens for a number of good 
seasons (sewa-tnenyewa). 
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Photograph: Three Butonese boys have helped their father to harvest nutmeg. The 
nutmeg and mace is drying in the sun. 
Photograph: A Butonese husband, wife and three of their sons are cracking dried 
nutmeg in their kitchen. 
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La Batiru prefers to harvest nutmeg trees with his sons rather than hiring 
other Butonese. His tiny boys climb the likewise tiny nutmeg tree to collect 
the nuts. La Batiru peels the husk from the nut with a knife. His wife takes 
care of the sun-drying in front of their house where the nuts are spread on 
mats. 
Interviews with the clients of La Batini indicated that lack of close male 
relatives to harvest the nutmeg trees and fear that youngsters would steal the 
harvest are strong motives to arrange pre-harvest arrangements with 
Butonese. In terms of money needs the following reasons were mentioned by 
the clients: 
- to buy food for herself and her husband (see pp. 45-56: 'Old and New 
Neighbors'); 
- to pay medicines for the parents; 
- to help a younger sister in 'trouble'; 
- to finance the journey of a child in search of employment; 
- to finance the educational expenses of a son; 
- to buy a few bags of cement; 
- to buy a drivers license. 
A transfer of the right to harvest usually involves 10 to 20 nutmeg trees. 
The price is the outcome of negotiation but depends, of course, on the length 
of the period and number of trees. It varies from Rp. 15,000 (as, for instance, 
in the case of a one-year contract for 13 trees); Rp. 80,000 (two-years contract 
for 10 trees); to Rp. 120,000 (three-year contract for 15 trees). The only case in 
which the price of the contract was much higher, involved not one but four 
nutmeg gardens: Pak Hi. Abu was paid Rp. 375,000 for the rental of 60 trees 
divided over four gardens for a period of two years. He wanted to finance 
the costs of higher education for his one and only son. Finally, it should be 
mentioned that some Ambonese simply extend the contract before the 
existing one has expired. 
Sago: The New Cash Crop 
Sago has been the traditional staple crop in the Moluccas. The cultivation 
of sago and its social-economic significance, however, have gradually 
changed now that rice consumption has become the standard, and Ambonese 
face increased money needs to finance this consumption and many other 
expenses (see Appendix 3.3 for an impression). Sago consumption has 
decreased and withit the practice of Ambonese family and neighbors to 
collectively harvest sago trees once every two or three months. To meet small 
money needs they sell instead the right to harvest these trees to Butonese 
migrants. Sharecropping arrangements (maanu) in which, for instance, a 
harvest of 20 baskets is divided in 12 baskets for the laborer(s) and 8 baskets 
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for the owner(s), are not usually preferred: the Ambonese of Tulehu do not 
want to eat so much sago and, more importantly, want to avoid the claims of 
relatives on the sago. Butonese claim that buying transactions are more 
profitable than sharecropping arrangements. 
My impression is that less and less Ambonese men know how to cut sago 
trees. In Tulehu the skill of sago mtting is now concentrated in the hands of 
a small class of 'professional' sago cutters. Two sub-categories of this class 
can be distinguished: the first consists of Ambonese and Butonese who cut in 
the traditionally non-mechanized way using a special hatchet, called nani. 
There are Ambonese who work in teams, Butonese who work in teams and 
also mixed teams with a Butonese cutting the tree and an Ambonese washing 
the sago pith. The second sub-category consists of about 10 Butonese who 
own a machine to mill the sago pith. There are no Ambonese owning such a 
machine but there are a few who work with them. The following cases 
provide details on the people involved in both types of sago processing as 
well as income flows. 
Pak Achmad Nahumarury is about 60 years old and has undertaken many 
different activities to make money: he used to be a driver and then the 
owner of a bus. He sold his bus when the transport business became too 
risky with profit margins dwindling. He sold the right to harvest a number 
of clove trees for three good seasons at a price of Rp. 1,500,000 to finance 
daily and other expenses when he was ill. He is now one of the few 
Ambonese who regularly cuts sago trees. 
These days he works together with his son Salim and the Butonese La 
Hamid. Either La Hamid or Pak Achmad buys the right to harvest the trees. 
A big one, costing Rp. 25,000 produces 40 baskets of sago worth Rp. 2,500 
per piece. Villagers of Tulehu usually buy one basket whereas those from the 
neigboring village of Tengah-Tengah come with their canoes to buy several 
of them. If Pak Achmad has bought the harvest right of such a tree, then he 
is paid the first Rp. 25,000 of the produce. The remaining Rp. 75,000 is 
divided into three between his son, La Hamid and himself. It takes about one 
week for two to three persons to cut down a big tree, transport it to the place 
to further process it, peel it, cut the pith into pieces and finally to wash the 
pith. The price of a sago tree not only depends on the thickness of a tree but 
also on the distance to the place of work. According to Pak Achmad trees at 
distant places cost no more than Rp. 7,000 a tree whereas the price of trees 
located close to the mouth of small rivers where the water-intensive 
processing takes place, vary from Rp. 5,000 to 25,000. 
Pak Achmad also worked with a sago machine together with La Iskari, the 
Butonese owner of the machine. With a machine, a big sago tree can be fully 
processed in about two to three days, which implies that unmechanized 
processing takes twice as long. The gain of time is not so dramatic because 
only one phase of the production process, the cutting of the pith, takes less 
time. Mechanized processing is not only faster than unmechanized 
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processing but also produces a finer flour. According to Pak Achmad, the 
washing of one bag of such flour is enough to produce one lump of sago 
whereas one needs two bags of traditionally cut sago to produce the same 
amount. 
I11ÏP 
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Photograph: A Butonese man is grinding sago pith with a madiine that rotates an 
iron brush. 
Another Ambonese who has become a professional sago cutter is Pak Hi. 
Mada, who has been to Mecca and enjoys the high social and religious status 
of a Haji. He buys trees from Tulehu villagers at a price of Rp. 7,500 to 
10,000. Most of his customers come from the neighboring village of Tengah-
Tengah: they order baskets of sago from him and come to collect them by 
canoe. According to Pak Hi. Mada, one person can produce two baskets of 
sago per working day - starting early in the morning and ending at noon. 
He explains that if a tree yields 24 baskets of sago at a price of Rp. 2,000 per 
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piece, the net income is about Rp. 40,000. This implies that the monthly 
income from sago cutting is not more than Rp. 100,000 — assuming a person 
cuts sago every day of the month, which of course, is quite unrealistic as 
sago ratting is very tiring. A more realistic figure is an income of Rp. 60,000 
to 70,000 on a monthly basis, which seems to be barely or not enough for an 
Ambonese household consisting of a father, mother and six children to meet 
minimal money needs, as the case of Pak Mad and Ibu lea suggests (see pp. 
45-56: 'Old and New Neighbors'). This implies that members of such a 
household have to undertake other income-generating activities or economize 
on expenses, mtensifying their collection of subsistence goods. 
The Butonese La Hasim cuts sago trees in the unmechanized way together 
with one or more of the following persons of his kampong Air Panas: one of 
his sons, a younger brother, a nephew and a neighbouring boy — all 
Butonese. When they work together, they distribute the weekly income of 
about Rp. 100,000 on a rotating basis. During the clove harvest season La 
Hasim is not cutting sago trees but buying cloves-on-the-trees (beli buah) or 
fresh cloves per tin (beli cupa). 
The sago machines that are used in the village area of Tulehu are located 
on the banks of the small river bordering kampong Hurnala-II. A machine 
costs Rp. 450,000-470,000. A Butonese recently bought one from his income of 
the unmechanized sago aitting, fishing, buying cloves-on-the-trees and as a 
laborer of a Butonese owner of a sago grinding machine. According to one of 
the laborers a machine can produce 100 small baskets of sago in one week at 
a price of Rp. 1,000 (during the clove harvest season) up to 1,800 per lump 
(outside the clove harvest season). The sago is bought in large quantities by 
urban traders who obviously have other investment priorities during the 
clove harvest season. 
The lack of a standard size of a lump of sago, diversity and distribution of 
trees, differences in labor inputs (in terms of time and size of working group) 
and technology used to process sago trees, do not make it easy to draw firm 
conclusions with regards to the productivity and income per labor unit and it 
is difficult to assess the impact of more capital-intensive sago production in 
Tulehu on 'sustainability' of sago forests in both the agro-technical and social 
security sense (Brouwer 1989 and 1995). It is striking, however, that it is the 
Butonese who dominate traditional sago aitting and who invest in new sago 
processing technologies. Another salient feature of sago production in Tulehu 
is the marketing of it, with people from neighboring villages and traders 
from Ambon City buying this new commodity. 
Conclusions 
The sale of the right to harvest nutmeg trees and the sale of sago trees 
points to broader processes of monetization and commoditization and to an 
increased need for daily cash among villagers of Tulehu in particular. 
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Although sago trees are still plentiful and pre-harvest arrangements allowing 
Butonese to harvest nutmeg trees can be extended before the end of a 
contract, the specific lease or buying arrangements are once-only ways of 
getting money for Ambonese. Because Ambonese use income from the sale of 
rights to nutmeg trees to buy food, medicines, cement or to provide financial 
assistance to relatives who need money for eductional purposes or a journey, 
and not for activities or investments that generate an income during the lease 
period, one might expect that many of them will need to resort to such a sale 
of rights again in the near future to meet new money needs or claims. Sale of 
sago trees and the rights to harvest clove trees are, of course, alternative 
ways to get money, but these do not make the sale of rights to harvest 
nutmeg trees unnecessary and vice versa. The sale of sago trees yields little 
cash and the large income from the sale of rights to harvest clove trees is 
mostly used for housing, higher education or a journey to Mecca. It is 
striking that Ambonese do not invest their income from the sale of (the rights 




Photograph: A place in Hurnala-II where Butonese mechanically grind sago, wash it 
and then wrap the produce up in small baskets of sago palm leaves. 
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All this can result in a greater dependency on Butonese migrants as buyers 
and /or a greater need of Ambonese to sustain or intensify other ways of 
getting money, for instance, through non-agricultural activities, such as the 
civil service, trade, shopkeeping and transport. The next three sections 
provide details about ways of getting and using money by the different 
actors involved in fish trade, shopkeeping and/or transport of people. 
Fishery, Fish Trade and Migrants 
In contrast to the transport of consumer goods from Ambon City and 
agricultural produce from neigboring islands via the new harbor of Tulehu 
(Appendices 3.1 and 3.2), no official data exist with regard to the volume of 
fish sold at the local fish market or transported to Ambon City. Neither do 
official documents exist on the different networks and arrangements between 
owners of fishing equipment, fishermen and fish traders, let alone how these 
networks and arrangements change through time. The lack of information 
has something to do with the claim of the Ambonese people of Tulehu to 
share in the 'catch' or in the trade of fish. The harbor master of Tulehu was 
threatened physically when he wanted the speedboats and fishing boats to 
moor in the new harbor (in katnpong Hurnala) instead of the old one (situated 
in katnpong Tengah). He did not seem to realize that his proposal implied the 
breakdown of networks providing many villagers with opportunities to make 
a living from the trade in fish. This section provides some insights into these 
networks. 
Silent Signs of Subsistence Fishing 
The shore line of Tulehu counts is used by 240 small canoes (see Table 
3.14). They suggest that low-technology fishery plays an important role in the 
provision of subsistence goods and little cash for the Ambonese population. 
However, a closer look at the distribution of canoes per kampong 
demonstrates that about half of the total number of canoes belong to 
Butonese. The kampong Air Panas and kampong Hurnala are Butonese; 
kampong Mamokeng is predominantly Butonese and kampong Pahlawan is 
mixed Ambonese-Butonese. In addition, according to a young and active 
Ambonese fisherman about two thirds of the owners of the canoes on the 
shores of the Ambonese kampong Baru, Tengah and Lama are rarely or not at 
all active fishermen. 
Probably, one of the reasons why Ambonese are no longer active as canoe 
fishermen is that fishing conditions seem to have changed: several fishermen 
emphasized that in the past you were back home before 10.00 hours with a 
bucket of fish. Nowadays it takes much longer to catch the same number. 
Critical voices say there is a direct connection between the decline of 
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subsistence fishing among the Ambonese and the emergence of large wooden 
rafts (pagan) owned by Butonese catching small fish at night in the bay of 
Tulehu. 
Table 3.14: Number of canoes in Tulehu per kampong 
Kampong Number of canoes 








Source: Data collected by field assistant (August 1989). 
The Pivotal Role ofBagan and Sero Gantung 
The bagan raft and the sero gantung floating house play a pivotal role in the 
regional fishing economy. In the bay of Tulehu about 20 bagan rafts are active 
whereas close to Ceram and Haruku island many sero gantung are in place. 
Four to six petrol lamps attached to the small house of the bagan or sero 
gantung attract small fish at night. Just before dawn the huge net of the 
bagan is pulled together. In case of the sero gantung the crew of a motorized 
vessel (body) carefully unleashes a huge net around the sero gantung and then 
pulls the bottom rope closing the net. The harvest of small fish not only 
provides an income for many fishermen and traders but is also of great 
importance for tuna fishing that needs these small fish as living bait. 
The fish from the bagan in the bay of Tulehu is transported to kampong 
Mamokeng by speedboat and then by lorry to Ambon City. Only a fraction — 
if anything at all — is sold at the local fish market. Most of the bagan are 
owned by Butonese and many of them have enjoyed financial support from 
Butonese fish traders of Ambon City to build the raft against the promise of 
future delivery of fish. 
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Only a few Ambonese of Tulehu own a bagan. One of them is 35 years old 
and the only child of his parents. To finance the construction of a bagan he 
asked his parents to sell their right to harvest clove trees to Butonese. In 1979 
he built his first raft at a price of Rp. 1 million whereas his current bagan 
dates from 1989 and cost Rp. 7 million. He divides the harvest as follows: 
first, fish for daily consumption is distributed among the crew. Second, a 
tuna fishing boat is supplied with 10 buckets of small fish — if available — at 
a price of Rp. 1,500 each. In addition, the bagan owner gets 10 percent of the 
tuna that will be caught. The rest of the small fish is usually sold at Ambon 
City by a Butonese fish trader who gets 10 percent commission. The 
remaining 90 percent is equally divided among the owner of the bagan and 
the group of 6 Butonese laborers (anak kerja) who watch at night and/or help 
to catch the fish. Harvests are usually very low during the rainy season 
(from April till August) and when the moonlight weakens the light of the 
petrol lamps. Outside these periods the harvest of one night can amount to 
20 to 40 buckets with prices at Ambon City varying from Rp. 1,500 to 18,000 
per bucket depending on the hour of the day, the total supply and the type 
of small fish caught. 
The fish from the sero gantung is transported with the motorized vessel to 
the shore next to the old harbor of Tulehu in kampong Tengah. In contrast to 
the marketing of fish from the bagan, most fish is sold to women fish traders 
Photograph: A bagan moored for repair on the shore of Tulehu. 
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of Tulehu; a local broker intermediates between the fishermen and the fish 
traders about the price per basket. The raft of the sero gantung is relatively 
cheap: about Rp. 400,000. The vessel with the motor and the apparatus to 
hoist the heavy net, however, costs about Rp. 4 to 5 million. Even so, the 
owner of the vessel does not get a larger share from the sale of the fish than 
the owner of the sero gantung. they get one third each, same as the group of 
about 20 crew members. This is because the owner of the sero gantung comes 
from the nearby village whereas the owner of the vessel is from another 
village or Ambon City. 
When a vessel with small fish (with, for instance, ikan momar, that are 
about 20-25 centimeter) arrives at the shores of Tulehu, there is a lot of 
commotion and shouting. Those women who succeed in collecting one of the 
still empty buckets of the brokers, win the right to buy the fish for cash, not 
on a credit basis. The local broker has a delicate task. On the one hand he or 
she wants to set the price at a maximum which means a high commission, on 
the other hand he or she is more or less obliged to offer a low price to the 
fish traders who are fellow villagers and sometimes even very close relatives. 
Two of the three regular brokers are Ambonese men. The third is a woman 
of half Ambonese and half Butonese origin. In a sense, the broker provides a 
very special pricing mechanism balancing different social and economic 
relations. 
The idea of distributing fish among a large group of family and neighbors 
seems not be very popular among small but entrepreneurial fish traders as 
the following event demonstrates. Once I went with one of my neighbours, 
the young man Ishaka, to participate in the fishing at a sero gantung close to 
Haruku island. The crew strongly believed that my presence brought them 
luck as that night they caught more than 50 buckets of small fish. The next 
morning the price of one bucket was set at Rp. 13,000 at the shore of Tulehu. 
I was given a small bag of fish and distributed them among my neighbours 
after my return to Tulehu. However, the wife of Ishaka, a fish trader, did not 
appreciate this at all. In the first place she was angry at her husband because 
I was given too little fish as the bringer of good luck. Second, I had made a 
mistake as well: I should not have distributed the fish among my neighbours 
but rather to her to sell in Ambon City. The income from the sale could then 
be used as uang jajan (money to buy sweets) for my little son. 
Tuna Fishery and Trade 
Wrecks of large ships on the shore of Tulehu remind one of a time when 
Ambonese were active as tuna fishermen. There used to be eight Ambonese 
owned boats but in the eighties they all broke down, both in the financial 
and literal sense, due to what people called 'mismanagement'. The new 
generation of owners of the motorized boats that often moor in the old 
harbor of Tulehu, consists of a Butonese living in Ambon City, an inhabitant 
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from Nolot (Saparua island) and one from Haria (Saparua island), each 
owning two boats. 
Their boats leave the harbor a few hours before dawn if bait is available at 
a nearby bagan or at midnight if the bait is not. As soon as the sun rises the 
search for the large tuna fish starts. When the spotter has finally detected a 
school of surfacing fish with his telescope, the boat quickly approaches the 
school and makes circles to confuse the fish with living bait. About 20 men 
then become active using rods with fishing lines, glittering feathers and 
hooks to catch the fish. In this surprisingly low-technologicy but effective 
way more than 1,000 tuna fish can be caught in half an hour. On a lucky day 
the men can catch as many as 3,000 fish. 
The Butonese Hi. La Enta is one of the owners of the fleet from Tulehu. He 
was born in 1949 and migrated to Ambon City in 1965. In March 1987 he 
offered the highest bid for a fishing boat at an auction: Rp. 15.5 million. The 
boat had been confiscated by a bank from a failed Ambonese entrepreneur. 
According to Hi. La Enta, in the first half of the 1980s it was too easy to get a 
loan from a bank to construct or buy a tuna fishing boat. One only needed a 
letter of recommendation from the Office for Fishery. However, the eager 
Ambonese borrowers very quickly lost the credit of the banks in the literal 
and symbolic sense and in the second half of the 1980s banks introduced 
classical collateral standards again, such as ownership of a house or land. 
La Enta spent another Rp. 9.5 million to repair the boat and then started 
fishing tuna — with success. In 1988 he already bought his second boat at a 
price of Rp. 40 million. Both the first and the second boat were bought 
without a bank loan. Before 1987 he had been a large-scale fish trader at the 
Ambon fish market for 11 years. He also owned three motor boats to collect 
small fish from sero gantung. These activities not only provided him with 
enough resources to self-finance his large investments but also with very 
useful knowledge regarding the supply of small fish and the organization of 
the fish market at Ambon City that seem pre-conditions to successfully 
manage a tuna fishing enterprise. 
The catch of the first boat that arrives in the morning in Tulehu is usually 
entirely transported to Ambon City by lorry. Usually, part of the catch of the 
next boats is sold to local fish traders. An agent of the owner awaits the 
boats and decides how many fish can be sold locally. The total number of 
fish sold locally usually varies between 300-1,000 fish with local prices 
varying from Rp. 1,000 for three fish to Rp. 1,500 per fish. The agent does not 
want to transport all the fish to Ambon City because he feels obliged "to give 
the villagers a chance to live" (kasih hidup). Besides, it would be foolish to do 
so as tuna prices at the Ambon fish market are relatively high when the first 
fish arrives but decrease when more fish is supplied. 
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Photograph: A dozen Ambonese men (not from Tulehu) catching tuna fish with rods, 
fishing lines, glittering feathers and hooks. The men sit at the stem of a motorized 
boat that makes circles to confuse the surfacing school of tuna fish. 
The Butonese La Enta gave an example of the income and expenditures 
from one boat catdung 1,000 tuna fish on one day. In Tulehu 300 fish might 
be sold at a price of Rp. 1,000 each. At the fish market of Ambon City his 
retailers might sell 700 fish at a price of Rp. 1,200 a piece. Expenditures 
include the cost of ice (Rp. 70,000), transport of fish from Tulehu to Ambon 
City (Rp. 30,000) and commission to the lookers ' of Tulehu (Rp. 15,000), his 
agent (Rp. 50,000) and the six small groups of Butonese retailers of Ambon 
City, each consisting of six persons with every group headed by a relative of 
La Enta (Rp. 140,000). The gross income less these expenditures is Rp. 
835,000 from which La Enta has to deduct 10 percent for the owner of the 
bagan or sero gantung. The remaining sum is divided among La Enta (70 
percent) and the crew of the boat (30 percent). The Butonese entrepreneur 
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also has to pay for the crew's food (Rp. 10,000), the living bait (Rp. 20,000), 
fuel (Rp. 67,500) and oil (Rp. 8,750). The net income of La Enta is then Rp. 
419,800 whereas the 20 crew members each get about Rp. 10,000 with a few 
of them (the captain, the mechanic and the cook) earning Rp. 15,000 or a 
double share. 
There is a group of 7 Ambonese men and 17 Ambonese women who are 
active as tuna fish traders. Three of them, all men, enjoy the privilege of 
negotiating with the agent of the boat owner as to the amount and price of 
the fish, earning a cornrnission of Rp. 50 per fish. They order a number of 
fish for every interested member of the group, then collect the money and 
finally pay the agent. In addition, they provide extra-financial services: one 
of them supplies fuel and another is an engineer providing technical help 
every now and then. 
The group of 24 fish traders includes 6 married couples. Two of the 
'singles' are a younger sister of one of the three 'leaders' and two others are 
close kin of one of the married women. Still, many of the fish traders would 
not categorize their mutual relations primarily in terms of kin but rather in 
terms of working relations. That these working relations, however, can result 
in quasi-kin relations confirms their club Keluarga Besar Cekalang (The Big 
Family of the Tuna Fish) that organized a big party in December 1989. In the 
preceding four months the 24 fish traders had daily saved Rp. 1,000 each, 
more than enough to finance the party which cost Rp. 1 million. 
Smoking Fish 
A final part of the chain for bagan fishermen, tuna fishermen and local 
traders are the 15 to 20 women of Tulehu who smoke tuna fish at their 
homesteads. They prefer to smoke fish rather than to sell fresh fish at the 
local market for several reasons: "the income is larger", "the sale of fresh fish 
takes so long" and "it is easier to combine with domestic tasks". What the 
women do not take into account is that the smoking itself is rather labor 
intensive: without any help the smoking of 50 fish can take five hours. Most 
of them smoke between 25 and 60 fish. In one case a woman smoked 110 fish 
but she worked together with her younger sister on that occasion. 
The women who smoke fish usually have a regular supplier but emphasize 
that they are not tied to her. The fish trader accepts that she will not be paid 
until the fish has been sold but this quasi-credit arrangement does not 
function as a tying device. A fish trader is not always in the business: when 
there is plenty of fish and/or when a rather high buying price has been set, 
she might consider the profit margins too low; she also might not be 
working for a few days for various reasons. If the regular supplier has not 
bought fish on a particular day, the women who want to smoke fish, will 
approach another trader. The women who regularly smoke fish do not turn 
out to be close relatives of their regular supplier but they do live close to 
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each other: the houses of the fish traders as well as the women who smoke 
fish are all situated close to the shore and the old harbor of Tulehu which 
means that they can all nearly see the boats arriving. 
Conclusions 
On the one hand the practice of subsistence fishing among Ambonese men 
seems to have declined, but on the other, Ambonese fish traders have 
effectively claimed the 'right to live' from the trade of fish. One might say 
that a subsistence ethic is reproduced by actions of Ambonese fish traders of 
Tulehu, most of them women but a few men fulfilling key roles as 
intermediaries, affecting relations with fishermen from other villages and 
agents of fish traders from Ambon City. The physical threat by Ambonese of 
Tulehu vis-a-vis local officials who ignore the 'right to live' of fish trade 
shows that such a right is not self-evident but a point of negotiation and 
social-normative struggle. 
The role of Tulehu fish traders in the regional trade of fish has both 
weakened and reinforced feelings and practices of sharing fish and income 
with other villagers. On the one hand they dislike the idea of freely 
distributing fish among neighbors, while on the other they organize a big 
party inviting many villagers of Tulehu to share in their wealth. Fish traders 
also let neighbors smoke their fish, enabling them to make an income. 
Two categories of people are increasingly prominent in fishing and the fish 
trade: Butonese men and Ambonese women. Butonese dominate the bagan 
fishing in the bay of Tulehu. Their limited access to land due to a lack of 
local-traditional ownership rights and their own fishing tradition, to a large 
extent explain the 'fishing orientation' of Butonese migrants. The more land-
based Ambonese enjoying ownership rights on land and/or trees, have not 
invested much in bagan fishing, that is much more advanced and capital-
intensive than canoe fishing. The only Ambonese owner of a bagan (in 1989-
1990) was the one and only son of his parents, who allowed him to use the 
income from the sale of the right to harvest clove trees to build a bagan. Lack 
of competitive claims on this resource and the lack of possible future claims 
from brothers and sisters on income from his fishing, to a large extent 
explain why he could enter and stay in the business. It would, however, be 
incorrect to say that the Ambonese have not tried to invest in new fishing 
technology. Wrecks of motorized ships on the shores of Tulehu remind one 
of such initiatives that failed due to 'mismanagement' or the inability of the 
Ambonese owners to run an enterprise and satisfy the money claims of crew 
and (other) relatives. 
The role of Ambonese women in the fish trade is also salient. Of course, 
many of them have previously sold a few fish in front of their house or at 
the local market place. These fish were caught by their husbands to serve 
subsistence and small money needs. The group of women fish traders, 
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however, buy large quantities of fish from non-kin and sell them at the 
market places of Tulehu and/or Ambon City. Their daily income is quite 
substantial: between Rp. 5,000 and 10,000 and sometimes even more. A new 
'class' of entrepreneurs seems to have evolved. 
Shops, Economic Survival and Migrants 
The village of Tulehu contains an exceptionally large number of keepers 
(see Table 3.15) also attracting many consumers from outside the village. 
Roughly speaking, one can say that the Ambonese run small shops, whereas 
medium-sized and large shops are in the hands of migrants, with one 
notable exception: Butonese migrants, nearly all of whom also run small 
shops, like the Ambonese (see Table 3.16). Newcomers in the shopkeeping 
business include a number of cooperative shops of Ambonese, but they are 
not the only ones. More than half of the existing shops (as of November 
1989) started in the period 1987-1989 (see Table 3.15). This does not 
automatically imply that the number of shops increased dramatically in the 
second half of the 1980s. A number of shops, especially the smaller ones of 
Ambonese and Butonese people, might have been started in the first half of 
the 1980s and given up before 1989. In this section I want to provide some 
background and detail of these general features of the shopkeepers of Tulehu 
on the basis of a survey among 54 shopkeepers, conversation with Sumatran 
shopkeepers and frequent visits to the cooperative shops. First, different 
ways of financing the shop and stock are described. Then, expansion in the 
number of Sumatran shops and the increase in Ambonese mini-shops is 
explained against the background of the fluctuating economy of Tulehu and 
its regional environment. Finally, the different social bases of cooperative 
shops of Ambonese are dealt with. 
Sources of Financing 
The survey of 54 shopkeepers showed that the Chinese shopkeepers (6 
cases), all but one of the Sumatran shopkeepers (11 cases) and the Javanese 
shopkeepers (3 cases) rented a place from an Ambonese. All Butonese (13 
cases) and all but one of the Ambonese shopkeepers (21 cases) had con-
structed a small shop themselves. The Sumatran and Javanese usually bought 
their goods on credit from a large Chinese shopkeeper of Tulehu and/or one 
or more large Chinese shopkeepers of Ambon City. The Ambonese and 
Butonese were less privileged in this respect: they usually bought their goods 
from a large Chinese shopkeeper of Tulehu (and sometimes from a large 
shopkeeper of Ambon City) but not so often on a credit basis. Only 8 of the 
19 Ambonese shopkeepers reported obtaining goods on credit from Chinese, 
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Table 3.15: Number of existing shops (as per November 1989) per year of 
establishment and per ethnic category in Tulehu 
Year A B ƒ s Ch Totals 
1969 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1971 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1972 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1973 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1974 2 0 0 0 0 2 
1975 1 1 0 0 1 3 
1976 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1977 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1978 1 1 0 1 1 4 
1979 1 1 0 0 0 2 
1980 0 2 0 0 0 2 
1981 2 1 0 1 1 5 
1982 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1983 3 1 1 2 1 8 
1984 0 0 0 3 0 3 
1985 0 0 0 3 1 4 
1986 2 2 0 3 2 9 
1987 7 2 1 3 1 14 
1988 6 3 0 5 2 16 
1989 17 10 1 6 0 34 
unknown 2 1 0 3 0 6 
totals 47 25 4 30 12 118 
Explanation: A= Ambonese; B= Butonese; ƒ= Javanese; S= Sumatran; Ch= Chinese. 
Source: Own field research. 
whereas 4 of the 13 Butonese shopkeepers indicated having credit relations 
with a Chinese shopkeeper. 
With regard to the financing of the very first expenses to construct or rent 
a shop and to buy stock, the following conclusions can be drawn: nearly all 
21 Ambonese respondents reported to have paid both types of expenses him 
or herself; the Butonese gave similar responses except in four cases in which 
relatives, friends and the large and popular Chinese wholesaler of Tulehu 
played a role at the very start. The three Javanese respondents had also 
relied to a large extent on their own means; only one obtained consumer 
goods on credit from another shopkeeper at the very start. Relatively 
speaking, young Chinese and Sumatran shopkeepers enjoyed much more 
often the support of relatives and other shopkeepers, living in Tulehu or 
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Table 3.16: Number of existing shops (as per November 1989) in Tulehu 





Ambonese 41 5 1 47 
Butonese 23 1 1 25 
Javanese 1 2 1 4 
Sumatran 2 21 7 30 
Chinese 0 2 10 12 
totals 67 31 20 118 
1 Daily turnover of a small shop (pondok) is less than Rp. 25,000; the turnover 
of a medium-sized shop (toko sedang) varies between Rp. 25,000 and Rp. 
100,000 per day whereas a large shop (toko besar) has a daily turnover of Rp. 
100,000 or more. 
Source: Own field research. 
Ambon City. One Chinese and one Sumatran respondent informed me they 
had borrowed from a bank as well, which was not the case from the data on 
the Ambonese, Butonese and Javanese respondents. A Sumatran respondent 
used an arisan to pay his rent. My conclusion on the basis of general 
observation of the street vending business and shopkeepers as well as from 
the case histories of Sumatran shopkeepers of Tulehu is that Sumatrans 
usually start at the bottom as street vendors (kaki lima) whereas Chinese 
shops are instead clones from a thriving family enterprise. 
The Economy Declines But Migrants Expand Their Shops 
Ekonomi merosot (The economy declines). This is a much heard complaint 
among the Sumatran entrepreneurs of Tulehu. It is rather sad for them as 
they migrated to Tulehu to make money and lead a better life. Of course, 
Tulehu is a very good choice as it has evolved as a regional trade and 
transport centre offering many opportunities. The Sumatran migrants have 
successfully concentrated on the shopping and restaurant business and form 
the largest group of medium-sized entrepreneurs of Tulehu. However, in 
recent years their profit margins have decreased as a result of a conjunctural 
decline of the local and regional agrarian economy with disappointing clove 
harvests and low clove prices (see Chapter 8). According to many Sumatran 
migrants it is now of strategic importance to direct all efforts to increase 
daily turnover. Not surprisingly, many of the Sumatran couples want to start 
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or have already started a second shop in Tulehu. Also, many of them try to 
tie more customers in from outside Tulehu through quality services and 
competitive prices. One Sumatran shopkeeper explained to me that 90 
percent of his customers come from other villages. The shops and restaurants 
of nearly all Sumatran migrants are located close to the old harbor, bus 
station, fish and vegetable markets, attracting many customers. 
There are three very important actions or constructs that have enabled 
Sumatran to grow in times of economic decline. First, the Sumatran 
community of Tulehu consisting of 40 households is highly organized: 
different groups are directed towards fund raising for Islamic festivals, 
contributing to rotating funds, organization of religious celebrations with, of 
course, many opportunities to exchange views on business. Second, the 
Sumatran shopkeepers do not borrow on easy terms from each other. One of 
them described his relationship with a visiting Sumatran as follows: "Here 
inside the shop, I am the shopkeeper and he is my client. Outside the shop 
we are (like) brothers". This normative construct allows Sumatran shop-
keepers both to sustain their enterprise and relations with other Sumatrans. 
Third, nearly all Sumatran shopkeepers enjoy the trust of a Chinese 
wholesaler who rents a place in Tulehu. He not only provides them with 
consumer goods at a zero rate of interest but also house construction 
material (with similar and flexible repayment conditions) if they need to up-
grade their rented house (see pp. 56-62: 'Houses with Concrete Walls'). The 
only 'price' is that the Sumatrans are expected to buy consumer goods from 
the Chinese wholesaler who has well understood that increasing the numbers 
of his clientele is a key to growth (see also Chapter 4). 
Mushrooming of Mini-Shops 
The complaint of the medium-sized shopkeepers about the mushrooming 
of small shops in Tulehu, together with the appreciation of a past when 
margins were considerably higher, suggest that the start of many small shops 
by Ambonese is a recent development (see also Table 3.15). This has also to 
do with the fluctuating economy of Tulehu and its regional environment. The 
start of a small shop is not so much an expression of an ambition to become 
a large shopkeeper but rather the hope of many Ambonese to sustain their 
increased standard of living in times of conjunctural decline in the local and 
regional agrarian economy: the boom period at the end of the 1970s when 
clove prices increased enormously, was followed by many years of low 
prices in the 1980s, with 1988 as a the lowest 'point'. And to make it even 
worse: from 1986 till 1989 many Tulehu gardens did not yield abundantly. 
Small shops are meant to provide an additional income, not a profit to be re-
invested in the micro-enterprise. Finally, it should be emphasized that 
shopkeeping is only one of the many (potential) ways for Ambonese (see pp. 
45-56: 'Old and New Neighbors') to make a petty income. 
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There are many other (related) reasons why Ambonese shopkeepers will 
remain small and vulnerable under harsh economic conditions. In contrast to 
the migrant shopkeepers, the Ambonese shopkeepers are not so oriented 
towards customers from outside Tulehu. They are not concentrated in one 
particular and busy area but spread all over the village. In fact, the 
Ambonese shopkeepers are dependent on the modest or weakening 
purchasing power of neighbors and family. Thin purses, in combination with 
social relations that exist between the shopkeeper and the client, often lead to 
easy borrowing, further endangering the capital base of the mini-enterprise. 
Butonese, like the Ambonese, are also well represented in the category of 
small shopkeepers. However, in contrast to the Ambonese, most of their 
shops are located in the market and transport centres of Tulehu. Also, 
rurtning a shop is only one of the many economic undertakings of Butonese 
(see pp. 79-88: 'Cash Crops, Money Needs and Migrants'; pp. 88-96: Tishery, 
Fish Trade and Migrants'; Chapters 2, 4 and 8) who very easily shift from 
one to another activity. Shopkeeping seems a stepping stone towards agri-
business (trade in cloves) or fishing enterprises (bagan). The high rates of 
'failure' or relatively short life-cycle of Butonese and Ambonese shops have 
thus totally different meanings. 
Cooperative Shops 
Maybe the only possibility for the Ambonese to start and successfully 
manage a medium-sized shop, avoiding the frequent and burdening credit 
demands of relatives, is to organize a cooperative undertaking. The 37 
members of a religious women's society (majelis) have done so. They started 
their shop immediately after the fasting month in 1988, building up a share 
capital of Rp. 810,000: nine women bought five shares, four bought three 
shares and 24 one share of Rp. 10,000 each. 
Just before the fasting month of 1989 every shareholder was given twice 
her contribution to the share capital as well as some rice, sugar and wheat. 
Most women were not primarily interested in capital accumulation and 
growth of the enterprise but rather in tangible benefits and means to pay for 
extra expenses (food, cloth) related to the fasting month. Not surprisingly, 
many shareholders were upset when the next year the treasurer decided in 
the absence of the chairlady not to disburse bonus payments to the 
shareholders. The shop had not performed badly. For instance, in the period 
between 9 April and 3 August, 1989, the gross income (selling goods) was 
Rp. 7,314,000 whereas expenditures amounted to Rp. 6,115,350 (buying 
goods) and Rp. 240,000 salary of the shopkeeper over a period of four 
months. In the end every woman received consumer goods worth Rp. 5,000 
following the advice of the chairlady upon her return. 
According to the chairlady, the cooperative shop is an association meant to 
strengthen social relations between the members rather than a commercial 
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enterprise directed at making a profit. This directive seems to be a guarantee 
to sustain, not to expand, the volume of business. The multiple bonds 
between the members of the cooperative shop and the sodal-religious 
authority of its informal board, consisting of five Haji, provide a solid basis 
for this economic initiative. Not surprisingly, the Chinese wholesaler who is 
very popular with the Sumatran business community of Tulehu, supplies 
goods on credit to the shop, which is a rather unusual privilege for an 
Ambonese enterprise. However, the commercial experience of especially the 
board members (in the trade of cloves and cloth) could also result in an 
erosion of this social base since some of them suggest giving high priority to 
expansion of the capital base and operating in a more commercial way. 
The shop has three suppliers: the Chinese wholesaler of Tulehu, the village 
cooperative (KUD) and an itinerant trader travelling by car. In the period 
from April 9 till August 3, 1989, more than 55 percent (of the total value) 
was bought (on credit) from the Chinese wholesaler, nearly 30 percent was 
bought (directly) from the itinerant trader, less than 10 percent from the 
KUD and about 5 percent was classified as 'KUD and car'. 
The cooperative shop is certainly not an effective instrument to avoid or 
reduce requests from villagers to buy on credit. On August 19, 1989, the 
debts of 59 non-members totalled Rp. 590,400. Thus, the average debt was 
about Rp. 10,000 per non-member. The shopkeeper kept three different 
notebooks of indebted non-members: the oldest book (from December 27, 
1988, onwards) contained data on nine women who were still indebted (from 
12 transactions) and 45 women who had already repaid their debts; the 
second book (from April 7, 1989, onwards) listed the debts of 39 women 
(through 44 transactions) whereas the newest book (from May 22, 1989, on-
wards) provided details of 11 debtors and their 18 transactions. The final 
pages of the books show that every now and then the shop also provides 
short-term credit for funeral and marriage ceremonies. The shop had lent Rp. 
360,000, Rp. 88,250 and Rp. 14,600 in goods for different marriage parties and 
Rp. 115,450 for a funeral ceremony. 
Whereas the social-religious majelis provided a solid base for the shop of 
the 37 women, the daily work of 12 harbor labourers provides the social base 
for their cooperative shop. They belong to a group of 25 harbor laborers 
(called Kelompok Biru) but for various reasons not all laborers want to buy 
shares in the shop. The 12 men each saved Rp. 1,000 per working day over 
about 40 weeks (for three working days per week) until the capital amounted 
up to Rp. 1,460,000. Then they approached the chairman of the village 
cooperative (KUD) to buy rice, sugar and wheat. The chairman suggested 
that they operate as one of his consumption units and added more than one 
million in kind to the worldng capital. Both parties profit from this 
cooperation among cooperatives: the 12 shareholders buy cheap consumer 
goods through the KUD; the chairman of the KUD avails of cheap and 
enthusiastic shopkeepers when the laborers who work on a rotating basis are 
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free; the chairman increases the turnover of his KUD; the shareholders enjoy 
bonus payments right before the fasting month; and are given financial 
support (from the sale of rice bags) by the chairman of the KUD to buy 
house construction material (which is quite substantial since every two to 
three weeks the KUD shops sell about five tons of rice). 
Conclusions 
Different 'styles' of shopkeeping might be distinguished among Tulehu 
shopkeepers: Ambonese and Butonese operate in a self-made shop, most of 
them buying, not taking goods from large Chinese shopkeepers of Tulehu or 
Ambon City on credit. Most Ambonese run a small shop in order to get 
small amounts of cash and to sustain a daily money flow at times of 
conjunctural economic decline. Butonese usually run small shops as a way of 
accumulating money to start a larger business in fishing or agricultural trade. 
Ambonese shops are spread all over the village whereas those of the 
Butonese, like those of all other migrants, are located close to the bus station, 
old harbor, fish and vegetable markets. 
Sumatran, Javanese and Chinese migrants, who run medium-sized and 
large shops, work and live in rented houses in the business centre of the 
village. The Sumatran and Javanese usually buy their goods on credit from a 
large Chinese shopkeeper of Tulehu or Ambon City. Sumatrans are able to 
sustain good relations with each other and expand their enterprises at the 
same time, not allowing mutual and multistranded relationships to define 
business transactions. This normative construct, as well as their mutual and 
regular exchange of business information, credit supplies from Chinese 
shopkeepers, and the strategic location of their shops, have enabled them to 
expand their business at times of economic decline. 
The few cooperative shops of the Ambonese but also their many mini-
shops that more resemble an individual or household enterprise, imply that a 
shopkeeper-customer relationship is added to relations of kin, neighborhood 
and/or friendship among them. My impression is that these former types of 
relations still affect the shopkeeper-customer relationship, limiting their 
possibilities to expand their business. Cooperative shops are not so much an 
attempt to isolate shopkeeper-customer relationships from existing social 
relations but rather a way to use the 'powers' of friendship of kin, neigbors 
and /or economic peers as a basis for shopkeeping. These powers should 
enable the club members or shareholders to better handle claims of (other) 
neighbors, friends and kin to borrow goods on credit. Shareholders want to 
see their investment or savings rewarded every year before the fasting 
month. This is not to say that the shareholders are free from the pressure of 
friends, relatives and neighors to borrow goods on easy terms from the shop. 
Also, the distribution of the surplus is a constant source of disagreement 
among the shareholders. But power and normative structures related to 
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Buses and Bosses 
The popular means of transport for people, consumer goods and small 
amounts of merchandise between Tulehu and Ambon City are minibuses. 
One-way trips take about an hour and cost Rp. 500 per person. A small bus 
transports 13 to 17 passengers whereas a large one takes 17 to 21 people. A 
bus usually drives to and from Ambon City three to four times daily. In 
1988, 88 persons were registered at the Provincial Office as license holders to 
operate the 129 buses on the route between Ambon City and Tulehu. In 
practice, not more than 60 to 80 vehicles are daily active on the busy route. 
The garages of Tulehu and the verges of the road to Ambon are full of buses 
to be repaired. Quite a few garages — and in particular the larger ones with 
better equipment — are run by Sulawesi mechanics. 
There are ten active bus owners in Tulehu: four Javanese, three Ambonese, 
two Chinese and one Sumatran. The ten bus entrepreneurs together own 31 
buses. Two of the three Ambonese bus owners are Haji. The two Chinese and 
one of the four Javanese bus owners are shopkeepers. The second Javanese 
runs a restaurant and the third is a large agricultural trader who owns eight 
buses. The fourth Javanese has no second major business. He is married to 
an Ambonese woman which cannot explain the lack of a second business 
since the largest bus owner, a Javanese, is also married to an Ambonese (also 
of high social status). The largest Chinese bus owner also married an 
Ambonese. The wife of the Javanese restaurant keeper comes from Sulawesi. 
The following three cases show how bus entrepreneurs finance their 
investment in buses; their strong committment to invest in the education of 
their children; and their dependency on drivers and conductors. 
The Javanese bus owner Pak Wazir Suarso, born in 1939 in Ambon City, is 
the son of a Javanese father and Butonese mother. He was a civil servant for 
ten years, tailor for five years and driver for one year. In 1972 he bought his 
first bus at a price of Rp. 1,100,000 and borrowed Rp. 300,000 from the Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) for that purpose. Three years later he bought his 
second bus for Rp. 2,000,000 - also with a BRI loan. In this way Pak Wazir 
Suarso expanded his bus enterprise until he owned four buses. But then 
times changed and he found that his enterprise produced only a very small 
profit against too high risks. He was too dependent on his drivers and 
reduced his fleet to one bus. According to Pak Wazir Suarso, ownership of a 
bus now primarily gives you prestige and generates just enough income for 
daily food expenditures (Untung noma, hiking belanja). He has decided to 
invest primarily in the higher education of his eight children and has opened 
a restaurant which requires little investments but guarantees a regular and 
relations of kin, friendship and neighborhood among the Ambonese, have 
clearly been reset. 
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rather high income. He estimates the total school expenditures (travelling, 
rent, school fees) of his children to be Rp. 500,000 per month. 
Pak Hi. Mohommed Ohorella is about 50 years old, has two wives and 11 
children. He claims to be one of the few Ambonese entrepreneurs to have 
remained in the bus business since the 1970s. He claims that about 30 other 
Ambonese entrepreneurs did not make it due to the continous tension 
between the wish to expand an enterprise and to sustain relations with kin 
and friends making requests for money. Pak Hi. Ohorella has succeeded in 
staying in the bus business, probably using the largest part of his profit to 
meet these small requests. Also, his great technical knowledge about car 
maintenance distinguishes him for many other Ambonese owners of buses 
and kept his buses running. Three of his buses were bought on dealers 
credit. The newest bus cost Rp. 24,700,000 and was bought with the help of a 
bank loan. The dealer and Pak Hi. Ohorella had visited the bank together to 
request the loan and to convince the bank managers that Pak Hi. Ohorella 
was serious about buying a bus and was certainly not a newcomer to the 
business (see also McLeod 1992). The main concern now of Pak Hi. Ohorella 
is the education of his children. Therefore, he has not yet accepted the offer 
of his mother to settle in the Netherlands close to her place. He estimates the 
total school expenditure of his three children who are at universities in other 
parts of Indonesia to be Rp. 500,000 per month. 
Pak Hi. Nuhumarury, who has retired as a civil servant, owns three buses 
and a taxi. His wife is the respected Ibu Hi. Dia, chairlady of two religious 
women clubs and cloth trader occasionally bringing nice pieces from Jakarta. 
They have two children. Their son has a masters degree in law but is driver 
of the taxi and mechanic of his fathers buses in daily life. Their daughter is 
working at the office of a notary of Ambon City. 
The income and expenditure account of one of the two small buses of Pak 
Hi. Nahumarury (see Table 3.17) suggests that this bus yields a net profit of 
only Rp. 212,500 in eight months (after deduction of the salaries of driver 
and conductor, respectively 20 and 10 percent of daily gross income). 
However, the expenditure account includes many non-bus items. When 
expenses concerning medicines, clothes, school fees of grandchildren, the 
electricity bill, 'arrangement of permits', contributions to arisan, shopping 
money and other non-bus expenses are left out, the net profit was Rp. 
1,266,000 in eight months or Rp. 158,250 per month. 
These figures — even the last-mentioned and most optimistic ones — also 
suggest that a brand new small bus of about Rp. 24 million cannot be 
bought with a bank loan only. Repayment of principal and interest 
(1.5 percent per month flat rate) in 60 monthly instalments will be Rp. 
760,000 per month in this case. However, if a bus drives four times a day 16 
passengers to and from Ambon City, the owner of the bus should earn Rp. 
44,800 per day (70 percent of the daily gross income). If the bus is in 
operation 24 days per month, the monthly gross income is Rp. 1,085,200, 
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Table 3.17: Income and expenditure accounts of a bus (in Rp.) 
Month Income1 Expenditure 
September 1988 335,000 123,000 
October 1988 315,000 372,000 
November 1988 330,000 124,000 
December 1988 125,000 381,000 
January 1989 420,000 809,000 
February 1989 400,000 148,000 
March 1989 515,000 380,500 
April 1989 204,000 104,000 
totals 2,644,000 2,441,500 
1 Pak Hi. Nahumarury has already deducted the payments for the driver and 
conductor from his 'income'. 
Source: Daily accounts of Pak Hi. Nahumarury during the period September 
1988 to April 1989. 
which is enough to pay monthly instalments, provided the cost of fuel and 
maintenance and local taxes do not exceed Rp. 325,200 per month. 1 6 But the 
income account of Pak Hi. Nahumarury suggests that these estimates are 
much too optimistic. In the period of eight months he received Rp. 10,000 on 
78 days, Rp. 15,000 on 69 days, Rp. 20,000 on 37 days, Rp. 25,000 on 3 days 
and Rp. 14,000 on one day. If these amounts are 70 percent of daily gross 
income then gross income does not usually exceed Rp. 35,000. 
Employer-Employee Relations 
The owner of one or more buses is very much dependent on his driver(s) 
as they and the conductors have to earn and collect the fees to be paid to the 
owner at the end of the day. The commission-system provides an incentive 
to the employees to work as hard as possible but is no guarantee that the 
owner will actually benefit from it. As it would be too time-consuming to 
select new drivers and conductors every week, owners of buses keep a large 
part of the daily wage with them to be disbursed at the end of the month 
(see also Chapter 4), rely on kin who drive or repair buses, or simply 
threaten to sack drivers or conductors. Usually, this threat is very effective 
16. If a big bus of Rp. 30 million is newly bought under similar repayment conditions, and 
transports 20 passengers every trip eight times a day, Rp. 396,000 is left per month to pay for 
fuel and repairs and to make a profit. 
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because a daily source of income is highly regarded by many Ambonese 
men. The driver's earning style greatly affects the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms of labor control as the following cases show. 
The Ambonese Pak Hassan is the driver of a big bus of the Javanese 
shopkeeper Pak Sudarmaji. He gets 20 percent commission which equals Rp. 
10,000 to 12,000 per day. However, at the end of the day Pak Hassan is only 
paid Rp. 2,000 to bring home for daily food expenses. The remaining sum is 
kept by his boss and paid on a monthly basis. A large part of the monthly 
payment is put away by Pak Hassan into a Tabanas savings account in the 
nearby village unit of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia. 
Amudin drives the small bus (named Padaelo) of his Sumatran father. He 
brings Rp. 30,000 home per day (stor). The unmarried Amudin drives only 
when he has run out of money. The brother-in-law of Amudin drives the big 
bus and collects about Rp. 50,000 per day. He is a father of three children 
and is more constant and careful than Amudin. In principle, he drives the 
bus every day, carrying the blue booklet of the SIMPEDES savings program 
of the BRI village unit of Tulehu in his breast pocket. 
Conclusions 
The case studies show that running a bus company is risky and not so 
lucrative (anymore) due to increased competition. This has affected the 
investment decisions of bus owners as well as their relations with drivers, 
conductors, creditors and kin. 
Not only has the maintenance of buses become crucial to keep their buses 
going, but so has maintenance of relationships with drivers as well. The 
different ways of owners to keep hard working and reliable drivers, and the 
different earning styles of drivers, explain the diverse sets of relationships 
that have evolved in the bus business, varying from more or less multiplex 
to rather ad-hoc ones. Other social networks in bus business relationships 
have become less multiplex. Bus dealers have introduced their buyers at 
banks to pass on the increased risks of default (see Chapter 8 for similar 
processes in the clove trade). The dealers are no longer creditors but only 
salesmen. 
Most of the bus owners have a second major business or enjoy a pension 
to supplement and secure their income. Another reason to run more than one 
business is to earn enough money to finance the higher education of ones 
children. An important motive to stay in the bus business inspite of risks and 
decreasing income is prestige. When I asked someone to denote the rich of 
village society, she pointed at a bus with the first letters of the name of its 
owner and close kin on it. 
The daily income of a bus owner is not only used for fuel and repair but 
also for non-bus expenses: relatives claim money to shop for medicines, 
clothes, etc. Ambonese owners, living among their kin, have to deal with 
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many such (potential) claims. One of them constructed huge walls and fences 
around his house — as if to isolate himself and his closest kin, in a literal and 
abstract sense, from ordinary people, from other kin and neighbors. 
Some Final Conclusions 
In this final section I draw some lines together on the basis of the domain-
specific conclusions outlined in the sections above, and compare my data 
with those of Fraassen (1972) who undertook a regional and comprehensive 
study of Ambon society, also collecting data about Tulehu. 
Finding Money 
The different ways Tulehu villagers get and spend money have diverse 
meanings and purposes. Changing consumption standards have dramatically 
affected the ways Ambonese villagers get and spend money. To secure daily 
subsistence many no longer primarily trunk in terms of cutting sago palm 
trees and collecting fish to guarantee food supply and/or to build a house, 
but about how to get money to buy rice, fish, breakfast snacks, petroleum oil, 
cigarettes, and so forth, and to give children pocket money to buy sweets 
(see Appendix 3.3). Nearly 25 years ago Fraassen (1972) predicted that, "A 
problem in the Central Moluccas will be how one can increase daily income 
in the traditionally economic system" (p.45, my translation) as he believed 
that cloves, nutmeg and sago trees would be of no value in this connection, 
either yielding a periodical income or being a pure subsistence crop. Many 
Tulehu villagers have been able to cope with this 'problem', profiting from 
the regional position of Tulehu in trade, transport, education and 
administration. The many mini-shops, street vending activities and the 
smoking of fish are typical can uang (literally: to search money) activities of 
Ambonese who want to secure a daily income to sustain a minimal 
consumption level. Villagers value 'private jobs' simply because they provide 
a daily income, or they emphasize the importance of joining the civil service, 
which is to guarantee a rninimal income, to contribute to the social security 
of relatives (and parents in particular) and to improve access to bank credit. 
But also what Fraassen described as the 'traditionally economic system' has 
become part of the possibilities of Tulehu villagers to secure daily 
subsistence: villagers sell the right to harvest nutmeg and sago trees to 
Butonese migrants with a view to financing daily and other small cash needs. 
The combination of insecure and often disappointing clove harvests and 
the strong desire of Ambonese villagers to build a house with concrete walls 
and a zinc roof, have possibly reinforced the need to look for daily income 
even more than increased and diverse daily consumption needs. Since the 
clove boom of the 1970s (see Chapters 4 and 8), the clove harvest has been 
108 People That Count 
traditionally regarded as the time to finance the construction of such a house. 
However, declining prices and disappointing harvests in the second half of 
the 1980s, more or less forced Ambonese to look for other ways to finance a 
new house. They were not going to wait for the next bumper clove harvest 
but started the piecemeal buying of house construction material from their 
daily and /or monthly income as fish traders, market women, drivers, harbor 
laborers, petrol vendors, civil servants. This search for money has led to 
hitherto unfamiliar practices of savings in house construction material but 
also in participation in savings and credit associations (see Chapters 4, 5 and 
6). The observation of Fraassen (1972) that, "If acute money needs have been 
satisfied, one does not further strive for maximalisation of income" (p.45, my 
translation) is certainly no longer enough to characterize preferences and 
practices of many Ambonese villagers of Tulehu as they do not face 'acute' 
money needs only but also want to invest in housing and higher education. 
Evolving savings practices point to rather fundamental but hardly traceable 
changes of view on nature, time, capital accumulation and social 
relationships of Ambonese. 
Finding Socially Acceptable Ways to Accumulate Capital 
Whereas avarice is described by Fraassen (1972: 77-78) as a typical anti-
norm of Ambonese society, many now disqualify the traditional practice of 
constructing sago palm houses as too inefficient and costly, and accept the 
now popular practice of saving in new house construction materials. Such 
saving in kind has reduced the possibilities for relatives and friends to 
effectively claim money. Fraassen (ibid) also concluded that at the beginning 
of the 1970s no process of elite 1 7 formation is taking place in the villages on 
the basis of ownership of land or capital (p.257). This might still be largely 
true for Tulehu society although today a few Ambonese bus owners are 
called 'rich' and much more Ambonese have gained or been given 
'privileged' access to trade and transport networks, not forming a tiny elite 
but rather a class of 'petty capital accumulators'. 
This is not to say that those 'accumulators' have become less caring about 
other people, neighbors, friends and other villagers. Fish traders retail fish to 
former neighbors and organize a big party inviting neighbors, friends, 
relatives and officials. Civil servants give money and rice to their parents. 
Market women, harbor laborers, fish traders and shopkeepers organize 
savings and credit associations (see Chapter 4) among economic peers. It 
would thus be misleading to characterize Tulehu as an atomized society in 
17. Fraassen (1972) defines an elite in terms of privileged access to material means, high status 
and the ability to exert power or authority (p. 250, my translation). 
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which "everyone only thinks about his own interests" (Fraassen, p.iv, my 
translation). 
Also, capital accumulation by those Ambonese enjoying a regular income 
from non-agricultural activities is often neither directed at investment in 
capital-intensive technology, such as sago machines, fishing rafts and fishing 
boats, nor used as working capital to start a large shop or agricultural 
trading company. Investments in housing and higher eduction are preferred. 
Likewise, bank loans are mostly not used by civil servants (who happen to 
be the most popular clients of the local village unit of the BRI, the people's 
bank of Indonesia) to set up an enterprise but to finance daily expenditures, 
to buy house construction material, medicines, luxury goods, and to pay for 
the costs of higher education. This 'consumption-orientation' looks very 
much a modern variant of the older modes of collecting sago and fish for 
subsistence purposes. 
Finding New Kin 
The lesser practice of subsistence fishing - with fishermen dividing their 
catch among kin and neighbors in the expectation of reciprocal acts at a later 
date — and the decreasing practice of joint harvesting of sago trees and the 
cooperative building of sago palm houses, have eroded or 'contracted' the 
significance of wider neighborhood bonds and kinship relations among 
Ambonese in these domains of life. The rise of a professional class of sago 
cutters, cooperatively owned shops and modern houses built by artisans, 
refer to similar processes of social disintegration among Ambonese kin and 
neighbors. 
However, in other domains of social life kinship bonds have evolved 
and/or become (increasingly) important. Close relatives do play an important 
role in financing eduction, finding jobs and providing social security for the 
aged, ill and children. Also, friendship and quasi-kin relations among 
Ambonese have evolved as a result of their joint participation in non-
agricultural activities: a group of fish traders call themselves the 'tuna fish 
family', all contributing to a permanent fund; vegetable traders organize 
savings clubs and call themselves sisters. 
Finding Migrants 
Parallel to processes of social disintegration and integration among 
Ambonese, relationships between natives and migrants have changed. In fact, 
change of Ambonese-Ambonese relationships can hardly been understood 
without taking into account change of Ambonese-migrant relationships. 
Migrants of Tulehu are actually or potentially very important sources of 
money (income, credit) for the Ambonese. Sumatran, Chinese and Javanese 
migrant-shopkeepers rent houses from their Ambonese owners. Butonese buy 
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the right to harvest sago, nutmeg and clove trees from the Ambonese. 
Ambonese clove farmers would rather sell their cloves (either on-the-trees or 
freshly picked) to Butonese men and women than to official agencies that are 
supposed to offer a standard and high price. Larger Chinese traders often 
provide smaller, Butonese ones with working capital on a credit basis to 
secure the supply of cloves (see Chapter 8). Finally, Butonese also buy land 
from Ambonese to build new houses with concrete walls (see Chapter 2). 
These practices sharply contrast with the overall situation described by 
Fraassen (1972) who believed that Ambon society could not be classified as a 
peasant society because, "Land is not sold or bought. Natural produce of 
villagers is seldom taxed. There are no exploitative traders to profit from his 
labor efforts and there is no dependency on moneylenders either. He does 
not have to bring his produce to something like a rice mill, neither is he 
dependent on government price policy regarding rice. He also does not have 
to buy fertilizers or make other capital-intensive investments" (p.266, my 
translation). 
Speaking overall, migrants of Tulehu have reinforced and expanded their 
central position in what Fraassen (1972) described as the "non-rural sector 
which has been dominated by the non-Moluccan element since colonial 
times" (p.88, my translation): shopkeeping, bagan fishing, tuna fishing, 
agricultural trade and public transport. Butonese migrants have even 
invested in sago processing machines. 
The largest ethnic rninority of Tulehu - more than 5,000 people — consists 
of Butonese, as in many other villages of Ambon. The thrift, lending and 
investment activities of the Butonese of Tulehu, however, have had rather 
unique social and socio-spatial consequences: a large number of Butonese 
now own a house with concrete walls and/or live close to the three 
Ambonese core kampong of Tulehu — contrasting with earlier times in which 
Butonese were "almost always situated in the hills" (Kennedy 1950: 42). Not 
only are some Butonese kampong situated next to Ambonese kampong, but 
also kampong of mixed composition have evolved. And although they are still 
"regarded as belonging to a lower class" (Kennedy 1950: 59) by Ambonese 
people, the actual standard of living (in terms of income and housing) of 
many Butonese matches or even goes beyond those of an Ambonese 
subsistence farmer, civil servant or petty trader. 
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Appendix 3.1: Amounts of mixed cargo, copra, cloves and nutmeg (in tons); 
wood (in cubic meter) imported at the quay of Tulehu; and number of 
passengers arriving at the quay of Tulehu from 1980 till April 1987 
1980 Mixed Copra Cloves Nutmeg Wood Arrivals 
Jan 2 _ 13 _ 1,430 
Feb 18 4 9 - - 1,255 
Mar 48 4 6 - - 1,249 
Apr 20 10 2 - - 1,373 
May 16 31 - - - 1346 
Jun 16 30 6 - - 1,094 
Jul 20 8 - - - 912 
Aug 76 9 2 - - 931 
Sep 33 8 - - - 1,003 
Oct 75 3 - - - 1,280 
Nov 92 8 - - 5 1,206 
Dec 139 8 - - - 1,505 
totals 555 121 38 - 5 14,584 
1981 Mixed Copra Cloves Nutmeg Wood Arrivals 
Jan 132 20 2 8 1,460 
Feb na na na na na na 
Mar 109 13 - - - 1,099 
Apr 85 40 - 4 4 2,107 
May 159 22 - - - 1,545 
Jun 116 17 - - - 1,783 
Jul 110 40 - - 12 1,846 
Aug 130 7 - - - 2,256 
Sep 229 - 13 - 10 3,264 
Oct 189 - 37 2 - 4,285 
Nov 276 - 7 - - 4,961 
Dec 230 2 - 38 - 4,551 
totals 1,765 163 59 44 34 29,157 
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Appendix 3.1 (continued) 
1982 Mixed Copra Cloves Nutmeg Wood Arrivals 
Jan 318 24 „ - - 4,638 
Feb 198 6 1 - - 4,526 
Mar 509 26 3 - 32 5,223 
Apr 497 124 - - 20 8,123 
May 256 76 - - - 7,650 
Jun 388 61 - - - 9,444 
Jul 541 119 - - 72 9,876 
Aug 676 109 - 20 - 9,870 
Sep 276 107 7 19 93 9,625 
Oct 557 95 8 - 71 8,750 
Nov 707 83 6 5 120 10,230 
Dec 1,042 117 - 4 100 11,070 
totals 5,965 947 25 48 508 99,025 
1983 Mixed Copra Cloves Nutmeg Wood Arrivals 
Jan 757 65 _ _ 78 7,810 
Feb 901 70 - - 25 7,230 
Mar na na na na na na 
Apr 970 35 - - 15 6,921 
May 835 20 - - - 6,605 
Jun 1,062 - - - 20 7,345 
Jul 580 15 - - - 7,085 
Aug 895 18 - - - 7,555 
Sep 505 16 7 - - 9,885 
Oct 1,835 38 46 - - 7,486 
Nov 553 24 60 - 25 9,090 
Dec 2,006 - 15 20 - na 
totals 10,899 301 128 20 163 77,012 
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Appendix 3.1 (continued) 
1984 Mixed Copra Cloves Nutmeg Wood Arrivals 
Jan 993 35 7,412 
Feb 850 10 - 25 32 7,031 
Mar 1,600 12 3 - 10 8,454 
Apr 1,070 - - 15 - 8,288 
May 1,147 - - - 21 8,906 
Jun 880 - 5 - 8 5,981 
Jul 895 - - - - 5,444 
Aug 797 - - - - 6,237 
Sep 1,113 - - - 5 6,155 
Oct 1,711 - 17 - 30 6,874 
Nov 1,580 - 26 10 14 5,460 
Dec 1,447 - 4 - 26 7,380 
totals 14,083 22 55 85 146 83,622 
1985 Mixed Copra Cloves Nutmeg Wood Arrivals 
Jan 1,019 5 „ _ - 6,537 
Feb 982 - 70 - - 5,795 
Mar 765 - - - - 7,347 
Apr 888 3 - - - 6,065 
May 938 133 - - 11 6,603 
Jun 1,443 - - - 6 8,245 
Jul 565 124 - 15 22 7,657 
Aug 981 32 - 52 15 6,900 
Sep 912 10 142 - - 8,508 
Oct 1,455 4 208 - 25 12,917 
Nov 901 - 328 - 8 9,938 
Dec 546 3 94 3 - 9,905 
totals 11,395 314 842 70 87 96,417 
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Appendix 3.1 (continued) 
1986 Mixed Copra Cloves Nutmeg Wood Arrivals 
Jan 1,053 6 24 - 10 8,278 
Feb 280 3 50 - 8 6,684 
Mar 780 55 10 - 5 9,404 
Apr 75 83 - - 14 11,337 
May 793 57 33 - 48 8,052 
Jun 802 81 6 - 28 7,763 
Jul 737 112 15 - 115 7,920 
Aug 295 2 - 2 9 11,329 
Sep 92 11 5 1 115 7,290 
Oct 377 4 31 - 53 8,318 
Nov 464 - 33 1 16 10,473 
Dec na na na na na na 
totals 5,748 414 207 4 421 96,848 
2987 Mixed Copra Cloves Nutmeg Wood Arrivals 
Jan 497 6 24 95 10,377 
Feb 104 20 14 18 na 8,714 
Mar 487 47 6 8 116 9,288 
Apr 236 69 5 6 83 9,291 
totals 1,324 142 49 32 294 36,670 
Source: Books of the Harbor Master of Tulehu, November 1989. 
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Appendix 3.2: Amounts of mixed cargo, cement and rice (in tons); and 
number of passengers departing from the quay of Tulehu from 1980 till April 
1987 
1980 Mixed Cement Rice Departures 
Jan 252 _ 14 1378 
Feb 211 - 10 997 
Mar 367 - - 932 
Apr 208 - 4 1,103 
May 358 - 45 1,117 
Jun 412 - 18 962 
Jul 516 125 20 763 
Aug 393 - 10 852 
Sep 433 - 8 882 
Oct 385 - 10 1,096 
Nov 472 13 - 1,065 
Dec 457 1 20 1,059 
totals 4,464 139 159 12,206 
1981 Mixed Cement Rice Departures 
Jan 462 _ 1330 
Feb na na na na 
Mar 430 - - 1,141 
Apr 395 - 12 1,855 
May 270 - 45 1,662 
Jun 513 5 - 1,935 
Jul 375 12 54 1372 
Aug 251 - 62 2,260 
Sep 839 26 60 3349 
Oct 902 25 98 4,432 
Nov 781 61 64 4,774 
Dec 601 65 86 5,166 
totals 5,819 194 481 29,776 
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Appendix 3.2 (continued) 
1982 Mixed Cement Rice Departures 
Jan 562 4,197 
Feb 635 - 10 4^14 
Mar 642 20 18 5351 
Apr 897 - 32 7,408 
May 593 - 22 na 
Jun 544 - 30 9385 
Jul 804 65 105 10,089 
Aug 914 20 36 10,053 
Sep 887 44 69 9,717 
Oct 974 23 40 9,049 
Nov 869 20 46 10,215 
Dec 1,140 40 53 11,247 
totals 9,461 232 461 91,425 
1983 Mixed Cement Rice Departures 
Jan 1,092 27 44 7,840 
Feb 770 134 20 6,895 
Mar na na na na 
Apr 616 164 53 6,999 
May 747 - - 6,660 
Jun 1305 23 97 7,425 
Jul 725 30 80 7,120 
Aug 931 20 53 9,255 
Sep 1,176 - 24 9350 
Oct 1301 - 81 7,480 
Nov 1,050 101 70 9,090 
Dec 1,465 10 65 na 
totals 11,678 509 587 78,614 
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Appendix 3.2 (continued) 
1984 Mixed Cement Rice Departures 
Jan 1,056 74 129 7,412 
Feb 862 116 64 7,031 
Mar 1302 95 94 8,454 
Apr 695 28 66 8,288 
May 536 79 65 8,906 
Jun 911 12 141 5,981 
Jul 792 18 89 4,671 
Aug 888 9 105 4,266 
Sep 1,021 84 150 5,428 
Oct 1,716 11 137 6363 
Nov 1,403 70 56 5,101 
Dec 1,253 93 78 7,473 
totals 12,635 689 1,174 80,374 
1985 Mixed Cement Rice Departures 
Jan 1,198 105 115 6355 
Feb 1,642 210 100 6,140 
Mar 1,106 228 129 7,049 
Apr 743 79 84 5,892 
May 1,160 51 148 6,128 
Jun 1358 115 91 8343 
Jul 1353 135 140 8,143 
Aug 1329 102 106 7,612 
Sep 1,894 32 82 10,632 
Oct 2,295 68 170 13,088 
Nov 1,957 12 90 10,004 
Dec 1,484 36 57 9,698 
totals 17,919 1,173 1312 99,484 
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Appendix 3.2 (continued) 
1986 Mixed Cement Rice Departures 
Jan 1,238 48 84 7,495 
Feb 1,446 96 48 7382 
Mar 1,739 105 42 8,784 
Apr 1,248 59 30 11,846 
May 2,001 77 60 7,876 
Jun 1,432 594 196 7,479 
Jul 1383 167 57 6,936 
Aug 1,072 13 59 12,016 
Sep 1,049 35 43 7,702 
Oct 1,112 13 246 9,264 
Nov 1,105 - 63 10,916 
Dec na na na na 
totals 15,025 1,207 928 97,696 
2987 Mixed Cement Rice Departures 
Jan 960 178 140 8,403 
Feb 945 52 69 8,485 
Mar 1315 18 57 8,498 
Apr 1,158 29 137 9377 
totals 4378 277 403 34,963 
Source: Books of the Harbor Master of Tulehu, November 1989. 
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Appendix 3.3: An mquiry into daily expenditure and income of households 
and their members in Tulehu. 
Close to the end of the field research period in 1990 I selected three 
categories of husbands and wives for an inquiry in daily expenditure and 
income: some of my friends and neighbors, members of a savings program of 
the village cooperative, and Butonese migrants. My purpose was to identify 
their possible savings and credit needs of households and their members, 
and to explain differences between Butonese and Ambonese in this respect. 
However, this proved to be a mission impossible for several reasons. 
First, the limited time period of the inquiry proved too weak a basis for 
firm conclusions. The selected villagers all kept their data on daily 
expenditure and income in an arithmetic notebook for several weeks (see 
Table A: days counted) between 15 February and April 2, 1990. The average 
number of days per case was 22.3. However, some expenses and income 
might be much larger or smaller during other weeks and months of the year. 
Second, diverse and changing household composition complicates 
generalization about contributors and consumers of household budgets. The 
investigation concentrated on husbands and wives, with respondents not 
always counting the more or less irregular contributions of other household 
members. Although I found evidence of wives keeping most of the daily 
income of their husbands or selling the harvest of their husbands, it would 
be too easy to speak in terms of Tiouseholds' or 'wives' only, when 
describing savings and credit needs of villagers. In general, however, many 
women are very knowledgeable with regard to daily money affairs. The fact 
that in most cases the women kept the record of daily expenditure and 
income (of the wife and husband) not only contributed in a positive way to 
the validity of my data but it also suggests that most of the men have little to 
hide from their wives. In one case the income of the husband (an average of 
nearly Rp. 6,000 per working day) was classified as 'shopping money for 
mother'. His wife was a fish trader with an average net daily income of more 
than Rp. 8,000 per working day. The husband handed over most of his 
earnings to his wife, keeping a little bit of the money himself to buy 
cigarettes. 
Third, savings and credit needs cannot be explained by deducting daily 
expenditures from daily income, with a deficit indicating credit needs and a 
surplus pointing at savings needs. For instance, changing consumption 
preferences and investment targets, expressing diverse views on getting and 
using money and capital accumulation in particular, are probably much more 
important in understanding savings and credit behavior. The identification of 
savings and credit 'needs' is a very complicated affair as so many different 
motives, social relations and wider contexts affect decisions of people with 
regard to saving, finance and insurance (see also Chapters 1 and 2). 
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The identification of the credit needs of rural poor has been considered a 
mission impossible by many finance specialists because of the fungibility of 
money and the lump-sum financial management of low-income households. 
They warn poverty-oriented banks and donor agencies that the use of loans 
cannot be controlled and that looking for credit needs creates an artificial 
demand for credit. There is wisdom in these warnings: one cannot bluntly 
ask someone about his or her credit needs, in particular not at first 
encounters and when representing a large funding agency. The question is 
too general and embarrassing, as (potential) borrowers cannot give a proper 
answer without taking into account the qualities of the lender and the 
multiple stipulations of the (future) contract (cf. Adams 1994). The search for 
credit needs usually tells us more about the assessor than the assessed: a 
presumed lack of capital among the rural poor makes donors and 
development banks raise suggestive questions on credit needs; the 
interviewed will agree that he or she needs a lot of credit when he or she 
thinks that the interviewer has no intention and socio-legal means to enforce 
repayment. Less easy and predictable answers will be given when credit 
transactions are tied to the sale or purchase of commodities or are embedded 
in multifaceted relationships. Basically, potential borrowers seem to think in 
terms of credit relations and their past, present and/or future dimensions 
rather than instant credit needs. They anticipate the risk and uncertainty 
involved; they assess their debt capacity when a lender is primarily 
interested in building durable relations with the borrower; and the functional 
character of the relation with the creditor possibly offering help in case of 
emergencies or helpful information in case of new investment opportunities. 
The identification of savings and credit needs is a complicated affair and 
many financial specialists simply advise not to do this. And a short inquiry 
into daily expenditure and income is not an muminating methodological tool 
in this connection. However, the inquiry did give an impression of how 
much money is handled in various households (Table A) and of the sheer 
variety of daily expenditure (Table B). For this reason I will now introduce 
the cases and present some findings. The numbers of the cases of Tables A 
and B as well as Overview C refer to the same respondents. 
Cases 1 to 18 are some of my neighbors in katnpong Baru (twelve cases) and 
friends (six cases, of which two used to be my neighbors). Cases 19 to 30 
have been randomly selected from the members (adults) of the savings 
program for children of the village cooperative (KUD), living in different 
kampong of Tulehu. Because Butonese migrants were neither neighbors nor 
savers at the KUD, I decided to select Butonese migrants as well. The more 
substantial reason to do so was to find some evidence or counter-evidence 
regarding the general saying about Butonese migrants being very economical 
(see Chapters 2, 4 and 8). Cases 31 to 38 consist of Butonese living in 
kampong Air Panas and Pahlawan (five cases), kampong Pohon Mangga I (one 
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case) and kamvong Hurnala II (two cases). I had regular contacts with these 
Butonese except those in kampong Hurnala n. 
Table A: Total expenditure of households (in Rp), household composition, 
and income of wife and husband during a number of days between 15 
February and 2 April 1990 
Case Days Total of Number Income of Income of Total Number 
counted expenses 1 of wife husband 3 income 3 of days 
mouths 1 with 
income* 
1 28 86,375 6(240) 44,750 100,000 144,750 22 
2 16 125,600 9(270) 
156,675 293,000 148,800 441,800 16 
3 28 192,850 7(250) 
408^00 568,000 171,000 739,000 28 
4 28 157,975 
60,750 
8(152) 
102,250 102,250 5 
5 28 75,275 8(251) 
18350 111,300 33,125 144,425 28 
6 43 648375 7(250) 136,200 175,900 322,100 6 
7 46 265,125 8(242) 3 4 3 O O 325,000 359300 14 
8 18 216,100 4(220) 
2,050,000 968^00 968500 1337,000 18 
9 30 191,825 7(232) 
534,750 779,000 unk 779,000 23 
168,400 349,950 349,950 
10 28 32,600 
14,900 
1(100) 
22,425 22,425 18 
11 21 267,850 
5292367 
12(237) 
438,850 unk 438,850 17 
12 15 44350 2(200) 10350 unk 10,350 5 
13 21 77375 9(270) unk 165,000 165,000 10 
14 22 115,075 6(231) 60,000 104300 164300 22 
15 21 85,850 8(242) 
87,000 108,000 89300 197300 8 
16 21 151,950 6(222) 
484300 673300 46,000 719300 21 
17 22 73,150 6(240) 41,725 41,725 83,450 16 
18 18 58300 9(261) 25,900 90,000 155,900 9 
1 In 13 cases two figures are given in the column on total expenditures. The expenditures for 
buying produce for sale (like fish, vegetables, cigarettes, etc.) or material (wheat, rice, etc.) to 
make and sell cookies have been put separatedly in a second row. Contributions to a savings 
and credit association (arisan) have been included in the amount mentioned in a first row. 
2 Number of 'mouths' refers to the number of people in the house that consume the goods that 
are bought The first figure refers to the total number. The figures between brackets refer to the 
Tiousehold composition': the first position concerns the husband and/or wife (who have been 
interviewed), the second the number of (their) children and the third the total number of 
adopted children, (grand)parents, brothers or sisters and in-laws living in the same house. 
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Table A (continued) 
Case Days Total of Number Income of Income of Total Number 
counted expenses of 
mouths 
wife husband income of days 
with 
income 







1,237,000 '1,237,000 21 
21 8 42300 6(240) 4,750 4,750 9300 2 
22 21 185,675 9(270) 367350 85,000 452350 21 
23 21 95,050 8(260) 3,100 51300 54,600 21 
24 15 109,725 7(205) 52500 45fi00 97500 1 
25 21 155300 11(227) 
1,217,075 lß82500 21,000 1203500 21 
26 21 118,800 7(232) 61300 unk 61300 18 
27a 21 265,650 3(210) unk 105ß00 105,000 1 
27b 21 44,050 5(230) 61,250 105,000 166,250 2 
28 19 114,850 7(241) 3,000 unk 3,000 1 
29 19 123,400 8(251) 100,000 100,075 200,075 18 
30 23 85,050 4(220) 
137300 24,000 80,000 104,000 11 
31 28 129300 9(270) 186325 186ß25 373,850 19 
32 28 22,100 7(250) 319,000 279PO0 598,000 3 
33 28 93,400 7(250) 77500 300J000 377300 12 
34 28 37380 4(220) 27300 157300 185,000 8 
35 21 27,300 8(260) 78,250 78,250 156300 18 
36 7 6350 6(240) 6225 6225 12,450 4 
37 7 10,450 9(270) 12300 20,900 33,400 7 
38 15 45,100 8(260) unk 63300 63300 15 
3 Figures put in italics mean that part of the income (of the husband, the wife or both) 
has been estimated. In those cases where the husband catches fish or harvest crops 
and his wife sells them, the income has been equally divided. The income from 
shopkeeping of the Sumatran couple (Case 8) has been likewise divided. 
4 This is the number of days with income from either husband, wife or both. This 
aggregation sometimes leads to misunderstanclings, like in Case 3 where the wife has 
a (net) income per day that is not lower but higher than the one of her husband. She 
was ill for nine days. 
5 Buying price estimated at two thirds of gross income (similar to ratio of Case 9). 
6 This is after deduction of salaries and before deduction of fuel costs. Costs of fuel 
are estimated at Rp. 237300 during the count. 
Unk: Unknown 
Source: Own field research. 
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Table B: Share of different expenses (in percentages) of the total daily 
expenses of respondent-households 
Case Breakfast Rice Fish Sago Casbee Ubi 
1 24.8 26.4 0.6 2.6 0.2 0.0 
2 17.6 14.1 13.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 
3 8.5 12.0 1.6 0.0 0.8 0.0 
4 17.1 7.3 4.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 
5 33.0 30.1 9.3 4.3 0.8 0.0 
6 3.1 2.4 1.7 0.1 0.0 0.2 
7 8.7 13.7 8.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 
8 4.4 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
9 20.6 18.7 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
10 0.5 11.0 15.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 
11 8.6 18.0 9.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
12 15.4 12.0 13.1 11.1 0.0 0.0 
13 16.0 29.2 12.6 3.4 0.0 0.0 
14 11.9 14.3 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 
15 6.8 22.4 10.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
16 7.2 12.4 4.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 
17 10.7 32.4 16.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
18 28.5 25.4 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
19 12.6 0.0 16.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
20 15.0 0.0 15.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 
21 5.9 16.3 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
22 8.1 8.8 11.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
23 11.4 28.1 14.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
24 14.6 35.0 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
25 7.2 0.0 16.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
26 0.0 15.2 11.6 5.7 0.0 0.6 
27a 2.8 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
27b 15.2 0.0 10.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
28 19.6 22.2 10.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 
29 18.0 19.4 15.4 1.4 0.0 0.0 
30 9.1 6.5 10.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 
31 4.9 16.7 0.0 4.2 12.1 0.0 
32 0.0 37.1 23.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
33 2.7 12.6 3.9 2.7 0.0 4.0 
34 2.7 33.3 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
35 unk unk unk unk unk 0.0 
36 urik unk unk unk unk 0.0 
37 0.0 0.0 28.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
38 0.0 34.7 16.2 0.0 3.3 0.0 
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Table B (continued) 
Case PO CO WS RS V S F B 
1 1.6 1.6 25 1.6 6.1 5.4 1.0 2.8 
2 5.6 0.7 0.8 0.0 5.4 2.5 0.0 1.0 
3 4.0 0.5 4.8 0.6 2.2 4.3 0.2 0.3 
4 0.0 0.9 1.0 0.8 2.1 2.3 32 1.6 
5 0.4 6.0 1.9 1.4 3.9 4.7 0.0 0.3 
6 0.1 0.0 1.4 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 
7 4.6 2.6 0.8 0.5 4.4 3.2 3.0 0.4 
8 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.0 3.3 2.3 0.0 0.0 
9 1.5 1.3 5.2 0.0 5.0 2.7 0.0 4.5 
10 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 11.7 5.0 0.0 3.4 
11 4.0 0.7 4.1 0.6 3.2 2.7 1.0 1.8 
12 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 4.8 1.8 11.7 2.0 
13 0.4 1.3 7.6 0.0 4.5 7.9 3.9 0.0 
14 2.6 12.3 4.6 3.3 4.9 7.0 3.8 4.1 
15 8.2 5.4 5.1 1.4 5.4 11.2 0.6 0.0 
16 3.3 4.0 1.8 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
17 4.1 2.8 5.3 0.7 3.5 2.1 2.3 1.6 
18 0.0 6.0 10.4 0.0 3.6 6.5 0.0 1.6 
19 5.2 1.4 0.0 12 5.7 4.3 2.7 3.0 
20 5.5 3.1 5.9 0.0 3.6 3.4 25 1.4 
21 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.7 2.0 0.9 0.0 2.6 
22 4.5 2.0 3.8 0.2 6.7 2.9 0.4 12 
23 0.0 0.0 3.4 1.6 2.2 16.1 0.0 1.3 
24 2.6 2.9 6.6 0.0 4.7 5.9 0.0 0.7 
25 3.3 4.2 4.2 4.2 1.3 1.9 4.0 2.5 
26 0.0 4.2 4.6 3.4 3.0 0.8 1.7 3.7 
27a 0.1 0.0 15 0.0 0.9 1.1 0.6 0.1 
27b 2.7 3.6 95 0.6 2.3 0.6 3.9 0.5 
28 2.2 0.5 52 2.1 2.3 4.6 1.7 1.7 
29 0.0 6.2 33 2.1 5.9 8.8 1.8 1.5 
30 0.0 0.0 2.6 1.0 5.0 3.3 2.4 5.3 
31 5.2 1.7 4.9 2.3 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 
32 2.0 2.7 10.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.9 0.0 
33 0.0 0.0 3.2 2.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
34 0.0 2.3 9.6 0.0 2.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 
35 unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk 
36 unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk 
37 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.8 0.0 0.0 
38 3.3 1.7 5.9 0.0 4.8 0.9 3.8 1.3 
Explanation: Petroleum Oil (PO), minyak tanah, is used to heat pans; Coconut Oil (CO), minyak 
keiapa, is used to fry food; WS is White Sugar and RS is Red Sugar; Vegetables (V) include bayam, 
bunds, daun kasbi, kangkong, kentang, ketimon, kol, Mm, rabon, sawi, tauge, terong, tomat and wortel; S 
is Spices, including asam, bawang merah, bawang putih, dli, garam, haliya, kecap, kuning, lada, lemon, 
lombok and terasi; Fruits (F) include belimbing, durian, jeruk, gandaria, keiapa, langsat, mangga, 
nangka, papaya, papinyo, pisang and rambutan; Beans (B) include kacang biji, kacang goreng, kacang 
ijo, kacang tanah, kacang tumbu and kacang panjang. 
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Table B (continued) 
Case Sweets 
money 1 
Cigarettes Electricity Soap 1 Transport Arisan 
1 6.5 4.3 4.8 2.4 0.0 0.0 
2 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.8 4.8 0.0 
3 6.0 6.8 2.9 1.2 0.0 29.0 
4 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.3 0.0 
5 0.3 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
6 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.7 7.9 0.0 
7 0.8 0.0 7.4 1.1 0.0 46.3 
8 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 
9 3.0 6.3 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 
10 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 5.1 0.0 
11 8.8 3.5 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 
12 0.0 1.6 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 
13 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
14 0.4 5.6 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 
15 2.1 3.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
16 3.5 3.5 0.0 2.9 10.0 0.0 
17 0.4 4.9 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 
18 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
19 1.6 2.0 0.0 0.1 7.2 0.0 
20 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
21 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
22 5.2 1.6 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 
23 3.5 6.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
24 2.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
25 5.3 2.4 0.0 0.0 19.6 0.0 
26 5.3 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
27a 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
27b 6.6 2.3 0.0 0.0 9.1 0.0 
28 0.9 0.0 0.0 3.1 0.0 0.0 
29 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
30 9.4 9.4 0.0 0.2 2.4 0.0 
31 0.0 6.4 0.0 2.9 7.7 0.0 
32 0.0 13.3 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 
33 1.4 0.0 0.0 7.2 25.4 0.0 
34 7.3 25.8 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 
35 unk unk unk unk unk 0.0 
36 unk unk unk unk unk 0.0 
37 15.2 28.6 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 
38 1.3 14.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1 Sweets money (uang jajan) is pocket money given by parents to their (young) children. 
2 Soap includes soap to wash the body as well as soap to wash clothes. 
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Table B (continued) 




Cloth, shoes Gifts 1 
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 7.6 
3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.8 
4 0.0 0.0 3.6 36.4 2.8 
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
6 0.4 61.2 0.0 0.0 2.2 
7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 12.6 
8 1.1 4.6 0.4 12.7 0.0 
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 
10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 
11 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
12 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
13 0.0 45 0.0 0.0 0.0 
14 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
15 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 
17 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
18 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
19 05 2.0 0.0 3.4 6.3 
20 0.0 7.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 
21 0.0 10.2 0.0 5.9 0.0 
22 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
23 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
24 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
25 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
26 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.5 
27a 0.0 78.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
27b 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
28 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
29 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
30 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 
31 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 2.3 
32 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
33 0.0 4.0 0.0 5.4 0.0 
34 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
35 unk unk unk unk unk 
36 unk unk unk unk unk 
37 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
38 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1 Gifts includes gifts to weddings, funeral ceremonies and mosques. 
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The total of all percentages per case is not 100 percent. The lacking 
percentages include the following expenditures: 
1. Typical consumption expenditures for the fasting month: butter, wheat, 
powder milk, canned meat, small breads and delicacies such as bubur, kue 
lapis and asida. 
2. Lunch bought at a small food store. 
3. Other consumption expenditures such as tahu, keladi, eggs, macaroni, meat 
and mie. 
4. Kitchen utensils. 
5. Firewood. 
6. Fish lines and hooks. 
7. Payment to the water carrier. 
8. Postage. 
9. Ticket for a film. 
For many households the largest of these 'residual' expenditures concerned 
the expenditure for the fasting month starting March 28, 1990. In 18 cases the 
remainder is less than 10 percent (mcluding 27a); in ten cases it is 10 to 20 
percent; in seven cases it is 20 to 30 percent (including 27b); in two cases it is 
30 to 35 percent; and in two cases it is unknown. 
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Outline C: Features of the various income-generating activities of the 
husbands (he) and wives (she)1 
1: He is a fisherman, carpenter and harvests nutmeg and coconut; she sells the fish 
caught by her husband. 
2: She is a market women and sells baked banana; he is the head of a primary school 
(earning Rp. 279,000 per month) 
3: She is a fish trader and had no income when she was ill during nine days of the 
count; he is a driver and his income is called uang belanja ibu (shopping money for 
mother). 
4: She smokes tuna fish; she gets a lot of help (in cash and kind) from her brothers 
and sisters as she takes care of their old parents; her husband works in Saudi-Arabia 
and sends a dollar cheque every now and then. 
5: He cuts sago trees, catches fish and harvests fruit; she sells cigarettes, banana, 
peanuts, beans before her house as well as the fish and fruits harvested by her 
husband. 
6: Both are civil servants: he monthly gets Rp. 122,750 and she earns Rp. 92,000 per 
month; she sells cookies and a clove product every now and then. 
7: He is the main assistant of a large clove trader; she sells peanuts and home-baked 
cookies. 
8: They are a Sumatran couple and run a shop. 
9: She is a market women and fish trader; one of her daughters is her partner. 
10: She is a widow and enjoys a pension (estimated at Rp. 75,000 per month); she 
regularly bakes and sells cookies. A local shopkeeper sells her cookies at a price of 
Rp. 25 per piece. She gets Rp. 20 per cookie from the shopkeeper. 
11: She sells peanuts, banana and Mm vegetables; her husband never came home 
during the count. 
12: She sells peanuts in front of her house and he makes roof plates of sago palm 
leaves (atop) at home. 
13: He is a harbor laborer and his wife sells self-baked cookies and the like. 
14: He is a very active fisherman and harvests fruits; his wife is a fish trader. 
15: She is a fish trader and he is a nurse at the local hospital. 
16: She is a fish trader and he is a fisherman harvesting fish at a sero gantung. 
17: He harvests fruits (lansat, durian, banana, coconut) and makes roof plates of sago 
palm leaves {atop); she sells the fruits. 
18: She sells beans and he is a soldier (with an estimated income of Rp. 150,000 per 
month). 
19: Both are teachers: he is 51 years old and his income is estimated at Rp. 225,000; 
she is 40 years old and her income is estimated at Rp. 150,000 per month; she sells 
durian fruits and he gets an extra bonus for supervision of students during their 
practical time. 
20: He used to be the traditional head of the village but now owns speedboats and a 
theatre. 
21: He is a fisherman and she sells beans. 
22: She sells banana cookies and owns a billiard-table; he is a chauffeur. 
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23: He is a chauffeur and two of his sons are in the transport sector as well; he gives 
his wife Rp. 2,000 to 3,000 every day. His sons also contribute to the household 
budget. Every month she gets another Rp. 100,000 from them. She sells fruits. 
24: Both worked in the Netherlands from 1951-1962 and now enjoy a pension of Dfl. 
91.46 each per month. She sells ice in front of her house. 
25: She is a teacher and earns about Rp. 75,000 per month. Her husband just 
graduated from an academy; her older sister is a market woman; her adopted child is 
a conductor who gives her about Rp. 30,000 per month. 
26: She sells nasi kelapa; her daughter who is a primary school teacher gives her Rp. 
10,000 per month plus 25 kilogrammes of rice. 
27: He (a) enjoys a pension (estimated at Rp. 150,000 per month) as a military officer; 
He (b) is employed by the village cooperative (at Rp. 150,000 per month) and she (b) 
is a civil servant (with a salary of Rp. 87,500 per month) 
28: She sells baked banana, beans and self-baked bread; he is a farmer. 
29: He is a harbor laborer and she sells a rice product as breakfast (ketupat). 
30: She is a petty petrol vendor and every now and then buys one drum of petrol at a 
price of Rp. 35^00 from a petrol truck; he is the owner of a billiard-room. 
31: La harvests nutmeg, cloves and durian fruits; Wa sells nutmeg and cloves from 
their stock; the durian is sold the same day. 
32: La is a sago cutter. 
33: La cultivates and sells tomatoes and other vegetables. La also fishes every now 
and then. 
34: She is a regularly-paid guard at the local hospital and he is a sago cutter and 
fisherman. 
35: He catches fish and collects durian fruits. She sells them. 
36: He harvests fruits, such as langsat, nangka and banana. She sells a chicken. He 
collects tuberous plants (ubi kayu) and fruits, like mangga, durian and banana, for daily 
consumption. 
37: He collects fruits and tuberous plants for daily consumption; he owns a machine 
and processes casbee for payment. She makes and sells roof plates of sago palm 
leaves at a price of Rp. 80 per piece. The plates are sold to a wholesaler who usually 
buys a hundred from her. 
38: He is a water-carrier supplying Ambonese households with water at a price of Rp. 
200 per two buckets (or more - depending on the distance from river to house). 
1 The first name of a Butonese man is preceded with 'La' whereas the first name of a 
Butonese woman comes after 'Wa'. 
Table A and Overview C show that Ambonese women — except a few -
have their own mcome-generating activities. Four clusters of such activities 
can be distinguished: first, selling vegetables, fish (fresh and smoked) at the 
local market or in the harbor area; second, selling 'breakfast snacks' on the 
street or close to the bus station; third, working at an office or school as a 
civil servant; fourth, selling home-baked cookies, cigarettes, peanuts, etc. in 
front of the house. 
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Market women and fish traders earn between Rp. 5,000 and Rp. 10,000. 
Income from the sale of 'breakfast snacks' is usually less but varies per 
snack. According to a woman (Case 28), the net income of selling two 
kilogrammes of grean beans (kacang ijo) is Rp. 2,500 per day. The net income 
of selling 100 small pieces of bread is Rp. 5,000 but can take more than one 
day. If one collects 100 pieces of ice from a person who owns a fridge, the 
owner gets Rp. 1,750 and the street vendor gets Rp. 750. Another woman 
(Case 29) frequently borrows three kilogrammes of rice from a shop at a 
price of Rp. 1,800; she sells 80 ketupat (wrapped up in banana leaf) at a price 
of Rp. 50 each. Her net (daily) income is about Rp. 2,000 as spices cost about 
Rp. 200. 
The monthly income of a civil servant is usually less than what is earned by 
a market woman or fish trader in one month but it is secure and stable. If a 
market woman or fish trader gets ill (as happened in Case 3), participates in 
a funeral ceremony (as happened in Case 4) or does not buy produce 
because she assesses profit margins to be too small and risks too high (with 
evidence found in Cases 3, 4 and 16), she makes no money at all. Selling 
activities in front of the house contribute only small amounts to the 
household budget — if anything at all because relatives and neighbours 
consume a lot of cigarettes and cookies without paying. 
The income-generating activities of the Ambonese men involved in the 
inquiry can be classified into four clusters or categories starting with quite 
capital-intensive activities and ending with subsistence-oriented ones: first, 
owning a speedboat and theatre; second, driving a bus, loading and 
unloading cargo in one of the harbors, assisting a large clove trader; third, 
working at an office, school or hospital as a civil servant; fourth, cutting sago 
trees, traditional fishing, making roof plates of sago palm leaves. 
The income of a driver and harbor laborer varies (in our cases) between Rp. 
120,000 and 235,000 on a monthly basis whereas the income of a civil servant 
(in our cases) varies between Rp. 75,000 and nearly Rp. 280,000 per month. A 
professional sago cutter (using traditional technologies) can earn about Rp. 
70,000 in one month. 
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Appendix 3.4: Number of postal remittances cashed in the Post Office of 
Tulehu sent by relatives living in the Netherlands or outside Tulehu in 
Indonesia 1 
Year Number of postal remittances 
cashed in the Post Office of 
Tulehu) from the Netherlands 
(N) or elsewhere in Indonesia 
(If 
Total Amount Average amount 
1985 93 (N) 5,731,158 61,625 
1986 37 (N) 2331341 68,690 
1987 40 (N) 4,255,126 106378 
1988 56 (N) 8,130345 145,185 
594(1) 32,670,073 55,000 
19893 37 (N) 4350,480 122,986 
1 This appendix does not include remittances that are cashed by villagers of Tulehu at 
the Head Post Office of Ambon city (see, for an example, pp. 51-62: 'Old and New 
Neighbors') and also excludes 'remittances' that are sent with the help of 'go-
betweens' (such as, for instance, Dutch people) who spend their holidays on Ambon 
island. My experience is that these other remittances can be quite large amounts of 
money (such as Dfl. 1,000 or USD 700, that is, more than Rp. 1,000,000). Because we 
do not know in how many cases remittances have been cashed by the same person 
or another person who, however, belongs to the same household, it is hard to draw 
firm conclusions about the percentage of inhabitants or households of Tulehu 
(officially 12,000 inhabitants and 2,000 households) enjoying gifts from relatives 
living elsewhere. 
2 The Post Office of Tulehu used two main entries to classify the remittances: Toreign 
Countries' and 'Domestic'. Toreign Countries', in practice, was synonym to the 
Netherlands with remittances sent from many different places, like Alphen a an de 
Rijn, Amerongen, Appingedam, Assen, Barneveld, Breda, Bussum, Capelle, 
Culemborg, Deventer, Dieren, Eibergen, Elst, Epe, Franeker, Geleen, Gouda, 
Groningen, Heerenveen, Helmond, 's Hertogenbosch, Hoogeveen, Huizen, Leerdam, 
Lunteren, Middelburg, Nijverdal, Nunspeet, Ridderkerk, Roden, Tiel, Tilburg, 
Vaassen, Vught and Waalwijk. 
3 Till July 18,1989. 
Source: Post Office of Tulehu. 
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Evolving Forms of Informal Finance in an 
Indonesian Town1 
Like other coastal towns in the Moluccan province of Indonesia, Tulehu 
has resources that guarantee most inhabitants a minimum living standard; 
sago peurns provide the traditional staple food as well as all necessary 
materials for traditional house construction, and the sea is a supplier of fish, 
an integral part of the daily diet. Food production requires neither capital-
intensive inputs nor large amounts of labor; in one week a half dozen people 
can collect enough sago food for the needs of three months. For most of the 
12,000 people living in or near the town, traditional farming and fishing are 
still major activities, but in the past couple of decades the range of economic 
activities has broadened with more government jobs and the opening of new 
port facilities. Still, when I asked a fish seller what she would do in case of 
total lack of money, she responded with ke hutan saja (we just go to the 
forest). The forest, even more than the sea, is perceived as a bank of last 
resort. 
In addition to the forest, however, various informal financial arrangements 
are also increasingly used by all classes of people in Tulehu to satisfy their 
economic needs and to insure against risks. In the following discussion I 
outline some of the arrangements I encountered while doing a study there in 
1989. Recent innovations in these arrangements show that informal finance 
behaves like a chameleon; it offers a colorful palette of financial services to 
villagers and readily adapts itself to their diverse and changing financial 
needs. 
1. Originally published in the book of D.W. Adams and Delbert A. Fitchett (eds.), Informal 
Finance in Low-Income Countries, pp. 225-238. Reprinted with permission of Westview Press. 
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Economic Change 
The extent and make up of informal financial arrangements is strongly 
influenced by overall economic conditions. Gradually, these conditions have 
been changing in Tulehu, causing substantial changes in the nature of 
informal finance in the area. Tulehu enjoys a strategic position in regional 
trade. Products such as fish, cloves, nutmeg, coconut, and fruits pass through 
the town's port on their way to Ambon city, and consumer goods are 
shipped via Tulehu to other islands. This strategic position gives the 
inhabitants opportunities to escape the subsistence oriented sago economy: 
government employees, fish traders, vegetable sellers, harbor laborers, 
busdrivers, speedboat crews, petrol vendors, and shopkeepers earn most of 
their incomes from nonfarm activities. Tulehu's central position in trade and 
transport networks reduces the dependency of the town's economy on the 
local clove production: in most years there are clove booms in some parts of 
the region, whose produce passes through Tulehu. 
In 1985-86 the strategic position of Tulehu as a regional trade and transport 
center was reinforced by the construction of a second harbor. Along side this 
harbor new shops were opened and new labor groups found employment in 
loading and unloading ships. Both the informal and formal financial sector 
expanded as a result of these changes. 
The construction of the new harbor facilities also attracted the Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (BRT), which opened a unit near the new port in 1987. The saving 
programs of the unit service a broad spectrum of people. One BRI deposit 
mobilization program called SIMPEDES attracted more than 700 depositors 
in less than two years. The interest rates paid on SIMPEDES accounts range 
up to 13.5 percent per annum. These rates are less than the 15 percent annual 
rate paid on another, more restricted, deposit program called TABANAS, but 
still the SIMPEDES program had twice as many depositors as TABANAS. 
This might be due to the response of SIMPEDES to popular financial needs 
of depositors, such as simple savings procedures, easy withdrawal 
procedures, and the possibility to win prizes in a lottery scheme. 
Clove Harvesting 
Many of the people in Tulehu realize substantial but unpredictable cash 
incomes from the clove business: every several years, clove trees yield a crop 
that is sold for a considerable amount of money. Cloves also represent a 
form of savings. After the harvest, part of the crop is often stored in the 
home and then sold when money is needed. In the 1970s, when clove prices 
rose to about US$20 per kilogram, 40 mature clove trees, each yielding 10 
kilograms, were enough to pay for large expenditures such as a pilgrimage 
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to Mecca or a new house with concrete walls and a metal roof. In the 1980s, 
the prices of cloves fell to only about US$2 per kilogram, while the cost of a 
journey to Mecca and house construction material sharply increased. 
Economic activities in the town shifted accordingly: in the late 1980s few 
residents were able to make the trip to Mecca, and families who wanted to 
build a new house did it in steps, resulting in numerous unfinished houses. 
The economic boom of the 1970s caused by high oil prices and attractive 
prices for other commodities produced in Indonesia did little to upgrade the 
economic base of Moluccan villages and towns. The large government cash 
flows into rural areas, partly in the form of subsidized loans, were largely 
used for consumption and resulted in little economic diversification of 
agriculture. Instead, it moved farmers closer to monocultural clove 
cultivation. The Indonesian government contributed to this by offering cheap 
credit for the intensification of clove production. When prices dropped 
because of the government promoted increases in clove acreage, the farmers 
were left with increased consumption needs only. 
Migrants to Tulehu, such as the Butonese, do not enjoy the same economic 
opportunities as do the natives: these newcomers lack traditional ownership 
or use fructuary rights to land and trees, and therefore concentrate on 
providing labor or financial services. The Butonese are migrants from 
Southeast Sulawesi and can be found in nearly all Moluccan villages. They 
provide substantial amounts of informal loans that support the clove 
business: they either buy the cloves-on-the-trees at harvest time (beli budh), 
and then do the harvesting themselves, or they lend the owner of the clove 
trees money by buying the rights, well in advance, to harvest clove trees for 
one or more good seasons (setoa pohon) — good seasons occurring only once 
in three years on average. The Butonese lender assumes both the price and 
yield risks of the crop. 
The Clove Trade 
Besides loans provided by the Butonese, there are four other main 
categories of organizations and lenders who are involved in the close trade 
and associated credit transactions: village cooperatives (KUDs), shopkeepers, 
private professional traders, and agents for cigarette factories. 
The cooperative movement is under the general direction and management 
of the central government in Jakarta, and the KUDs in the Moluccan province 
have a monopoly on cloves marketing. They buy cloves directly from the 
farmers for a fixed price and then PUSKUD, the central cooperative, auctions 
the cloves collected by the KUDs. Many of the KUDs also provide some 
loans to individuals who own clove trees. 
In practice, the KUDs are not able to buy all of the cloves produced and 
this leaves room for other agents to become involved in the clove trade. In 
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the remote towns and villages in the Moluccas where shopping alternatives 
and possibilities to earn money are few, local shopkeepers offer consumer 
goods on credit and accepts repayment in kind: the debt is recorded in 
kilograms of cloves and the interest payment is embedded in the price paid 
for the product. These shopkeepers, in turn, may be receiving loans in kind 
or cash from professional traders or from KUDs. Relatively large amounts of 
funds enter villages such as Tulehu in this way. At harvest time the big 
traders and KUDs collect the cloves at the village shops for loan repayment. 
Profits and interest rates for parties involved are hidden and depend on 
future market prices for cloves. Credit is a tying device in this part of the 
cloves market. 
Clove change hands from private traders to agents of kretek cigarette 
factories (the private channel) and from KUDs to PUSKUD (the government 
cooperative channel). These channels often cross: professional private traders 
and shopkeepers let the KUDs sell their cloves at lucrative prices on auction 
floor at the PUSKUD. Some KUDs that collect more cloves than can be 
auctioned at the PUSKUD sell their cloves to or store them with, cloves 
wholesalers or other merchants in Ambon city.2 A number of these 
transactions involve informal loans whose terms vary widely. 
Fishing Business 
The decline in the price of cloves in the 1980s made the Buyonese more 
cautious about long-term loan agreements with owners of clove trees. As a 
result, they shifted part of their investments and lending activities to fishing 
endeavors. Wrecked ships on theshore near Tulehu are vivid reminders of 
unsuccessful attempts by the government during the 1970s to promote high-
tech investments in fining. When borrowers could not keep up the 
maintenance or loan payments on these boats they returned to traditional 
fishing using low-technology equipment such as wooden canoes, rafts, and 
small nets. In the late 1980s nearly all the owners of fishing rafts (bagan) in 
Tulehu were Butonese. In the late 1980s the construction of a medium-sized 
bagan cost about US$2,200 far less than the price of a motorized boat but 
many times the price of a proa (wooden canoe). In some cases the Butonese 
rented these rafts and also provided informal loans for their operations. 
Some Butonese fish wholesalers in the nearby city of Ambon also supplied 
interest free loans to fishermen who agreed to sell them future catches. 
Many of the Butonese who finance both clove harvesting and fishing 
activities, in turn, occasionally obtain loans from government pawnshops 
2. See chapter 8 for a more comprehensive and historical account of clove marketing 
chains in the Central Moluccas. 
Evolving Forms of Informal Finance in an Indonesian Town 137 
located in Ambon. As Bouman and Houtman (1988) found in India, these 
individuals usually pawn gold coins or ornaments. The maximum periods on 
these loans are 3 and 6 months with interest rates of 4 and 3 percent per 
month. Pawnshops are able to fulfill emergency financial needs of the 
Butonese on the spot - an identity card and a gold item are enough to obtain 
a loan. Many of these loans are repaid within two months. The pawnshop is 
the only formal financial institution that is accessible to the 'landless' 
Butonese. 
Government Employees 
A relatively large number of government employees, including teachers, 
live in and around Tulehu since it is the administrative capital of a 
subdistrict. Nearly 350 local residents are on the government payroll and 
about 85 people enjoy government pension payments. This results in a 
regular cash flow into many of the 2,000 households located in the Tulehu 
area. Government jobs are valued because white collar workers enjoy some 
prestige, a regular income, and pension benefits. Government salaries, 
nevertheless, are usually not enough to cover daily expenditures that can, in 
effect, force government employees to work in the forest on free days or to 
have some other part-time job. 
Although the monthly salaries of the government employees are hardly 
enough to cover most household expenses, many employees are creditworthy 
in the eyes of both formal and informal financial intermediaries because they 
have stable sources of income. In a credit program called KUPEDES that is 
provided by the branch of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) in Tulehu, for 
example, more than 90 percent of the borrowers are government employees. 
A number of shopkeepers in the town supply consumer goods on credit 
mainly to government employees. The number of their borrowing customers 
varies but may be as high as 40 persons per shop. These customers are 
expected to repay the interest-free loan within several months. The 
shopkeepers do not perceive it as credit but speak of customers "who have 
not yet paid" (belum bayar). 
The extensive amount of street vending activities by women in Tulehu 
indicate the need for extra income among government employees as well as 
other people laboring in the private sector. These activities are called bantu 
suami (to help your husband), which in fact refers to all income-generating 
activities of wives. Women dominate as vendors in the vegetable and fish 
markets and are, generally speaking, substantially involved in small informal 
loans as well as informal group savings efforts. 
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ROSCAs 
An interesting development in Tulehu is the increasing popularity of arisan 
among a variety of inhabitants. These associations are similar in many 
regards to ROSCAs found by Bouman (1979) and other researchers in many 
low-income countries. Their growing popularity is an indication of the 
increasing capacity to save due to the expanded possibilities for people in the 
area to earn income in government service, as workers, or as entrepreneurs. 
Individuals who are still mainly traditional farmers or fishermen are seldom 
members of ROSCAs, apparently because they lack relatively steady cash 
incomes. 
During my research I encountered several dozen ROSCAs. A tabulation of 
these arisan by member characteristics is given in Table 4.1. As can be noted, 
a broad range of economic and social groups are members of arisan. One of 
the Sumatran restaurant/shopkeepers groups had the longest experience 
with an arisan in Tulehu: they started their group some 15 years ago, when 
they were newcomers. Each week they came together to eat and drink and 
play arisan as a means of strengthening ethnic ties. They had earlier exposure 
to ROSCAs in Sumatra where they were called bajulo-julo. Over time this 
group gradually commercialized the arisan and discontinued weekly 
meetings. A predetermined sequence of receivers, instead of the lottery 
system, now determines the rotation of the fund; all participants bring their 
contributions each day to the group leader and after ten days, one participant 
comes to the leader to receive the deposits. The group leader is the first 
person to take the fund. 
Table 4.1: Member arisan encountered in Tulehu in 1989 
Member characteristics Number of arisan 
Sumatran restaurant and shopkeepers 2 
Haruku women 1 
Banda women 1 
Harbor laborers 3 
Petrol vendors 1 
Fish traders 2 
Market women and restaurant managers 4 
Praying and singing groups 5 
Government employees 5 
Total 24 
Source: Field survey in 1989. 
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A government employees' group has the second oldest arisan. They started 
about 10 years ago when government circulars encouraged the savings habit. 
In the two women's clubs the arisan functions as a focal point to mobilize 
and organize members around festivities or specific social issues, such as 
health care and family planning. Their meetings, like their salaries, are on a 
monthly basis. The 18 other ROSCAs have been started in the last 5 years 
and were called arisan, which indicates an external origin of the term and 
practice. 
It may be useful to regroup these arisan by applying five additional 
criteria: 
1. by the gender of members, 
2. by the primary purpose of the arisan, 
3. by the period of rotation, 
4. by the mechanism that determines rotation of the fund, and 
5. by the existence of a complementary emergency loan fund. 
Gender Groups 
As might be expected, there was gender concentration among the arisan 
surveyed. Two of the groups, the harbor workers and the petrol vendors, 
were made up of only males. The Sumatran restaurant operator and 
shopkeepers' arisan and the fish traders' ROSCA had both male and female 
members. The remainder of the groups had only female members. In part 
these gender tendencies show social preferences, but they also rnirror the 
gender make up of the economic group around which the ROSCAs were 
organized — there are almost no females who fish or sell petrol, for example. 
Primary Purpose 
Some of the groups appeared to be mainly socializing mechanisms, while 
other arisan had mainly economic functions. The Sumatran restaurant 
operator/shopkeepers, the Haruku women, and the Banda women groups 
were made up almost entirely of enthnic minorities who used an arisan as an 
instrument to tie together people with common roots, these groups had a 
flavor of being mutual protection associations. The groups built on praying 
and singing clubs and those comprised of government employees also 
appeared to be organized largely around social or religious issues. The 
remaining arisan had strong economic overtones. The primary functions of 
these economic units were to mobilize deposits, encourage members to save 
more, to privide loans to members, and to act as a risk management 
instrument for members. Many of the members in these economic arisan 
reported they joined because they felt participation resulted in them saving 
more than if they were not members. 
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Rotation Period 
A third way to classify arisan is by their period of rotation. These periods 
strongly correlate with the primary function of the ROSCA; if the arisan is 
primarily a social organization, funds are collected and distributed at the 
weekly or monthly meeting of the group. If the arisan primarily satisfies 
savings needs, the members contribute daily, but the fund is distributed 
every two, five, or ten days. The collection and distribution of the funds in 
these types of arisan takes place during working hours in a shop, restaurant, 
or market stall. Every day, each participant brings his/her contribution to the 
moneykeeper and at the end of the savings period one participant comes to 
this person to obtain the fund. The daily saving clubs also offer their 
members short-term lending facilities and a member may borrow from the 
keeper of the fund, provided that she/he repays before the end of the 
savings period. ROSCAs that are more economic in nature collect and 
distribute funds on a cycle that coincides with the payment of members' 
salaries or wages. 
Determination of Rotation 
Arisan can also be classified according to the mechanisms used to 
determine the rotation of the fund—who receives the fund at any given 
rotation. These mechanisms are closely related to the primary function of the 
arisan: if the arisan is mainly a socializing technique, a lottery is standard 
procedure in Tulehu for deterrnining the order of the rotation. If the arisan is 
mostly an economic group, a member list is drawn up in which the order of 
rotation is determined both by lottery and deliberation between the treasurer 
and members who are in need of the fund. I did not find any arisan that 
used bids to deterrnine order of rotation, a practice that is common in many 
other Asian countries. 
Complementary Emergency Fund 
A final way to classify arisan is by the existence or absence of associated 
nonrotating emergency funds that complement the arisan. Typically, small 
contributions are made to these emergency funds by group members each 
time they pay shares into the ROSCA, but the money in the two funds are 
kept separately. It is also common for this emergency fund to provide loans 
or grants to members in case of sickness or death and even for religious 
purposes. In some cases, funds in the emergency funds may also be lent to 
individuals who are not members of the group. Fourteen of the ROSCAs 
studied had emergency funds: both women groups, two of the three harbor 
laborers groups, the praying and singing clubs, and the government 
employees groups. 
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Multiple Funds 
One of the harbor labor groups I studied was involved in four distinct 
funds: one that rotated the distribution of the money collected, and three 
funds that did not rotate. When work is done, the 25 members of the group 
meet to divide the team's total daily income. The group's income varies 
between about US$110 and US$340 per working day. Earlier, the members 
agreed to participate in an arisan that distributed the equivalent of about 
US$55 to each member in rotation. 
Due to the unpredictability of team incomes, this group designed an 
innovative way to manage the collection and timing of payments to the 
ROSCA. They agreed to put all daily group earnings in excess of US$110 into 
a ROSCA fund. When the 'excess-earnings' fund reached the equivalent of 
about 55 US$ it was given to one of the members of the group, in rotation, 
who was selected by lottery. If the excess was less than 55 US$, the rotation 
was postponed until that amount had been accumulated. If the excess income 
in one day was worth at least US$110, then two members received their 
rotations in a single day. On average the group worked about three days per 
week in the port and were able to complete a entire rotation of the fund in 
about two months. 
In addition to the ROSCA fund, the group also made contributions to 
another parallel emergency fund. This fund was made up of small amounts 
of money left over after payment of the regular ROSCA shares and by 
occasional voluntary contributions by members. This fund could be used for 
any group or individual emergency, such as paying for damages done to 
cargo handled by the group. 
In mid-1989 two subgroups within this team of laborers decided to 
contribute to still two other forms of nonrotating funds. One subgroup made 
small contributions to a fund each work day that was used to help Islamic 
religious leaders, and to assist poor people. This fund might be labeled a 
social welfare fund. Another subgroup made similar small contributions to a 
fund that was allowed to build up, and then appropriate shares were 
returned to contributing members just before the Islamic fasting month 
began, when large amounts of food were typically purchased. This fund had 
many of the features of a contractual savings program aimed at assembling 
deposits sufficient for some targeted purchase. 
An Evolving Group 
About 15 years ago four women who were relatives started a praying 
society that met on Sunday evenings. Each week the members contributed to 
a nonrotating fund that was used for religious purposes and helping poor 
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people. The funds collected were stored in a box in the home of the 
organizer. Eventually the society grew to 37 members who decided several 
years ago to contribute additional small amounts each meeting to an arisan. 
The arisan funds collected are given out in rotation to society members who 
were chosen by lot. The woman receiving the distribution, in turn, was 
expected to host the meeting of the society the following week and to use the 
arisan money to pay for the expenses incurred in hosting the meeting. 
The weekly meetings of the praying arisan society further consolidated the 
existing family and friendship ties among the members and provided a solid 
base for other commercial activities by the group. A few months after the 
start of the arisan, the club opened a cooperative store. The 37 members of 
the club bought shares in the store that provided starting capital equivalent 
to approximately US$500. The new store developed commercial relations 
with a wholesaler who soon began to supply consumer goods on credit to 
the store. Since then, the store has twice issued a 200 percent stock dividend 
and also extended consumer credit to about 60 customers. 
Jxi 1990 the group decided to open a deposit account in the local branch of 
the Bank Rakyat Indonesia where they deposited idle social-religious funds 
and some of the cash generated by the store. The attractive interest rate 
offered by the bank was the main reason for this decision. The society has 
not sought a bank loan because they are satisfied with the credit 
arrangements they have with a Chinese wholesaler who continues to provide 
them goods on credit efficiently and without charging any explicit interest. 
Money Guards 
This Chinese wholesaler provides 84 shops in the region with consumer 
goods on credit. He also holds small deposits made by a group of 11 laborers 
who frequently work for him or for one of his clients. The laborers receive 
no explicit payment for these funds but they do informally count on his help 
in case of financial trouble, and he also occasionally gives them free 
cigarettes. The laborers believe it is not advisable to keep savings at home 
because the money is too easily spent. The wholesaler said, "I don't pay them 
any rent (on their money)" and describes his function as a money guard. 
Another shopkeeper who is Javanese also is a money guard. He owns two 
buses for public transport. His drivers play a pivotal role in his enterprise as 
they must realize enough daily income to pay for the installments on the 
loans he used to buy the buses. As an incentive to work hard he pays his 
drivers 20 percent of the daily gross income they generate. Because of this 
arrangement and the large size of the buses, both drivers are able to save a 
substantial part of their income which they leave on account with their boss. 
The importance of offering money guarding services was clearly 
understood by the chairman of the local cooperative (KUD). In October 1988 
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the innovative chairman started the first daily deposit program in the 
Moluccan province under KUD sponsorship without direction from higher 
authorities. He advertised the effort as an educational savings program for 
children and their parents who want to assemble funds for school 
expenditures. Within three months more than 1,000 parents and children 
opened deposit accounts at the KUD that paid no interest. The program 
offers depositors three benefits: a secure place to deposit funds, convenient 
hours for making deposits and withdrawals, and simple procedures. This 
daily savings program of the KUD satisfies an illiquidity preference (the 
money guarding) and a liquidity preference (easy withdrawal). The KUD 
chairman's motives are not completely altruistic. He deposits the funds 
mobilized in the local unit of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia and realizes for the 
cooperative a 13.5 percent rate of return on the deposits. In a casual way he 
was providing the link between informal deposits and formal banking that 
has been promoted by Seibel (1985). 
Conclusions 
Some researchers, such as Geertz (1962), have viewed informal finance as 
being a static stepping stone or transitory phase that is left behind as 
development occurs. Other people, particularly politicians, have thought 
informal finance was a scourge that should be eliminated as quickly as 
possible. The impressions I gleaned from my research lead me to be uneasy 
with both views. Informal finance in Tulehu is dynamic, growing and 
evolving; it appears to have a highly complementary relationship with 
development, in general, and also with growth in the formal financial 
system. Informal finance also provides highly valuable financial services to 
many poor people, to individuals who start small businesses, and to 
marginal social groups. It is doing for poor people what many formal credit 
programs fail to do: providing them sustained financial services. 
The chances of improving the performance formal finance programs, in 
this regard, may be enhanced if more features of the informal financial 
system are grafted onto these programs. These include more emphasis on 
deposit mobilization, more attention to pawning, more attention to insurance, 
and building more convenience into formal finance programs. 
Deposits 
I was impressed by the amount and extent of savings that occurred in 
informal financial markets in Tulehu. The substantial amounts of deposits 
made in ROSCAs and in other nonrotating group funds show that people in 
the area are willing to save. The significant use of money guards as a place 
to hold deposits is an indication that people have a need to save even when 
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the explicit rewards for doing so are nil. While the formal financial system is 
gradually offering more formal deposit services in the area, clearly formal 
deposit mobilization opportunities have not yet been fully exploited. 
Pawning 
Because of the low transaction costs involved for both lender and 
borrower, pawning is an inexpensive way to provide small, short-term loans 
to borrowers who would otherwise not be creditworthy. In Indonesia, 
pawning services are offered by some banks and it may be desirable to 
extend these services into other banking facilities. In countries where all 
pawning is done by the informal market, it may be desirable to formalize at 
least some of these services. 
Insurance 
Enhancing mutual trust and building unutilized credit reserves that can be 
used in times of trouble are major reasons for participating in informal 
finance. In large measure, many forms of informal finance are substitutes for 
formal insurance and for dependable access to other formal financial services. 
Formal financial intermediaries might offer various forms of explicit 
insurance and also provide more dependable services that emulate these 
features of informal finance. 
Convenience 
Three of the most impressive features of informal finance in Tulehu are its 
flexibility, its proximity, and the fact that it is entirely designed to meet 
needs of its users. Various systems have been developed to mobilize small 
amounts of irregular savings, along with systems to provide small loans to 
people who borrow only occasionally to meet some pressing need or to 
capitalize on some fleeting opportunity. Participants value this flexibility 
highly and are willing to pay significant amounts to sustain access to these 
valuable services. The value, in the eyes of users, of these services is 
enhanced by the close proximity of informal financial transactions to where 
users work, live, or do most of their shopping. Formal finance would be 
more useful if it embodied more of these convenience features. 
5 
People That Count: The Forgotten 
Faces of Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations in Indonesia1 
It is very popular nowadays for both researchers of rural finance and 
representatives of development agencies to briefly honor the role of rotating 
savings and credit associations in rural financial markets of Third World 
countries (cf. Berger 1989; World Bank 1989). To define a rotating savings 
and credit association as a group of people who agree to make regular 
contributions to a fund which is given, in whole or in part, to each 
contributor in turn (cf. Ardener 1964; Bouman 1977), is to demonstrate that 
the author is well aware of the importance of this widespread phenomenon 
in Third World countries. An outline of a standard pattern of rotating 
savings and credit associations is a minimum requirement for any 
publication on 'rural financial intermediation' or 'informal finance': ten 
participants contribute 10 dollar every month to the rotating fund and 
eventually pocket 100 dollars each. After 10 months the cycle is closed (cf. 
Bouman 1977) but participants may decide to start another one, possibly with 
a different member composition and adapted rules. 
Most Interesting, Ancient and Significant 
in Size and Coverage 
The new benevolent attention to rotating savings and credit associations is 
also directed to Indonesian ones that have only recently been praised for 
their impressive and promising qualities. According to Kern (1986), former 
credit adviser with the USAID/Government of Indonesia Provincial 
1. Originally published in 1992 in Savings and Development XV1(4): 371-401. Reprinted with 
permission of the editor of the journal. 
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Development Programme in East Java, "One of the most interesting forms of 
rural financial institutions in Indonesia, as well as many other countries, is 
the Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA), or in Indonesian, 
arisan" (p.118). Bouman and Moll (1992) who are rural finance analysts, state 
that, "The most ancient and widespread form of group finance in Indonesia 
is likely the rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA) called arisan" 
(p.215). The Indonesia Rural Credit Sector Review of the Asia Regional Office 
of the World Bank recognizes that the so-called informal credit system 
including rotating savings and credit associations, is "significant in size and 
coverage" (1987: iv). 
However, I believe that the apparent praise of the role of rotating savings 
and credit associations in Indonesia and elsewhere has to be interpreted with 
great caution. Not because I feel that these associations are not popular 
among millions of rural and urban people in Third World countries (cf. Von 
Pischke 1991). My three-fold concern is rather about the quality and different 
intentions of the swelling choir of researchers and policy makers who 
acclaim rotating savings and credit associations. First, it is not the self-
regulative capacities of poor people that is acclaimed but rather the rotating 
savings and credit association as a model. The use of the abbreviation 
ROSCA (in capital letters) is very telling in this respect. Used as a model, the 
term ROSCA makes one easily disregard the diversity and evolution of 
rotating savings and credit associations. Also, the acclaimation of the ROSCA 
model is not very challenging in terms of empirical research: the more or less 
implicit assumption is that when you know the model, there is no need to 
further explore how the model works. This probably explains why research 
on the use of rotating savings and credit associations is not that popular 
although these associations have been spotted in many Third World 
countries and awarded outstanding qualities such as 'flexibility' and 
'adaptability' by various rural finance specialists like Bouman (1977), Nayar 
(1986), Von Pischke (1989), Ghate (1990) and Adams (1992). The dominant 
question seems to become how to use rotating savings and credit associations 
for official credit and other development programs or how to apply the 
ROSCA mechanism. This foreshadows my second concern. 
My second concern is that it is not the savings and organizational 
capacities and preferences of poor people that is acclaimed but rather the 
ROSCA as a mechanism to mobilize rural savings. 2 For some reason "the 
message" (Bouman 1977) about savings and organizational capacities of poor 
people is hard to understand. Some simply do not even consider the 
2. It is striking that in present circles of policy analysts and development planners the term of 
Rotating Savings and Credit Assocations (RoSCA or ROSCA) is standard, whereas in the older 
and more anthropological literature the term 'rotating credit associations' (Geertz 1962; 
Ardener 1964) is used. 
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attractiveness of the ROSCA as a mechanism to mobilize savings. In 
particular those, who are convinced of the superior quality of large-scale 
banking institutions to induce 'development' (cf. Tolentino 1991)3 or the 
absolute necessity of special credit lines to assist rural poor 4, find it very 
difficult to conceive of financial intermediation based on self-regulation as an 
"Alladin's lamp of information" (Bouman 1990). Many others take quite an 
ambiguous attitude toward rotating savings and credit associations when it 
comes to their savings and economic potential. Berger (1989) states that the 
rotating savings and credit association is "one of the most significant 
indigenous financial innovation in developing countries, established largely 
by and for women" but still believes that "continued reliance on them is one 
means of perpetuating the marginalization of women's economic activities" 
(p.1024). Kern (1986) recognizes that, "The rural dweller much prefers to save 
through regular contributions to a group fund, which is immediately 
disbursed, thus avoiding security problems and achriininstrative costs" 
(p.118). Still, he believes that rotating savings and credit associations are 
inefficient mobilizers of savings: "The arisan gathers savings at one point in 
time for immediate disbursal. It is not an efficient mechanism because a 
person must be a member of the arisan to utilize the savings function and 
savings can only be made at fixed points in time when an arisan is in 
operation" (p.119). According to Kern, rotating savings and credit 
associations do not contribute to "the rapid movement of funds from surplus 
areas to deficit areas", which he considers as "one of the major characteristics 
of efficient financial intermediation" (p.102). Seibel and Marx (1987) believe 
that rotating savings and credit associations are not enough or enough 
qualified as agents of development: "Informal financial institutions" including 
rotating savings and credit associations, "tend to keep a near-stationary 
economy going, rather than contributing to its development" (p.vi). They 
suggest to 'upgrade' them to non-rotating, that is permanent, savings and 
credit associations for construction of 'linkages' with banks (see also Seibel 
and Shrestha 1988). Von Pischke, Bouman and Adams take quite a different 
position in the unorganized debate on the use of rotating savings and credit 
associations. Von Pischke (1989) does not stimulate the actual use of rotating 
savings and credit associations in planned development. Instead he conceives 
of these associations as "a benchmark or project design standard, a starting 
3. "The principal task of financial reform - that of encouraging financial deepening, clearly 
involves pushing back the frontiers of finance - of enlarging the scope of the formal financial 
system and thus reducing the size of the informal financial system and economy. The informal 
system, otherwise called the Tjlack market', the 'curb market', the 'underground economy' has 
been found to grow under conditions and policies which restrict and over-regulate the formal 
system" (Tolentino 1991: 8). 
4. This applies to the introduction of "Specialized Farm Credit Institutions" as channels of cheap 
credit to poor farmers. For critical comments: Von Pischke (1980) and Southwold (1991). 
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point for strategic thinking about financial services for the poor and a test of 
implementation plans" (p.2). This is close to the view of Bouman (1977) who 
is more in favor of "tracutionalizing modern institutions" instead of 
"modernizing traditional instititutions". The disappointing results of so-called 
'formal' agricultural credit programs over the last 30 years prompted Adams 
(1992) to investigate rotating savings and credit associations and other types 
of 'informal' finance: he considers the possibilities of grafting the 
mechanisms of popular types of 'informal' finance onto 'formal' credit 
programs' in order to increase their so-called 'sustainability'. 
Third, many acclaimations of the role and distribution of rotating savings 
and credit associations are nothing more than lip-service or hypotheses. For 
example, the staff of the Asia Regional Office of the World Bank (1987), 
which is one of the main international donor agencies and employs 
thousands of highly qualified people, has to admit that, "Although the 
informal credit system is significant in size and coverage, this report was 
limited to the formal rural credit institutions due to resource constraints (pp. 
iv and v)". Another example is the statement of Bouman and Moll (1989) 
about the long history and wide geographical distribution of ROSCAs in 
Indonesia. They wisely speak in terms of likelihood because their statement 
cannot be supported by a vast number of publications spelling the 
development and diversity of rotating savings and credit associations (see 
also Ohio State University 1989). In old publications of Dutch rural finance 
specialists like Fruin (1937) and Ballendux (1951), no single reference to 
indigenous savings and credit associations is to be found. Kern (1986) assures 
that, "There is no recorded history to establish the beginning of indigenous 
credit institutions" (p.116) in Indonesia. 
Most Interesting Quotations 
This paper is not to further explore the policy debate on the use of rotating 
savings and credit associations as a model or mechanism for planned 
development. I believe that such a debate is - to put it nicely — rather 
premature without some understanding of the diversity and development of 
rotating savings and credit associations. In my view, one of the best ways to 
prepare such a policy debate and to contribute to a better understanding of 
rotating savings and credit associations is to reassess popular quotations and 
classical works. 
Many authors who want to illustrate the ROSCA model or mechanism or 
want to provide an excuse for new empirical studies, simply quote the study 
of either Geertz (1962) or Ardener (1964). For Indonesia the study of Geertz 
is the popular quotation: it contains one of the few and, probably, the first 
descriptions of rotating savings and credit associations in Eastern Java. 
Geertz' study is still gratefully cited to demonstrate the existence of rotating 
savings and credit associations now and for Indonesia as a whole. This is 
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rather embarrassing because the paper of Geertz has been published nearly 
30 years ago and — worse still — I am not aware of any documented case of 
rotating savings and credit associations outside Java except for Ambon (see 
Chapter 4). The first objective of this paper is therefore, to compare the 
findings of Geertz (1962) to more recent data on rotating savings and credit 
associations in Indonesia. 
Although Geertz and Ardener published nearly three decades ago, their 
studies are still unique works in the literature on rotating savings and credit 
associations. A distinctive feature of both studies is the comparative analysis 
of rotating savings and credit associations in different parts of the world. 
Further, both studies together are a vivid debate on the development of 
rotating savings and credit associations: the classical work of Ardener was 
the earliest response to that of Geertz. However, after Ardener formulated 
her critique the debate has abated: more recent comments on the study of 
Geertz (cf. Kurtz 1973; Schrader 1991) usually cite the criticism of Ardener. 
Some of these comments might now probably get the approval of Geertz 
himself because his article of 1962 was clearly framed in a now outdated 
modernization theory. The institutional analysis of Ardener has seldomly 
been critically analyzed itself. I believe that taking a fresh look at both papers 
may further both the policy debate as well as the formulation of new 
research questions on rotating savings and credit associations. The second 
objective of this paper is, therefore, to reassess the debate between Geertz 
and Ardener on the development of rotating savings and credit associations. 
The third objective of this paper is to provide an example of the diverse 
backgrounds and roles of rotating savings and credit associations in a small 
Indonesian town on the basis of my own field research in 1989-90. From the 
point of view of one particular group of people, the role of rotating savings 
and credit associations is compared to other savings and credit arrangements, 
methods, strategies and organizations. 
Studies of ROSCAs in Indonesia 
This section contains a brief outline of Geertz' analysis of rotating credit 
associations in Eastern Java and a larger, issue-wise, review of more recent 
fmdings. To accentuate these findings I compare them to those of Geertz. 
Geertz (1962) describes rotating credit associations of different locations in 
Eastern Java. According to the author, its most elementary form is found in 
Modjokuto, a town-village complex in Eastern Java: "interest is not 
calculated, rotation is determined by lot or by agreement, memberships tend 
to be small, and a separate staff does not exist" (p.243). Geertz emphasizes 
that a meeting of this rotating credit association, called arisan is "commonly 
viewed by its members less as an economic institution than a broadly social 
one whose main purpose is the strenghtening of community solidarity" 
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(ibid). He outlines that more commercial forms of arisan in rural areas evolve 
as a result of processes of 'commercialization' and 'urbanization'. The minds 
of people change: there is "an increased sensitivity to and understanding of 
the economic aspects of the rotating credit association, as against its 
symbolic, ritualistic aspects". This especially applies to inhabitants of urban 
compounds and towns. It is in these urban contexts where the most clearly 
and specifically economic arisan can be found: the market arisan. This type of 
arisan is characterized by daily contributions, no meetings, fixed order of 
drawing and a large number of members. 
Geographical Distribution 
The recognition that "our understanding of financial development would 
remain incomplete unless we systematically set out to learn about the 
informal sector" (Ghate 1990, foreword) prompted the Asian Development 
Bank to conduct a comparative study that looked at informal finance5 across 
a common set of issues in five Asian countries mcluding Indonesia. One of 
the types of informal finance that was distinguished and studied was the so-
called ROSCA. The overview volume states that "ROSCAs are widespread in 
Indonesia, where they are known as arisan" (Ghate 1990: ch.6, p.13). 
However, neither the field report of the Indonesian research team nor any 
other written material can have been the source of information to support 
this observation. The efforts of the Indonesian research team like those of 
many others (Lindauer 1971; Scheepens 1978; Patmo-Mingoen 1980; 
Hesselink-van Stelle 1983; Williams and Johnston 1983; Jansen 1987; Papanek 
and Schwede 1988; Veltenaar 1988; Bouman and Moll 1989; Van der Brugh 
1989) who happened to study rotating savings and credit associations were 
concentrated on some parts of Java. Unfortunately, also Geertz (1962) 
provides no information or hypothesis on rotating credit associations in the 
so-called 'Outer Islands': Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara and 
the Moluccas. My conclusion is that the widespread character of rotating 
savings and credit associations in Indonesia has yet to be documented. I have 
to resort to personal communication with fellow researchers 6 — a method 
5. Ghate (1990) emphasizes two dimensions of the concept of informal finance: "informality" and 
- what might be called - self-regulation. "Informality is characterized by highly personalized 
loan transactions entailing face-to-face dealings with borrowers and flexibility in respect of 
loan purposes, interest rates, collateral requirements, maturity periods and debt rescheduling" 
(ch.l, p.5). Self-regulation is my own term for Ghate's view that, "The informal financial sector 
functions outside the purview of regulations imposed by the formal sector in respect of 
capital, reserve and liquidity requirements, ceilings on lending and deposit rates, mandatory 
credit targets, audit and reporting requirements and so on" (ch.1, p.6). 
6. All fellow researchers happen to be staff members, fellows, PhD students or graduate students 
of the Department of Agrarian Law of the Wageningen Agricultural University. 
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that was also employed by Ardener (1964) — to provide some case material 
from Sumatra, Sumba and Sulawesi. 
Slaats-Portier7 (pers.comm.) reports that on North Sumatra arisan became 
the dominant term for rotating savings and credit associations in the 1980s to 
replace that of jula-jula that was much-heard in the 1970s. Arisan are 
organized by officials of the Family Welfare Program (PKK) and the 
organization of female civil servants (Dharma Wanita). Some women 
consider arisan appropriate instruments to quickly satisfy their consumptive 
needs. Traders respond to this need and use arisan to safeguard their sale of 
luxury goods. 8 Wijngaard and Hoeve 9 (pers.comm.) report that rotating 
savings and credit associations in Tukka, a village on North Sumatra, are 
specially organized to finance one of the following expenditures: weddings, 
house construction or university education. The finance of weddings is the 
most popular target of the associations. One of them is called julo-julo adat 
ndko. Like most of the rotating savings and credit associations that are 
organized to finance weddings, the contributions of this association are in 
meat (cf. Geertz 1962: p.246: paketan daging). All 92 members contribute one 
kilogram of meat each to the wedding fund few days before the marriage. 
The ultimate sanction on default is a public confiscation of household goods. 
Van de Ven 1 0 (pers.comm.) mentions several arisan of female teachers who 
work at the same school in village Hiang, Jambi Province of Sumatra. He 
also reports about kelompok gotong royong which is a common denominator of 
a variety of local cooperative undertakings. One type of such a cooperative 
undertaking is a praying and singing society (pengajian) that keeps arisan 
every week. The members also work in small labor groups to finance the 
purchase of meat for the fasting month. The laborers do not want to get paid 
immediately but collect their income just before the fasting month. 
7. Slaats-Portier has done extensive research among the Karo Batak of North Sumatra that 
resulted in a PhD thesis on social mobility and social security among the Karo Batak. 
8. This much resembles the practice of Ibu Isoh on West Java as described by Veltenaar (1988: 
85-88): Ibu Isoh is a tailor and organizes arisan to sell her produce. In several villages she 
gathers about 10 women willing to buy her clothes or embroidery. The women regularly 
contribute to a rotating fund which is used to buy for instance, a bedspread from Ibu Isoh. In 
some cases the arisan bedspread passes into one that serves to buy and sell table-covers of Ibu 
Isoh. In other cases, the members decide to start an arisan pan, arisan plates, arisan money or 
arisan gold coordinated by Ibu Isoh who receives a small commission for her services. In 1988 
she coordinated 20 arisan including four arisan bedspread. At that time Ibu Isoh herself 
participated in an arisan with a contribution of Rp. 100,000 per month (for a Bolivian version 
of this type of arisan: see Adams, D.W. and Canavesi, M.L. (1992). 
9. Wijngaard and Hoeve were graduate students of the Wageningen Agricultural University. 
They conducted a comparative study on credit unions and rotating savings and credit associ-
ations in North Sumatra from October 1991 till March 1992. 
10. Van de Ven conducted field research on agrarian law and social security in Kerinci (Jambi 
Province, Sumatra) as part of his PhD program 
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According to Ve l u (pers.comm.) arisan on Sumba are to be found among 
salaried people only. The observation of Vel (1991) that money is a scarce 
good on this island is a plausible explanation of the limited occurence of 
rotating savings and credit associations with contribution and distribution in 
cash. With respect to two older types of associations on Sumba, it is better to 
speak of a rotating 'pool' instead of a rotating 'fund': the first type refers to a 
group of farmers, all men, who cut imperata grass. 1 2 The daily yield is 
divided on a rotating basis among the members to be used for repair of the 
roof of the house. The second type concerns a group of people from well-to-
do households, men and women, who annually contribute a large amount of 
rice to a pool that is cashed by the winner to buy roof plates of zinc. A new 
version of these two types of rotating associations with contributions in kind 
has been recently introduced by the local development organization assisted 
by Vel (pers.comm.): women have been organized in a group that makes 
mats of pandanus leaves to be sold every two weeks to the benefit of one of 
the membrs. Usually, the winner uses the fund to buy household ustensils. 1 3 
Tang 1 4 (pers.comm.) distinguishes two types of rotating savings and credit 
associations on South Sulawesi: mengandelek15 and arisan. Mengandelek is the 
popular term among becak drivers, fishermen and wives of fishermen. Daily 
contributions to the fund which is distributed every ten days, characterize 
this type of rotating savings and credit association. Whereas the rise of 
mengandelek dates back to the 1950s, arisan or the use of the term arisan, 
evolved in the 1970s. Officials of the Family Welfare Program (PKK) organize 
arisan of neighbors (dasa wisma) who contribute on a monthly basis. Arisan 
with a monthly contribution are also common among teachers. 
11. Vel worked as an advisor to a small rural development organization of the Protestant Church 
of Sumba from 1983 to 1990. She studied the local economy and culture of the western part 
of Sumba island with a special emphasis on indigenous food security systems and their 
interaction with development programs. 
1Z For a description of imperata grass: Ronald E. Seavoy (1975), The origin of tropical grasslands 
in Kalimantan, Indonesia, in: The Journal of Tropical Geography, vol.40, pp.48-52. 
13. March and Taqqu (1986) make a distinction between "rotating credit associations" and 
"rotating labour associations" in their survey of women's informal associations in developing 
countries. However, the last example of Vel (pers.comm.) is obviously a mixture of both. 
14. Tang has conducted a PhD research on social security in South Sulawesi. 
15. Mengandelek shows resemblance to the Dutch word aandeel (which means: share). Scheepens 
(1978) who compared "traditional savings and credit organisations and modern credit organi-
sations of village Bojong" in West Java, found a similar term. He casually remarks that "some 
people told me that in early days there were also arisan (named andilan)" (p.30). Andilan looks 
like the Indonesian pronunciation (andiV) and noun (an) of the Dutch word aandeel. This 
suggests that Dutch colonial administrators or welfare workers might have stimulated Indo-
nesian people to organize themselves in arisan. 
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Papanek and Schwede (1988) found that 106 women in their 1972-1974 
survey among 146 lower-middle and middle class Jakarta women belonged 
to one or more arisan. Drawing lots was the typical mode of rotation. The 
respondents belonged predominantly to arisan formed among friends or 
work colleagues (57 percent of 262 memberships); there were also 75 
neighborhood arisan (29 percent) and 38 kin-group arisan (14 percent). The 
authors conclude that "arisan are ad hoc social institutions that depend for 
their effectiveness on preexisting bonds that form the basis of mutual trust" 
(p.92). Most savings were intended for the acquisition of capital assets: land, 
house, car, motorcycle, houdehold equipment, jewelry. According to the 
authors, some urban women commented that "arisan were helpful in 
protecting small sums against casual requests by men and children because 
all family members could understand how shameful it would be not to make 
one's promised contribution at the next meeting" (p.95). Others commented 
that "husbands who might object to what they considered women's excessive 
socializing were mollified by the economic gains that arisan membership 
brought with it (ibid). 
The specific urban setting and selection of middle class women of the 
study of Papanek and Schwede make it impossible to draw generalizations 
with regard to Indonesian women's use of rotating savings and credit 
associations — if possible at all. The authors "are not aware of any recent 
systematic studies of the role of arisan among women in Indonesia" (p.92).1 6 
Long time ago Geertz (1962) mentions that the arisan becomes an 
"extraordinarily popular institution" among "people who represent a semi-
urban, semi-rural proletariat, the members of which, though they have been 
forced to adopt many of the social, political, and economic patterns of the 
town, still cling to many of the values and beliefs of the village" (p.246). He 
adds that arisan are most particularly popular among the women of this 
proletariat, "who hold the purse strings in any case" (ibid). 
Contributions 
One of the eight prevailing forms of agricultural credit on Central Java 
characterized by Lindauer (1971) is arisan. He observes that "during the 
inflation in the Sukarno era, the contributions were linked to the price of rice 
or gold" (p.267, my translation). In the country study on "Informal Credit 
Markets in Indonesia" implemented under the auspicies of the Asian 
16. Chapter 4 contains general information on women's involvement in arisan on Ambon, the 
Moluccas. It also describes the case of a praying society of women that starts arisan and 
business activities. 
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Development Bank, three adaptations of arisan to inflation are casually 
reported: first, the agreement to make contributions in kind; second and 
third, to index the cash contribution to the price of a gramme of gold or a 
sheet of zinc (Prabowo et al. 1989). Ghate (1990) who has put together the 
findings of the country study on "Informal Credit Markets in Indonesia" in 
an overview volume, mentions that, "Apart from cash arisan, many of the 
arisan entailed contributions in kind (such as building materials, labor and 
foodgrains). Moreover some of the cash arisan were dedicated to the 
purchase of specific objects such as household ustensils and furniture 
(popular among women) or livestock and roofing, piping and fencing 
material (which were popular among the men)" (ch.6, pp. 13-14).17 The 
article of Geertz (1962) does not include information on this kind of details. 
Non-rotation 
Another form of agricultural credit described by Lindauer (1971) is 
tengelan, which is a non-rotating savings and credit association: the fund does 
not rotate but is lent to third parties. In this connection the paper of Williams 
and Johnston (1983) provides an interesting final thought: they suggest that 
arisan on Java may evolve in the future as non-rotating savings and credit 
associations: "In order to avoid the arisan's element of unpredictability, some 
groups are dissolving their arisan and forming kelompok simpan-pinjam 
(savings and loan groups)" (p.72). Prabowo (1989) remarks that, "Some arisan 
have developed lending and credit arrangements beyond those of traditional 
ROSCAs" (p.9): the group fund is used for giving credit and does not rotate. 
Prabowo adds that, "In our survey such associations are identified as simpan 
pinjam, usaha bersama [which means: to work together, my translation] or 
credit union" (p.10). Geertz (1962) who discusses in detail the evolution of 
rotating savings and credit associations (see second section), does not include 
non-rotating savings and credit associations in his analysis. 
Bidding for the Fund 
To my knowledge the only published article that solely deals with arisan is 
the article of Williams and Johnston (1983). The authors coordinated 
community development projects on central Java and discovered arisan all 
over the place. According to Williams and Johnston, two new types of arisan 
17. Scheepens (1978), Hesselink-van Stelle (1983) and Veltenaar (1988) classify arisan uang (which 
means: money) and arisan barang (which means: goods). With arisan barang the fund is 
targeted to the purchase of glasses, plates, spoons, forks or pans. Patmo-Mingoen (1980), 
Jansen (1987) and Van der Brugh (1989) distinguish arisan uang and arisan beras (which 
means: rice). Just-mentioned authors have conducted village studies on Java as graduate 
students. 
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have emerged after Geertz published his survey in 1962. The first type is the 
'arisan call' (cf. Prabowo et al. 1989). The rotation of the fund of this type is 
determined by commercial bidding. Williams and Johnston believe that the 
arisan call "has gained great popularity among the urban elite since the mid-
1960s [...]. It is quite common for wives of high-ranking public servants and 
military officers to be members of 10 or more arisan call groups at the same 
time" (p.72). According to the two development workers, "this form of arisan 
is based on the Chinese hui (Chinese for: association) which has long been 
practised by the ethnic Chinese business community in Indonesia" (ibid). The 
findings of Williams and Johnston imply a reassessment of the observation of 
Geertz (1962) who concluded that in contrast with arisan in rural Java "almost 
all urban arisans decide on the order with which the individual draws the 
fund not by agreement but by lot" (p.247). 
Official Arisan 
The second new type of arisan distinguished by Williams and Johnston 
(1983) is the 'official arisan'. This type of arisan is organized under the 
auspicies of government bodies or official welfare programs such as the 
Family Welfare Program (PKK) which is primarily directed at women "who, 
after all, are the members of the community who are most concerned with 
health, progress and prosperity of the family (Rustam 1986: 77). Rustam 
(1986) who, as the wife of the Minister of Home Affairs, is the chairman of 
the PKK at national level, says that the PKK has "spread rapidly" and 
evolved into a "nation-wide movement" after its official recognition in 1972. 
The organization of arisan is part of the PKK programs on health and 
housing: the PKK "sets up rotating lottery (arisan) groups to finance 1 8 the 
repair or building of houses, family lavatories and bath plus laundry units" 
(p.81). Martm-Schiller (1989) reports that "the popular arisan, under the 
auspices of PKK (Program Kesejahteraan Keluarga - the government Family 
Welfare Program) or other women's organizations, are purely women's 
activities" (p.36). Prabowo and others (1989) speak of 'programmed' or 
'dependent' arisan versus 'independent' arisan. The authors indirectiy define 
18. Rustam (1989) who wonders how to organize fund raising activities to finance PKK activities, 
finds to her own relief that, "Fortunately, there are old customs for this kind of activity: 
women may be told to put a single spoonful of rice into another pot every time they cook; 
once a week all those spoonfuls are added to what other villages have collected; when there 
is enough, the rice can be sold, and the little money' needed is obtained" (p.80). Sinaga and 
others (1976) distinguish two types of local savings and credit groups of the West Javanese 
village Sukagalih: arisan and groups called beras parelek (which means: a spoonful of rice). 
According to the authors most of the women are member of beras parelek groups. Every 
members saves a spoonful of rice each day as a contribution to a collective stock that serves 
as a security fund for families who have run out of rice in the pre-harvest period (paceklik). 
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'programmed' and 'dependent' arisan: they deplore with regard to 
independent arisan that, "It is difficult to compute the exact number because 
their activities are not registered in the district aclministration book" (par.4.2). 
According to Williams and Johnston, the arisan of PKK and other 
government or government-supported bodies function as a "drawcard" of 
government officials who 'have gradually intensified efforts to capitalise on 
the economic and social potential of the arisan in order to popularise 
women's activities and other development programmes" (p.67). However, in 
many cases PKK meetings might have become little more than a brief arisan 
like happened with a radio listeners' group of women, organized as part of a 
government program for dissemination of information (Martm-Schiller 1989: 
36; see also Hesselink-van Stelle 1983: 41). Williams and Johnston (1983) warn 
that, "In fact, high attendance at PKK meetings can easily be deceptive 
because participation in the arisan may become an end in itself, while the 
aims of the programme are overlooked" (p.71). In addition, they critically 
remark that, 'A study of six villages in West Java found that arisan formed 
on official initiative tended to be less popular than those formed 
spontaneously by local people' (pp. 71-72). 
Geertz (1962) mentions that, "The arisan is also quite popular among the 
elite of the town, those who, for the most part, live in the stone houses along 
the streets. In this group it is almost always based on one or another of the 
dozens of sodalities, political parties, youth groups, labor unions, charitable 
associations, school societies, women's clubs, athletic associations, which 
have proliferated on the urban scene since the Revolution of 1945" (p.247). 
An interesting but difficult question is what happened with these — what 
Geertz described as — "voluntary associations" and their arisan activities after 
the New Order (Orde Baru) was established in 1965. Maybe all activities of 
these voluntarily associations were temporarily postponed at the time the 
central government restructured the relationships between public and private 
bodies. The official recognition in 1972 of the Family Welfare Program (PKK) 
by the central government can be possibly interpreted as a new impulse to — 
what government officials describe as - "a voluntary movement operating at 
grass-roots in country villages and wards" (cf. Rustam 1986: 77) and to what 
government officials call 'arisan'. 
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Different Comparative Studies 
The specific interest of Geertz in rotating savings and credit associations1 9 
can only be understood as part of his broader interest in processes of social 
transformation. The young anthropologist Geertz is much concerned with the 
"shift from a traditionalistic agrarian society to an increasingly fluid 
commercial one" (p.260) in the so-called 'underdeveloped nations'. According 
to him, this process involves a problematic shifting of "the whole framework 
of peasants from one emphasizing particularistic, diffuse, affective, and 
ascriptive ties between individuals, to one emphasizing - within economic 
contexts - universalistic, affectively neutral, and achieved ties between them" 
(p.260). Geertz (1962) conceives rotating savings and credit assocations as a 
product and conductor of this transformation: "the rotating credit assocation 
has been found associated with a lesser or greater penetration of an 
elaborated, and ultimately international exchange economy into a primarily 
agrarian society" (p.261). He describes arisan on Java as "a link between the 
largely unmonetized economy of the past and the largely monetized 
economy of the future" (p.245). The functional significance of rotating savings 
and credit associations in this process is "primarily to facilitate social and 
cultural change in respect to economic problems and processes" (p.261). 
Geertz mentions the rotating savings and credit association as an educational 
and socializing mechanism that learns peasants to be traders in the broad 
cultural sense (p.260). He places different rotating savings and credit 
associations on a continuum (like Van der Brugh 1989, pp. 32-40) "ranging 
from more traditionalistic to more rationally oriented types" (p.261). 
Solidarity and other social values are central features of the first, simple 
forms of rotating savings and credit associations described by Geertz. These 
associations are 'modern' forms of cooperation which reinforce existing social 
and cultural ties. Therefore, the contribution and distribution of money is a 
social and cultural act. The next, more complex associations on the 
continuum described by Geertz have a lesser social and cultural meaning: 
rational-economic considerations of members become more important. 
Meetings do not serve as cultural exchange in a narrow sense but rather as 
an exchange of business information. In many cases the need to gather is not 
felt anymore. The association transforms from an association of people into 
an association of capital. Geertz suggests that, "In this sense, the form is, 
perhaps, self-liquidating, being replaced ultimately by banks, cooperatives 
and other economically more rational types of credit institutions" (p.262). 
19. I consider "rotating credit associations" and "rotating savings and credit associations" as 
synonyms (see also: note 2) but prefer the latter because this term expresses savings 
capacities and - preferences of members. 
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Geertz is one of the few who has tried to analyze the rise and evolution of 
rotating savings and credit associations from a general perspective on 
processes of social transformation. It should be emphasized in this 
connection that Geertz is not only interested in this type of associations but 
in "the family of institutions" that "not only spring up in the economic, but in 
the political, religious, stratificatory, familial and other aspects of the social 
system as well" (p.263). Geertz conceives these institutions as "middle rungs 
between traditional society and more modern forms of social organization" 
(p.263). A critique of Geertz' description and analysis of rotating savings and 
credit associations therefore, implies a critique of his general perspective. 
Three points follow: 
First, Geertz describes and analyzes rotating savings and credit associations 
of different places as part of an evolutionist continuum. This is only 
acceptable when every place follows the same societal development. Geertz, 
who cites Eisenstadt, speaks in this respect of the "general direction of 
modernization" (p.260). From this perspective the development of 
associations in the least developed places is fully predictable. It then follows 
that it is almost unnecessary to further specify changes and contexts of 
rotating savings and credit associations because all these associations are 
product of the same modernization process. However, this argument is false. 
Geertz seems to underestimate the very complex societal dynamics that 
evolve when an international exchange economy 'penetrates' a primarily 
agrarian society. It is hard to accept that an increasing interwovenness of 
international, national and local economies provides the momentum of a 
modernization process that reduces these economies into phases of one and 
the same development plan. Still, Geertz treats whole countries and 
provinces as homogenous economic units including rotating savings and 
credit associations with a corresponding degree of complexity. 
Second, Geertz simply assumes that all rotating savings and credit 
associations that occur in a specific region are in the same phase of 
development or same place on the continuum. The evolutionist model of 
Geertz does not take into account the possibility of co-existing but extremely 
different types of rotating savings and credit associations in one place or 
region. Different groups of people or even one group of people (see third 
section) in a particular place might for instance, want to participate in 
different rotating savings and credit associations that vary much in terms of 
social and economic purposes. 
Third, Geertz suggests that rotating savings and credit associations are 
'irrational' when he predicts their transformation into banks, cooperatives 
and "other rational credit institutions" (p.263). He adds that the latter "can 
only function when the differentiation of a specific economic pattern of 
norms has occured - when courts will enforce contracts, when managers 
worry about their business reputations and keep honest books, and when 
investors feel safe in giving cash resources to debtors to whom they are not 
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related" (p.263). On the one hand, the number of sources that doubts whether 
these conditions have been met, is still growing. For instance, Kurtz (1973) 
who describes rotating savings and credit associations (cundina) in urban 
Mexico and the USA, reports about "expUcitly negative attitudes of the poor 
regarding institutions of finance, such as banks and savings & loan 
companies. [...] Banks were considered exploitative and rude. In general, 
many people felt that banks were unfriendly, demanding, or placed 
restrictions on loans which the cundina did not" (pp. 55-56). On the other 
hand, there is little evidence of some rotating savings and credit associations 
who have transformed themselves into non-rotating savings and credit 
associations (Williams and Johnston 1983; Prabowo 1989). 
In spite of the shortcomings of the Geertz' analysis (1962) I believe his 
approach is not to be set aside. Those who briefly review Geertz' paper 
easily throw the baby out with the bathwater: they conclude that the 
evolutionist perspective of Geertz is not appropriate or appealing and forget 
about analysis of rotating savings and credit associations as part of processes 
of social transformation altogether (cf. Schrader 1991). My suggestion is to 
redefine the analysis of rotating savings and credit associations in terms of 
Geertz' larger interests and drop the evolutionist bias. The idea of rotating 
savings and credit associations as flexible forms of cooperation that 
restructure social relations in changing contexts, remains. Furthermore, I 
believe a more differentiated look at people and development in particular 
regions is needed. Most case studies of rotating savings and credit 
associations do not relate the diversity and development of these associations 
to local economic, social and political developments. They confine themselves 
to description of some institutional features of rotating savings and credit 
associations. 
To Isolate According to Clear Criteria 
The paper of Ardener (1964) "The comparative study of rotating credit 
associations" is to be mentioned together with that of Geertz as one of the 
classical survey studies of rotating savings and credit associations. Ardener 
believes that her paper "may complement Geertz' work" (p.202). This 
certainly applies to the many detailed descriptions in both papers of diverse 
types of rotating savings and credit associations: they hardly overlap. 
However, in terms of analysis of the backgrounds and development of 
rotating savings and credit associations the paper of Ardener sharply differs 
from the one of Geertz. Whereas Geertz uses a deductive approach and takes 
rotating savings and credit associations as a case study of the process of 
modernization, Ardener tries an inductive approach that not results in a 
grand theory, but in some empirical generalizations and research questions. 
Ardener has great difficulties with the evolutionist model of Geertz and 
points at exceptions and contradictory developments (pp. 221-222): first, she 
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is not convinced that rotating credit associations are product of a shift from a 
traditionalistic agrarian society to an increasingly commericial one as claimed 
by Geertz, and suggests that they have been partly, at least, causative. 
Second, she questions "why do these asociations flourish in some societies 
which have made this transition, while they are less important in others 
which have also done so?" (p.221). Third, Ardener briefly refers to 
communities in which "associations are confined to non-trading wage-
earners" to illustrate her doubts of Geertz' notion of peasants learning to be 
traders. Fourth, Ardener provides evidence that counters the notion that 
'economic' or 'rational' aspects necessarily predorninate in the more 
sophisticated institutions or those with larger membership. 
Both the strength and shortcoming of the paper of Ardener (1964) can be 
traced back to her objective that is mentioned in the last sentence of the 
postscript: "In this paper I have attempted to isolate according to clear 
criteria one type of institution which has received comparatively little 
treatment so far in the literature, and to draw attention to some of the 
variables relevant to its analysis" (p.223). According to Ardener, the two 
elements of rotation and regularity are the essential criteria to distinguish 
rotating credit associations from the whole range of mutual benefit clubs and 
cooperative undertakings. She distinguishes the following 'structural 
variables' of rotating credit associations: membership, organization, 
contributions, the fund, transferability, deductions from fund, and sanctions 
(pp. 210-217). The strength of the paper of Ardener is the systematic and 
detailed descriptive analysis of various types of rotating savings and credit 
associations. Her data collection enabled her to easily refute the 'theory' of 
Geertz. The shortcoming is the other side of the coin of institutional analysis 
of rotating savings and credit associations. I feel that such an institutional 
analysis ignores two important questions: first, the self-regulative and 
adaptive behavior of members of rotating savings and credit associations and 
second, the relative significance of rotating savings and credit association 
compared to other savings and credit arrangements, methods, strategies and 
organizations. 
Members of rotating savings and credit associations make rules and join 
associations that fit their employment conditions, income flows, savings and 
money needs. When a collective income determines the contribution to a 
fund, the actual rotation is not necessarily regular (see Chapter 4): for 
instance, a group of harbor laborers might agree to put all daily group 
earnings in excess of a minimum amount of money into an orison fund. Only 
when enough money has been saved, the fund is distributed. As a result of 
fluctuating team incomes, the actual rotation of the fund is not regular. 
Members of a rotating savings and credit associations might also decide to 
contribute to a permanent fund that parallels the rotating fund (ibid). It is 
also possible that rotating savings and credit associations evolve into non-
rotating savings and credit associations (Williams and Johnston 1983; 
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Prabowo 1989). To overemphasize the essential criteria of rotating credit 
associations as defined by Ardener (1962), is to easily disregard the rule-
making and adaptative behavior of members of rotating savings and credit 
associations. 
Self-regulation of rotating savings and credit associations implies endless 
possibilities to meet diverse financial needs and objectives of members: 
indexed contributions, mutual exchange of turns, competitive bidding, 
borrowing from the organizer, and shared or multiple membership are some 
of the many examples. Therefore, it is very tempting not to study the use of 
alternative savings and credit arrangements, methods, strategies and 
organizations. However, it is exactly this kind of study that gives an 
opportunity to better understand the relative significance of rotating savings 
and credit associations. 
It was not the intention of Ardener (1964) to extensively describe the self-
regulation and adaptations of particular rotating savings and credit 
associations nor the relative significance of these associations compared to 
other savings and credit arrangements in a particular place. However, I feel 
that for a better understanding of the role and development of rotating 
savings and credit associations it is not enough to compare institutional 
features of these associations. One of the next steps is to study changes of 
rotating savings and credit associations and their particular roles as a savings 
and credit alternative. It is people that count: people make rules, adapt rules 
and compare rules and resources of different saving and credit arrangements. 
Different Backgrounds and Roles of ROSCAs in a Moluccan Town 
Perhaps the region in Indonesia that has longest been articulated with the 
world-wide economy are the islands of spices of the Moluccas. The arrival of 
Portugese traders in the sixteenth century marked the beginning of a 
dramatic expansion of the trade networks that included this region. Other 
European traders followed and struggled for the privilege to buy cloves from 
local rulers. The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) that took over control 
from the Portugese in 1605 (Knaap 1981a) forced the producers to sell all 
their cloves at the price of 56 rixdollar per bahar (550 pounds): five for the 
local rulers, one for transport and fifty for the producer. The VOC was the 
first in the spice trade to pay their suppliers in cash. In 1863 Dutch governors 
had to abolish their policy of enforced cultivation because the new 
cultivation of cloves in African Zanzibar had pushed the world market price 
below the cost price of the Dutch (Knaap 1981b). At independence in 1945 
the new Indonesian leaders inherited a free market system. It was not until 
late in the post-colonial period that clove producers faced a monopoly on 
cloves marketing and fixed prices again: Presidential Decree No.8 (1980) 
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orders that only government village cooperative (KUD) are entitled to buy 
cloves from the farmers for a fixed price. 
The typical irregularity of the clove production, corruption of local rulers 
and austere production and price policies make it hard to reconstruct how 
much money was actually earned by Moluccan clove producers under 
colonial rule. But at least they touched money from time to time — whether 
considerable or not. In the eyes of Geertz (1962) this contact might provide a 
ground for rotating credit associations that he describes as "a link between 
the largely unmonetized economy of the past and the largely monetized 
economy of the future" (p.245). However, in spite of three hundred fifty 
years of exposure to Dutch traders, missionaries and administrators, rotating 
savings and credit associations are likely of a late post-colonial origin in the 
Moluccan region. 2 0 
One of the main reasons of the late development of rotating savings and 
credit associations in the Moluccan region is the central importance of sago 
and fishery in the local economy (Knaap 1981a). Sago palms provide the 
traditional staple food as well as necessary materials for house construction 
and the sea is a supplier of fish, an integral part of the daily diet (see 
Chapters 2 and 4). The plentiful sago palms can be harvested every time of 
the year. Even more important - sago and fish were not exchanged for 
money until recently: they have been near-full subsistence crops. The 
paradise-like availability of sago and fish has been the silent barrier for 
centuries of a gradual monetization of the local economy after the first 
contacts with foreign traders and rulers. There is little need for thrift and 
regular saving among sago and fish collectors. Traditional sago cultivation 
and fishing neither imply cash investments nor enable or give much sense to 
contributions in cash to a common fund. 
Another main reason why rotating savings and credit associations did not 
evolve in the Moluccan region as a result of the early articulation of the local 
economy with the world economy is that clove trees yield abundantly only 
once per three to four years. This irregular production does not enable 
regular saving. Furthermore, group saving of clove producers is hard to 
realize because clove production is very location specific. Still, one might also 
assume that irregular cash income necessitates more or less regular saving, 
like in the many rice producing areas of Indonesia where women used to 
save a spoonful of rice every day to bridge the difficult pre-harvest period. 2 1 
However, the abundancy of sago and fish in the Moluccan region provided 
20. The historical studies of Rumphius (1910) and Knaap (1987) do not contain descriptions of 
rotating savings and credit associations on the Moluccas or Ambon island in particular. 
Neither do the field notes of Kennedy (1950) and comprehensive village study of Fraassen 
(1972). Even Van Paassen (1986) who conducted a socio-economic study of Tulehu, makes no 
reference to rotating savings and credit associations. 
21. See note 18. 
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no reason to start regular saving in cash or kind. Periods of food scarcity 
rarely occured. Money needs were extremely modest because sago and fish 
guaranteed most inhabitants a minimum living standard in terms of food 
supply and housing. 
Whereas the Moluccan economy as a whole has been in contact with 
international trade networks for centuries without changing so much, the 
village economy of Tulehu has dramatically altered within the last two 
decades as a result of the village becoming a new regional trade and 
transport centre. Tulehu is located at the northeastern coast of Ambon island 
and is a link between Ambon city and other ports of Indonesia on the one 
hand and the hinterland of the Central Moluccas on the other. The small 
town that officially numbers 12,000 people (census 1989) attracts many 
migrants looking for work and education. About one third of its population 
consists of Butonese migrants who are much involved in the clove trade. 
Sumatran, Chinese and Javanese migrants are smaller, but economically 
powerful groups who dominate as shopkeepers and restaurant owners. Many 
government services have got an office in Tulehu which is the administrative 
capital of a sub-district. In Tulehu, rotating savings and credit associations 
have become a new phenomenon since the 1970s. I distinguish three different 
backgrounds of rotating savings and credit associations: migrants, 
government extension and organization, and increased money needs. 
Migrants: Parallel Social and Economic Associations as 
Forms of Collective Self-Help 
To speak of a late 'origin' of rotating savings and credit associations in the 
Moluccan region is somewhat misleading. The first associations in this region 
have probably been started by migrants (cf. Ardener 1964: 209). In Tulehu, 
Sumatran migrants started rotating savings and credit associations some 15 
years ago. Each week they came together to eat, drink and play arisan as a 
means to strengthen ethnic ties. They had former exposure to rotating 
savings and credit associations in Sumatra, where they were called bajulo-julo 
(see also Chapter 4). 
The first Sumatran migrants of Tulehu started selling self-baked cookies as 
a street vendor (kaki lima), then opened restaurants and after a few years 
managed to establish medium-sized shops. With the help of these pioneers, 
new Sumatran migrants easily found opportunities to make a little income 
and ways to finance their larger business plans. The Sumatran entrepreneurs 
started to use arisan as an efficient vehicle to save for investments. The socio-
cultural arisan gradually commercialized and discontinued weekly meetings. 
A pre-arranged sequence of receivers, instead of the lottery system, now 
deterrnines the order of rotation; all participants bring their contributions 
each day to the group leader and after ten days, one participant comes to the 
leader to receive the deposits. The group leader is the first person to take the 
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fund (see Chapter 4). Both Sumatran men and women participate in these 
commercial arisan. I found two arisan of Sumatran shopkeepers and 
restaurant owners of Tulehu: the first arisan consists of ten men and three 
women who each contribute Rp. 5,000 per day, except for two members 
paying Rp. 10,000 for two positions. 2 2 Every 10 days the fund is distributed 
so that the full cycle takes nearly five months and the rotating fund amounts 
to Rp. 750,000. The full rotation is determined by lottery at the start of the 
cycle. The first position forms the exception, the organizer receiving the first 
fund. The second arisan consists of 14 Sumatran women with a daily 
contribution of Rp. 1,000. Four of them each have two positions and one 
member even three positions, so that one cycle takes more than six months. 
Many Sumatran couples own two shops or try to open a second one. The 
wife manages the first shop and pays for daily household expenses. Possibly, 
this explains the smaller standard contribution of the women arisan. 
Parallel to the commerical arisan, other, more social savings and credit 
associations have evolved as well. In Tulehu an association of 40 Sumatran 
households called Ikatan Keluarga Saiyo Sakato (IKSS) coordinates at least three 
activities. First, all 40 households contribute Rp. 2,500 per month to a social 
fund that is deposited by the secretary into a savings account at the Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia (BRI). The non-rotating fund is used for funeral ceremonies 
(Rp. 25,000 per case) and trips to Sumatra (one ticket per family). Secondly, 
most of the members of the IKSS weekly contribute to a fund for the annual 
hari raya qurban, an Islamic festival. A Sumatran shopkeeper who is a haft, 
keeps this non-rotating fund. In 1989-90 34 families together contributed 
about Rp. 40,000 per week. When a household is unable to save the required 
amount (the price of a goat or a seventh part that of an ox) the savings are 
retained for the next season or returned just prior to the festival. Third, 26 
women gather every month for religious classes at the local Islamic 
university. Their club, Bando Kanduang (which means: dedicated women), 
keeps arisan every meeting. Each member contributes Rp. 5,000 while two 
members receive half a fund. The women also contribute monthly Rp. 500 
each to a social fund for emergencies and birthday presents. Every three 
months the women together with their husbands, come to the Islamic 
university to discuss the progress of the uang qurban and have a large 
celebration. 
Butonese migrants participate on a limited scale in labor associations with 
a rotating fund. In small groups they cut sago trees and distribute the 
proceeds of the sale of sago pith on a weekly rotating basis. Butonese 
migrants are much more involved in pre-harvest arrangements with 
Ambonese: they buy the rights to harvest clove trees for one or more (good) 
22. US$1.00 = Rp. 1,760 (July 1989). 
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seasons. 2 3 The small Chinese and Javanese minorities of Tulehu are not 
involved in rotating savings and credit associations. Still, an old Chinese 
shopkeeper remembered hui as the Chinese name of rotating savings and 
credit associations that used to be popular among Chinese entrepreneurs in 
large urban centres of Indonesia. 
Government Extension and Organization of Women 
The second 'origin' of rotating savings and credit associations in the 
Moluccan region is government extension and organization. About ten years 
ago the first 'official' arisan was started in Tulehu by wives of police officers 
and the military. These run smoothly due to the regular income of their 
husbands. They are organized as part of semi-official women's clubs. The 
monthly contributions vary from Rp. 5,000 to Rp. 15,000. Arisan that result 
from government educational programs perform rather poorly in Tulehu, like 
the one of the local Family Welfare Program (PKK) that collapsed, failing to 
attract women to extension meetings. The arisan of the Office of Coordinated 
Services (Posyandu) has still to attract many women to the extension 
meetings. The contribution per month or two weeks is quite low, not 
exceeding Rp. 1,000. 
It is difficult to describe arisan of government extension services in terms of 
the dualistic and evolutionary notions of social clubs that gradually 
transform into economic ones. There are no ethnic or neighborhood ties that 
serve as a pre-existing social basis of arisan, and there are no future economic 
targets to finance. Besides, meetings are not to be discontinued but to serve 
as an extension mechanism for a long time. To a lesser extent this also 
applies to the arisan of wives of police and military officers. They live on 
compounds with their husbands, mostly migrants who happen to be 
stationed in Tulehu. In all these cases, however, the role of the arisan as an 
organizational tool or tying device of government programs directed at 
women, should not be underestimated. 
Increased Money Needs and New Social Units 
Arisan among the native Ambonese population of Tulehu are the most 
recent ones. Three types have evolved in the last five to seven years: the 
arisan of economic peers who earn a regular income, the neighborhood arisan 
and the arisan of members of a religious society. The evolution of all three 
23. Cf. Ardener (1964): "Hill suggests that, in Ghana, they are unlikely to spread into areas where 
farmers can raise capital by pledging their farms, although pledging of land among the Mba-
Ise Ibo of Nigeria did not inhibit the development of rotating credit associations there" 
(p.206). 
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types is much related to the increased need, use and importance of money in 
the local economy. 
Until recently, Ambonese relatives and neighbors helped each other with 
the construction of traditional sago houses on a more or less rotating basis 
(masohi). The forests provided all necessary construction materials. However, 
Ambonese villagers got a taste for modern house construction material when 
the enormous incomes from the sale of cloves in the 1970s enabled them to 
finance the construction of new houses with concrete walls and zinc roofs. 
As a result, the need to organize masohi faded. Rotating savings and credit 
associations, such as on Java, to finance the purchase of zinc roofs, did not 
evolve because the Ambonese started to bank on the clove harvest as the best 
single opportunity to invest in housing. 
Arisan in Tulehu are likely no adaptations of masohi. Arisan of Ambonese 
people, who earn income from non-farm activities satisfy rather different 
needs than the masohi of subsistence farmers. These non-farm activities are an 
example of the new economic opportunities in Tulehu as well as an 
expression of people's increased money needs. When prices of cloves 
dropped in the 1980s, the farmers still had their increased money needs only. 
Besides, the zinc roof as the new standard of housing, rice had become the 
new standard of consumption, to replace the tasteless sago porridge. To meet 
both these needs, the growing non-farm opportunities to earn extra income 
in Tulehu were gratefully exploited. Arisan serve as a tool for efficient cash 
flow management. Contrary to the Sumatran entrepreneurs of Tulehu, who 
started arisan to strengthen ethnic ties, arisan of Ambonese people who earn a 
regular income, have no social or ethnic precursor. These arisan not only 
serve as a means to protect members against sudden expenditure but also 
against claims of family members. 
Both men and women are involved in these arisan that appear as new 
social units in commercializing Tulehu. Arisan of harbor laborers consist of 
men only; a small arisan of petrol vendors includes one women; arisan of fish 
traders are a female affair, as are the arisan of market women. All 
contributions are on a daily basis; the number of members varies from three 
to 25 people. Harbor laborers determine the full order of rotation at the very 
beginning of the cycle by lottery. The fish women use both lottery and a pre-
determined order. Market women deliberate each time to decide who is next 
to receive the fund. 
Neighborhood arisan function less to strengthen neighborhood ties but 
rather to collect money. The use of daily or monthly contributions, such as 
among neighboring civil servants and pensioners, is an expression of the 
central importance of money collection through neighborhood arisan. Default 
of members has made this type of arisan not so popular: they were not a 
common phenonemon in the many wards of Tulehu. Those people, who 
were involved in neighborhood arisan were typically women. 
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Every week members of a religious society come together to sing and pray 
Islamic verses. There are male societies as well as female ones. It is very 
striking that only female societies organize arisan at the end of the evening to 
stimulate members to participate in the meetings. I feel that this is not 
because women are less dedicated Islamic people than men. The large 
involvement of women in street vending activities and vegetable and fish 
markets and, last but not least, their dominant role in managing the 
household purse, have made many women aware of functions and 
possibilities of money. It is not only the lottery as the common method to 
determine the rotation of the fund, that is attractive for women to participate 
in arisan, but also the mere use of money. Most of the religious gatherings 
are held at the place of the winner of the fund who pays for the tea and 
snacks at the next meeting. In one case, the house of the leader, who is 
married with one of the most well-to-do men in town, is the place of weekly 
congregation. Besides the common contribution of Rp. 1,000 to the arisan, all 
20 to 40 members also contribute Rp. 100 each to a non-rotating emergency 
fund. 
The Use and Relative Importance of ROSCAs 
Case studies and inquiries involving many different people, can provide 
information on the use and relative importance of rotating savings and credit 
associations. For pragmatic reasons and comparative purposes, I concentrate 
on one particular group of people and their different savings and credit 
alternatives: Sumatran migrants of Tulehu. 
Ibu Efi is a member of an arisan of Sumatran shopkeepers and restaurant 
managers. Once per five months, she receives the fund of Rp. 750,000. Her 
husband and brother-in-law are members as well. They all manage their own 
shop and daily contribute Rp. 5,000 each to the arisan. Ibu Efi runs the first 
shop of her husband that he started at the time she had not yet migrated to 
Ambon island. The young Sumatran women explains that proceeds of her 
shop are used to pay for food and medicines. Still, she is involved in another 
arisan as well, that includes Sumatran shopkeepers of Ambon city. There are 
16 positions and Ibu Efi pays four positions of Rp. 1,000 per day. Every ten 
days the fund is distributed. She used her last four draws of Rp. 160,000 as 
follows: she sent Rp. 550,000 to her mother on Sumatra to purchase gold (Rp. 
250,000) and to pay her ticket to Ambon (Rp. 300,000). The remaining Rp. 
90,000 Ibu Efi used for small consumptive needs. 
Pak Wir is a member of an arisan of Sumatran shopkeepers and restaurant 
keepers. He draws two lots of Rp. 750,000 in one cycle of about five months. 
Pak Wir has used the funds of arisan for the following types of expenditures: 
first, when he started his first shop in Tulehu in 1983, he used the fund 
mostly for the purchase or payment of working capital. According to Pak 
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Wir, the fund served to smoothen business operations that had to guarantee 
a stable income and food security. Second, at a later date, he also used the 
fund for large investments: Pak Wir rented a house for seven years at the 
price of Rp. 1,500,000. The Ambonese owner of the house requested Pak Wir 
to pay the rent in zinc sheets to replace the roof of sago palm leaves. Pak 
Wir was unable to pay the rent himself and discussed the matter with his 
Chinese wholesaler. He told him that within two weeks it was his turn to 
receive the fund of the arisan. The wholesaler immediately provided the zinc 
sheets and half the interest-free loan was repaid two weeks later. Third, Pak 
Wir mobilized arisan funds for unexpected expenditures: Pak Wir was taken 
by surprise when the District Office of the Ministery of Transport and 
Communication decided to use the business place that was rented to Pak 
Wir, to tax licensed private buses. Pak Wir asked the Sumatran community 
of Tulehu for help and one of them was prepared to waive his rights as a 
lessee of a place at the price of Rp. 1,800,000. Pak Wir twice used his draw 
from the arisan as a payment to his friend. The most recent and fourth use of 
the fund is the purchase of gold that he considers, like many other Sumatran 
people, an extremely attractive form of savings because of its stability. The 
wife of Pak Wir, who runs their first shop and participates in three arisan, 
regularly wears golden earrings and a golden necklace. 
The finance needs and strategies of Pak Wir are not exceptional for the 
Sumatran community of Tulehu. Most of them are involved in arisan and are 
very enthusiastic about the financial services of their Chinese wholesaler. 
Another common experience of the Sumatran entrepreneurs that they 
certainly do not share with the many small Ambonese shopkeepers, is to 
have been visited by the manager of the local unit of the Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (BRI). Since the opening of this unit in Tulehu in 1987, the manager 
has tried to interest the Sumatran entrepreneurs in loans from his unit. 
However, many feel there is no need to borrow money from this bank 
because they enjoy the credit (modal vercayaan) of their Chinese wholesaler 
who, according to Pak Wir, is even prepared to borrow goods from local 
Chinese shopkeepers to serve his Sumatran customers. Those Sumatran 
people who manage a restaurant, add that their business does not require 
much capital and certainly not a loan from a bank. The conclusion to draw is 
that arisan and suppliers' credit are much more appreciated sources of 
finance than bank credit in the eyes of Sumatran entrepreneurs. 
With regard to the use of the savings facilities of the BRI unit desa, the 
Sumatran entrepreneurs have less in common. Many shopkeepers consider 
savings at this bank a waste of money because of the inflation and the weak 
Indonesian currency. Pak Wir will never try a bank deposit, "unless they let 
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me open a dollar account". He prefers to invest his profits irnmediately 2 4 or 
to use them to reduce his current debts with the Chinese wholesaler. Others 
take a different point of view: although shopkeeper Pak Sanan has to travel 
by scooter to reach the BRI unit desa of Tulehu, he still enjoys the simple 
savings procedures and easy withdrawal procedures of his SIMPEDES2 5 
account that he uses as his business current account. Pak Beti who manages a 
restaurant, also has a SIMPEDES account at the BRI unit desa. He uses this 
account to deposit his draws from his arisan. His basic motive for 
participation in arisan and transfer of arisan funds to the bank, is to save for 
higher education of his children. The conclusion to draw with respect to 
savings strategies of Sumatran entrepreneurs is that many of them let their 
savings first accumulate in an arisan. Usually, most of the fund is then 
mobilized for investment and consumptive expenditures. When investment 
opportunities lack or consumptive needs have been met, (remaining) funds 
are converted into gold or deposited at a local bank. 
24. Pak Wir told me he had saved coins in a traditional money box, but found he opened the 
box whenever a pedlar passed by. 
25. SIMPEDES is short for Simpanan Pedesaan (village savings) and is the name of a deposit 
mobilization program launched by the Bank Rakyat Indonesia on a national scale in 1986 (see: 
Asian Regional Office of the World Bank, 1987, p. 38-43). SIMPEDES offers simple savings 
procedures, easy withdrawal procedures, the possibility to win prizes in lottery schemes and 
interest rates up to 13.5 percent per annum (see also Chapter 4). 
Photograph: Three members of a praying society-cum-flrisan and myself, ready to throw 
a small and folded paper indicating the name of the winner of the arisan. 
6 
Women's Differential Use of 
ROSCAs in Indonesia1 
The new benevolent attention to rotating savings and credit associations is 
also directed to those in Indonesia that have only recently been praised for their 
impressive and promising qualities. For example, according to Kern (1986:118), 
former credit adviser with the USAID/Government of Indonesia Provincial 
Development Programme in East Java, "one of the most interesting forms of 
rural financial institutions in Indonesia, as well as many other countries, is the 
Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA), or in Indonesian, arisan". 
And Bouman and Moll (1992: 215), who are rural finance analysts, state that, 
"The most ancient and widespread form of group finance in Indonesia is likely 
to be the rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA) called arisan." 
However, any praise of ROSCAs has to be interpreted with great caution. First, 
I am concerned that it is not the self-regulative capacities of poor people that is 
acclaimed but rather the ROSCA as a model. (The use of the abbreviation 
HOSCA' is very telling in this respect.) My second concern is that it is not the 
savings and organizational capacities and preferences of poor people that are 
praised but rather the ROSCA as a mechanism to mobilize rural savings. 2 And 
third, many acclamations are nothing more than Hp-service or hypotheses. I 
have elaborated these points elsewhere in a longer version of this paper (see 
Chapter 5). 
1. Originally published in Money-Go-Rounds: The Importance of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
for Women, edited by Shirley Ardener and Sandra Burman, Oxford: Berg, 1995, pp. 127-148. 
Reprinted with permission of the publisher. 
2. It is striking that among present-day policy analysts and development planners the term 'Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations' (RoSCA or ROSCA) is standard, whereas in the older and more 
anthropological literature (Geertz 1962; Ardener 1964) the term 'rotating credit associations' is 
used. 
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Those who promote ROSCAs as a model or mechanism easily forget that, 
strictly speaking, ROSCAs do not behave; rather it is people who construct and 
reconstruct their own form of the association. No use is made of an actor 
perspective (cf. Long 1989) in their methodologies and analyses. One of the 
consequences of this bias is the production of quite general and simplistic ideas 
on the significance of rotating savings and credit associations for particular 
groups or categories of people. Probably the most dramatic example in this 
connection concerns about half the world's population: women. Few studies 
attempt to differentiate women according to their socio-economic background 
and their use of ROSCAs. Below I describe how different groups or categories 
of women participate in different kinds of savings and credit associations. For 
this purpose I outline the diverse backgrounds of different ROSCAs in a small 
Indonesian town. In my view, such an outline is a precondition for a more 
nuanced look at women's differential use of these associations. 
Comparative Studies 
Although Geertz (1962) and Ardener (1964) published nearly three decades 
ago, their studies on rotating savings and credit associations are still unique 
works in the literature, and are much quoted. The contribution by Geertz 
contains one of the few and probably the earliest descriptions of ROSCAs in 
Eastern Java. 31 am not aware of any documented case of ROSCAs outside Java 
except for Ambon (see Chapter 4). As a young anthropologist, Geertz was much 
concerned with the "shift from a traditionalistic agrarian society to an 
increasingly fluid commercial one" (1962: 260) in the so-called underdeveloped 
nations". According to him, this process involves a problematic shifting of "the 
whole framework of peasants from one emphasizing particularistic, diffuse, 
affective, and ascriptive ties between individuals, to one emphasizing within 
economic contexts - universalistic, affectively neutral, and achieved ties between 
them" (p.260). Geertz conceives rotating savings and credit associations as a 
product and conductor of this transformation: "the rotating credit association 
has been found associated with a lesser or greater penetration of an elaborated, 
and ultimately international exchange economy into a primarily agrarian 
society" (p.261). He describes orison on Java as "a link between the largely 
unmonetized economy of the past and the largely monetized economy of the 
future" (p.245). 
Geertz is one of the few who have tried to analyse the rise and evolution of 
ROSCAs (which he termed RCAs) from a general perspective of processes of 
3.1 consider 'rotating credit associations' and 'rotating savings and credit associations' as synonyms 
(see also: note 2) but prefer the latter because it suggests members' savings capacities and 
preferences. 
Women's Differential Use ofROSCAs in Indonesia 173 
social transformation. It should be emphasized in this connection that he is 
interested both in this type of association and in the family of institutions that 
"not only spring up in the economic, but in the political, religious, stratificatory, 
familial and other aspects of the social system as well" (p.263). He conceives 
these institutions as "middle rungs between traditional society and more 
modern forms of social organization" (p.263). Geertz seems to underestimate the 
very complex societal dynamics that evolve when an international exchange 
economy 'penetrates' a primarily agrarian society. It is hard to accept that an 
increasing interweaving of international, national and local economies provides 
the momentum for a modernization process that reduces these economies into 
phases of one and the same development plan. Yet Geertz treats whole 
countries and provinces as homogeneous economic units, including ROSCAs 
despite varying degrees of complexity. Second, Geertz's evolutionist model does 
not take into account the possibility of very different types of ROSCAs 
co-existing in one place or region. Third, Geertz (p.263) suggests that ROSCAs 
are 'irrational' when he predicts their transformation into banks, co-operatives 
and 'other rational credit institutions'. An ever-increasing number of sources 
doubt whether this is likely to occur. For instance Kurtz (1973), who describes 
ROSCAs (cundina) in urban Mexico and the USA, reports explicitly negative 
attitudes by the poor to financial institutions such as banks and savings and 
loan companies. Many people felt that banks were unfriendly or demanding, or 
placed restrictions on loans which the cundina did not (pp. 55-56). On the other 
hand there is little evidence of ROSCAs which have transformed themselves 
into non-rotating savings and credit associations (Williams and Johnston 1983; 
Prabowo 1989). 
In spite of the shortcomings of Geertz's analysis, I believe his approach is not 
to be set aside. My suggestion is to redefine his analysis in terms of his wider 
interests and drop the evolutionist bias. The idea remains of ROSCAs as flexible 
forms of co-operation that restructure social relations in changing contexts. 
Furthermore, a more differentiated look at people and development in particular 
regions is needed. Most case studies do not relate the diversity and 
development of these associations to local economic, social and political 
developments. 
The article by Ardener (1964), is another classical survey of ROSCAs. Whereas 
Geertz uses a deductive approach and takes ROSCAs as a case study of the 
process of modernization, Ardener tries an inductive approach that results, not 
in a grand theory, but in some empirical generalizations and research questions. 
Ardener is not convinced by the evolutionist model of Geertz, and points to 
exceptions and contradictory developments (pp. 221-222). The strength of 
Ardener's study is her systematic, detailed descriptive analysis of various types 
of ROSCAs. Her data collection enabled her easily to refute the 'theory' of 
Geertz. The shortcoming is the other side of the coin of an institutional analysis 
of ROSCAs, which ignores two important questions: first, the self-regulative and 
adaptive behavior of members of ROSCAs, and second, the relative significance 
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of ROSCAs compared to other savings and credit arrangements, methods, 
strategies and organizations. 
Members of ROSCAs make rules and join associations that fit their 
employment conditions, income flows, savings and money needs. For example, 
because of fluctuating incomes, the actual rotation of a fund may not be regular 
(see Chapter 4). It is also possible — if unlikely - that ROSCAs evolve into 
non-rotating savings and credit associations (Williams and Johnston 1983; 
Prabowo 1989). Self-regulation of ROSCAs implies endless possibilities to meet 
members' diverse financial needs and objectives: for example, indexed 
contributions, mutual exchange of turns, competitive bidding, borrowing from 
the organizer, and shared or multiple membership. Therefore it is very tempting 
not to study the use of alternative savings and credit arrangements, methods, 
strategies and organizations. However, it is exactly this kind of study that gives 
an opportunity to better understand the relative significance of ROSCAs. We 
must remember that it is people that count: people make rules, adapt rules and 
compare rules and the resources of different saving and credit arrangements. 
Studies of ROSCAs in Indonesia 
According to Geertz (1962), the most elementary form of ROSCA in Eastern 
Java is found in Modjokuto, a town-village complex where: "interest is not 
calculated, rotation is determined by lot or by agreement, memberships tend to 
be small, and a separate staff does not exist" (p.243). Geertz emphasizes that the 
arisan is "commonly viewed by its members less as an economic institution than 
as a broadly social one whose main purpose is the strengmening of community 
solidarity" (ibid). More commercial forms of arisan in rural areas evolve as a 
result of processes of commercialization and urbanization. The minds of people 
change: there is "an increased sensitivity to and understanding of the economic 
aspects of the rotating credit association, as against its symbolic, ritualistic 
aspects". It is in urban contexts that the most clearly and specifically economic 
arisan can be found: the market arisan, which is characterized by daily 
contributions, no meetings, fixed order of turns and a large number of members. 
The Asian Development Bank conducted a comparative study of informal 
finance across a common set of issues in five Asian countries, including 
Indonesia. Although in his overview Ghate (1992: 93) states that "ROSCAs are 
widespread in Indonesia", this has yet to be fully documented; I have referred 
to some of the literature in Chapter 5. I have had to resort to personal 
communication with fellow researchers 4 — a method that was also employed 
4. All fellow researchers happen to be staff members, fellows, PhD students or graduate students 
of the Department of Agrarian Law at Wageningen Agricultural University. 
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by Ardener (1964) — to provide some of the case material below from Sumatra, 
Sumba and Sulawesi. 
Slaats-Portier (pers. comm. 1991) reports that on North Sumatra arisan became 
the dominant term for ROSCAs in the 1980s, replacing that of jula-jula, which 
was much heard in the 1970s. Arisan are organized by officials of the Family 
Welfare Programme (PKK) and the organization of female civil servants 
(Dharma Wanita). Some women consider arisan appropriate instruments to 
satisfy their consumption needs quickly. Traders respond to this need, and use 
arisan to safeguard their sale of luxury goods. 5 Wijngaard and Hoeve (pers. 
comm. 1991) report that ROSCAs in Tukka, a village on North Sumatra, are 
specially organized to finance one of the following expenditures: weddings, 
house construction or university education. The finance of weddings is the most 
popular aim of the associations. One of them is called julo-julo adat nako. Like 
most of the ROSCAs that are organized to finance weddings, the contributions 
of this association are in meat (cf. Geertz 1962: 246, paketan daging). Each of the 
92 members contributes one kilogram of meat to the wedding fund a few days 
before the marriage. The ultimate sanction for default is public confiscation of 
household goods. 
Van de Ven (pers. comm. 1991) mentions several arisan of female teachers 
who work at the same school in Hiang village, Jambi Province of Sumatra. He 
also reports on kelompok gotong royong, a common denominator of a variety of 
local cooperative undertakings. One such is a praying and singing society 
(penghajian) that maintains a weekly arisan. The members also work in small 
labor groups to finance the purchase of meat for the fasting month. The laborers 
do not want to get paid immediately, but collect their income just before the 
fasting month. 
According to Vel (pers. comm. 1991), arisan on Sumba are found only among 
salaried people. Her observation that money is a scarce good on this island is 
a plausible explanation of the limited occurrence of ROSCAs with contributions 
and distribution in cash. With respect to two older types of associations on 
Sumba, it is better to speak of a rotating 'pool' (instead of a rotating 'fund'), as 
in the case of a group of male laborers who together cut imperata grass. Their 
daily yield is divided among members on a rotating basis to be used for roof 
5. This much resembles the practice of Ibu Isoh on West Java, as described by Veltenaar (1988: 
85-88): Ibu Isoh is a tailor, and organizes arisan to sell her products. In several villages she gathers 
about ten women willing to buy her clothes or embroidery. They regularly contribute to a 
rotating fund which is used to buy, for instance, a bedspread from Ibu Isoh. In some cases the 
bedspread arisan changes into one that serves to buy her table-covers. In other cases the members 
decide to start an arisan for purchase of zinc sheets (pan), arisan for plates, money arisan or gold 
arisan coordinated by Ibu Isoh who receives a small commission for her services. In 1988 she 
coordinated 20 arisan including four to buy bedspreads. At that time Ibu Isoh herself participated 
in an arisan with a contribution of Rp. 100,000 per month. (For a Bolivian version of this type of 
arisan: see Adams and Canavesi 1992). 
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repairs. The second type is a group of men and women from well-to-do 
households who annually contribute a large amount of rice to a pool that is 
cashed by the winner to buy zinc sheets for roofing. A new version of 
associations with contributions in kind has recently been introduced by the local 
project society, assisted by Vel (pers. comm.): women have been organized in 
a group that makes mats of pandanus leaves, to be sold every two weeks for the 
benefit of one of the members. Usually the recipient uses the fund to buy 
household utensils. 6 
Tang (pers. comm. 1991) clistinguishes two types of ROSCA on South 
Sulawesi: mengandelek and arisan. Mengandelek 7 is the popular term among 
becak drivers, fishermen and fishermen's wives. Daily contributions are made 
to funds which are distributed every ten days. Whereas the rise of mengandelek 
dates back to the 1950s, arisan (or the use of the term arisan), evolved in the 
1970s. Officials of the Family Welfare Programme (PKK) organize arisan of 
neighbors (dasa wisma), who contribute on a monthly basis, arisan with a 
monthly contribution are also common among teachers. 
Papanek and Schwede (1988) in their 1972-1974 survey found that 106 women 
among 146 lower-middle and middle-class Jakarta women belonged to one or 
more arisan. Drawing lots was the typical mode of rotation. The respondents 
belonged predominantly to arisan formed among friends or work colleagues (57 
per cent of 262 memberships); there were also 75 neighborhood arisan (29 per 
cent) and 38 kin-group arisan (14 per cent). The authors conclude that "arisan are 
ad hoc social institutions that depend for their effectiveness on pre-existing 
bonds that form the basis of mutual trust" (p.92). Most savings were intended 
for the acquisition of capital assets: land, house, car, motorcycle, household 
equipment, jewellery. According to Papanek and Schwede, some urban women 
commented that "arisan were helpful in protecting small sums against casual 
requests by men and children because all family members could understand 
how shameful it would be not to make one's promised contribution at the next 
meeting" (1988: 95). Others commented that 'husbands who might object to 
what they considered women's excessive socializing were mollified by the 
economic gains that arisan membership brought with it" (ibid). 
6. In their survey of women's informal associations in developing countries March and Taqqu 
(1986) distinguish between 'rotating credit associations' and 'rotating labour associations'. 
However, the last example of Vel (pers. comm.) is obviously a mixture of both. 
7. Mengandelek shows resemblance to the Dutch word aandeel (share). Scheepens (1974), who 
compared 'traditional savings and credit organizations and modern credit organizations of village 
Bojong' in West Java, found a similar term. He casually remarks (p.30) that "some people told me 
that in early days there were also arisan (named andilan)." Andilan looks like the Indonesian 
pronunciation (andil) and noun (an) of the Dutch word aandeel. This suggests that Dutch colonial 
administrators or welfare workers might have stimulated Indonesians to organize themselves in 
arisan. 
Women's Differential Use ofROSCAs in Indonesia 177 
The specific urban setting and selection of middle-class women studied by 
Papanek and Schwede make generalizations impossible about Indonesian 
women's use of ROSCAs. The authors "are not aware of any recent systematic 
studies of the role of arisan among women in Indonesia" (p.92).8 A long time 
ago Geertz (1962) mentioned that the arisan became an 'extiaordinarily popular 
institution' among "people who represent a semi-urban, semi-rural proletariat, 
the members of which, though they have been forced to adopt many of the 
social, political, and economic patterns of the town, still cling to many of the 
values and beliefs of the village" (p.246). He added that arisan were most 
particularly popular among the women of this proletariat, "who hold the purse 
strings in any case" (ibid). 
Contributions 
On Central Java, one of the eight prevailing forms of agricultural credit is the 
arisan (Lindauer 1971). Lindauer observes that "during the inflation in the 
Sukarno era, the contributions were linked to the price of rice or gold" (p.267, 
my translation). In the study on Informal Credit Markets in Indonesia' 
sponsored by the Asian Development Bank, three adaptations of arisan to 
inflation are casually reported: first, the agreement to make contributions in 
kind; second and third, to index the cash contribution to the price of a gram of 
gold or a sheet of zinc (Prabowo et al. 1989). Ghate (1990) mentions that "apart 
from cash arisan, many of the arisan entailed contributions in kind (such as 
building materials, labor and foodgrains). Moreover some of the cash arisan 
were dedicated to the purchase of specific objects such as household utensils 
and furniture (popular among women) or livestock and roofing, piping and 
fencing material (which were popular among the men)" (Ghate 1992: 94).9 
Non-rotation 
In this connection the paper by Williams and Johnston (1983) provides an 
interesting final thought: they suggest that arisan on Java may in future evolve 
as non-rotating savings and credit associations: "In order to avoid the arisan's 
element of unpredictability, some groups are dissolving their arisan and forming 
kelompok simpan-pinjam (savings and loan groups)" (p.72). Prabowo (1989: 9) 
8. Chapter 4 contains general information on women's involvement in arisan on Ambon, the 
Moluccas. It also describes the case of a women's praying society which initiates arisan and 
business activities. 
9. Scheepens (1974), Hesselink-van SteUe (1983) and Veltenaar (1988) distinguish between arisan 
uang (which means: arisan money) and arisan barang (which means: arisan goods). In the case of 
arisan barang the fund is targeted to the purchase of glasses, plates, spoons, forks or pans. 
Patmo-Mingoen (1980), Jansen (1987) and Van der Brugh (1989) also distinguish arisan uang and 
arisan beras (which means: arisan rice). 
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remarks that, "Some arisan have developed lending and credit arrangements 
beyond those of traditional ROSCAs": the group fund is used for giving credit 
and does not rotate. Prabowo (p.10) adds that, "In our survey such associations 
are identified as simpan pinjam, usaha bersama, meaning to work together (my 
translation) or credit union" (p.10). Geertz (1962) does not include non-rotating 
savings and credit associations in his analysis. 
Bidding for the Fund 
To my knowledge the only published article dealing solely with arisan is that 
by Williams and Johnston (1983), who discovered arisan that are widespread on 
Central Java. According to them, two new types of arisan have emerged since 
Geertz published his survey in 1962. The first is the 'arisan call' (cf. Prabowo et 
al. 1989), in which the rotation of the fund is determined by commercial 
bidding. They believe that it "has gained great popularity among the urban elite 
since the mid-1960s .... It is quite common for wives of Wgh-ranking public 
servants and military officers to be members of 10 or more arisan call groups at 
the same time" (op. cit.: 72). Further, "this form of arisan is based on the Chinese 
hui ('association'), which has long been practised by the ethnic Chinese business 
community in Indonesia". These findings imply a reassessment of Geertz's 
conclusion (1962: 247) that "almost all urban arisans decide on the order with 
which the individual draws the fund not by agreement but by lot". 
Official Arisan 
The second new type of arisan distinguished by Williams and Johnston (1983) 
is the 'official arisan', organized under the auspices of government bodies or 
official welfare programmes such as the Family Welfare Programme (PKK). This 
is primarily directed at women "who after all, are the members of the 
community who are most concerned with health, progress and prosperity of the 
family" (Rustam 1986: 77). 
Rustam who, as the wife of the Minister of Home Affairs, is the chairman of 
the PKK at national level, says that the PKK has spread rapidly and evolved 
into a nation-wide movement after its official recognition in 1972. The 
organization of arisan is part of the PKK programmes on health and housing: 
the PKK "sets up rotating lottery (arisan) groups to finance the repair or 
building of houses, family lavatories and bath plus laundry units" (p.81).10 
10. Rustam (1986), who wonders how to organize fund-raising activities to finance PKK activities, 
finds to her relief that, "Fortunately, there are old customs for this kind of activity: women may 
be told to put a single spoonful of rice into another pot every time they cook; once a week all 
those spoonfuls are added to what other villagers have collected; when there is enough, the rice 
can be sold, and the Tittle money' needed is obtained" (p.80). Sinaga and others (1976) 
distinguish two types of local savings and credit groups of the West Javanese village Sukagalik 
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Martm-Schiller (1989) reports that "the popular arisan, under the auspices of 
PKK (Program Kesejahteraan Keluarga, the government Family Welfare 
Programme) or other women's organizations, are purely women's activities" 
(p.36). Prabowo and others (1989: par. 4.2) speak of 'programmed' or 
'dependent 7 arisan versus 'independent' arisan. The authors indirectly define 
'programmed' and 'dependent' arisan: they deplore, with regard to five 
independent arisan, that "it is difficult to compute the exact number because 
their activities are not registered in the district aclministration book". 
According to Williams and Johnston (1983), the arisan of PKK and other 
government or government-supported bodies function as a 'drawcard' used by 
government officials who "have gradually intensified efforts to capitalize on the 
economic and social potential of the arisan in order to popularize women's 
activities and other development programmes" (p.67). However, in many cases, 
PKK meetings might have become little more than a brief arisan, as happened 
with a group of women radio listeners organized as part of a government 
programme for the dissemination of information (Martin-Schiller 1989: 36; see 
also Hesselink-van Stelle 1983: 41). Williams and Johnston (1983: 71) warn that 
"in fact, high attendance at PKK meetings can easily be deceptive because 
participation in the arisan may become an end in itself, while the aims of the 
programme are overlooked". In addition, they critically remark that "a study of 
six villages in West Java found that arisan formed on official initiative tended 
to be less popular than those formed spontaneously by local people". 
Geertz (1962) mentions that "the arisan is also quite popular among the elite 
of the town, those who, for the most part, live in the stone houses along the 
streets. In this group it is almost always based on one or another of the dozens 
of sodalities, political parties, youth groups, labour unions, charitable 
associations, school societies, women's clubs, athletic associations, which have 
proliferated on the urban scene since the Revolution of 1945" (p.247). An 
interesting but difficult question is what happened with these 'voluntary 
associations' and their arisan activities after the New Order (Orde ~Ba.ru) was 
established in 1965. Perhaps the central government recognition in 1972 of the 
Family Welfare Programme (PKK) can be interpreted as a new impulse towards 
what government officials describe as "a voluntary movement operating at 
grass-roots in country villages and wards" (cf. Rustam 1986: 77) and towards 
what government officials call arisan. 
arisan and groups called beras parelek ('a spoonful of rice'). According to the authors, most of the 
women are members of beras parelek groups. All members save a spoonful of rice each day 
towards a collective stock that serves as a security fund for families who have run out of rice in 
the pre-harvest period (paceklik). 
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The Background to Women's Differential Use of ROSCA: 
The Case of Tulehu 
Perhaps the region in Indonesia that has longest been articulated with the 
world-wide economy is the spice islands of the Moluccas. The arrival of 
Portuguese traders in the sixteenth century marked the beginning of a dramatic 
expansion of trade networks that included this region. Other European traders 
followed and struggled for the privilege to buy cloves from local rulers. The 
Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) that took over control from the Portuguese 
in 1605 (Knaap 1981a) forced the producers to sell all their cloves at a price of 
56 rixdollars per bahar (550 pounds): five for the local rulers, one for transport 
and fifty for the producer. The VOC was the first in the spice trade to pay its 
suppliers in cash. In 1863 Dutch governors had to end their policy of enforced 
cultivation because the new cultivation of cloves in African Zanzibar had 
pushed the world market price below the cost price of the Dutch (Knaap 1981b). 
At independence in 1945 the new Indonesian leaders inherited a free market 
system. It was not until late in the post-colonial period that clove producers 
faced a monopoly on cloves marketing and fixed prices again: Presidential 
Decree No. 8 (1980) orders that only government village co-operatives are 
entitled to buy cloves from the farmers for a fixed price. However, in spite of 
three hundred and fifty years of exposure to Dutch traders, missionaries and 
adrninistrators, ROSCAs seem to be of late post-colonial origin in the Moluccan 
region. 1 1 
One reason why ROSCAs did not develop is the importance of sago and 
fishery in the local economy (Knaap 1981a). Sago palms provide the traditional 
staple food as well as materials for house construction, and the sea provides 
fish, an integral part of the daily diet (see Chapter 4). The plentiful sago palms 
can be harvested all year round. Even more important, sago and fish were not 
exchanged for money until recently: they have been more or less subsistence 
crops. The paradise-like availability of sago and fish has for centuries been a 
brake on the gradual monetization of the local economy which followed the first 
contacts with foreign traders and rulers. There is little need for thrift and 
regular saving among sago and fish collectors. Traditional sago cultivation and 
fishing neither imply cash investments nor enable or give much sense to cash 
contributions to a common fund. 
Another reason why ROSCAs did not develop is that clove trees yield 
abundantly only once in three or four years, and this does not make for regular 
saving. Furthermore, group saving by clove producers is difficult because clove 
11. The historical studies of Rumphius (1910) and Knaap (1987) do not contain descriptions of 
ROSCAs on the Moluccas or Ambon island in particular: nor do the field notes of Kennedy 
(1950) and the comprehensive village study of van Fraassen (1972). Even van Faassen (1986), 
who conducted a socio-economic study of Tulehu, makes no reference to rotating savings and 
credit associations. 
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production is very location-specific. Still, non-daily cash income can necessitate 
more or less regular saving, as in the many rice-producing areas of Indonesia 
where women used to save a spoonful of rice every day to bridge the difficult 
pre-harvest period. However, the abundance of sago and fish in the Moluccan 
region provided no reason to start regular saving in cash or kind. Periods of 
food scarcity rarely occurred. Money needs were extremely modest because 
sago and fish guaranteed most inhabitants a minimum living standard in terms 
of food supply and housing. 
Within the last two decades the economy of Tulehu has dramatically altered 
since the village became a new regional trade and transport centre. Located at 
the north-eastern coast of Ambon island, it is a link between Ambon city and 
other ports of Indonesia on the one hand, and the hinterland of the central 
Moluccas on the other. The small town, which officially numbers 12,000 people 
(census 1989), attracts many migrants looking for work and education. About 
a third of its population consists of Butonese incomers who are much involved 
in the clove trade. Sumatran, Chinese and Javanese migrants form smaller but 
economically powerful groups, who dominate as shopkeepers and restaurant 
owners. Many government services have offices in Tulehu, which is the 
administrative capital of a sub-district. In Tulehu ROSCAs are new phenomena 
since the 1970s. I distinguish three different situations which encourage the 
formation of ROSCAs: migration, government extension and organization, and 
increased money needs. 
Migrants: Parallel Social and Economic Associations 
as Forms of Collective Help 
To speak of a late 'origin' of ROSCAs in the Moluccan region is somewhat 
misleading. The first associations in this region were probably started by 
migrants (cf. Ardener 1964:209). In Tulehu, Sumatran migrants started ROSCAs 
some fifteen years ago. Each week they came together to eat, drink and play 
arisan, to strengthen ethnic ties. They had earlier been exposed to ROSCAs in 
Sumatra, where they were called bajulo-julo (see Chapter 4). 
The first Sumatran migrants of Tulehu started selling home-baked cookies as 
street vendors (kaki lima), then opened restaurants, and after a few years 
managed to establish medium-sized shops. With the help of these pioneers, new 
Sumatran migrants easily found opportunities to make a little income and ways 
to finance their larger business plans. They started to use arisan as efficient 
vehicles to save for investments. The socio-cultural arisan gradually became 
commercialized and discontinued weekly meetings. A pre-arranged sequence 
of receivers, instead of the lottery system, now determines the order of rotation; 
all participants bring their contributions each day to the group leader, and after 
ten days one participant comes to the leader to receive the deposits. The group 
leader is the first person to take the fund (see Chapter 4). Both Sumatran men 
and women participate in these commercial arisan. I found two arisan of 
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Sumatran shopkeepers and restaurant owners of Tulehu: the first consists of ten 
men and three women, who each contribute Rp. 5,000 per day, except for two 
members paying Rp. 10,000 for two turns. 1 2 Every ten days the fund is 
distributed so that the full cycle takes nearly five months and the rotating fund 
amounts to Rp. 750,000. The full rotation is determined by lottery at the start of 
the cycle. The first turn forms the exception, the organizer receiving the first 
fund. The second arisan consists of fourteen Sumatran women with a daily 
contribution of Rp. 1,000. Four of them each have two turns and one member 
even has three turns, so that one cycle takes more than six months. Many 
Sumatran couples own two shops or try to open a second one. The wife 
manages the first shop and pays for daily household expenses. Possibly this 
explains the smaller standard contribution of the female arisan. 
Parallel to the commercial arisan, other, non-rotating social savings and credit 
associations have evolved. In Tulehu an association of forty Sumatran 
households called Ikatan Keluarga Saiyo Sakato (IKSS) coordinates at least three 
activities. First, all forty households contribute Rp. 2,500 per month to a social 
fund, which the secretary deposits in a savings account at the Banky Rakyat 
Indonesia (BRI). The non-rotating fund is used for funeral ceremonies (Rp. 
25,000 per case) and trips to Sumatra (one ticket per family). Second, most of the 
members of the IKSS contribute weekly to a fund for the annual hari raya 
quarban, an Islamic festival. A Sumatran shopkeeper, who is a haji, keeps this 
non-rotating fund. In 1989-90 thirty-four families together contributed about Rp. 
40,000 per week. When a household is unable to save the required amount (the 
price of a goat or a seventh part of that of an ox) the savings are retained for 
the next season or returned just prior to the festival. Third, twenty-six women 
gather every month for religious classes at the local Islamic university. Their 
club, Bando Kanduang or 'dedicated women', keeps arisan every meeting. Each 
member contributes Rp. 5,000, while two members receive half a fund. The 
women also each contribute Rp. 500 monthly to a social fund for emergencies 
and birthday presents. Every three months the women come with their 
husbands, come to the Islamic university to discuss the progress of the uang 
quarban and have a big celebration. 
Butonese migrants participate on a limited scale in labor associations with a 
rotating fund. In small groups they cut sago trees and distribute the proceeds 
of the sale of sago pith on a weekly rotating basis. Butonese migrants are much 
more involved in pre-harvest arrangements with Ambonese: they buy the rights 
to harvest clove trees for one or more (good) seasons. 1 3 The small Chinese and 
Javanese minorities of Tulehu are not involved in ROSCAs. But an old Chinese 
1Z US$1.00 = Rp. 1,760 fluty 1989). 
13. Cf. Ardener (1964): "Hill suggests that, in Ghana, they are unlikely to spread into areas where 
farmers can raise capital by pledging their farms, although pledging of land among the Mba-Ise 
Ibo of Nigeria did not inhibit the development of rotating credit associations there" (p.206). 
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shopkeeper remembered hui as the Chinese name of ROSCAs that used to be 
popular among Chinese entrepreneurs in large urban centres of Indonesia. 
Government Organization of Women 
About ten years ago the first 'official' arisan was started in Tulehu by wives 
of police officers and the military. These run smoothly due to the regular 
income of their husbands. They are organized as part of semi-official women's 
clubs. Monthly contributions vary from Rp. 5,000 to Rp. 15,000. arisan that result 
from government educational programmes perform rather poorly in Tulehu, like 
the one of the local Family Welfare Programme (PKK) which collapsed, failing 
to attract women to extension meetings. The arisan of the Office of Coordinated 
Services (Posyandu) has still to attract many women to the extension meetings. 
The monthly or fortnightly contribution is quite low, not exceeding Rp. 1,000. 
It is difficult to describe the arisan of the government extension services in 
terms of the dualistic and evolutionary notions of social clubs that gradually 
transform into economic ones. There are no ethnic or neighborhood ties that 
serve as a pre-existing social basis of arisan, and there are no future financial 
economic targets. Besides, these associations have no end dates. To a lesser 
extent this also applies to the arisan of wives of police and military officers. 
They live in compounds with their husbands, mostly migrants who happen to 
be stationed in Tulehu. In all these cases, however, the role of the arisan as an 
organizational tool or device to tie women to government programmes should 
not be underestimated (but see above for reservations). 
Increased Money Needs and New Social Units 
The most recent arisan of Tulehu are those of the native Ambonese. Three 
types have evolved in the last five to seven years: the arisan of economic peers 
who earn a regular income, the neighborhood arisan, and the arisan of members 
of a religious society. The evolution of all three types is closely related to the 
increased importance of money in the local economy. 
Until recently, Ambonese relatives and neighbors helped each other to build 
traditional sago houses on a more or less rotating basis (masohi). The forests 
provided all necessary construction materials. However, with the enormous 
incomes from the sale of cloves in the 1970s Ambonese villagers got a taste for 
building new houses with concrete walls and zinc roofs. As a result, the need 
to organize masohi faded. ROSCAs to finance the purchase of zinc roofs, as on 
Java, did not develop because for the Ambonese the clove harvest provided the 
best single opportunity to invest in housing. 
Arisan in Tulehu are not likely to be adaptations of masohi. The arisan of 
Ambonese people, who earn income from non-farm activities, satisfy needs 
rather different from the masohi of subsistence farmers. These non-farm activities 
are an example of the new economic opportunities in Tulehu, and also an 
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expression of people's increased money requirements. When prices of cloves 
dropped in the 1980s, the farmers still had their increased money needs. Besides 
the zinc roof as the new standard of housing, rice had become the new standard 
of consumption, replacing the tasteless sago porridge. The growing 
opportunities to earn extra non-farm income were gratefully exploited, and 
arisan served as a tool for efficient cash flow management. In contrast to the 
arisan started by Sumatran entrepreneurs of Tulehu to strengthen ethnic ties, 
arisan of Ambonese people who earn a regular income have no social or ethnic 
precursor. These arisan not only protect members against sudden expenditure; 
they also deter claims from family members. 
Both men and women are involved in these arisan, which appear as new 
social units in increasingly commercial Tulehu. Those of the harbor laborers 
consist of men only; one small arisan for petrol vendors includes one woman; 
fish traders' arisan axe a female affair, as are the arisan of market women. All 
contributions are made daily; memberships vary from three to twenty-five. 
Harbor laborers determine the full order of rotation by lottery at the very 
beginning of the cycle. The fisherwomen use both a lottery and a 
pre-determined order. Market women deliberate each time on who is to receive 
the fund next. 
Neighborhood arisan function less to strengthen neighborhood ties than to 
collect money. Neighbors who are civil servants and pensioners, typically 
women, make daily or monthly contributions. But default has made this type 
of arisan less popular and less common in the many wards of Tulehu. People 
involved in neighborhood arisan were typically women. 
Every week members of a religious society come together to pray and sing 
Islamic verses. There are male societies as well as female ones. It is very striking 
that only female societies organize arisan at the end of the evening to stimulate 
members to participate in the meetings. I feel that this is not because women are 
less dedicated to Islam than men. The large involvement of women in 
street-vending activities and vegetable and fish markets, and their dominant role 
in managing the household purse, have made many women aware of the 
functions and possibilities of money. It is not only the lottery as the common 
method of determining the rotation of the fund that attract women who 
participate in arisan, but also the mere use of money. Most of the religious 
gatherings are held at the place of the winner of the fund who pays for the tea 
and snacks at the next meeting. In one case the house of the leader, who is 
married to one of the most well-to-do men in town, is the place of weekly 
congregation. Besides the common contribution of Rp. 1,000 to the arisan, all 
20-40 members also contribute Rp. 100 each to a non-rotating emergency fund. 
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Women's Differential Use of ROSCAs: 
Some Case Studies 
I have just noted that there are arisan composed of female Sumatran 
shopkeepers, female Ambonese government employees, market women, female 
fish traders, female neighbors, and women who come together to sing and pray. 
My field survey in 1989 showed that sixteen out of twenty-four arisan consisted 
of women only, and four arisan had a mixed gender composition (see Chapter 
4). Therefore one might safely conclude that ROSCAs are predominantly female 
affairs in Tulehu. The diverse socio-economic backgrounds of these Tulehu 
women, however, make it impossible to speak of women's use of ROSCAs 
without referring to the different groups or categories of women involved. To 
further illustrate my argument, I briefly describe four cases of women and their 
use of ROSCAs. Each includes some tentative conclusions on the significance of 
ROSCAs for the group or category of women as a whole. 
The first case is that of Ibu Efi, one of thirteen members (ten men and three 
women) of an arisan of Sumatran shopkeepers and restaurant managers. Once 
every five months she receives the fund of Rp. 750,000. Her husband and 
brother-in-law are members as well. They all manage their own shops, and 
daily contribute Rp. 5,000 each to the arisan. Every ten days the fund is 
distributed. Two members of the arisan draw two times in one cycle, as they 
pay for two turns, that is, Rp. 10,000 per day. Ibu Efi runs the first shop her 
husband started before she had migrated to Ambon island. The young Sumatran 
woman explains that proceeds of the shop she manages are used to pay for food 
and medicines. She is also involved in another arisan, which includes Sumatran 
shopkeepers of Ambon city. There are sixteen turns and Ibu Efi pays for four 
of Rp. 1,000 per day. Every ten days the fund is distributed. She used her last 
four draws of Rp. 160,000 as follows: she sent Rp. 550,000 to her mother on 
Sumatra to purchase gold (Rp. 250,000) and to pay for her ticket to Ambon (Rp. 
300,000). The remaining Rp. 90,000 Ibu Efi used for small consumption needs. 
The main reason for Sumatran women joining ROSCAs is not to protect small 
sums of money against requests by relatives or husbands in particular (cf. 
Papanek and Schwede 1988). Close relatives live far away in Sumatra and the 
local Sumatran migrant community has few kinship ties. On the contrary, 
ROSCAs are often used to tighten family relations. Many funds of the Sumatran 
associations have been used by female and male members to finance a journey 
to Sumatra. The wife's responsibility for one of the two shops of a Sumatran 
couple which is common among the Sumatran community of Tulehu suggests 
a rather independent position of the entrepreneurial wife vis-a-vis her likewise 
entrepreneurial husband. However, the domestic responsibilities of Sumatran 
women seem to limit their capacity to participate in ROSCAs with large 
contributions. Finally, the golden earrings and necklaces many Sumatran 
women possess suggest that they commonly use ROSCAs as a stepping-stone 
towards savings in gold. 
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The second case is that of Posyandu, short for Pos Pelayanan Terpadu, a small 
semi-official health centre. Right behind the bunding of the sub-district 
aclxninistration in Tulehu, the coordinator of the Posyandu organizes a meeting 
every fortnight. Every meeting consists of three parts: a health issue, an arisan, 
and gymnastics — in that order. According to the co-ordinator and her 
assistants, the meetings are meant to strengthen feelings of unity and mutual 
help among the forty female participants; and arisan should be seen as an 
integral part of this. The contribution is Rp. 1,000 each fortnight. At every 
meeting two folded pieces of paper, each with a name on it, are drawn from a 
glass full of papers: two women have to share the fund of Rp. 40,000. Although 
the arisan is clearly meant to attract women to meetings, it has not been 
important enough to guarantee a high degree of participation for two reasons: 
first, the health centre is some distance up hill from the village centre, making 
this unsuitable for regular meetings. Second, the initiative to organize the 
meetings comes from above not only in a spatial sense but also in an abstract 
sense. Most of the Tulehu women do not appreciate these initiatives from 
semi-governmental bodies. An early collapse of the arisan is the result, as 
happened with the PKK unit in Tulehu, which had started an arisan that 
stopped rotating after a few meetings. 
My third case is that of Ibu Aci, a member of two praying societies of elderly 
Ambonese women. Both societies meet weekly, and organize arisan when the 
late praying and singing has come to an end. As she puts it herself, Ibu Aci 
lives in a very small and ugly house, with her husband who runs a small shop 
in the front room. These externals conceal the fact that Ibu Aci is quite a 
wealthy woman, with an impressive savings account at a bank in Ambon city. 
In fact she makes millions of rupiahs from the inter-island trade in clothes sold 
on credit. She could afford to participate in an arisan with large contributions, 
like the arisan of Ibu Efi that collects Rp. 50,000 per member every ten days. 
However, the arisan connected to the praying societies only require a 
contribution of Rp. 1,000 per week. Obviously the arisan serves to stimulate 
women to attend the meetings regularly and is not a pure savings device. What 
makes the arisan of religious societies of elderly Ambonese women quite 
effective, unlike those of the Posyandu and PKK-unit, is that they reinforce 
existing ties of friendship, kinship and religion. 
My fourth case is that of two Ambonese market women: Ibu Cum and Ibu 
Ida, who are the treasurers of two different arisan of vegetable sellers and 
restaurant-keepers. Every day the members of these arisan bring their 
contributions of Rp. 2,500 to the nearby market stall of their treasurer. The daily 
contributions are not distributed immediately but are saved till the fifth day, 
when the women decide who will get the accumulated fund. Not surprisingly, 
Ibu Cum and Ibu Ida are known as very honest women. The substantial amount 
of daily savings underlines their responsibility as treasurers: Rp. 2,500 is about 
30-40 per cent of the daily net income of a market woman of Tulehu. Ibu Ida's 
predecessor was the Sumatran restaurant keeper Pak Hab, who was married to 
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an Ambonese woman. Pak Hab was one of the few Sumatran people strongly 
in favor of the integration of the Sumatran and Ambonese communities. In spite 
of his good intentions, he had to hand over the leadership of the arisan of 
Ambonese women because they felt a little ashamed (malu) of bringing their 
contributions to a Sumatran man — albeit a very friendly one. Ibu Cum has a 
much longer reputation as a solid treasurer than her friend Ibu Ida. Possibly her 
husband plays an indirect role in this connection: he is a high official in the 
Departmental Office for Education and Culture earning a regular and 
considerable high income. Somehow he managed to let his office donate Rp. 
300,000 to his wife as the best market woman of Tulehu, as a board above her 
market stall shows. Ibu Cum can expect only few requests for money from her 
husband. This certainly does not apply to all market women, who are well 
aware that they cannot save individually at home without demands upon them. 
Therefore they use the ROSCA as a savings device to protect their small daily 
earnings against the many requests of relatives. 
Women's differential use of ROSCAs in Tulehu cannot be understood without 
reference to the changing local society and rural economy. Put even more 
strongly, my case suggests that the study of women's use of these associations 
is an exciting but demanding attempt to understand change and continuity 
within different sets of relationships — migrants and their hosts, government 
employees and their clients, and small-scale entrepreneurs and their relatives. 
To look through the eyes of Tulehu women is to look through the eyes of 
migrants, target groups of government programmes, wives and mothers. Hence 
it is important not to use the label 'ROSCA' or the label 'women' in an 
undifferentiated way. Different classes or categories of women have their own 
particular and changing reasons to join, adapt or frustrate rotating savings and 
credit associations. Therefore the study of women's differential use of ROSCAs 
may provide much-needed pictures of people — and it is people that count. 

7 
The Struggle for Cooperatives1 
The history of so-called cooperatives in developing countries is a litany of 
broken promises. National governments of developing countries have long 
assured rural populations as well as international funding agencies that to 
introduce cooperatives with their rules and procedures, is to emancipate the 
so-called backward and unorganized rural population, to bring prosperity to 
its member-producers, to increase the production of food and cash crops, to 
guarantee national food security and to induce national economic 
development. Although the exact package of promises varies from nation to 
nation and from development plan to development plan, all packages have 
in general been of a grand or grandiose quality. 
However, those institutions called cooperatives did not function as they 
were supposed to function and were not what they were supposed to be 
according to the ideals, policies and even 'theories' of their different 
supporters. The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
concluded that,"... rural cooperatives have seldom achieved the development 
goals set for them by economic and social planners. This has been most 
clearly evident when the goals have included structural changes" (UNRISD 
1975: 10). In his FAO report Dulfer (1976) says that "for some time now 
critical voices from the spheres of project implementation and empirical 
research have been making themselves increasingly heard. They point out 
numerous failures or at any rate examples of lack of success either in 
individual projects or in entire cooperative programmes" (p.l). According to 
Baviskar and Attwood (1984), "...the performance of cooperatives in most 
countries has been spotty and mostly discouraging" (p.85). 
1. Originally published in Law as a Resource in Agrarian Struggles edited by F. von Benda-
Beckmann and M. van der Velde, Wageningen Studies in Sociology 33, Wageningen 
Agricultural University, pp. 241-265. 
290 People That Count 
From Reassurance to Reassessment of Cooperatives 
Different conclusions have been drawn by the different actors involved in 
'the cooperative debate'. Three main types of arguments against cooperatives 
can be distinguished. 
First, many of these actors now question the intrinsic or absolute value of 
the cooperative as a tool to combat rural poverty in developing countries. In 
their World Bank paper Lele and Christiansen (1989) citing Hanak and Loft 
(1987) for example, recommended that Nordic donors drastically review their 
assumptions on the role of cooperatives in development: "unless Nordic 
donors openly begin to reassess the blanket assumption that cooperatives are 
a good thing everywhere, there are dangers that future promotion will again 
turn to areas where cooperatives do not stand a chance of success" (p.19). 
Abbott (1989), former chief of the Marketing and Credit Service of the FAO, 
also emphasizes the relative value of cooperatives and suggests that, 
"Cooperatives are needed as a competing channel, not as a monopoly" (p.19). 
Even the staunchest adherents of cooperatives like a top official of the 
International Cooperative Alliance now admit, "It is becoming apparent, 
whether cooperative supporters wish to realise it or not, that cooperatives are 
not always the best or most appropriate development tool" (Thordarson 1988: 
46). The so-called cooperative has lost its privileged status as a development 
instrument to the benefit of small rural producers. 
Second, many participants in the discussion on the role of the cooperative 
in development have concluded that so-called cooperatives in developing 
countries are not 'genuine' cooperatives but 'pseudo-cooperatives' (Verhagen 
1988) or 'gov-operatives' (Van Dooren 1978). It is now accepted wisdom 
among the wide range of international development agencies that many 
cooperatives in developing countries are far from being member-controlled 
institutions and — analytically and practically speaking — qualify better as a 
government-controlled institution. "If member participation and democracy 
are among the basic cooperative values, they are noticeable by their absence 
in much of the developing world" (Thordarson 1988: 42). The so-called 
cooperative has lost its reputation as a 'self-help association'. This has 
focussed attention on what precisely are the essential features or hasic 
values' of the cooperative (Watkins 1985; Marcus 1988) so as to make a better 
distinction between false and genuine cooperatives. The strong and now 
widespread conviction that, "The relationship between cooperatives and 
government remains, with little doubt, the single greatest obstacle to the 
success of cooperative development efforts in the South..." (Thordarson 1988: 
49) explains the increasingly heard policy rhetoric on the need for "de-
officialisation" (ibid) or "appropriate roles for government in promoting the 
cooperative movement" (United Nations 1987). It is more or less assumed 
that it is possible and necessary to transform those organisations called 
cooperatives by international development agencies and national 
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governments into organisations which are much closer to a pre-defined set of 
cooperative ideals and principles. 
The third conclusion is an extreme version of the second. It elaborates the 
conclusion that the concept of the cooperative is misleading and no 
guarantee of 'self-help' and 'self-regulation'. The central idea is not to 
transform so-called cooperatives into 'genuine' cooperatives but to break 
with the concept of 'the cooperative' altogether in favor of alternative 
concepts like 'self-help association' and 'self-help promoting institution' 
(Verhagen 1988). However, attempts to define 'self-help' and to solve the 
paradox of 'self-help promotion' will demonstrate that this break is not that 
fundamental. The essential features of 'self-help associations' and 
'cooperatives' are both hard to define and to use as analytical tools such as to 
distinguish these organisations from other types of organisations. In the 
international network of so-called Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
organized parallel to governmental aid agencies which partly finance them 
(Hospes 1988), the idea of promoting these alternative concepts is rather 
popular. Those who promote this idea, however, run the risk of immediate 
disqualification as participants in the development policy discussion on 'the 
cooperative'. Persistent believers in the concept of the cooperative (e.g. 
'single issue' bodies as the International Cooperative Alliance) feel uneasy 
about these ideas. However, broadly-based international development 
agencies which change policy discourse from time to time and 'play on' a 
range of development instruments will have less scruples in welcoming these 
people to the 'cooperative debate' (cf. Seminar on the Donor Support to the 
Promotion of Rural Cooperatives in Developing Countries organized by the 
World Bank, 1990). 
Cooperatives Do Not Speak for Themselves 
This article is about the struggle for cooperatives. I want to review the 
promotion, evaluation as well as the discouragement of those institutions in 
developing countries which are called cooperatives by national governments 
and international development agencies. Different assumptions, ideas and 
views on the essence of cooperatives as well as conflicting interests of the 
parties involved in cooperatives have assured a lively debate and a fierce 
struggle for cooperatives. This debate and struggle suggest that cooperatives 
are best viewed as social-normative constructs as well as swords which fit 
many hands. This argues for the development of legal-pluralistic and 
political-economic approaches to cooperatives. 
Two main themes function as entry points to describe the struggle. The 
first concerns the poorly understood Western European and colonial histories 
of early so-called cooperative movements. The second main theme is the 
Babylonian confusion over the essence and evaluation of cooperatives which 
arose when cooperatives proved unable to create heaven on earth in 
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developing countries. Both themes are related: one-sided historical 
interpretation of the significance of cooperatives in Western Europe and their 
areas of overseas influence has contributed to confusion about the essence 
and evaluation of cooperatives in developing countries. A more 
comprehensive understanding of these histories as cases of farmers' 
technical-economic and political-economic interest articulation however, will 
not yield the essence and appropriate evaluation of 'the cooperative'. It will 
rather emphasize historically specific roles of cooperatives facing particular 
circumstances and the disregarded significance of governments and unions in 
both Western Europe and its colonies in supporting the interests of farmers. 
In the first section of this article, I reconstruct the misleading picture of the 
potential of the cooperative based on its success in Western European 
history. My first argument is that the history of the first Western European 
cooperative movements has placed excessive weight on farmers with their 
back to the wall as a result of poor socio-economic conditions in general and 
exploitative traders in particular. My second argument is that the 'self-help 
promotion' efforts of national governments during the rise and consolidation 
of cooperative movements in Western Europe have been poorly articulated in 
the debate on the role of the cooperative in developing countries. 
In the second section, I draw lessons from histories of cooperatives in 
colonized economies. For pragmatic reasons I concentrate on cases from 
British East Africa. A first lesson is that cooperatives were not immediately 
set up on a nation-wide basis but rather emerged in particular cash crop-
producing areas as marketing bodies (see Van Dooren 1978; Vincent 1988; 
Cranenburgh 1990). Secondly, the rise of these cooperatives pre-dated 
national cooperative law (see Vincent 1988; Cranenburgh 1990). A third 
lesson is that introduction of cooperatives in East African colonies increased 
the awareness of farmers and their leaders of colonial conditions and 
provided an opportunity to openly discuss the tasks and responsibilities of 
the colonial ruler (ibid). 
The third section is about the post-colonial history and debate of so-called 
cooperatives in the developing countries, as they are now called. This history 
begins with the formation of the alliance between Third World national 
governments and international development agencies with regard to promote 
cooperatives. Lively debates start when the cooperatives supported by these 
national governments and development agencies evolved as the anti-climax 
of a wider historical development of cooperatives, which began in Western 
Europe and spread to the colonies. I address three main themes: the first 
concerns the essence and 'proper' evaluation of so-called cooperatives. What 
are the essential features of a cooperative and how do we evaluate 
cooperatives in different contexts? The use of local-traditional forms and con-
cepts of cooperation for cooperative development strategies is the second 
theme. Baviskar and Attwood (1988) regret in this connection that, "Most 
cooperatives are planned without any real knowledge of how, and under 
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what circumstances, village people do cooperate informally with each other" 
(p.10). The third theme is the relationship between cooperatives and 
governments. Central questions concern 'appropriate roles' of governments in 
cooperative promotion and the nature and possiblities of turning 
government-controlled cooperatives into member-controlled institutions ('de-
officialisation of cooperatives'). 
When the First Western European Cooperative 
Movements Emerged 
The Industrial Revolution which took place in the first half of nineteenth 
century England was a specific combination of technological progress and 
social underdevelopment. In this historical context, consumer cooperatives 
were started as an attempt of small industrial producers and industrial 
laborers to relieve their social distress and to provide an attractive alternative 
to the truck system which meant that employees were more or less forced to 
buy basic consumption goods of their employers. However, the breakthrough 
of the consumer cooperative movement took place after wages and salaries 
had gone up considerably. It was not so much the first pains of the Industrial 
Revolution but rather the economic gains which followed which guaranteed 
the continuity of the cooperative as an organization to defend consumer 
interests in England. 
The grain crisis in Western Europe at the end of the nineteenth century 
(1877-1895), a result of the enormous supply of cheap North American 
wheat, provided the seeds of a European-wide wave of agricultural 
cooperative movements. Farmers faced financial difficulties and were almost 
forced to work together to market agricultural produce so as to rninimize 
costs. However, the Western European farm cooperative movement had just 
experienced an organizational take-off when the world grain crisis subsided 
at the turn of the century and a period of new economic growth began. 
Farmers were in need of a marketing instrument which could efficiently 
handle the enormous expansion of the flows of modern agricultural inputs 
and agricultural produce (Stuijvenberg 1977). This marketing instrument had 
to be organizationally complementary to the family farm as the unit of 
agricultural production. The cooperative was their answer and evolved as a 
technical-economic extension of the family farm. 
Input suppliers and output dealers were catalysts of the movement. Under 
poor socio-economic conditions, but even more so when economic conditions 
improved, agricultural traders were a thorn in the farmers' flesh. Sharp 
increases in traders' profits with the enormous expansion of trade was hard 
to accept and further motivated farmers to start cooperatives (Stuijvenberg 
1977). 
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The history of the first Western European cooperative movements has been 
associated too much with farmers in dire straits as a result of poor socio-
economic conditions in general and exploitative traders in particular. 
Cooperatives have been too easily considered as just an expression and 
answer to crises. The less recognized historical significance of cooperatives in 
Western Europe is their role after situations of crisis: these cooperatives 
proved not so much an instrument to combat rural poverty but rather a 
product of recovery and growth. Small farmers joined cooperatives to claim 
their share of the new economic welfare which otherwise might have ended 
up in the hands of traders and large farmers. 
The first cooperatives of Western Europe were the initiative of small 
industrial producers and industrial laborers (in England) and farmers and 
their leaders of local agricultural communities (in the Netherlands, Germany, 
Ireland and Denmark) in response to poor economic conditions and 
exploitation of input suppliers. As expression of mutual material interests of 
laborers or small farmers, these cooperatives support definition of 'the 
cooperative' as a timeless, invariable and universal phenomenon. However, 
the specific features of the historical-economic circumstances which forced 
and enabled laborers and farmers to cooperate cannot be emphasized too 
much. 
The need for more emphasis on the circumstances specific to the rise and 
consolidation of cooperatives in Western Europe also applies to the general 
political situation. There is a broad consensus that at the turn of the century 
Western European liberal governments were not involved in formation of 
cooperatives which started as a 'self-help movemenf. The common 
conclusion that governments played no role or at most a minor one, 
disregards the active indirect role of Western European liberal governments 
vis-a-vis agriculture in general and cooperatives in particular. These 
governments enabled cooperatives to increase and stabilize their market 
shares of agricultural produce and to become one of the most distinctive 
features of Western European agricultural systems in the twentieeth century. 
The most profound but least recognized step of Western European 
governments in stimulating cooperative development however, has not so 
much been the supply of a whole array of support services (in the fields of 
law, tax and quality control of agricultural inputs and produce) but the 
(re)construction of the organisational infrastructure of the agricultural sector: 
government stimulated farmers to organize themselves better in cooperatives 
as well as unions and to form representative national bodies to defend their 
interests and to discuss agricultural policies. These incentives contributed to 
the development of an enormous diversity of cooperatives and unions which 
in turn reflected different product-specific interests and socio-cultural 
backgrounds of the farming population. Cooperatives primarily defended the 
technical-economic interests of farmers whereas farmer unions concentrated 
on their political-economic interests (see Smith 1961; Diepenbeek 1988). The 
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technical services and legal instruments of governmental bodies created near-
optimal conditions for cooperatives as farmer service centres. Representatives 
of unions were given opportunities to inform national agricultural policy 
makers about the points of view of the farming population. 
Cooperatives in Colonized Economies 
The success of the cooperative movements of Western Europe inspired 
national governments to implement their ideas on cooperatives in their 
colonies. The first step of the Dutch in promoting cooperatives overseas was 
to officially declare the Dutch Law on Cooperative Societies as the official 
cooperative law in the East Indies in 1915. The British conceived credit 
cooperatives as appropriate instruments to combat rural indebtness in India 
(cf. Robert 1983). Indigenous farmers in British East Africa were stimulated to 
organize themselves in marketing cooperatives (see e.g. Van Dooren 1978). 
The significance of the ideas and practices of the colonial ruler with respect 
to rural institution-building cannot be underestimated as these ideas and 
practices have resulted in legal-organizational structures which condition the 
development of government-supported cooperatives in the post-colonial era. 
Vincent (1988) states that, "many of the legal and governmental structures 
within which cooperatives in Uganda function today, were framed within the 
colonial period" (p.189). 
This section draws some conclusions from the histories of cooperatives 
established in East Africa under British colonial rule. These cooperatives 
were the common effort of indigenous traders and the colonial government. 
Indigenous agricultural produce traders successfully used cooperatives to 
increase their own market shares by breaking the monopolies of Asian 
traders (Van Dooren 1978: 40). In Tanzania, according to Cranenburgh (1990), 
"The cooperatives' early success was not due to their superior efficiency 
compared to private traders, but to their political appeal: they were 
instrumental in wresting economic control away from immigrants and 
toward Africans" (p.125). 
The very first forms of farmer cooperation organized by agricultural 
traders pre-dated national cooperative law making. When cooperatives 
proved attractive in facilitating cash crop marketing, colonial governments 
intensified their efforts to construct a legal-administrative framework to give 
cooperatives a central — if not monopolistic — position in the marketing of 
cash crops (for Tanzania, see Cranenburgh 1990: 126-127). "Cotton which 
made up less than 10 percent of Uganda's exports in 1906-7 [...] accounted 
for over 90 percent of its total exports twenty years later. At that point, as the 
indigenous cooperative movement began to spread eastwards to Teso, 
government policy makers advocated the establishment of a cooperative 
system under government control throughout the whole country" (Vincent 
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1988: 190). The government control of Teso District was particularly 
important as it had "the highest average per capital production in the 
protectorate" (ibid: 199). 
Cooperatives were not immediately set up on a nation-wide basis (as 
happened in the post-colonial era) but rather emerged in particular cash crop 
producing areas. For Tanzania Cranenburgh (1990) notes that, "The 
expansion of the movement was limited, however to the cash crop producing 
areas of Kilimanjaro and Bukoba, Sukumaland and the south" (p.127). 
Cooperatives were not used to market food crops, as they were supposed to 
in the post-colonial era (see Lele and Christiansen 1989: 18). 
In public rhetoric the role of cooperatives was acclaimed as an expression 
of proper British government aclmrnistration which enabled local people to 
acquire leadership capacities. "The fundamental principle of the [cooperative] 
system is identical to that of Indirect Rule' - which could be better named 
'Cooperative Rule' - the essential aim of both being to teach personal 
responsibilities and initiative ... Not the least attractive feature of this 
movement is that no other system offers better prospects of producing 
leaders from among the people" (Lugard, quoted in Coulson 1982: 98; 
Cranenburgh 1990: 126). The British colonizer wished to 'educate' the 
colonized how to manage and cooperate according to a modern western 
formula. One of the less intended consequences of these educational efforts 
however, was that cooperatives increased farmers' awareness of the tasks 
and responsibilities of the colonial ruler. Cranenburgh (1990) says that in 
Tanzania, "The multiplication of cooperative societies and unions ... during 
the 1950s gained a great social and political significance. Indeed, the 
cooperative movement became the most important institutional forum for the 
representation of African interests vis-a-vis the colonial government" (p.128). 
In her detailed historical account of the cooperative movement in Teso 
District of Uganda, Vincent (1988) states that, "It was in the context of 
African nationalism that the cooperative movement got off the ground in 
Teso" (p.195). Vincent however, emphasizes that seizure of state power has 
neither been the central demand of the cooperative movement nor the first 
wish of upcoming nationalist leaders involved in cooperatives. "It may be 
suggested, then, that the cooperative movement in Teso developed as only 
one phase of a reform commodity movement which had its earliest 
expression in the 1920s [...]. A reform commodity movement, according to 
Jeffrey Paige (1975: 70), is a typical form of political expression in a small-
holding agricultural system such as that of Teso. It is concerned with the 
control of marketing in agricultural commodities. It demands neither the 
redistribution of property nor the seizure of state power" (Vincent 1988: 201). 
The development of Ugandan cooperatives cannot be seen in isolation from 
the growth of the Uganda African Farmers Union. This Union was founded 
in 1948 by Ignatius Musazi who is described as 'Uganda's first modern 
national leader' (Engholm, quoted in Vincent 1988: 195). "Registered under 
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the Business Names Ordinance as a partnership of twenty persons, its 
objective was to act as commission agents for the sale of cotton, coffee and 
other produce. Since its main purpose was to pressure the government into 
fixing higher prices for cotton, its growth was rapid" (ibid: 194). 
The post-colonial history of cooperatives in Uganda and many other Third 
World countries painfully demonstrates that the combined mobilization of 
cooperatives and unions vis-a-vis national rulers has been a rather unique 
feature of cooperative development in the late pre-independence era. 
Post-Colonial History and Debate of Cooperatives 
Although cooperatives were a foreign formula, independence did not end 
cooperative development in the new nations but instead ushered in an 
enormous growth of new cooperative movements as 'the third way' 
(differing from the capitalist and socialist models) to organize and develop 
rural economies. The new leaders praised the nation-wide tradition of 
mutual help and described cooperatives as its modern expression. They 
promised that cooperatives would effectively combat rural poverty, acting as 
a counterweight to defend and secure the interest of farmers against 
exploitative traders who where regarded a main obstacle to economic growth 
(see Bouman 1981). Cooperatives became integral parts of rural development 
programs and were given a privileged status in the new economic constituti-
on as key instruments of economic and social development. Ministries of 
Cooperatives were established to implement cooperative policies and 
programs. 
Decolonization did not put an end to foreign support to cooperative 
development in the South. The post-war and post-colonial boom of 
international development agencies further guaranteed the continued 
promotion of cooperatives as an appropriate tool to combat rural poverty. As 
members of these international development agencies, former colonial states 
were able to contribute indirectly to cooperative movements in developing 
countries. Ministeries of Foreign Aid or Development Cooperation were 
established to include bilateral support to cooperatives in developing 
countries. 
With the financial support of international development agencies of 
western countries, Third World national governments could spend a great 
deal of capital planning and implementating cooperative projects. However, 
enormous financial support to these cooperative projects and ambitious 
development objectives set by national governments sharply contrasted with 
their generally disappointing results. The dramatic report of the United 
Nations Research Institute for Social Development (1975) on the role of 
cooperatives as agents of change in developing countries was the beginning 
of a period of confusion and disagreement on the essence and 'proper' 
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evaluation of cooperatives among large international development agencies 
such as the United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization and World 
Bank on the one hand and cooperative interest bodies sucha as the 
International Cooperative Alliance, Committee for the Promotion of 
Cooperatives and World Council of Credit Unions on the other. 
The 'Essence' of Cooperatives and Their Evaluation 
UNRISD's extensive research in the period 1968-70 of 40 individual 
cooperatives and related institutions in thirteen countries in Africa, Latin-
America and Asia was based on the view that, "Among the ideals associated 
with the cooperative movement has been the aim that class distinctions 
among members should be eliminated or at least greatly reduced and that 
the cooperative should promote egalitarianism with regard to the means of 
production (access to equipment and credit, water supply, in some cases size 
of holdings, etc.) and with regard to income and benefits" (UNRISD 1975: 6). 
The Research Institute concluded that their sample provided not much cause 
for optimism on the role of cooperatives as 'agents of change': 
A general conclusion of the study is that cooperatives introduced into rural 
communities characterized by significant inequalities of wealth, power and 
status are not likely to be very effective in bringing about fundamental 
social change in favour of the more disadvantaged groups. Those in a 
more advantageous position will tend to take advantage of the cooperative. 
Instead of changing the local structure, the cooperative is more likely to be 
absorbed by it and may reinforce and deepen existing inequalities by 
yielding benefits to a limited group. If the poorer members of the 
cooperative do not benefit from the cooperative services or if the poorer 
members of the community at large do not belong to the cooperative, then 
the effect of the cooperative in relieving rural mass poverty will be 
minimal (UNRISD 1975: 7). 
The International Cooperative Alliance, one of the largest post-colonial 
guardians of cooperative business and ideology, tried very hard to refute 
UNRISD's findings. First, it presented a methodological critique and 
questioned the tendency of UNRISD to generalize across levels and across 
different types of cooperatives. The ICA warned against "generalization from 
some rural cooperatives to other rural cooperatives, from rural cooperatives 
to urban cooperatives and from one type of cooperative, e.g. credit 
cooperatives, to other types of cooperatives, dealing with production, 
marketing, transportation, etc." (ibid: 25). Besides, the ICA complained that 
"the cases studied were not all genuine cooperatives..." (ibid). So, even ICA 
knows some (many) cooperatives are bogus, even if officially chartered as 
cooperatives. Secondly, the ICA presented a substantive critique and opposed 
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the view of UNRISD on the role of cooperatives in development. According 
to the ICA, cooperatives should not be primarily burdened with the task of 
reducing socio-economic inequality in rural societies. This creates wrong or 
unreasonably high expectations and easily results in negative evaluations of 
cooperatives. The ICA suggested that, "It would be more correct to say that it 
is a major purpose of cooperatives to provide small and medium-sized 
producers with better access to the means of production and productive 
techniques. Viewed in this light most of the cases studied showed some 
progress" (ibid: 26). The ICA further mentioned that UNRISD had confused 
'equality' with 'equity'. According to the ICA, "Cooperative principles are 
primarily concerned with equity and not a blanket equalitarianism. The 
difference is that equity implies rewards commensurate with contributions" 
(ibid: 27). Not surprisingly, the ICA was convinced that from this point of 
view the overall results of cooperatives in developing countries were not as 
disappointing as claimed by UNRISD. 
From the perspective of UNRISD the concept of cooperatives as 'agents of 
change' referred to an instrument that brings benefits to the masses of poorer 
inhabitants in developing countries. However, UNRISD underestimated the 
complexities of social stratification at local level and inadequately 
conceptualized cooperatives as part of the social context. The ICA had a more 
modest agent of change in mind and refused to consider distribution of 
benefits of cooperatives as part of the larger problem of social inequality. 
Still, it is very useful (even in an economic sense) to think about how social 
inequality of society at large affects the possibilities of cooperatives to start 
and to serve the economic interests of their members. Baviskar and Attwood 
(1988) addressed the problems of cooperative action in stratified societies and 
asked whether cooperatives contribute toward equalization of opportunity. 
They conclude that "cooperation, whether formal or informal, whether based 
on grass-roots initiative or state planning, is not likely to change the 
indigenous social structure very far, especially not where the economy is 
stagnating and opportunities for innovation are absent. However, inequality, 
at least moderate inequality, is not necessarily an obstacle to cooperation" 
(p.5). 
A better understanding of the dynamism of cooperatives in different social 
contexts implies an understanding or consensus of the essential features of 
'the cooperative'. A seemingly minor methodological criticisms by the ICA of 
the UNRISD research was that not all studied cases were genuine 
cooperatives. However, this is not a mere methodological critique but rather 
a substantive one. It suggests that the ICA clearly understood the difference 
between 'real' and 'false' cooperatives and that the working definition used 
by UNRISD was inappropriate. The selection of case studies by UNRISD did 
not follow a pre-defined set of substantive features defining 'the cooperative' 
but rather a loose approach. UNRISD simply selected those institutions called 
'cooperative' as case studies and studied a wide range of different 
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'cooperatives' with varing degrees of involvement by governmental agencies, 
peasant syndicates, rural syndicates, Catholic Church authorities, Protestant 
missions, national cooperative organizations, development projects, 
cooperative unions and the local farming population (UNRISD 1975: 59-64). 
This diversity of 'cooperative' institutions provides another strong argument 
against general statements (like those of UNRISD in its final report) on the 
effectiveness of 'cooperatives' on whatever grounds. At the same time this 
diversity complicates attempts to define more or less abstract features, 
principles or values of 'the cooperative' and to make distinctions in diverse 
concrete situations between 'real' and 'false' cooperatives. 
Top officials of the ICA hold the view that their cooperative principles 
differ only slightly from those of the famous Rochdale cooperative (Marcus 
1988) which started in 1844 and is regarded the first 'real' Western European 
cooperative (see e.g. Van Dooren 1978: 13). However, during the 23rd ICA 
Congress in 1966 it was decided to speak of 'democratic control' as one of 
the six main cooperative principles instead of the classical Rochdale formula 
of 'one man, one vote'. The Rochdale principles of 'goods sold at regular 
retail prices, business conducted on a cash basis and the number of shares 
which one man might own are limited' (Filley 1922: 21-22) were also 
discarded. The new principles were 'open and free membership, internal and 
external extension and cooperation between cooperatives at national and 
international levels' (later known as 'movement to movement assistance': see 
Thordarson 1988: 51ff). The Rochdale principle of 'earnings divided in 
proportion to patronage' is probably the best conserved, since it still is one of 
the top six ICA cooperative principles. 
These seemingly subtle redefinitions force officials of the ICA to cite 'Basic 
Values' as the supposedly common and constant normative base of changing 
'Cooperative Principles'. 'Basic Values' are characterized as "self-help values, 
mutual help values, non-profit interest values, democratic values, voluntary 
effort values, universal values, education values and purposeful values" 
(Watkins 1986; Marcus 1988; Book 1988). The recognition by the ICA that the 
problems and situations faced by the Rochdale Pioneers differ greatly from 
those of current cooperatives (Marcus 1988) basically explains ICA's 
increased emphasis of abstract-normative values underlying cooperative 
principles. These vaguer notions of the essence of the cooperative make it 
very hard to take the self-confident words of the president of the ICA very 
seriously when he states that: "We know what makes a cooperative and 
whom it should serve ..." (Marcus 1988: 5). 
However, the words of the president gain significance when he continues 
that, "... our principles do not explain how it should operate when changes 
are taking place in the surrounding socio-economic field" (ibid). Whether 
intended or unintended, the president introduces a central dilemma of the 
evaluation of cooperatives. How do (changing) socio-economic circumstances 
affect the essence of cooperatives? When do so-called 'cooperatives' which 
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adapt themselves to changing circumstances turn into non-cooperatives? 
How does the essence of cooperatives materialize under different 
circumstances? Do all these institutions qualify as 'cooperative'? How have 
these questions been approached? The case of Apthorpe and Gasper (1979) is 
probably the most instructive. They were invited to an international 
consultation in 1977 to present a brief critique of cooperatives and their 
pertinence, or lack of it, for the rural poor. However, their critique passed 
"without mention in the proceedings published in the following year" which 
is "perhaps, some indication of the sensitivity of criticism that students of 
public policies can encounter" (p.35-36). 
Apthorpe and Gasper (1979) distinguish two pairs of evaluative approaches 
of cooperatives: 'immanent-transcendent and essentialist-instrumentalist'. 
They consider these four types neither "mutually exclusive or a 
comprehensive catalogue of approaches in evaluation nor consensually 
applied in particular cases" but as "the leading elements in some overall 
approaches found in the evaluative discussion of cooperatives and other 
organizations" (p.4). An immanent evaluation is an 'internal approach' which 
"takes as its criteria those used within the policy /institution itself' (ibid). In a 
transcendent evaluation an 'external approach' is used. This approach takes 
"its criteria independently of the policy evaluated, without any necessary 
overriding reference to me policy's self-conception or implied criteria" (ibid). 
The weakness of the immanent evaluation is two-fold: first, it seems to 
ignore that many conflicting official and unoffical criteria and objectives 
might be used within the policy/institution itself. "In the case of 
cooperatives, goals have generally been set by governments but at times the 
government's Tudden objectives' may be as strong as — or even stronger than 
— the stated objectives. This makes investigations of the fulfilment of only 
stated goals rather obscure" (Holméh 1990: 9). Secondly, it is very hard to 
determine whether the criteria and objectives used 'within' the policy or 
institution itself have an 'internal' or 'external' origin. "With cooperatives it is 
often the case that their goals and roles have been determined by external 
actors, usually the state and international aid agencies, and then they have 
been superimposed on local societies" (ibid). The weakness of the immanent 
approach thus provides a critique of the distinction between an 'immanent' 
and 'transcendent' evaluation. 
An 'essentialist approach' can "sometimes be seen as an extreme form of an 
immanent approach. There is a particular commitment concerning the matter 
being evaluated [...]. Its essential and true form must be distinguished, free 
from distortions which disguise its potential, its true nature. It should be 
assessed only in the light of its own avowed, true and distinctive objectives. 
Usually the commitment is a positive one; the true nature posited is good" 
(Apthorpe and Gasper 1979: 7). Apthorpe and Gasper, placing all four types 
of evaluative approaches on a continuum, characterize an 'instrumentalist 
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approach' as an extreme form of 'transcendent evaluation (ibid: 8)'. This 
approach, 
treats particular activities and measures simply as means toward some 
more general ends; ends without reference to features of particular means. 
For example, in considering the promotion of a particular type of 
programme or institution, an instrumentalist approach would, roughly 
speaking, first consider 'whether' rather than Turn'... This detachment from 
particular means leads to a willingness to entertain considerations about, 
and to be open to, the adoption of a variety of means, and different means 
in different cases, according to circumstances. That is, it tends very much 
to situationalism in assessment and prescription (Holmén 1990: 7). 
The weakness of an instrumentalist approach is two-fold: first, it assumes 
that we all have a common frame of reference when discussing the possibili-
ties of cooperatives. It simply considers 'the cooperative' as one type of 
instrument. Among international development agencies an instrumentalist 
approach easily results in 'joy riding' with concepts (like 'cooperatives', 'self-
help associations' and TsTGOs'). Second, the instrumentalist approach gives 
the false appearance of 'objectivism'. It ignores different expectations and 
interpretations of cooperatives as well as differences of opinion with regard 
to the 'essence of development' as a goal of cooperatives. "With 
instrumentalism it can be the goals rather than the means to attain them 
which tend to be seen as not requiring much defence or even close 
examination" (Holmén 1990: 7). This also implies that the difference between 
the essentialist and instrumentalist approach resembles the false distinction 
between 'normative' and 'objective' approaches. The instrumentalist approach 
is a many-sided but normative approach. It is based on vague notions about 
'development/ and implicit ideas about the suitability of different 
'instruments' as means towards the ultimate aim of 'development'. 
Apthorpe and Gasper reviewed four large studies and conclude that three 
of them use an immanent-essentialist approach and one is instrumentalist. 2 
The immanent-essentialist as well as transcendent approaches offer few 
possibilities to analyze how (changing) circumstances affect the essence of 
cooperatives. The instrumentalist approach does take different and changing 
circumstances into consideration but denies the normative dimension of 
(evaluation of) cooperatives. Another approach or combination of approaches 
2. Immanent-essentialist: a) the 1968-70 UNRISD-studies b) the 1977 survey study called "A 
Review from within the Cooperative Movement" which served as a background study for c) 
the 1977 Loughborough Consultation organized by the ICA. Instrumentalist: a) the 1977 
survey study called "Cooperatives and the Poor: A Comparative Perspective" which also 
served as a background study for the Loughborough Consultation (Gasper and Aphtorpe 
1979: 9-16). 
The Struggle for Cooperatives 203 
is needed to go beyond the limitations of these four types of evaluative 
approaches. 
I believe the opposite of an essentialist approach is not an instrumentalist 
approach but rather the combination of a 'legal-pluralisf and legal-
anthropological' approach. This combination is not an evaluative tool but 
rather an analytical perspective. A legal-pluralist perspective distinguishes a 
plurality of 'essences' or normative complexes instead of one 'essence' or 
standard (see Benda-Beckmann 1983a; Griffiths 1986). From a legal-
anthropological perspective these 'essences' are considered social-normative 
constructs which means that in human interaction these 'essences' are being 
created, changed and mixed (for a case study see: K. von Benda-Beckmann 
1987). The enormous diversity of human interaction again explains plurality 
of norms, ideas, definitions, expectations and assumptions. 
From a legal-pluralist perspective it is impossible to speak of the essence, 
the material features, or the development objectives of the cooperative but 
rather different natures and conflicting objectives of so-called cooperatives. 
Thordarson (1988), ICA Development and Associate Director says that, 
"While they may all look alike on the surface and all call themselves 
cooperatives, they have evolved from very different sources and carry out 
fundamentally different functions" (p.4.6). However, his distinction of three 
different kinds of cooperatives is not very impressive as he admits himself: 
There is little but the name in common between the large agricultural 
cooperatives which process and market sugar in India, coffee in Kenya, 
and ground nuts in Senegal; multipurpose cooperatives formed at the 
initiative of government departments to provide credit and inputs to 
farmers; and the grass roots cooperatives which have grown at the initiati-
ve of local members in order to provide the poor with improved services 
and bargaining power. A distinction among these three fundamentally 
different kinds of cooperatives is not always clear. In some countries single 
purpose consumer cooperatives function as grass roots institutions 
(Antigua), while in others they are part of a state system to distribute 
essential commodities (India) (p.47). 
Therefore, he safely concludes that, "Nevertheless, any analysis of the success 
or failure of cooperatives as a development tool must take into consideration 
the different nature of cooperatives and the different goals which they seek 
to accomplish" (ibid). 
A legal-anthropological perspective however, emphasizes that it is not 
cooperatives that seek goals but different bureaucrats as well as farmers and 
traders who differently define the nature and objectives of cooperatives in 
which they are to some degree involved. 'Cooperative principles' cannot not 
explain how the cooperative "should operate when changes are taking place 
in the surrounding socio-economic field" (Marcus 1988). These principles do 
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not speak for themselves (see Benda-Beckmann 1983b). It is rather human 
beings as part of changing socio-economic fields who try to put their flag on 
top of the 'mountain' of different principles, features and objectives of 
cooperatives. This shifts the issue of the debate from the essential features of 
the cooperative towards the struggle of different interest groups to further 
public and private goals with the help of 'cooperatives' as social-normative 
constructs. 
Cooperatives and Other Forms of Cooperation 
While the efforts of most of these groups [new forms of grass roots 
organizations based on cooperative patterns] are only to be encouraged, it 
would be a sad day for the cooperative movement if its own theory and 
practices were being better and more effectively applied by groups which 
felt the need to disassociate themselves from the formal cooperative sector. 
[...] If cooperative organisations do not place a greater importance on this 
kind of policy research [on indigenous or tribal forms of cooperative 
behaviour] and search for innovative approaches [based on this research], 
there is a considerable danger that other forms of 'self-help organizations' 
may replace cooperatives as a favoured instrument of grass-roots 
development (Thordarson 1988: 43 and 60). 
This quotation from a top official of the International Cooperative Alliance 
illustrates claims of the ideal of organized cooperation for the 'formal 
cooperative sector'. Thordarson refuses to award 'the title of cooperative' to 
cooperative organizations which behave like the cooperative movement 
should according to its own theory. The idea that 'other forms of self-help 
organizations' could be 'real' cooperatives does not even occur to him. He 
believes that the 'formal cooperative sector' must be protected. The approval 
of this ICA official to explore 'other forms of self-help organizations' can thus 
be interpreted as an attempt to both incorporate these other forms and 
improve the formal cooperative sector. 
Ideas and research proposals like those of Thordarson are not unknown 
among national governments of developing countries: the histories of 
cooperatives as part of rural development programs in Indonesia (Bowen 
1986) and Tanzania (Cranenburgh 1990) are full of political abuse and 
distortion of traditional local concepts and even suggest that national policy 
makers might have very well understood the magic charm of traditional local 
concepts of cooperation to further their 'cooperative policies'. 
The highest rank which might be awarded to 'other forms of self-help 
organizations' with the permission of adherents of 'the cooperative ideal' is 
'the pre-cooperative' (Munckner 1981; United Nations 1983). This concept 
implicitly recognizes the existence of 'other forms of self-help organizations' 
but fails to recognize their diversity. Even worse, it conceives of these 'other 
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forms' as a primitive form of cooperative organization which however, might 
evolve into 'the cooperative' as the final stage of legal-organizational 
development. The disappointing record of those organizations called 
cooperatives in developing countries and confusion over their nature and 
objectives provide sufficient reason not to simply consider 'the cooperative' 
as the ultimate concept or form of cooperation but instead as an alternative 
concept which has been given different functions and meanings in different 
places and times. The same argument also applies to the concept of 'self help 
association' as a substitute for 'pseudo-cooperatives' (Verhagen 1987). Large 
international development agencies might welcome and use such an 
alternative concept to raise funds and to (falsely) guarantee their efficient 
use. The still virginal concept then evolves as a new title for an old litany. 
Many colonial and post-colonial governments assumed that the social 
norms underlying 'traditional forms of cooperation' would be a fertile base 
for the smooth introduction of 'modern cooperatives'. Dore (1971) concluded 
that this assumption is based on a romanticized view on the nature of 
traditional communities. Besides, "even if traditional communities are 
solidary and egalitarian it is difficult for them to take on the formal 
institutions of modern cooperatives, such as rational auditing and control 
over managers, without destroying the very bonds of solidarity and mutual 
trust which are supposed to be their advantage" (Dore 1971: 60). There are 
two 'practices' which provide completely different perspectives on use of 
'traditional' concepts of cooperation for 'modern' cooperative development 
strategies. First, those few national cooperative planners in developing 
countries who have read Dore's conclusions might have decided to put more 
emphasis on 'cooperative education and training' and the careful 
reconstruction of traditional local concepts. With respect to the role of 
education, these planners still enjoy the support of international development 
agencies: "Education in cooperation has to be undertaken in the formative 
years of children, if they are to acquire a sound understanding of the 
principles of cooperation and democratic self-management" (United Nations 
1987: 11). Secondly, "new forms of grass roots organizations based on 
cooperative patterns" (Thordarson 1988) evolve as 'modern' expressions of 
so-called traditional local organization. This development refutes 
assumptions on the static character of traditional societies, the lack of 
organizational capacities of their members and the idea of 'the cooperative' 
as the ultimate modern form of organization. An interesting dimension in 
this connection is that there is a need for these 'new forms' to loosen their 
relationship with those (modern) cooperatives which are more or less 
regulated by government agencies (see Thordarson 1988: 43). 
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Cooperatives and Governments 
There is broad agreement among scholars and international development 
agencies about the problematic role of national governments in promoting 
'cooperatives' in developing countries (see e.g. Van Dooren 1978; Baviskar 
and Attwood 1988; Cranenburgh 1990). "In accepting public aid, cooperatives 
have often become dependent on governments, which, in not a few countries, 
have used this leverage to gain control over these organizations. To the 
extent this happens, it serves to undermine the democratic and autonomous 
nature of the cooperative organization" (United Nations 1987). In this section 
some results of the debate of international development agencies on the ideal 
and actual relationship between cooperatives and governments have been 
analyzed. These results suggest that the debate has at least four 
shortcomings. 
First, it is misleading to talk about the relationship between governments 
and cooperatives. The central question of the United Nations seminar (1987) 
on "The Role of Government in Promoting the Cooperative Movement" in 
which representatives from Ministeries of Cooperatives of two dozen Third 
World countries participated, provides a nice illustration: "How to reconcile 
government support for cooperatives without compromising member 
interests and the self-reliant character of cooperatives, is a challenge to both 
government officials and cooperatives alike" (United Nations 1987). This 
definition of the problem confuses the ideal and actual relationship between 
governments and cooperatives. Ideally, government officials and cooperatives 
are two separate entities. However, in many developing countries it is hard 
to determine where the tasks and responsibilities of goverments end and 
those of 'cooperatives' begin (for Indonesia, see Schott 1985). Diepenbeek 
(1990) holds that cooperatives in many developing countries have evolved as 
'internal economic organisations' (p.16). This implies that the question of 
cooperative organisation is an internal affair of centrally planned economies 
(ibid: 2) or part of public acuxdnistration. 
A second shortcoming is that policy recommendations for changing relati-
onships between governments and cooperatives are extremely vague. In his 
article3 called "From Stockholm to Stockholm: The Lessons of Three Decades 
of Cooperative Development", Thordarson (1988) considers 'de-officialisation 
of cooperatives' as one of the priorities for the future of the cooperative 
movement in developing countries. This ICA leader seems very much aware 
of the interwoven goals of cooperatives and government when he describes 
'de-officialisation' as "the transformation of government-controlled 
3. This article was presented at the Seminar on the Donor Support to the Promotion of 
Rural Cooperatives in Developing Countries, organized by the World Bank in January 1990, 
held in Washington D.C. 
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cooperatives into a more member-controlled form" (p.48). However, it is not 
very clear what is meant by 'de-officialisation'. Thordarson only refers to the 
need for "increased autonomy" of cooperatives to be realized on the basis of 
a "partnership" of governments and cooperatives which, however, suggests 
that the false distinction between governments and cooperatives has not been 
understood. Van Dooren (1978) describes 'de-officialisation' as the 
government promotion of autonomy of cooperatives. He mentions "education 
and tiaining of members and chosen managers of cooperatives on the one 
hand and transfer of state authority and programs to central organizations of 
cooperatives on the other, as the best steps towards cooperative autonomy 
and democratization" (p.45, own translation). According to Van Dooren 
(1978) 'de-officialisation' implies that "the state should take action to 
transform cooperatives which have been established by the government into 
independent, democratic self-help cooperatives" (p.45, own translation).4 He 
is convinced that 'the state' should take the initiative to 'de-officialize' 
cooperatives because "experience has shown that expectations for the 
automatic transformation of 'state cooperatives' into real democratic self-help 
cooperatives have nowhere been fulfilled" (ibid: p.45, my own translation). 
However, these recommendations ignore the interests of national 
governments in promoting and contiolling cooperatives, which leads to the 
next shortcoming of the international debate on cooperatives and 
goverments. 
A third shortcoming is that policy recommendations on the appropriate 
roles of governments in promoting cooperatives fail to view governments as 
part of the problem. One of the main fiscal policies of national governments 
in developing countries is maximizing the difference between national 
consumer prices and export prices of food crops. A large difference enables 
these governments to finance their budgets and to make investments in 
industry and infrastructure. At the same time low domestic agricultural 
prices support the national government in a political sense: low national 
consumer prices are effective tools to win and sustain political support from 
urban populations. Cooperatives are extremely useful tools to implement this 
policy and nunimize its social costs. Anti-farmer price policies might lead to 
rural unrest. 5 However, this reveals the 'multi-purpose' character of 
cooperatives. Propaganda on the role of cooperatives in 'nation building' 
disguises economic and administrative control. A cooperative adrninistration 
with the common three-tier structure (national, provincial and local) enables 
governments to monitor and control marketing of agricultural produce and 
4. In his publication Dooren (1978) uses the term "state" and "government" as synonyms. 
5. One of the four main questions of the farmers of Teso District of Uganda under British Rule 
was: "(1) what was the relationship between the world price of cotton and the prices paid to 
growers.... While the first question was common to farmers throughout Uganda ... (Vincent 
1988:199)". 
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farmers' organizational initiatives. Distribution of privileges related to 
cooperatives does the rest: new leadership, cheap credit, trade monopolies 
and monopsonies buy off agricultural price discrimination and stifle rural 
unrest. These government objectives are rarely spelled out in official 
publications on the role of governments in promoting cooperatives. In the 
United Nations report (1987) on the "Role of Government in Promoting 
Cooperative Movement" for instance, the strong involvement of national 
governments in cooperatives is regretted but merely taken as an occasion to 
emphasize (again) and distinguish five 'appropriate' roles that governments 
can usefully play in promoting cooperative development: "effective 
legislation for governing the establishment and operations of cooperatives, 
granting financial and concessional benefits, general promotion of the 
cooperative movement, support to cooperative education and training 
programs and regulatory control to ensure that the officers and members of 
cooperatives discharge their responsibility in conformity with legal practice" 
(pp. 5-14). High expectations are fostered with regard to the 'appropriate 
legal framework' which is "necessary to prevent abuses which plague the 
cooperative movement in many countries or to remedy those which arise" 
(ibid: 6). 
But given the implicit but decisive objectives of national governments in 
promoting cooperatives, it is doubtful whether the legal, financial and 
educational services of governments described in the report guarantees less 
government control. An idealized view of the record of governments in 
promoting cooperatives feeds unrealistic notions on 'appropriate roles' of 
governments in promoting cooperatives: 
It is widely acknowledged that government has played an important role 
in encouraging the formation and strengthening the operation of 
cooperative organizations in many developing countries as well as 
developing countries. This observation remains particularly valid in 
developing countries where poor people, if left without assistance from the 
state, would have meager prospects for organizing cooperatives and 
running them efficiently (United Nations 1987: 4). 
This observation also underestimates the damage done by national 
governments to cooperatives as 'self-help organizations'. It does not take into 
account that millions of rural people in Third World countries now associate 
institutions which are 'cooperatives', at least according to government 
officials and international development agencies, with government 
intervention, gifts and control. 
A fourth shortcoming is that no implications are drawn from the 
significant rise of cooperative organizations which prefer not to be 
government sponsored or registered. 
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Many small cooperatives may find it convenient not to be registered, 
hoping thus to remain unknown to national authorities. This applies, for 
instance, to cooperatives set up in some countries by trade unions. A 
significant recent development is the emergence of a more experimental 
approach to the problems of organizing popular participation. This has 
created a 'grey area' involving organizations which, though clearly not 
cooperatives, have common objectives with cooperatives. [...] There are also 
considerable numbers of associations which, although they have certain 
characteristics of cooperatives, do not meet all the requirements for formal 
registration as cooperatives. This is perhaps one of the most significant 
developments in recent years (United Nations 1983: 107). 
Conclusions 
In many developing countries government support of so-called 
cooperatives has been a kiss of death for small rural producers: cooperatives 
have been institutional components of low domestic agricultural price 
policies of national governments. The monoculture of institution building by 
national governments promoting cooperatives as the privileged development 
tool has eroded small rural producers' possibilities to protest government 
price policies. Therefore, better articulation of responsibilities and interests of 
governments and farmers involved in cooperatives is needed to transform 
cooperatives from rural tax systems to enterprises serving the material needs 
of farmer-members. However, this is not a mere technical affair which 
requires more training or extension. The conclusion to draw is that most of 
the debate about the nature of cooperatives is irrelevant, because it fails to 
deal with the motives for and realities of the capture of cooperatives by 
governments. 
Insights on conflicting interests of governments and farmers raise 
discussion on the need and possibilities for political-economic interest 
articulation by farmers vis-a-vis governments. In this discussion the 
transformation of government-controlled cooperatives into a more member-
controlled institution is a political and economic problem. Its central question 
is whether national governments will accept the farmers' articulation of their 
interests in union-like organizations functioning parallel to cooperatives or in 
apex 6 cooperatives. This seemingly passive act of acceptance might be one of 
the most decisive steps of governments in promoting cooperative movements 
to benefit small rural producers. This does not imply a reduction of 
6. Apex cooperatives are secondary or tertiary cooperatives which represent village 
cooperatives (primary cooperatives) or secondary cooperatives at the national level. 
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responsibilities of governments with respect to cooperatives but rather a 
stronger commitment to stimulate farmers to articulate their own interests. 
The histories of cooperatives in Western Europe and in colonized 
economies provide interesting lessons, being case studies of rural political-
economic and technical-economic interest articulation. These histories also 
shed light on policies and publications which emphasize the relative value of 
cooperatives as a development tool. These histories do not suggest that the 
disappointing results of cooperatives in developing countries are a reason to 
select another development tool or concept to replace the cooperative as the 
favored formula, but rather emphasize the complementary role of 
cooperatives and unions in articulating farmer interests vis-a-vis national 
governments. 
A divorce of the post-colonial marriage between Third World governments 
and international donor agencies in promoting cooperatives is an important 
pre-condition for substantial change in the nature of many cooperative 
movements in developing countries. Without the approval and financial 
support of international agencies, these governments are less able to continue 
their 'promotion' of cooperatives. Holmen (1990), who tries to "determine the 
conditions under which cooperatives can be suitable institutions for 
enhancement of development" (p.6) in Africa, even believes that, 
"Termination of development aid and of external support to praetorian 7 
states might seem cruel in the short perspective. In the longer run, however, 
it would most likely force governments to reduce (albeit reluctantly) their 
direct interference in local and regional economic life" (ibid: 76). However, 
this drastic termination would throw the baby out with the bathwater. 
International donor agencies might require national governments to be on 
speaking terms with NGOs like, for instance, farmer unions. Finance then 
becomes related — or even subordinated — to attempts to build a rural 
organizational infrastructure as an arena for farmers to articulate their 
different interests. 
It is very tempting for international funding agencies to claim the ideal of 
organized cooperation for so-called 'self help associations' now that 
government-supported cooperatives have failed to serve farmer interests in 
many developing countries. Some of these agencies seek collaboration with 
NGOs (see, for instance, Newiger 1984: 99-100) as 'self help promotion 
institutions' and new partners in promoting grass-roots development. From a 
legal-pluralist perspective these attempts might be qualified and analyzed as 
7. Holmen (1990: 57) mentions that, "Praetorian societies are defined by "their lack of 
community and effective political institutions" (Huntington S, 1968), ... by their absence of 
agreed procedures,... the fragility of institutions,.... [and] the lack of widespread sentiment of 
their legitimacy" (Finer SE, quoted from Naur M, 1986, p.151). 
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8. This is analogue to concepts used by two legal antropologists: K. von Benda-Beckmann (1984) 
speaks of 'forum shopping' with regard to Minangkabau people who approach different 
courts to win disputes. Spiertz (1986) suggests the concept of 'idiom shopping' to characterize 
the strategic use of local normative complexes by villagers involved in a funeral ceremony on 
Bali. 
'formula shopping' 8 and not of much interest to small rural producers in 
developing countries. A more pragmatic and political-economic approach 
deserves much more attention among international policy makers. This 
approach takes the wider question of political-economic and technical-
economic interest articulation of farmer populations as its starting point. 

8 
Struggles to Secure the 
Supply of Cloves: The Case of Ambon 
Clove producing areas of Indonesia have been the scene of many struggles 
of private and public traders to secure their supply of cloves. The trade of 
this cash crop is a conflict-laden business as it involves considerable 
investments, high risks but also potentially enormous profits. Attempts of 
private and public traders to control the marketing of cloves have also 
mdirectly fueled conflicts between producers claiming ownership or 
usufructuary rights on the same clove trees. This article focusses on the 
struggles of clove traders, while recognizing that conflicts between producers 
(Benda-Beckmann 1990a, 1991, 1992) complicate efforts of traders who want 
to buy cloves or the right to harvest them. 
In the first half of the seventeenth century Portugese, British and Dutch 
trading companies crossed the oceans to wage war with each other and local 
rulers of the Moluccas to establish a monopoly over the trade of cloves 
(Knaap 1981). In the period 1651-1656, the military arm of the Dutch East 
Indies Company (VOC) was able to take control of the most important clove 
producing areas of the Ambon islands. This marked the beginning of the 
world-wide clove monopoly of the VOC that would last for more than two 
centuries. The cruel establishment of this monopoly was followed by an even 
more rigid control of the production of cloves: to realize optimal world 
market prices, the VOC tried to control production by all possible means, 
varying from the enforced expansion of the cultivated area to the burning of 
clove gardens. 1 Not surprisingly, the monopolistic VOC required that all 
1. This optimalization, however, is very hard to realize, because there is a time lag of about five 
years between the planting and maturing of clove trees. This means that the planting of trees, 
at a time when demand and prices are high, is no guarantee of good prices after five years, 
when these new trees come into production. On the contrary, low prices might easily result as 
a result of over-ambitious plantation. Clove cultivation, in fact, is one of the best examples of 
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cloves had to be sold to the company against a fixed price. However, in 1864 
the VOC had to surrender its monopoly position because world market 
prices fell below the cost price of the Dutch due to the increasing supply of 
cloves from Zanzibar. 
In the post-colonial era the struggle for cloves has been fueled by similar 
interventions, that is, efforts of public and private agencies to control fully 
the marketing of cloves and regulate production and prices. Both the 
differences and similarities with former price and production policies of the 
VOC are striking. In contrast to the colonial era, cloves are not now primarily 
bought for auction at foreign commodity markets but to meet the enormous 
domestic demand for cloves as an ingredient of the popular kretek cigarette. 
These cigarettes are produced at large kretek factories on Java that are the 
major buyers of cloves. Village cooperatives (KUDs) are supposed to play a 
key role as primary collectors of cloves: since 1980, these cooperatives have 
the official mandate to buy cloves from farmers at a fixed price (Presidential 
Decree no. 8, 1980). 
In fact, KUDs can be considered the backbone of the clove production and 
marketing policy of the Indonesian government that is directed at the 
following objectives: to offer clove farmers a reasonable price and to free 
them from the clutches of private traders, leading to an increase in the 
income and well-being of clove farmers; to build up a Fund for the 
Rehabilitation of Cengkeh (SRC) in order to provide incentives to clove 
farmers to increase clove production; to strengthen the role of the KUD as a 
means of increasing the well-being of clove farmers; and to secure a stable 
supply of cloves to the kretek cigarette factories (Ministry of Trade and 
Cooperatives 1980). The formal decision of the Indonesian government in 
1980 to give KUDs a central role in the trade of cloves marked a shift 
towards policies that are basically aimed at control of the marketing. 
Before 1980 the Indonesian government concentrated on policies that were 
directed at the increase of production. According to Godoy and Bennett 
(1990), the Indonesian government "embarked during the 1960s upon an 
ambitious and highly successful smallholder clove intensification program" 
(p.62) to meet the enormous domestic demand for cloves and to economize 
on foreign currencies. This policy was continued in the 1970s: "Government 
assistance for clove cultivation, in the form of credit and seedling 
distribution, coupled with rising farm gate prices during the 1970s, induced 
smallholders to expand and rehabilitate clove stands" (ibid). In the 1980s, 
clove marketing policies were introduced as a follow-up of the production-
oriented policies: not only were KUDs given official monoposony rights, the 
the so-called 'pig cycle'. 
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government also declared an increasing number of provinces as official clove 
producing areas. This number increased from six in 1981 to fourteen in 1991. 
One of the most dramatic attempts at controlling the marketing of cloves at 
the national level has been the establishment, in 1991, of a new national 
marketing board, BPPC (Saptari 1992; Vlasblom 1992, 1993). The BPPC 
resulted from a merger between a large trade consortium and the 
government buying agency that was supposed to guarantee minimum floor 
prices to KUDs and its farmers. This semi-pubHc agency has been given 
official powers to buy all cloves from KUDs as well as to act as the only 
supplier of cloves to the kretek cigarette factories. This, of course, has been 
very hard to accept for the captains of the clove industry. Also, it is very 
doubtful whether many clove farmers will benefit from the monopolistic 
BPPC that officially is meant to secure the income of clove farmers. Because 
the chairman of the BPPC feared that his marketing board would not be able 
to buy more than half of the domestic clove production in 1992, he suggested 
that the remaining half be burned (Vlasblom 1992). 
In spite of the attempts of national government agencies and large private 
enterprises to control the marketing of cloves, little is known about the 
struggles for cloves at the local level in the post-colonial period. Few studies 
have explored the diverse transactions, arrangements and forms of 
cooperation in the clove trade in any one of the clove producing areas of 
Indonesia (Clauss 1988; Godoy and Bennett 1990). Moreover, although KUDs 
have been given official monopoly powers in the purchase of cloves from 
member-producers, there are scarcely any regional or case studies that 
describe regional clove markets and explain the seemingly poor performance 
of many of these cooperatives (K. von Benda-Beckmann 1987; Godoy and 
Bennett 1990). 
The first objective of this chapter, therefore, is to analyze how different 
clove traders in the Central Moluccas try to secure the supply of cloves. The 
analysis is based on field research in 1989-1990 and includes a reconstruction 
of earlier strategies of traders in the 1970s and 1980s. Strategies of clove 
traders can be characterized according to their different use of financial, 
social and legal means in securing the supply of cloves. Financial means 
include price fixing and the supply of credit against the promise of 
repayment in cloves. The use of social means refers to the mobilization of 
social relations based on kinship, trade connections and/or credit ties. Legal 
means concern different types of pre-harvest arrangements and official 
regulations on the marketing of cloves. One can expect that traders use 
combinations of financial, social and legal means that are hard to distinguish 
from each other as integral parts of their strategies and relations. 
The second objective of this chapter is to describe the structure of clove 
trade networks in the Central Moluccas and to analyze their dynamics. A 
main determinant of these networks is the source of working capital of a 
trader. Possible sources of working capital are: credit from kretek cigarette 
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factories, from large shopkeepers, agricultural traders, pawnbrokers, banks or 
personal or family capital. Another determinant of clove trade networks are 
official regulations concerning the organization of the clove market. These 
regulations only recognize the government cooperative channel (from farmer 
via KUD to PUSKUD) to increase its market share vis-á-vis the private 
channel (from farmer via shopkeeper and private trader to agent of cigarette 
company). Changes in the organization of this market can be analyzed as 
intended or unintended consequences of these official regulations. 
The third objective is to analyze how two structural features of clove 
production affect strategies of traders: first, there is a large variation in 
production on a small scale and on a time basis. This has strong implications 
for output-securing strategies of traders in terms of working areas and 
buying or credit transactions. Second, a low level of the total production of 
cloves in a specific region does not automatically imply high market prices 
and vice versa. On the contrary, high regional levels of production can go 
together with high market prices and, worse still, low levels of production 
may coincide with low market prices. In other words, estimates of total 
regional production are hardly useful for predicting the development of 
seasonal market prices. These prices are instead the outcome of struggles and 
speculations of national kretek cigarette companies who are officially called 
the consumers of cloves.2 This implies that local traders should have an 
'upward orientation' for information on price developments. At the same 
time, they have to develop strategies to both secure their supply of cloves 
and mirürnize disadvantegeous effects related to the fluctuation in market 
prices. 
The fourth objective is to describe how the strategies of different traders 
and their effectiveness have changed as a result of increased money 
circulation and transport facilities in the Central Moluccas. For instance, in 
the 1970s 'farm gate' prices of cloves soared from Rp. 1,000 up to Rp. 10,000-
15,000/kg, but then declined to Rp. 2,000-3,000/kg by the end of the 1980s 
(Godoy and Bennett 1990: 63). Money circulation also increased because of 
changes in consumer preferences from sago, a locally available food crop, to 
rice that is not grown locally; and from sago houses to concrete houses with 
zinc roofs. In addition, in the late 1980s, some Ambon-based banks opened 
branches at the village level. Finally, the impact of the increase in the number 
of buses and boats connecting villages over land and sea in the Moluccan 
archipelago should not underestimated. Changes in the marketing of cloves 
in terms of barter-like transactions, pre-harvest arrangements, profit margins, 
credit sources and the selection of them, can be seen as the differential 
outcome of these processes. 
2. In this respect, the Indonesian clove market might be described as a buyers' market generally 
speaking, buyers of cloves have greater influence on prices than sellers of cloves. 
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Clove Marketing Chains in the Central Moluccas 
At the village level in the Central Moluccas, one or more of the following 
possibilities exist for farmers to sell their cloves or future harvest: pedlars 
with cloth merchandise, village shopkeepers, village cooperatives, itinerant 
Butonese traders, office-based Chinese agricultural traders and large Ambon-
based shopkeepers (see Figure 8.1). 
Chinese agricultural traders and, to a much lesser extent, village 
cooperatives also act as secondary-level traders: Chinese agricultural traders 
buy, store or sell cloves from small Butonese traders. Travelling agents of 
village cooperatives supply consumer goods to shops in distant villages to be 
repaid in cloves. In this respect, these agents imitate the much larger and 
longer-established operations of a small number of middlemen who also 
operate at the secondary level. Middlemen buy cloves from village 
shopkeepers but also from a smaller number of village cooperatives. 
Large Ambon shopkeepers provide middlemen with daily consumer goods 
and house construction materials against future payments in cloves. The 
middlemen are not employed by the large shopkeepers but have developed 
close working relations with them and, in fact, act as their retailers-cum-
collectors. Chinese agricultural traders, Butonese traders, pedlars with cloth 
merchandise are, or used to be, agents of the 30-40 large Ambon 
shopkeepers 3 involved in the clove trade (see also: Godoy and Bennett 1990). 
Even some KUDs supply cloves to these shopkeepers, although they are 
expected to sell their cloves on the auction floor at the centre for the village 
cooperatives (PUSKUD). Yet even cloves on the auction floor might first have 
passed through the hands of a village shopkeeper, middleman and/or large 
Ambon shopkeeper (see Figure 8.1). 
The large Ambon shopkeepers are the main suppliers of cloves to the four 
agents of kretek cigarette companies stationed in Ambon City. These agents 
also have access as potential buyers to the auction floor of the PUSKUD 
where they bid against the prices offered by the state-buying agent, Kerta 
Niaga. 
3. According to key informants, the following enterprises and shops have the largest clove trade 
businesses in Ambon City: Sama Subur, Inkara, Banju Mas, Goti, Marga Bhakti, Marga T., 
Mitra Usaha, Maluku Indah, Manusela, Bumi Jaya, Usaha Baru, Rimba Raya and Sama Rasa. 
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Figure 8.1 provides a picture of the possible flows of cloves, but not of the 
'mechanisms' or arrangements used to buy or sell cloves, such as: direct 
purchase, provision of a loan in cash or consumer goods to be repaid in 
cloves (with local arrangements called panjar uang, tolong petard and cengkeh 
kilo) and purchase of the right to harvest clove trees for one or more seasons 
(called beli budh for short-term transactions and sewa pohon for longer-term 
transactions). Figure 8.1 likewise does not offer insights into changes of trade 
networks and time-spatial variations in buying or selling mechanisms. It is a 
map, a static representation, of what is a dynamic complex of clove trade 
systems in the Central Moluccas. To provide a more historical perspective 
and explain changes in the flows of cloves, I will therefore describe specific 
Figure 8.1: Clove trade networks in the Central Moluccas 
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segments of Figure 8.1, and the changing practices for buying cloves in more 
detail in the following two sections. 
In the first section I concentrate on the position of cooperatives and the 
PUSKUD in clove trade networks, providing data for the Central Moluccan 
region as a whole. Some Ambon City-based collectors play a key role in the 
marketing of cloves through cooperatives. Hence, this regional and city-based 
section includes two cases of these collectors and their collaboration with 
village cooperatives. 
The second section provides a picture from the village-level perspective. It 
describes changing roles and strategies of different clove traders who are 
based in the village of Tulehu. Again, the KUD is described and compared 
with other clove traders. Their changing roles and strategies mirror broader 
socio-economic developments but also the particular position of Tulehu in 
regional trade and transport networks. 
The Use of State Cooperatives: 
Cengkeh Murni Mixed With Cengkeh Toko 
Since 1980 clove farmers in Indonesia are supposed to sell their cloves to 
the village cooperative (KUD). Officially, the KUD has become their only 
marketing outlet since KUDs have been given monopoly rights in the 
purchase of cloves from farmers. To effectuate this monopsony, KUDs have 
been accorded two official privileges: first, the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) 
provides them with special working capital on soft terms, the so-called 
Kredit Tata Niaga Cengkeh (TNC), to buy cloves from farmers. Second, only 
KUDs are allowed to auction cloves at the PUSKUD, the centre for 
cooperatives. A floor price system at the auction is meant to guarantee KUDs 
and its member farmers stable and reasonable prices for their cloves. 
However, there is strong evidence — supported by local official resources -
that many farmers have not benefitted from the floor price system and do 
not sell their cloves to the KUDs but to private traders. Many of these KUDs 
have developed working relations with traders and shopkeepers as their 
suppliers of cloves. This section explains the stagnant, marginal share of 
KUDs in the direct purchasing of cloves from farmers in the Central 
Moluccas as well as the evolving forms of cooperation between KUDs and 
private traders. 
The Auction 
There are two PUSKUDs in the Moluccan province: one in Ternate in the 
northern district of the Moluccas, and one in Ambon in the central district. 
The PUSKUD of Ambon was officially opened in 1980, and in 1989 served 97 
KUD-members, spread over the 18 sub-districts of the Central Moluccas. The 
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privileged access of KUDs does not imply that all these cooperatives can 
bring their cloves at any time they wish to the auction floor of the PUSKUD. 
The officials of the PUSKUD invite only four to five KUDs to auction their 
cloves on a specific date. In addition, participating KUDs are not free to 
decide the amount they wish to sell at the auction floor. The stipulated 
amount of cloves per auction is 3,025 kilogram per KUD. Finally, a KUD 
cannot sell different grades of cloves. Sucofindo, a semi-official body, takes 
samples of every batch of cloves to assess their quality: if the sample is too 
humid or too dirty, the batch cannot be offered for auction. This quality 
control is not only important for determining which batches can be auctioned 
and which not; it also sets the floor price of good batches. If the cloves 
exactly meet minimum standards, the state agent is obliged to bid the official 
floor price of Rp. 7,000 per kilogram. The state agent uses a tabulated price 
index with dryness and cleanliness as the two variables that determine his 
offer for cloves meeting mirumum quality standards. 
Besides the state agent, inter-island traders (PAP) who are agents of the 
kretek cigarette companies bid for the cloves. The following kretek cigarette 
companies have an agent in Ambon City who participates formally in the 
auction at the PUSKUD: Gudang Gar am, Bentoel, Djarum and Sampurna. 
Not surprisingly, participation in the auction was not very attractive for the 
agents in periods when market prices were much lower than the officially 
prescribed prices on the auction floor, such as for instance in 1986-1989. They 
simply did not show up and the counting of the auctioneer, awaiting a 
higher bid than that of the state agent from Kerta Niaga, was a formal show 
rather than a real competition in buying cloves. 
Within two days after the auction the 'winner' of the auction has to pay for 
the cloves as well as the auction fee (biaya lelang) and a contribution to the 
fund for the rehabilitation of clove trees (Sumbangan Rehabilitasi Cengkeh) at 
the Bank Rakyat Indonesia. The BRI transfers the SRC, which is Rp. 500 per 
kilogram, to an account of the Provincial Government at the Bank 
Pembangunan Daerah Maluku (BPDM). The auction fee is one percent of the 
price of the cloves and is distributed between the PUSKUD (25 percent), 
Sucofindo (5 percent) and the Provincial Technical Team (75 percent). 
The buying price of the cloves paid by the KUD to the farmers is officially 
determined as the minimum floor price minus 500 rupiah, that is, Rp. 6,500 
per kilogram. The BRI distributes the margin of Rp. 500 as follows: Rp. 100 
per kilogram is transferred to an income account of the KUD (Rekening 
Pendapatan); Rp. 100 is transferred to a KUD savings account; and Rp. 300 is 
deposited in an account for the financial support of farmer members of 
KUDs. The latter two accounts are not freely managed by the KUDs since the 
head of the Provincial Department of Cooperatives recommends when and 
how these funds should be used (Surat Dirjen Bina Usaha Koperasi 1987). 
The Presidential Decree of 1980 that prescribes the privileges of KUDs in 
the clove trade does not provide these cooperatives with instant access to the 
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auction floor. The Provincial Technical Team has to scratinize applications of 
KUDs for membership of the PUSKUD. These teams are chaired by high 
officials of the Provincial Department of Trade and Department of 
Cooperatives with officials from Economic Affairs, Fiscal Affairs and the 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia acting as members. Still, the very low number of 
registered cooperatives in the Moluccas before 1980 (Damanik 1981) suggests 
that the Presidential Decree of 1980 marked or even kick-started the take-off 
of the official cooperative sector in the Moluccas. 
The number of KUDs in the Central Moluccas given the privilege to 
auction their cloves at the PUSKUD in Ambon increased ten-fold in the 1980s 
(see Table 8.1). However, in the same period the average percentage of 
member-cooperatives that actually sold cloves on the auction floor was not 
more than 60 percent, with lowest rates of 20 and 30 percent in 1984-1986. 
Not all those KUDs that sell cloves at the auction are given the same 
number of opportunities to participate. In 1989, 57 KUDs participated only 
one to three times in an auction, whereas 21 KUDs participated four to six 
times. 
Table 8.1: Number of member-KUDs, KUDs that sold at auction (PUSKUD, 
Ambon City) and auction days 
Year Number of member-
KUDs per 31 
December 
Number of KUDs 
that sold at the 
auction 
Number of auction 
days 
19804 9 13 42 
1981 35 31 94 
1982 44 31 103 
1983 58 39 99 
1984 63 14 45 
1985 69 22 30 
1986 72 19 30 
1987 78 51 128 
1988 91 65 84 
1989 97 78 61 
Sources: PUSKUD Ambon, summary review of the auction of cloves in the 
period 1980-1988 and annual reports of 1984, 1988 and 1989. 
4. The number of 13 cooperatives that actually sold cloves on the auction floor in 1980 exceeds 
the number of 9 member-cooperatives at that time. It seems that those cooperatives that had 
applied for membership of the PUSKUD, and were awaiting the final approval of the 
Technical Team, participated in the auction. 
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On the other hand, not all cloves that were exported from Ambon to the 
national stock or the kretek factories on Java had passed the auction floor. 
Official data (Table 8.2) show that in the eighties an average of about 30 
percent of exported cloves from Ambon had passed the auction floor, thus 
suggesting that the market share of village cooperatives in the purchase of 
cloves from farmers was of the same order. 
Pre-Auction Contracts 
However, the real market share of KUDs is probably much lower than 30 
percent because not all cloves that are auctioned at the PUSKUD are bought 
by these cooperatives from farmers. For a number of reasons many KUDs 
have been unable to do so: first, the production of cloves is subject to 
strong fluctuation and is almost unpredictable. Even worse, large variations 
in production occur on a small-scale. As a consequence, it is nearly 
impossible for a village cooperative to collect annually a constant amount of 
cloves from its member farmers in the village area. The pattern of clove 
Table 8.2: Turnover at auction and export of cloves from Ambon (in tons of 
cloves) 
Year Turnover at Export from Ambon 
auction 
Via auction 1 Not via auction Total export 
1980 156.33 4,146.02 _ 4,146.02 
1981 802.54 3,025.35 870.53 3395.88 
1982 1395.18 1,445.45 1382.10 2,827.55 
1983 2366.94 764.62 2,497.83 3,262.45 
1984 947.75 2,623.51 1,726.48 4349.99 
1985 462.44 33,177.92 277.08 3,455.00 
1986 250.97 2,192.36 380.17 2372.53 
1987 1,931.67 2,211.62 1,631.15 3,842.77 
1988 1,273.20 3,170.04 1324.38 4,494.42 
19892 573.26 1,433.63 759.12 2,192.75 
totals 10,860.28 24,190.52 10,848.84 35,039.36 
1 The annual figure for the turnover of the auction and the volume of exported cloves 
passing through the auction are not the same because cloves are probably not shipped 
immediately after the auction. 
2 Till July 1989. 
3 According to Godoy and Bennett (1990: 70), Djarum had the largest market share of 
all private cigarette companies in 1985 when its agent on Ambon bought 2,000 tons of 
cloves and the agent of Gudang Garam half of this amount. 
Source: The Provincial Office of Trade, Ambon. 
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production more or less compels KUDs, that want to make optimal use of 
their privilege to sell cloves at the auction, to search for cloves in other, 
remote village areas when their local supply of cloves is not enough. On 
these occasions buying agents of the cooperative usually do not contact 
farmers but shopkeepers — partly explaining the connection between KUDs 
and village shopkeepers in Figure 8.1. 
A second reason why KUDs fail to buy cloves from farmers is that many 
farmers have already sold the right to harvest their cloves to village 
shopkeepers or Butonese traders. In remote areas with few opportunities to 
make money, farmers are more or less forced to sell the right to harvest a 
number of their clove trees to the village shopkeeper in exchange for 
consumption goods. In villages with more opportunities to make money, 
many farmers decide to make pre-harvest arrangements with Butonese 
traders to meet their large financial needs, to transfer production and price 
risks, and to save the trouble of harvesting and selling the cloves. Even when 
farmers harvest the cloves themselves, they do not automatically sell to the 
KUD since the managers of this cooperative have little experience in trading 
cloves and cannot always be trusted. 
Third, the excessive supply of Kredit TNC in the first half of the eighties 
was counterproductive because it resulted in indebtedness among KUDs that 
simply could not collect enough cloves from their village areas. Besides, the 
size of the loans at that time (80 to 120 million rupiah per KUD) occasioned 
for embezzlement among the many new cooperative chairmen who were 
only familiar with village shopkeeping and small turnovers of not more than 
Rp. 10,000 per day. Not surprisingly, the BRI refused to supply new Kredit 
TNC to heavily indebted KUDs. According to the chairman of one of those 
indebted KUDs, the BRI had barred about one third of the total of member-
KUDs from the Kredit TNC program in 1990. As a result, the cooperatives 
started to look for alternative sources of working capital and credit 
connections. Some cooperatives simply requested large urban wholesalers to 
auction their cloves at the PUSKUD on their behalf. The cloves were not 
transported Tjack' to the village but directly from the stores of the 
wholesalers in Ambon City to the nearby auction floor of the PUSKUD, 
which explains the flow of cloves from wholesalers to the KUD-PUSKUD 
connection in Figure 8.1. One of the central agencies in this respect was a 
construction company running a clove business enterprise. 
Aris Liem is the director of a construction company that builds roads in 
isolated places in the Central Moluccas. This young Chinese entrepreneur 
also trades in cloves thus benefitting from his contacts as a constructor. He 
has worked with three different types of suppliers of cloves: large 
shopkeepers of Ambon City, professional agricultural traders and village 
cooperatives. 
Large shopkeepers of Ambon City were his most important suppliers. He 
supplied credit to these shopkeepers against the promise of repayment in 
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cloves. But now that many Ambonese shopkeepers have considerable 
financial means themselves and enjoy good credit connections with banks, 
this strategy is not so effective anymore. Yet, he is certainly not out of the 
game. When a shopkeeper wants to buy enormous amounts of cloves and 
applies for a bank loan for this purpose, bank employees call him to receive 
his advice. The price of a positive recommendation is the future supply of 
cloves. However, Aris Liem is not the only 'advisor' of the Chinese business 
community, and, therefore, he is not able to tie down many shopkeepers. 
Also, Aris Liem cannot expect the individual shopkeeper to supply all of his 
cloves to him in reciprocation for his recommendation. 
Six professional agricultural traders operating in different places in the 
Central Moluccas, regularly supply cloves to Aris Liem. One of them is 
located in Tulehu. Aris Liem supplements their working capital with loans to 
be repaid in one or two weeks. He charges no interest. On the contrary, he 
pays his suppliers of cloves two to three percent commission from his bulk 
sale to an agent of a kretek cigaratte company. 
Only a few village cooperatives (KUDs) supply cloves to Aris Liem. On the 
contrary, the supply of cloves from Aris Liem to the KUDs is significant. The 
cloves are not transported from Ambon City back to the village but directly 
to the PUSKUD in Ambon City where the cloves of Aris Liem are auctioned 
in the name of an individual cooperative. In this way Aris Liem provides 
'services' to about 30 KUDs. The larger the difference between market prices 
and the floor price at the auction, the more lucrative is collaboration with 
village cooperatives. Aris Liem is well-informed about the official trade 
system because of his close contacts with the Head of the Department of 
Trade. The Chinese entrepreneur has no informal relations with the new 
Head of the Department of Cooperatives yet, as the latter is quite formalistic 
and very touchy about unofficial trade practices. 
Liem usually sells his cloves to Gudang Garam. He is very familiar with 
this kretek cigarette company. His father used to supply cloves to Gudang 
Garam; one of his nephews is employed by the company; and in the past 
Liem himself worked at Gudang Garam. However, Liem is not tied to 
Gudang Garam through huge debts. He is a borrower of the Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (BRI) and enjoys general trade credit (Kredit Umum Perdagangan) 
that can be extended year after year. When Liem does not want to sell cloves 
because of an expected increase in price but does not possess the financial 
means to buy new cloves, he borrows money for a few days from Gudang 
Garam. In these situations the BRI is simply too slow. 
It should be noted that not only those KUDs that are excluded from Kredit 
TNC facilities have working relations with urban wholesalers. Some of the 
KUDs simply on-lend (part of) the Kredit TNC to urban wholesalers to buy 
cloves. But it is also true that not all large urban shopkeepers and traders are 
eager to develop working relations with village cooperatives. The following 
case illustrates this point. 
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Pak Sam is a large agricultural trader in Ambon City. He is owner of four 
restaurants and has rented a building at the new, large market place of the 
town where he buys and stores cloves. The building and all his restaurants 
are called 'Sama Rasa'. 
In 1980 Pak Sam borrowed the money equivalent to one bag of cloves from 
the trading company Goti. He used this to buy small amounts of cloves 
because he had to repay his debt with one bag of cloves. This was the 
beginning of his clove trading activities. Now he is one of the main suppliers 
of Gudang Garam, one of the largest inter-island traders (PAP) who 
possesses large store houses in Paso village that connects the two peninsular 
parts of Ambon island. Pak Sam has daily contact by telephone with Gudang 
Garam concerning prices and price developments. When the telephone 
connection is broken, he is desperate. 
Like many clove traders, Pak Sam has credit connections with banks. In 
1987 he borrowed Rp. 15 million from the BRI. In 1988 the BRI provided him 
with a loan of Rp. 50 million. Still, Pak Sam is not considered to belong to 
the largest buyers of Ambon City. A trader at the village level qualified him 
as 'not yet strong' (belum kuat) in terms of purchasing power. Pak Sam, who 
uses a working capital of Rp. 100 million, calls himself a collecting trader 
(pedagang menyumpul). According to him, a trader can only speculate and /or 
win price wars if he controls more than Rp. 500 million. 
Pak Sam operates no permanent working relations with KUDs. He is afraid 
that chairmen of village cooperatives might decide not to pay him after the 
auction of his cloves at the PUSKUD. Pak Sam simply does not want to let 
the profit margin of his enterprise depend on the conditions of KUDs and 
the level of honesty of their chairmen. If he were to cooperate with a KUD, 
he would first need to convince himself of the qualities, intentions and 
prospects of the cooperative. Such a screening costs him too much time. Pak 
Sam prefers to buy small amounts of cloves at his building in Ambon City to 
be sold in larger packages to Gudang Garam. In addition, he does not have 
to upgrade his cloves in order to meet quality standards — which is 
necessary if one auctions at the PUSKUD. However, the secretary of KUD 
Hika, who has auctioned the most at the PUSKUD in 1989, said that Pak Sam 
still works together with a KUD every now and then. 
A substantial part of the farmer suppliers of Pak Sam come from Tehoru, 
Ceram island, close to his wife's place of birth. Other suppliers are villagers 
from the islands of Saparua and Haruku. In addition, his mother is an 
Ambonese from Suli, not far from Tulehu village. Pak Sam tries to build 
permanent relations with his suppliers offering 'good services' and financial 
support in emergency situations. 
A Chinese professional agricultural trader from Hitu, located on the 
northern coast of Ambon island, explained that he sells most of his cloves to 
Pak Sam. He buys 100 to 200 kilogrammes of cloves every day from village 
shopkeepers on Ceram island. However, if he collects more than one ton in 
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one day, he directly sells the cloves to the agent of Gudang Garam. He 
classified the village shopkeepers, who buy by the tin and not by the 
kilograrnme, as small buyers, whereas he qualified himself as a medium-
sized buyer and Pak Sum as a large one. In April 1989 the price of a tin of 
fresh cloves on Ceram was Rp. 150 which means that one kilogramme of 
dried cloves was worth Rp. 1,800 to 2,100 at that time. The medium-sized 
buyer of Hitu, however, did not say at what price he bought the (dried) 
cloves. His colleagues in Tulehu, however, paid about Rp. 3,000 per 
kilogramme in April 1989. 
Unofficial Patronage Refunds5 
The official minimum price paid by KUDs to farmers is not actually 
offered by these cooperatives — if they buy cloves directly from farmers at 
all. Those KUDs that buy cloves from village shopkeepers or farmers pay the 
market price. Ironically, those KUDs that auction cloves of urban wholesalers 
pay a price to their suppliers that is close to the official minimum price for 
farmers. Table 8.3 is an example of the distribution of profits between a KUD 
and a private trader. The example was given by a chairman of a KUD in 
March 1989 when market prices were about Rp. 3,000 per kilogram. 
Low market prices are a strong incentive for both private entrepreneurs 
and KUDs to sell cloves at the auction. The profit margin to be shared 
among entrepreneurs and KUD is maximal in the case of low market prices. 
In this connection, the seasons of 1986-1987, 1987-1988 and 1988-1989 must 
have been very lucrative for organizing 'joint ventures' (see Appendix 8.1 
and 8.2) — possibly explaining the considerable increase of KUDs that sold 
cloves on the auction floor after 1986 (see Table 8.1). Concomitantly, auction 
volumes also sharply increased from 1986 till 1989 (see Table 8.2). Contrary 
developments take place in the case of high market prices. Such prices slow 
down auction activities, as occured in 1985 and 1986. The lowest number of 
auction days during the 1980s were realized exactly in these years (cf. Table 
8.1, Table 8.2 and Appendix 8.1). 
8. According to western cooperative business theory, "Patronage refunds result because 
cooperatives, like most other businesses, cannot estimate with certainty their exact operationg 
costs at the time they occur. To be on the safe side, cooperatives therefore seek to operate with 
sufficient margins so that their income exceeds their outgo. [..]. Patronage refunds, then, are 
the "group savings" that are returned to individual patrons in proportion to the business they 
do with their cooperatives. The technique explains why, in the conventional sense, 
cooperatives that return patronage refunds to members have no profits as legal business 
entities (Abrahamsen 1976: 308)." 
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Table 8.3: An example of the cfistribution of profits between a KUD and a 
private entrepreneur after the auction of cloves at the PUSKUD (with prices 
in Rp/kg) 
Selling price of cloves at auction 
minus Gross profit of KUD 
7,000 
1,000 
Payment to private entrepreneur 
minus Cost price of private entrepreneur 
6,000 
3,000 
Gross profit of private entrepreneur 




Net profit of private entrepreneur 2^00 
In November 1989 I happened to witness a breakdown of auction activities. 
Market prices came close to the floor price of the auction and all of sudden a 
the number of auction days dropped from 16 in October to 2 in November to 
a full stop in December. For many local government agencies such a 
breakdown means a loss of levies. 
Table 8.4 summarizes the different types of levies and their collectors. The 
Special Levy is the only type that is implemented by a local government 
agency but not prescribed by national government agencies. In fact, this levy 
is another token of the failure of KUDs to pay farmers a reasonable and 
standard price for their cloves. The officials of the PUSKUD and the 
Department of Cooperatives know very well that for many KUDs private 
traders act as suppliers of cloves to the auction. They even speak of 'pure 
cloves' (cengkeh mumi) versus 'cloves from shops' (cengkeh toko). The officials 
also know that those KUDs that buy cloves directly from farmers do not pay 
the official buying price but a (lower) market price. Therefore, the PUSKUD 
charges a Special Levy to be paid by the KUDs participating in the auction. 
In 1989 this levy was increased from Rp. 300 to Rp. 400 per kilogram of 
cloves sold at the auction (PUSKUD 1990). By the end of 1989, the total of 
special levies at the PUSKUD of Ambon reached nearly 300 million rupiah -
euphemistically called 'other savings' (simpanan lain-lain). The total of 
entrance fees amounted to nearly 10 million rupiah and the total of 
obligatory savings was not more than 14 million rupiah (ibid). Unfortunately, 
KUDs have no direct access to their 'other savings'. 
For local government agencies a stable supply of cloves to the auction floor 
is very important in terms of tax income. A reduction in this supply implies 
a reduction of tax income for these agencies. For the national government, 
however, a stable flow of cloves that does not pass through the auction floor 
(see Table 8.2) is an important source of tax income. According to official 
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1% of auction volume 
Rp. 100/kg cloves 
Rp. 300/kg cloves 
Rp. 400/kg cloves 
Rp. 500/kg cloves 
PUSKUD, Sucofindo, Technical 
Team 
Head of Department of 
Cooperatives 




Sources: Annual reports of PUSKUD Ambon of 1988 and 1989; Ministerial Decree of the 
Department of Trade and Cooperatives no. 28/Kp/l/1980 on the Domestic Trade and 
Production of Cloves; Decree of the Directory-General of Cooperative Enterprises no. 
372/BUK/IV/87. 
regulations, inter-island traders (PAP) have to pay a penalty for cloves that 
have been bought 'directly from the farmers'. These penalty fees are levied 
by officials from the Department of Trade to be transferred to the Treasury. 
From 1981 till 1984, the penalty fee was fixed at ten percent of the value of 
the crop. This meant, for instance, that in 1982 the total penalty fees charged 
in the Central Moluccan district was about one billion rupiah, assuming that 
all non-auctioned cloves were in fact taxed. For some reason, however, the 
Ministry of Trade reduced the fee to five percent in September 1984. Then, in 
1987 the same Ministry ordered that the penalty fee should be variable 
"depending on the price of cloves in Java" and "the expected profits of the 
inter-island traders" (Ministry of Trade 1987). Whether this legal measure has 
resulted in an increase or decrease in the penalty fee or in public revenue, is 
hard to say. Obviously, this measure has created more room to inter-island 
traders to bribe local officials. 
Traders from Tulehu 
The actual flow of cloves from a particular village or villager in the Central 
Moluccas to Ambon City-based agents of public and private companies 
depends on the location in regional transport and trade networks. To this 
geographical dimension we should add a time-perspective since processes of 
dramatic increase in money circulation and transport facilities have strongly 
affected clove marketing chains in the Central Moluccas, the effectiveness 
and significance of contracts, agreements, and local concepts used to 
guarantee supply of cloves. These processes — like many processes of 
commoditization and monetization elsewhere — have been uneven and 
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complex ones that have differently involved and affected villages and their 
inhabitants. For instance, the 'clove boom' of the 1970s, resulting from the 
soaring prices of cloves, implied an increase in money circulation which 
enabled villagers to buy concrete houses with zinc roofs, to buy rice and 
processed food, to go on pugrimages and/or to send children to high school 
and universities in Ambon or elsewhere in Indonesia. The decline in farm 
prices during the eighties might have slowed down money circulation but 
nevertheless it increased money needs and, off-farm activities and the 
expansion of bank credit facilities again fueled money circulation. Location-
specific patterns of clove production have further differentiated the impact of 
broader commoditization and monetization processes at the village level, not 
to speak of the different positions of villages in evolving transport networks. 
One place that has experienced a marked increase in money circulation and 
transport facilities is the village of Tulehu. Tulehu is situated at the north-
eastern coast of the island of Ambon and has evolved, in the past 25 years, 
as a regional trade and transport centre linking Ambon City and the 
hinterland of the Central Moluccas. This has strongly affected the ways and 
possibilities of buying and selling cloves in Tulehu. Particular types of 
output-securing devices — still operating in more distant villages of the 
Central Moluccas — have lost their effectiveness in Tulehu and new types of 
buying transactions have emerged. It has also become much easier for 
agricultural entrepreneurs from Tulehu to visit more distant villages to buy 
cloves. This, again, has implications for the ways and possibilities of buying 
and selling cloves in these more distant villages. Likewise, it has become 
much easier for farmers from more distant villages to visit Tulehu to sell 
cloves and do some shopping. This has, in turn, affected the ways and 
opportunities to buy and sell cloves in Tulehu. The increase of transport 
facilities and money circulation has resulted in a dialectical process of change 
in the strategies of traders to secure the output of cloves. 
This section describes the rise and decline of different clove traders, both 
micro entrepreneurs and large-scale enterprises, who are living and/or 
located in Tulehu village. What they all have in common is that their 
activities are not so much directed at the Tulehu farming population but 
reach out to a wider clientele: they either visit their clientele outside Tulehu, 
that is, in more distant villages, or do transactions in Tulehu with non-
residents who want to cash some cloves for shopping in Tulehu and/or 
Ambon City. Another common feature of clove traders from Tulehu is that 
they - except for the categories of the cloth pedlar and the KUD - belong to 
migrant populations. Finally, the first of every type of trader — except for the 
KUD — started and/or expanded clove businesses in the 1970s, the clove 
boom period. 
My description of traders from Tulehu is both a diachronic and synchronic 
account of their changing supply-seorring strategies at the village level in the 
period 1970-1990. I start with 'earlier' strategies that gradually give way 
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either to new strategies of the same actor or to those of new traders. Cloth 
pedlars, village shopkeepers and their suppliers are first described. Butonese 
traders and Chinese agricultural traders follow. My description ends with the 
KUD of Tulehu representing the youngest shoot of the tree. I explain changes 
in their strategies, and henceforth clove marketing systems, as variables of 
processes of increasing money circulation and transport facilities, the 
decreasing trend in clove prices in the 1980s, or a combination thereof. 
Pedlars Exchanging Clothes and Cloves 
In many isolated villages in the Central Moluccas a pedlar with cloth 
merchandise was probably one of the first buyers of cloves at the beginning 
of the 'clove boom' in the 1970s when the price of cloves increased 
enormously (Fraassen 1981). From Tulehu, which evolved as a regional 
transport and trade centre, women went on foot to far-away villages of 
Ambon island to sell cloth for payment in cloves. By canoe and later by 
speedboat and larger ships, clients were visited on nearby islands. "Besides 
trading in consumption goods, the women and particularly those from 
Tulehu, try to sell cloth and utensils at the time of the clove harvest on 
Ceram island. Also, they set up small xvarong where guest laborers can have 
their meals" (Paassen 1986: 77, my translation). The next three cases illustrate 
the financing of these quasi-barter transactions in which profit and interest 
are difficult to quantify. They also give an impression of the processes that 
have reduced the scope and importance of these transactions: 
Ibu M. sells cloth to villagers on the nearby island of Saparua. The 
villagers pay her with cloves during the harvest season or with cash after 
they have received their monthly salaries. Ibu M. goes twice a month to 
Saparua and knows exactly when junior and senior civil servants receive 
their salaries. She borrows cloth from two Chinese shopkeepers of Ambon 
City but sells her cloves to one of the professional agricultural traders of 
Tulehu who is employed by toko Inkara of Ambon City. In kampong Baru 
only two other women are active in what is called tukar pakaian, the 
exchange of clothes (for cloves). According to Ibu M., many more women 
used to be active in this business. However, most of them abused the 
credit of the Chinese cloth traders by using the income from the sale of the 
cloth to pay school fees and meet the other cash needs for their children. 
Ibu Aca is one of those women who used to be active in the exchange of 
cloth for cloves. In the past she travelled with her husband to the coast of 
Tehoru during the harvest season when he and his Javanese boss bought 
cloves from village shopkeepers. While these men visited different villages, 
Ibu Aca stayed in a distant village where she exchanged cloth and plates 
for cloves. 
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Ibu lea was also used active in what she describes as tukar-menukar. Her 
clients were the villagers of Asilulu, Seith and Ulur, places inaccessible to 
motorized vehicles. In her first season, Chinese sellers supplied her with 
credit in cloth worth Rp. 25,000. In her last season, 1987-1988, her working 
capital amounted to Rp. 500,000. There were two reasons why she stopped 
exchanging cloth for cloves: first, new roads opened up the formerly 
inaccessible villages. Hence villagers travelled to buy cloth outside their 
place and became more and more cost-conscious. Second, during her last 
season as an itinerant trader, the price of cloves sharply decreased whereas 
the prices of cloth increased. 
Cloth sellers were not only one of the first buyers of cloves in isolated 
villages but also one of the first agents of large Chinese shopkeepers of 
Ambon City in rural areas. Chinese shopkeepers entrusted them with small 
amounts of cloth to be sold to villagers. They increased the credit volume 
when the women repaid the loan. However, the sale of cloth for cloves was 
put under pressure due to increasing transport facilities, money circulation 
and money needs: it became much easier for villagers to buy cloves in 
Ambon City themselves, cloves were no longer the single means of payment, 
and many 'agents' proved vulnerable to the increasing money needs of their 
own children. 
Village Shopkeepers 
Increasing monetization of consumption habits in the subsistence-oriented 
sago-economy of the Moluccas triggered village shopkeeping activities in the 
1970s and 1980s. In many cases, migrants, looking for new places to make 
money, responded to these opportunities and started selling consumption 
goods in the more isolated villages. Most of the villagers did not enjoy a 
salary or a stable income from fishing - if they sell fish at all. One of the few 
possibilities to meet cash consumption needs was to sell future cloves to the 
village shopkeeper. Village shopkeeping was, therefore, also a strategic entry 
into the business of clove trading. 
Two types of arrangements evolved: first, the village shopkeeper provided 
credit in consumption goods to be repaid in cloves — using a low Active 
price standard to calculate the debt in kind. For instance, when a villager 
borrowed Rp. 100,000 in consumption goods at a fictive price of Rp. 2,000 
per kilogramme of cloves, the villager was expected to pay back his loan 
with 50 kilogrammes of cloves. In this way villagers are easily inclined to 
indebt themselves when there are few possibilities to buy consumption 
goods. It is a matter of ambil barang-barang saja (to simply collect the 
consumption goods). 
The second type of arrangement, called sewa pohon, implies a contract for 
one or more years with the owner of the clove trees. The village shopkeeper 
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supplies consumption goods to the owner of clove trees in exchange for the 
right to harvest these trees for a number of good seasons. When the 
agreement is made, the trees are given a mark (kasih tanda) enabling hired 
laborers of the shopkeeper to easily locate the trees at the time of the harvest. 
A meagre harvest does not count as (partial) redemption of the debt. In some 
occasions the owner sells the right to harvest clove trees to two different 
shopkeepers. Not surprisingly, this often leads to violent conflicts between 
the borrower, creditors and their groups of laborers. 
The supply of consumption goods to beginning village shopkeepers was, of 
course, a strategic manoevre for urban wholesalers with ambitions to set up a 
clove trade network reaching the village level. A rather segmented clove 
market structure emerged with a few wholesalers contiolling different — 
almost physically separated — market segments. Villages, such as Hila and 
Tulehu, at the northern coast of Ambon island, were excellent bases to 
contact or station an agent visiting different villages on the other side of the 
bay on Ceram island. 
However, as a result of the increase in transport and shopping facilities, 
not only on Ambon island but also on more peripheral sites like Ceram, 
Haruku and Saparua island, the role of village shopkeepers as clove traders 
became less prominent and clove trade networks became more diffuse. New 
harbors and ferry lines connecting the northern part of Ambon island and 
southern coast of Ceram implied more opportunities for farmers to sell their 
cloves and do their shopping elsewhere. In addition, the declining trend of 
clove prices in the 1980s made village shopkeepers wary of long-term 
contracts. 
The village of Tulehu is one of the places where the mterlinkage of 
shopkeeping and clove trade has been most deeply constrained due to the 
increase in monetization and transport facilities. In November 1989,1 counted 
118 shops in the village of Tulehu (see Chapter 3), which is much more than 
the number of shops in most of the other coastal villages of the Central 
Moluccas. About 40 percent of them were small shopkeepers of Ambonese 
origin, 21 percent small to medium-sized Butonese shopkeepers, 4 percent 
Javanese shopkeepers (in all categories), 25 percent Sumatran shopkeepers (in 
all categories), and 10 percent medium-sized to large Chinese shopkeepers. 6 
For Ambonese shopkeepers, their micro businesses constitute not so much a 
stepping stone towards large shops or clove trading but rather an additional 
way for making money to cover daily expenses, that is, a livelihood strategy. 
The Sumatrans prefer to invest in gold, land, and a second shop or to travel 
9. The following criteria were used for classifying shops according to daily turnover 
- small (pondok): less than Rp. 25,000; 
- medium (toko sedang): between Rp. 25,000 and Rp. 100,000; 
- large (toko besar): Rp. 100,000 or more. 
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to Sumatra. Butonese migrants of Tulehu are heavily involved in the clove 
trade. Shopkeeping is one of their methods of accumulating capital to buy 
cloves-in-the-trees or future harvests. The small size of their shops, their 
temporary outlook but strategic position in public places, suggest that 
Butonese do not aim to manage a large shop, as do the other migrant 
populations. The Javanese and Chinese, the big shopkeepers, hesitate to 
become deeply engaged in the clove trade (again), as the following case 
illustrates. 
Pak Alex is one of the two largest Chinese shopkeepers of Tulehu with 
daily turnovers varying between one and two million rupiah. He himself 
stresses again and again that he is too busy to get really involved in the 
clove trade and that he only plays a minor role in it. However, according 
to his assistant, Pak Alex buys cloves directly from farmers who come to 
his shop to sell cloves. Second, he financially helps farmers (tolong petani) — 
and Butonese in particular — in cases of emergencies, against the promise 
of future supply of cloves. Third, he sells consumption goods on credit 
against the promise of repayment in cloves. Pak Alex also supplies a 
number of small Butonese shopkeepers with consumption goods on credit. 
Every now and then a Butonese tenant-farmer stores his cloves in the shop 
of the Chinese. His assistant emphasizes that only well-known people are 
'eligible' for the latter two 'services'. 
One day in March, long after the clove harvest season, 15 bags of cloves 
were suddenly stored in the back of his shop. According to him, one third 
belonged to his younger brother who owns a shop, speedboats, mini-buses 
and trades in cloves. Another third belonged to Pak Alex himself, and the 
final part belonged to 'other people'. The wife of Pak Alex explained that 
those who store cloves in their shop can buy consumption goods on credit. 
Pak Alex says that he does not trust the villagers of Tulehu anymore. 
Indeed, there is a sign in his shop telling the customer that goods are not 
to be sold on credit. Also, Pak Alex has become very careful with the 
supply of loans in cash against the promise of future payment in cloves. I 
witnessed a man from Haruku island who visited Pak Alex to pay back his 
debts accumulated since 1981. The customer then kindly asked for a new 
loan of Rp. 2,700,000 to buy freshly picked cloves at Haruku but Pak Alex 
turned down the request with mild anger. 
Also, the village cooperative does not enjoy the trust of Pak Alex anymore. 
The chairman of the cooperative and the Chinese blame each other for 
owning lots of cloves in hidden places. Obviously, their strained relations 
tell us that they are currently not working together. Probably, negative 
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experiences with earlier transactions or forms of cooperation have resulted 
in a breakdown of working relations. 
The large Qunese shopkeepers do play a role in the buying or storing of 
cloves. However, this role has been marginalized due to changing conditions. 
It is easy nowadays for the villagers of Tulehu to go to Ambon City to do 
some shopping with one of the many mini-buses (see Chapter 3). Also, the 
number of shops in Tulehu has increased enormously from not more than a 
dozen in the early 1970s to nearly 120 in 1990 (see Chapter 3). It has become 
almost impossible for the Chinese shopkeepers of Tulehu to tie clients to 
them and to secure the supply of cloves through the provision of 
consumption goods on credit. 
In addition, the Chinese shopkeepers of Tulehu face increasing competition 
from professional agricultural traders who have started business in Tulehu in 
the last decade. In contrast to the shopkeepers, these Chinese entrepreneurs 
specialize in the buying of cloves. Because of daily contact with traders in 
Ambon City, they are much better informed about price developments than 
the shopkeepers. 
Middlemen 
The large Chinese shopkeepers of Ambon City do not only serve urban 
customers but also act as wholesalers providing consumption goods to 
village shopkeepers through middlemen. The main function of the 
middlemen is to transport consumption goods to distant places in the 
Moluccan archipelago and to collect cloves in return. One of the largest 
middlemen is Pak Su, who is one of the most entrepreneurial and richest 
persons of Tulehu. 
Pak Su is a Javanese trader in consumption goods, construction material 
and cash crops, that is, mainly cloves and coconuts. He is the owner of a 
bus company and a passenger boat. All his means of transport carry the 
name of Rasuna, an acronym built up from the first two letters of the 
names of his eldest daughter, himself and his wife, who happens to be a 
sister of a former village head. Pak Su began his career as a school teacher 
on Java but, after six years, moved to Ambon where he continued teaching 
for another two years. He then accepted the offer of a Javanese owner of a 
boat who traded between Tulehu and Ceram island, to work with him. Pak 
Su started as the cook on the ship, then became the cleaning person, later 
the steers man and finally, the mechanic. When his boss died, Pak Su had 
gained enough experience to start his own trading business between 
Tulehu and Ceram island. Furthermore, he had 'inherited' a lot of trade 
contacts and continued doing business with people from the sub-district of 
Tehoru of Ceram. 
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Table 8.5: Numbers of shopkeepers-aim-customers of Pak Su in 1989-1990 
according to ethnic background 





Ambonese (local) 7 
Maluku Tenggara 5 
Toraja (Sulawesi) 4 
Sumatran 4 





Source: Main assistant of Pak Su. 
In the months preceding the harvest period for cloves, Pak Su supplies 
consumption goods to village shopkeepers on credit. He qualifies this 
supply as drop barang (to drop off goods). Ehiring the harvest season these 
supplies are repaid in cloves. In 1989-90 Pak Su supplied goods to 74 
shopkeepers in 12 different coastal villages. Table 8.5 provides a 
breakdown of these shopkeepers according to ethnic background. 
Pak Su does not consider village cooperatives as competing agencies, 
although they officially have the monopsony in the trade of cloves. Instead, 
"I work together with them" says Pak Su. He explained that village 
cooperatives need two weeks each month to collect cloves for the auction 
at the PUSKUD, leaving them with another two weeks to collect cloves for 
sale to private traders like him. 
The main assistant to Pak Su counts the number of bags with cash crops 
that are transported from Tulehu to Ambon City. Table 8.6 provides an 
overview of the number of bags of cloves and coconut that were unloaded in 
the new harbor of Tulehu from the ship KM Rasuna in a period of more than 
three months, and thereafter to be transported in trucks to Ambon City. 
One bag of cloves weighs about 60 kilogrammes. The gross income of Pak 
Su from trading cloves was more than Rp. 70 million during a period of 
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three months at the end of 1989, if we assume an average selling price of Rp. 
6,000 per kilogramme (see Appendix 8.2). 
Until a few years ago, Pak Su was the only large itinerant trader who 
secured his supply of cloves through the provision of consumption goods 
and construction materials to village shopkeepers. The debt was calculated 
on the basis of low fictive prices. And the village shopkeepers supplied 
consumption goods to villagers against an even lower fictive price. Large 
profits were realized by Pak Su and his 'agents'. However, nowadays Pak Su 
faces competition from four other large boat owners — three Chinese and one 
Ambonese — who imitate his trading practices and work in the same clove 
production area and marketing line. As a result, the difference between 
buying and selling price has decreased in a few years from about Rp. 2,000 
to Rp. 250 per kilogramme. Hence the scope of price agreements enabling 
large traders to make huge profits has decreased enormously. The 
professional agricultural traders of Tulehu, who operate under quite 
competitive circumstances and transport cloves over much shorter distances, 
operate on a margin of Rp. 100 to 200 per kilogramme. Thus, we can 
conclude that Pak Su does not realize impressive monopoly profits anymore. 
Paassen (1986) observed a similar trend, concluding that, "Monopoly profits 
are not possible any longer" (p.76) in the clove trade in the Central Moluccas. 
Table 8.6: The number of bags of cloves and coconuts that have been bought 
by Pak Su in the period 9 September to 16 December 1989 
Date of arrival in port of 
Tulehu 
Cloves Copra 
09-09-89 41 116 
14-09-89 57 172 
24-09-89 89 159 
03-10-89 199 119 
12-10-89 218 188 
20-10-89 107 190 
07-11-89 329 215 
20-11-89 521 unk 
29-11-89 266 324 
06-12-89 64 300 
16-12-89 102 242 
Source: Main assistant of Pak Su. 
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The main suppliers of Pak Su are four large shopkeepers of Ambon City: 
Marga Bhakti, Mitra Usaha and Manusela provide rice and sugar on an 
interest-free credit basis, whereas Maluku Indah supplies construction 
materials. Pak Su only supplies cloves to Marga Bhakti and Mitra Usaha, 
although Manusela is also an active buyer of cloves. Both Marga Bhakti and 
Mitra Usaha are customers of the agent of the kretek cigarette company 
Gudang Garam. Still, Pak Su does not wish to describe these relations as tied 
ones (terikat): both shopkeepers buy cloves with loans from the Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (BRI) and prefer not to borrow from Gudang Garam for this 
purpose. 
Pak Su is also a client of the BRI. In 1977 he borrowed for the first time 
from the BRI to the tune of Rp. 3 million. Now he has a much larger debt at 
the bank since he borrowed Rp. 15 rnillion Kredit Investasi Kecil (credit for 
small investments) and Rp. 45 million Kredit Modal Kerja Permanen (credit for 
permanent working capital). He uses the KMKP for the clove trade. Pak Su 
estimates that he needs about Rp. 100 million to buy cloves in one season. 
He does not want to be tied to Gudang Garam or another agent of a kretek 
cigarette company. He wants to be able to choose the best price. 
The preference of Pak Su and his suppliers of consumption goods to not be 
tied to one of the cigarette companies, in fact, has been stimulated by these 
companies themselves. As a result of price developments in the 1970s and 
1980s, the buying agents of these companies were forced to review their 
strategy to secure the supply of cloves. From 1973 to 1980 the price of cloves 
rose from Rp. 1,500 to Rp. 15,000 per kilogramme. In these years the system 
of kontrak harga (the price contract) was commonly used by Gudang Garam, 
one of the largest buyers of cloves in Indonesia: the agent of the company, 
for instance, supplied Rp. 10 million to a shopkeeper who promised to pay 
back one kilogramme of cloves for every Rp. 5,000 of the loan, that is, two 
tons of cloves. In the beginning of the 1980s, however, such contracts proved 
to be very risky. Prices dwindled and the creditors experienced losses. Hence 
Gudang Garam decided to put more emphasis on the principle of ada barang, 
ada uang (those who avail of goods, are eligible for loans): for instance, if a 
shopkeeper possesses four tons of cloves and wants to buy more but has 
exhausted his financial means to do so, then Gudang Garam is prepared to 
supply a short-term loan equivalent to the value of four tons of cloves. In 
other words, Gudang Garam requires collateral. 
Another major but related change concerns the increased use of bank credit 
by urban shopkeepers. Again, the kretek cigarette companies have contributed 
to this development, wittingly or unwittingly because of changing market 
conditions. Gudang Garam has become much more careful in the provision 
of loans to secure the supply of cloves. Of course, this company has at its 
disposal billions of rupiahs but it cannot control fully the price developments 
and risks involved. To neutralize or pass on the risks related of the kontrak 
harga system, the cigarette companies, such as Gudang Garam, accept or even 
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stimulate banks to supply credit to their suppliers of cloves, that is, to urban 
shopkeepers. Gudang Garam now resorts to other services to tie down 
suppliers: if a shopkeeper promises to deliver cloves in about two days, 
Gudang Garam pays the best price of these two days. Another mechanism to 
attract shopkeepers is to offer short-term credit, defining their stock as 
collateral. 
Laborers and Lenders: The Changing Roles of Butonese Migrants 
A group of persons that has become very involved in the trade of cloves as 
a result of increased money circulation are Butonese migrants. These 
migrants come from Southeast Sulawesi and make up about one third of the 
rural population of the Central Moluccas. They do not enjoy traditional land 
use rights and are not allowed to plant perennial crops (such as clove and 
nutmeg trees) because, according to local custom, such an act implies 
claiming ownership. The Butonese became increasingly involved in the 
harvesting of clove trees when local kinship- and neighborhood-based 
organisation became less and less appreciated in the 1970s when clove prices 
increased enormously (cf. Faassen 1986: 78-79). Owners of clove trees were 
not only supposed to provide cooperating neighbors and kin with food and 
drinks during the harvest but also with buckets of the highly valued product. 
Hence Butonese became popular as migrant laborers to replace the 
demanding neighbors and kin. The rather unpredictable production of cloves, 
which varied from year to year and from garden to garden, reinforced this 
trend. Potentially lucrative bumper harvests take place once every three to 
four years. These production features therefore make it hard for Ambonese 
kin and neighbors to develop a system of reciprocal labor based upon an 
equitable distribution of labor investments and benefits. 
The rise of Butonese as primary buyers of cloves is no more than a logical 
consequence of their role as harvest laborers in a period of increasing money 
circulation and cash requirements among Ambonese. The 'clove boom' in the 
seventies implied an enormous increase in the circulation of money and led 
to a fundamental shift of consumption standards: concrete houses and rice 
consumption have replaced houses of sago palm trees and sago porridge. To 
meet these new standards, Ambonese need much more money on both a 
daily and longer term basis. Many of them cannot or do not want to await 
the next bumper harvest of cloves and decide to make a pre-harvest 
arrangement with Butonese. Because of their modest use of money for daily 
consumption (see Chapter 3), Butonese can save enough money to buy the 
right to harvest cloves trees, thus meeting the money needs of the Ambonese. 
The different ways in which the Butonese buy cloves or the right to 
harvest clove trees do not only reflect the money needs of Ambonese but 
also the wish of the Ambonese to avoid money claims from relatives and 
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neighbors. Four different ways can be distinguished: beli cupa, panjar uang, 
beli buah and sewa pohon (see also Chapter 2). Beli cupa is the only post-
harvest transaction and refers to the purchase of cloves using an old 
condensed milk tin as the standard unit. Relatively speaking, beli cupa 
involves only small amounts of cloves — typically occuring during slack 
seasons. Butonese women are the primary buyers of cloves by tin. Their huts 
are built close to the clove gardens and, consequently, they are in a good 
position to buy the cloves from the Ambonese farmers on their way from 
their gardens to their homes. More importantly, many Ambonese farmers 
consider the sale of the freshly picked cloves to the Butonese women as very 
attractive because money is easier to hide from greedy relatives than buckets 
of cloves. 
Panjar uang, beli buah and sewa pohon are pre-harvest arrangements. Panjar 
uang means to advance money. Usually a low fictive price of cloves per 
kilogram is used to calculate the amount of cloves that is needed to repay the 
advance. Those who supply the money emphasize that it is meant "to help 
people in need of money". In contrast to panjar uang, beli buah and sewa pohon 
transactions imply the transfer of rights for harvesting the cloves from the 
Ambonese owner to the Butonese migrant. The moment of the purchase of 
the right to harvest cloves marks the difference between beli buah and sewa 
pohon. Beli buah means to buy the fruit. The right to harvest a tree is bought 
when or after the first signs of the flowering of a clove tree are visible, that 
is, about seven to eigth months before the harvest. In the case of sewa pohon, 
the rights to harvest are bought earlier when signs of future production are 
not yet visible. 
Strangely enough, little has actually been documented about the role of the 
Butonese in the buying of cloves. In official statistics and schemes (see, for 
instance, Godoy and Bennett 1990) their relatively large share as primary 
buyers is not recognized. Consequently, the different relations and positions 
of Butonese in clove trade networks are not outlined. The following 
description of the different ways in which Butonese finance the purchase of 
cloves provides a picture of these relations and positions. 
How Butonese Finance Their Clove Business. There are many possibilities 
for Butonese migrants to finance their clove business: self-finance or 
mobilization of their own savings is the most popular one. Loans from 
professional clove traders, shopkeepers, pawnbrokers and other Butonese 
migrants are supplementary sources of finance. 
The primary source for finance of Butonese migrants for the buying of the 
right to harvest clove trees are savings in cloves or nutmeg. Most of the 
Butonese traders simply store these crops in one or more sacks in the 
backroom of their simple houses. However, large traders prefer to deposit 
large amounts of cloves with Chinese shopkeepers in Ambon City. Of course, 
they realize that the enormous numbers of cloves that are stored in their own 
houses are an easy target for thieves. However, the main purpose of keeping 
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doves with Chinese shopkeepers is to gain crechtworthiness in the eyes of 
these shopkeepers. The case of La Macid not only illustrates the savings 
capadties of Butonese but also their strategies to cope with risk in the fields 
of income generation and finance. 
La Madd is locally known as the largest tenant of clove trees. According to 
other Butonese, he was one of the first Butonese to become active in 
Tulehu in the clove trade. At the end of the sixties, La Macid and his wife 
started to make money through the sale of casbee. One bread (gepe) cost 
Rp. 25. In 1973 he bought the right to harvest six durum trees. Soon after he 
started to buy the rights to harvest coconut and clove trees. During the 
period 1983-1990, he concluded 27 contracts (sewa-menyewa cengkeh) for a 
total price of Rp. 31,700,000. These contracts concern the transfer of harvest 
rights of nearly 2,000 dove trees spread all over Ambon, Haruku and 
Saparua island. La Madd is very proud to have been able to provide 
financial support for three persons to go to Mecca (kasih naik haji) in 
exchange for the right to harvest their clove trees. La Madd does not only 
buy harvest rights for dove trees but also for nutmeg, durum and coconut 
trees. He also owns two mini-buses for public transport and equipment for 
hire to listen and dance to music at parties. He bought this equipment with 
a loan from a Chinese shopkeeper who regularly buys his doves. 
La Madd enjoys working relations with five Chinese shopkeepers in 
Ambon City. He stores his doves at one of their shops and only cashes 
them in when he needs working capital for new buying transactions. There 
are two reasons why he has contacts with these five shopkeepers: first, if 
one particular shopkeeper cannot provide money, there surely will be 
another who can. Second, he can pay off a debt at one shop with a loan 
from another. In 1983 La Madd was given Rp. 15 million by one Chinese 
shopkeeper to buy doves. He did not have to pay an interest but was 
expeded to supply the doves to his creditor. According to La Madd, these 
are still the common rules of the game. 
The many, smaller Butonese traders of Tulehu make similar agreements 
with the Chinese professional agricultural traders who are active in Tulehu 
as the agents or partners of large shopkeepers in Ambon City. The Butonese 
store their doves with one of these professional traders and are eligible for 
interest-free loans against the promise of a future supply of cloves. Butonese, 
however, prefer not to be tied (terikat) to Chinese and do not automatically 
accept the rather aggressive loan offers of these Chinese, who sometimes 
even visit the houses of the Butonese. 
Another popular form of savings that also acts as an important tool to 
establish working relations with Chinese traders is gold. Many Butonese 
invest a part of the profit from the trade of doves in gold. A Butonese trader 
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once told me that she buys gold worth half a million rupiah when she has 
saved cloves worth two million rupiah. Only on special occasions, such as 
marriages, do Butonese women wear expensive gold ornaments in public. In 
daily life Butonese women restrict themselves to cheaper ornaments, such as 
a necklace with a ten dollar gold coin. Butonese emphasize that it is wiser to 
save in gold instead of cash because cash savings are too easily spent. 
Besides this illiquidity preference, Butonese mention two other reasons for 
saving in gold: first, savings in gold are a security device. In contrast to 
Ambonese, Butonese have no traditional ownership rights in land. Therefore, 
they cannot sell land in case of unexpected expenditures due to illness and 
death. Therefore, gold ornaments or coins are sold if faced by an emergency. 
A Butonese villager of Tulehu made this point concisely: Orang Tulehu sakit, 
jual tanah. Orang Buton sakit, jual mas (When Ambonese villagers of Tulehu 
are sick, they sell their land. When Butonese are sick, they sell their gold). 
Second, gold plays an important role as collateral for loans from Chinese 
shopkeepers and professional agricultural traders. According to Butonese, the 
depositing of gold at their shops or working places is an important way of 
gaining their trust. A Butonese woman explained that the depositing of gold 
with Chinese is only meant to get to know each other (can kenal dengan mas). 
If the trust of the Chinese is not put to shame, the gold is no longer 
necessary as collateral. 
Although it is also possible for Butonese to pawn their gold at the official 
pawnshop in Ambon City against lower rates of interest, many Butonese 
prefer Chinese traders as pawnbrokers. The constant number of loan 
applications at the official pawnshop also suggests that this pawnshop does 
not play an important role as supplier of working capital to Butonese during 
the pre-harvest period when Butonese need extra amounts of cash. Butonese 
explain that the Chinese traders offer larger loans for the same piece of gold 
and will not sell the gold so long as the borrower keeps paying monthly 
interest. The official pawnshop, however, only provides loans up to 60 
percent of the value of the gold and regularly organizes auctions selling gold 
when loans are overdue. A minor advantage of official pawnshops is that the 
borrower can claim the yield of the auction for late payment of the loan. 
Butonese women play a central role in the pawning of gold with Chinese 
shopkeepers and in the trade of cloves in general. When they need money to 
buy food or clothes, they bring a bag of cloves or nutmegs to a professional 
trader or shopkeeper. Through these more or less regular visits, they become 
familiar with these traders and might then decide either to deposit cloves 
with them or to deposit gold 'to strengthen their relations' and borrow 
working capital. In addition, the women help processing the cloves at home 
and keep an eye on the clove stock when their husbands are working in the 
gardens. Not surprisingly, they are very much aware of the locations of these 
gardens and what arrangements have been agreed upon concerning the 
harvesting of the trees. 
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Large Butonese traders are also a source of finance for the many other but 
smaller Butonese traders. Their evolving role as suppliers of loans to other 
Butonese people is one of the expressions of an increasing socio-economic 
differentiation among the Butonese population (see also Chapter 2). At least 
three different types of loan arrangements occur: first, loans are provided in 
cash against repayment in cloves with a Active low price standard for one 
kilogram of cloves. A second type concerns loans in cloves (for instance 100 
kilogram) to be repaid with (110 kilogrammes of) cloves. A third type of loan 
arrangement is called tanggung pokok or tanggung modal which refers to the 
provision of working capital against the promise of repayment and the 
sharing of profit or loss — possibly inspired by Islamic regulations regarding 
provision of capital. Paassen (1986) also noted such joint ventures of 
Butonese in Tulehu: "A number of persons contribute to a common fund and 
agree to jointly harvest clove trees" (p.80, my translation). The fund is used 
to buy the right to harvest clove trees in the near future (beli budh). The 
lender inspects the clove trees and estimates their future yield to rninimize 
risks. 
Probably due to the strong demand for working capital among Butonese, it 
is not surprising that these intra-ethnic loan arrangements take business-like 
features. Moreover, most of the Butonese have no close kinship ties with 
other Butonese living in the same neighborhoud. However, such ties do 
make a difference: the large trader La Macid, for instance, not only provides 
loans under conditions that reflect high opportunity costs. He also supports 
relatives, such as a younger sister who was given capital (kasih modal) on 
very favorable terms to start a small shop. 
Hard collateral conditions and cases of fraud have freightened Butonese 
from developing credit relations with banks. Wa Sira, the wife of La Macid, 
explained that they considered the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) "already 
sick" (sudah sakit) in 1979 when a bank employee visited their home to collect 
installments but did not record these repayments. Also, they both 
complained about the large number of documents (such as ownership titles) 
that are needed to apply for such a loan. Finally, they found it hard to 
understand why a borrower could only take home 9 million rupiah out of a 
loan of 10 million. However, the introduction of a BRI unit in Tulehu in 1987 
and the promotion of its savings program with easy deposit and withdrawal 
facilities (SIMPEDES) in particular, has changed Butonese views and their 
use of banking services. A number of Butonese traders now see the BRI 
village units as an opportunity and a nearby place for keeping money. It is 
very telling in this respect that the BRI village unit of Tulehu is simply called 
'SIMPEDES' by La Macid. 
Options and decisions of Butonese with regard to the selection of clove 
buyers mirror their financial options and decisions. Those Butonese who 
operate with advance payments or loans are supposed to supply their cloves 
to the lender(s) involved. Professional agricultural traders and large Butonese 
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traders are the most important suppliers of credit for small and medium-
sized Butonese traders. Only the largest Butonese traders, like La Macid, are 
eligible for loans from Chinese shopkeepers in Ambon City. 
The dramatic changes in the roles and relations of Butonese of Tulehu in 
the clove trade are not representative for the other villages of the Central 
Moluccas. A similar argument applies to professional agricultural traders. It 
is the waves of monetization and commoditisation that have been much 
more intense in a regional centres, such as Tulehu, than in most other coastal 
villages — offering Butonese a perfect place to evolve from laborer to trader-
cum-moneylender vis-a-vis the Ambonese, and professional agricultural 
traders room to operate in Tulehu. 
Professional Agricultural Traders 
In the old harbor of Tulehu 10 pembeli hasil bumi are active. Pembeli hasil 
bumi literally means buyers of produce from the earth. The working places 
where pembeli hasil bumi weigh and buy cloves can be easily overlooked. 
Their simple rooms are located in the narrow but lively alleys close to the 
landing-stage of the old harbor. Their competitive strengths are their market 
intelligence, mobility and specialisation: because of their daily contact with 
large shopkeepers of Ambon City, they are well aware of actual and 
expected price changes. The sale of consumption goods is not a major 
activity but plays a role in the buying of cloves. 
The pembeli hasil bumi of Tulehu buy the following cash crops: cloves, 
nutmeg, mace and dried coconut. Every now and then hasil laut (literally: 
produce from the sea) is bought, that is, very special shells - not fish. They 
enjoy a regional clientele: their suppliers come from Tulehu and neighboring 
villages but also from the islands of Saparua, Haruku, Nusa Laut and, to a 
lesser extent, Ceram. The cloves are transported by speed boats and other 
small motorized vessels to the old harbor of Tulehu. Agricultural produce 
from Ceram is largely transported to the new harbor of Tulehu located a 
mile distance from the old harbor. Large passenger boats (like those of Pak 
Su) moor at the new harbor which is the port of disembarkation for many 
people coming from different and distant places of the Central Moluccas who 
bring cash crops with them. 
Seven of the 10 pembeli hasil bumi are Chinese, two are Javanese and one is 
an Ambonese born on Haruku island. Nearly all of them live in Ambon City 
and come every day, except on Sunday, to Tulehu with a small van. Two of 
the Chinese traders are married to Ambonese from Tulehu and live in that 
village. Seven of the 10 traders say that they have worked for more than 10 
years in Tulehu whereas the other three started only a few years ago. 
Although the clove harvest season is from August till November, most of 
the traders are also active outside this season: they b-
producers who have stored part of the harvest at horn 
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nutmeg and dried coconut. The most important cash crop, however, remains 
cloves. During the harvest season for cloves the price of nutmeg sharply 
decreases. The professional agricultural traders want to use their capital to 
buy cloves and disencourage the sale of nutmeg by offering low prices. As a 
result, the Butonese sell only very small amounts of nutmeg to them. 
In November 1989 pembeli hasil bund usually bought about 100 to 300 
kilogrammes of cloves per day. Only in a few cases was about one ton 
bought by a trader in a day. The professional agricultural traders, but also 
the owners and tenants of clove trees, characterized this season as a meagre 
one. During a bumper harvest about two tons are bought per day per 
agricultural trader. 
Several government bodies and villagers regulate and profit from this 
lucrative agricultural trade: the permit to trade in cloves has to be paid at the 
Office of the Sub-district and every year a trade tax is collected by a visiting 
inspector from Ambon City. A third type of outlay for a trader is the rent of 
the place. For some villagers the rental of rooms in the economically strategic 
old harbor of Tulehu is a considerable source of income: rents vary from Rp. 
400,000 to Rp. 1,000,000 per year. Still, the pembeli hasil bumi are not 
concerned by these costs. Their daily concern and strategies are directed at 
securing a supply of cloves from producers, and the minimalization of 
financial dependency and optimalisation of their selling options. 
How Professional Agricultural Traders Finance Their Business. To 
supplement their own financial means, the traders use a combination of the 
following sources of credit or quasi-credit to buy cloves: working capital 
from shopkeepers, bank loans and advances from agents of kretek cigarette 
companies. 
Self- and jointly-owned shops or the shops of relatives are used as sources 
or mechanisms for mobilizing funds for the trade in cloves. First, they put 
aside income from the shop for the trade in cloves. The professional 
agricultural traders speak of modal sendiri (own capital), considering the clove 
trade as part of their Chinese family enterprise. Second, the shopkeepers 
apply for bank loans to be used for clove tiading. 
Five pembeli hasil bumi have brothers who run a shop in Ambon City. These 
shopkeepers supply their brothers with working capital to buy cloves in 
Tulehu. Sometimes the shopkeeper replaces his brother at his place in 
Tulehu. Another professional trader has been an Ambonese assistant of a 
Chinese shopkeeper of Ambon City for many years and has been entrusted 
with family-capital to buy cloves in Tulehu. Again two other professional 
agricultural traders also keep a shop in Tulehu: in one case the shop is not 
located at the same place as the buying room for cloves. But the income from 
the shop (and a transport company) has been used to start clove trading 
activities elsewhere. In the other case the buying and selling of consumption 
goods and cloves takes place in one and the same place, attracting potential 
buyers: a civil servant from Haruku island - on his way to Ambon island to 
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arrange his affairs - stored 32 kilogrammes of cloves at the shop of a 
professional agricultural trader of Tulehu. On his way back home, the civil 
servant sold the cloves and bought consumption goods from this trader-cum-
shopkeeper. Only two professional agricultural traders run no shop nor have 
close relations with a shopkeeper. 
Banks are the second important source of finance. Loans from banks have a 
special dimension. This does not concern the size of the loan but rather the 
lack of pre-conditions: the loans stipulate no obligations to supply cloves to a 
particular shopkeeper or kretek cigarette company agent. Of course, the debt 
implies repayment of the loan but the trader is more or less free to select to 
whom he will sell the cloves. Credit or advances from shopkeepers, traders 
or the agents of cigarette companies are usually interest-free but not without 
obligations regarding the supply of cloves. The use of such credit implies 
being tied (terikat), which many agricultural traders prefer to avoid. 
Seven professional agricultural traders indicated that they worked with a 
combination of their own capital and bank loans. Five of them mentioned 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia as their lending agency. Loans from Bank Exim and 
Bank Arta Pusara were used by the other two. The share of bank loans in 
working capital is difficult to estimate. Traders speak of percentages varying 
from 50 to nearly 100 percent. Two other traders operate with their own 
capital and credit from the agent of Djarum, one of the leading kretek 
cigarette companies located in Ambon City. Another describes himself as an 
assistant (anak buah) of the Djarum agent. This sub-agent works exclusively 
with capital from the company. 
This sub-agent not only buys cloves from producers but also from other 
pembeli hasil bumi of Tulehu. On one day in November 1989 he bought more 
than 500 kilogrammes of cloves from Pak Gino, another trader, who had 
recently bought the cloves at prices varying from Rp. 5,700 (for small 
amounts) to Rp. 5,800 (for large amounts) per kilogramme. However, Pak 
Gino received only two rnillion rupiah from the sub-agent. Obviously, he had 
bought cloves with capital from the sub-agent and the credit was deducted 
from the payment. 
The use of a sub-agent at village level has been quite successful: five 
agricultural traders said they were clients of Djarum. However, only two of 
them operate with capital from that source. The five Djarum suppliers sell 
their cloves either directly to the sub-agent or indirectly to the main office in 
Ambon City. In the latter case cloves are first stored at the family-owned 
shop in Ambon City. Two other agricultural traders supply cloves via their 
shop in Ambon City to another leading kretek cigarette company, Gudang 
Garam. Again two other traders sell their cloves to large urban shopkeepers 
who are not closely related with their suppliers. 
Clove trade contacts and credit relations are certainly not fixed but are the 
outcome of the strategies and responses of the different actors involved. 
According to one agricultural trader, his boss, who owns a shop in Ambon 
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City, used to be an 'independent' borrower from the bank. Now that his 
bank loan has been repaid he is a supplier to Djarum who quickly provided 
him with capital and filled the void. In another season, however, with other 
yields, prices and financial positions of small and large buyers, the supply of 
cloves and credit might follow a totally different route. The agricultural 
traders of Tulehu certainly know that credit implies debt and obligations. 
They prefer not to be tied to the agent of a kretek cigarette company because 
this implies they cannot choose the highest price. This explains why some of 
them prefer to operate with their own capital supplemented by bank loans. 
Pak Amacina regularly supplies cloves to toko Rimba Raya and the Banyu 
Mas trading company. However, he emphasizes that he is not tied to them. If 
another buyer offers a higher price, he requests his regular buyers to pay 
him the difference. He does not buy cloves with advances from urban 
shopkeepers or agents of kretek cigarette companies. He has once borrowed 
from banks but describes the volume of their loans as insufficient. He has 
bought the ownership titles of six pieces of land against which to borrow 
considerable sums from banks. 
Only two traders supplement their own capital with a loan from the agent 
of a kretek cigarette company. It is much more common for traders to help 
each other. When the supply of cloves from producers to a trader exceeds his 
buying capacity on a particular day, he is financially supported by one of his 
colleagues. Pak Cale, for instance, can borrow money on an interest-free basis 
from four different colleagues. The loan has to be repaid the following day. 
He also borrows every now and then from one of his suppliers, a shopkeeper 
on Haruku island. Pak Cale is an Ambonese who was born on Haruku 
island, and he acts as an intermediary in case of conflicts between traders 
and their clients. 
The two agricultural traders who also run a shop in Tulehu, supply cloves 
to large shopkeepers of Ambon City. However, they do not use cloves as a 
means of payment for consumer goods from urban wholesalers. Trade in 
consumption goods and cloves are not two sides of the same coin or 
contract. The professional traders want a good price for their cloves and, if 
necessary, inform their buyers about better prices elsewhere, forcing them to 
adjust their price. One of these two professional traders-cum-shopkeepers 
supplies cloves to two large shopkeepers. The other one supplies cloves to a 
large shopkeeper and the agent of Gudang Gar am. Small amounts are sold to 
the first-mentioned and large amounts to the latter. 
Pak Coco who does not run a shop, supplies cloves to a large shopkeeper 
and the agent of Gudang Gar am in Ambon City. He has submitted a loan 
request to a bank because he does not want to be tied to the shopkeeper or 
agent. Pak Coco in his turn tries to tie down 20 to 30 clients by supplying 
them with capital to buy cloves. According to him, it remains a risky affair 
as you can never be sure the borrower will actually supply the cloves to the 
creditor. He feels the use of kinship relations to secure the supply of cloves is 
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a much better strategy. Coco has a Chinese father and a Butonese mother. 
Half of his clientele lives in a village on Haruku island, including many 
relatives. 
The Use of Credit as an Output-Securing Device. Agricultural traders 
supply credit for two kinds of money needs: consumption needs (to buy rice 
or to pay school fees) and to buy fresh cloves. In both cases they speak of 
panjar uang (literally: to advance money) and in both cases the client is 
obliged to supply cloves to the trader in the near future. The advances are 
only given to well-known people who have earlier supplied cloves to the 
trader. These advances are thus not so much an instrument to start a trade 
relation but to strengthen an existing relation. The traders assured me that in 
the period 1989-90 no interest was charged nor pre-fixed prices set. During a 
meagre harvest season not more than 10 people are given about Rp. 100,000 
each. During a bumper harvest the traders 'contract' about 30 people with 
loans of Rp. 300,000 each. The traders emphasize that the number of clients 
who can borrow money for consumption purposes is much more limited. 
The traders not only provide loans in cash but also in kind as the list of 
debtors of Pak Asis illustrates (see Appendix 8.3). His loans in kind only 
concern rice and cigarettes. These basic goods are supplied by urban 
wholesalers to the trader with a view to tie down the trader and his cloves. 
Appendix 8.3 also underlines the popularity of Butonese clients (whose 
names start with La or Wa) as important or potential suppliers of cloves to 
these traders. 
KUD Lawa Mena 
The KUD of Tulehu is one of the oldest members of the PUSKUD of 
Ambon City. It was registered at the Department of Cooperatives in 
December 1980 with the name Lawa Mena, which means: Go Ahead. The 
KUD of Tulehu is, in a sense, representative for the KUDs of the Central 
Moluccas as its history contains all the elements of cooperative drama. When 
this KUD is called a forerunner, then this might be referring to its early 
failure and imitation of the practices of private traders. 
In 1983 KUD Lawa Mena ran into heavy debts because the chairman 
embezzled large amounts of Kredit TNC. As a result, the office of the 
cooperative was closed from 1983 till 1987. In September 1987 Pak Ohorella, 
a younger brother of a former village head, gave up his position as secretary 
of the village council and became the new chairman of the KUD. He was left 
with a debt of 56 million rupiah at the BRI which was not willing to supply 
his cooperative with new loans. 
The chairman developed two alternative strategies to finance the purchase 
of cloves: first, he took cloves on credit from an urban wholesaler to be sold 
on the auction floor. Second, he started a savings program in 1988 for 
children and their parents who wanted to save money for school expenses 
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(see also Chapter 4). He used a large part of these savings, amounting to five 
rrtillion rupiah in 1989, to finance the purchase of cloves. A nephew of the 
chairman is the buying agent of the KUD. He worked five years for Pak Su 
in the trade of cloves and is farniliar with a lot of village shopkeepers on 
Ceram island. The nephew buys cloves from about 20 of these shopkeepers, 
travelling as a passenger on the ferry of Pak Su. 
Through the collection of cloves from village shopkeepers and urban 
wholesalers, KUD Lawa Mena was able to sell cloves at the auction of the 
PUSKUD. In the last quarter of 1987 the cooperative participated three times 
in the auction and in 1988 six times. At the annual meeting held in March 
1989 the chairman proudly declared that the deficit of the KUD had been 
reduced 15 rnillion rupiah in 1988. With creative bookkeeping the chairman 
was able to conceal in the annual report that the cloves had not been bought 
by the official minimum buying price (Hospes 1990). Unfortunately, the 
promising revival of KUD Lawa Mena slowed down in 1989. The cooperative 
participated only two times in the auctions of that year because of two 
developments: first, for some reasons many savers withdrew all their savings 
in the course of 1989, reducing the capital base for trade in cloves, and 
second, urban wholesalers reduced their supply of cloves to the auction floor 
in November when market prices increased to the level of the official floor 
price. 
Changing Credit Relations and Clove Trade Networks 
In this final section I summarize some findings concerning the strategies of 
traders to secure the supply of cloves, and examine the changes that have 
taken place as a result of the enormous increase of money circulation and 
transport facilities in the Central Moluccas during the last 25 years. 
Where Money Was Still a Scarce Thing 
In those areas of the Central Moluccas where money was still a scarce 
thing and links with other villages and urban centres were rather poor, the 
supply of credit in the form of consumption goods was the best way to 
secure the output of cloves. The first group of traders in those areas were 
cloth pedlars and village shopkeepers. Non-monetized, barter-like credit and 
buying transactions characterized the collection of cloves from producers. 
The most effective way to collect cloves from village shopkeepers was to 
supply them with consumption goods in return for cloves. Clove trade 
networks evolved as collecting systems, with one or two shopkeepers per 
village, and one collecting agent serving a large number of village 
shopkeepers. The entrepreneurial people who decided to start shopkeeping 
activities in one of the many isolated villages and were prepared to take 
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enormous risks as well as time to gradually build social relations with 
villagers, were nearly all migrants of Butonese, Chinese or Javanese origin. 
Not surprisingly, village shopkeepers and their suppliers exploited their 
early monopolistic positions, explaining their high (gross) profit margins. 
As a result of improved infrastructure and increasing money circulation, 
however, the supply of credit in the form of consumption goods as the tying 
mechanism of clove trade networks lost its effectiveness. Better transport 
facilities enabled villagers to go to market places and urban centres 
themselves to buy cloth and dally consumption goods. Cloth pedlars and 
village shopkeepers lost clientele and had to adjust credit arrangements in 
favor of their customers: the common practice of a low and fictive price 
standard to calculate the amount of cloves needed to repay the loan was 
brought under pressure. Profit margins in clove trade also dwindled because 
of the increase in the number of middlemen. Their boats became larger and 
larger, leading to an increase of transport in passengers as well. This inter-
island public transport again put pressure on clove trade networks as pure 
collecting systems. 
The practical content of arrangements called panjar uang, tolong petani and 
cengkeh kilo changed or to be more precise, diversified, as a result of the 
increase in transport facilities and money circulation. The 'sharp edges' of 
these arrangements disappeared in those areas where possibilities to sell 
cloves steeply increased. The clear-cut cengkeh kilo arrangement and the 
euphemistic tolong petani (to help the farmer) providing credit in 
consumption goods or cash to farmers, using a low and fictive price standard 
to calculate repayment in cloves, became too risky for shopkeepers. Signs in 
shops say that goods cannot be provided on credit. The declining trend of 
clove prices in the 1980s fueled these changes. This is not to say that credit is 
no longer provided by shopkeepers and professional agricultural traders to 
secure the supply of cloves. Its significance has changed due to changing 
circumstances and markets, with customers and clove producers in a much 
better position compared to earlier times. Credit is not so much the 
instrument to control relations and realize monopoly profits but rather the 
gift to sustain working relations with a selected number of people, trusted 
persons — preferably Butonese traders. 
Staged by Urban Shopkeepers 
Clove trade networks gradually changed from an almost fully collecting 
system with one collecting agent to serve many village shopkeepers, to a 
mixture of collecting and distributing systems, with more collecting agents, 
more shopkeepers and more accessible marketing spots to sell cloves. In this 
new mix, the buying of consumption goods and the sale of cloves are not 
necessarily tied to each other as part of one transaction or arrangement. 
Because the provision of loans in the form of consumption goods lost its 
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effectiveness for buying or securing cloves, and chains of transactions 
shortened because of increased access to market centres, some urban 
shopkeepers decided to come 'closer' themselves to the large production 
areas. They started units specialized in buying agricultural produce in 
Tulehu, a regional transport centre, connecting Ambon City and the islands 
of Ceram and Haruku. Exploiting market intelligence rather than a monopoly 
situation became the challenge of the urban shopkeepers and their agents. 
For similar reasons Butonese migrants became very attractive partners for 
urban shopkeepers and their agents: many of these migrants are able to 
predict and locate good harvests throughout the region and make short-term 
pre-harvest arrangements with farmers. Their market intelligence and short-
term contracts are worth gold in times when profit margins dwindle, prices 
decline, competition increases and clove production is erratic, as is common. 
Not surprisingly, professional agricultural traders are willing to store cloves, 
gold adornments or coins from Butonese traders who try to win the 
confidence of the professional trader and to get a loan at a future date. 
Clove trade networks have been very much the product of urban 
shopkeepers who developed different 'agent-systems' for collecting cloves 
varying from systems with middlemen, village shopkeepers and itinerant 
cloth traders, to systems including professional agricultural and Butonese 
traders. The responses of urban shopkeepers to increasing monetization, 
transport facilities and price developments have strongly affected clove trade 
networks and the contents of credit relations. 
Nobody Wants to Be Too Tied Down 
The owners of the urban-based shops and their collecting agents in Tulehu 
prefer not to borrow money from the agents of the cigarette companies but 
from banks — if necessary at all. The professional traders of Tulehu do not 
want to be tied (terikat) to the cigarette companies through their provision of 
credit in return for the supply of cloves. Still, these professional traders 
themselves supply credit to 10 to 30 well-known villagers for the same 
purpose. Butonese migrants who run village shops elsewhere and/or trade in 
cloves, are favorite customers as potential suppliers of cloves. The 
professional traders not only provide credit in cash but in rice and cigarettes 
as well. These village-based traders emphasize that they do not make use of 
fictive and low price standards of cloves to calculate how many kilogrammes 
of cloves need to be supplied as repayment of the loan. It is not the 
equivalent of rice in cloves that counts but the money equivalent of rice. 
The lack of a fictive price or money standard also now characterizes the 
marketing and financial strategies of the urban-based agents of the cigarette 
companies who buy cloves from large urban shopkeepers. The use of clove 
price standards was very common in the 1970s when prices were very high 
and collecting agents enjoyed near-monopsonistic positions. However, the 
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increase of accessible places to sell cloves combined with the sharp decline of 
clove prices in the second half of the eighties, put the system of contract 
prices (kontrak harga) under strong pressure. The agents of cigarette 
companies had to develop other strategies to secure their supply of cloves 
and to rnimimize price risks. They put more emphasis on quick but 
collateral-based supply of short-term credit. The new guideline became "no 
goods, no credit": the amount of a loan was based on the current stock of 
cloves of the shopkeeper — possibly and partly kept in one of the huge stores 
of the agent. The agents also exploited their role as guarantors of bank loans 
through the provision of letters of recommendation to banks promising that 
the shopkeeper would use the loan to buy cloves to be sold to the agent. 
Fighting Practices of the Past 
The impressive growth in the 1980s of the number of village cooperatives 
(KUDs) in the Central Moluccas that were given official monopsony rights to 
buy cloves from producers, coincided with dramatic changes in credit 
relations and marketing strategies of private clove traders. The use of low 
and Active price standards to calculate the amount of cloves as repayment of 
loans in consumption goods became eroded. The profit margins of 
monopolistic collectors of cloves who advanced consumption goods to village 
shops against the promise of repayment in cloves in the harvest period 
dwindled. Possibilities for the farming population to go to competitive 
market places and sell cloves increased. However, it would be wrong to 
conclude that the official village cooperatives, that were meant to free clove 
farmers from the clutches of private traders, were the agents of change in 
this connection. The changes of credit relations and marketing strategies of 
private traders were instead expressions of wider processes of increasing 
transport facilities and money circulation. These changes put the planned 
intervention of the KUDs in a rather odd time-perspective: they were 
mandated to free clove farmers from private traders in a period when pre-
conditions for private traders and shopkeepers to tie down clove farmers and 
their output gradually weakened. One might say that the village cooperatives 
were ordered to fight practices of the past. 
The KUDs seemed well-equipped to in gaining full control of the 
marketing of cloves. Their means to compete with private traders included 
special bank credit facilities and privileged access to the official auction at 
the PUSKUD that offered reasonable floor prices. However, the KUDs did 
not succeed to gain a large market share. They did not even pay the officially 
prescribed minimum price to clove farmers, but followed market price 
developments. One cannot but conclude that the privileges of KUDs have not 
been used to increase the well-being of the clove farmers. The supply of bank 
credit in the first half of the eighties was too excessive and indebted a large 
number of KUDs, excluding them from future bank credit. At best, one 
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might say that these large amounts of credit enriched those clove farmers 
who decided to become chairman of a KUD and use (part of) the credit for 
their own purposes. An unintended consequence of the excessive supply of 
bank credit to village cooperatives was that many of these cooperatives that 
were officially meant to free farmers from the clutches of private traders, 
ended up themselves in a dependency relation with one of these traders: 
heavily indebted cooperatives that were unable to buy cloves themselves 
requested urban-based traders and shopkeepers to sell their cloves on the 
auction floor in the name of the KUD. Unfortunately, many other KUDs had 
to adopt this strategy as well because they were dependent on the supply of 
cloves from too limited a number of local and loyal member-producers and 
had not developed working relations with farmers or shopkeepers living 
elsewhere. The introduction of a government-regulated marketing spot, that 
is, the auction at the PUSKUD as the umbrella organisation of KUDs, 
stimulated the development of new private-public forms of cooperation 
among civil servants, large private traders and chairmen of village 
cooperatives who wished to exploit and share the margin between low off-
farm prices and high official rninimum buying prices at the auction floor. 
The means of the KUDs to secure the output of cloves neither resulted in a 
monopoly situation of the KUDs to fully control the clove marketing and 
offer reasonable prices to farmers, nor to stimulate a competitive struggle for 
cloves to the benefit of farmers. KUDs did not so much struggle to secure the 
output of cloves from farmers but to secure working relations with traders 
and bureaucrats. 
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Appendix 8.1: Market prices of cloves (in Rp/kg) in 1980-1989 at Ambon City 
level 
Year Miminum price Maximum price 
1980 6.550 8.475 
1981 6.900 7.950 
1982 6.050 7.475 
1983 4.500 8.200 
1984 4.750 8.000 
1985 6.000 11.000 
1986 4.500 6.300 
1987 4.000 6.000 
1988 2.200 4.950 
19891 3.000 5.500 
1 Till July. 
Source: Department of Trade, Province of Maluku. 
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Appendix 8.2: Market prices of cloves in Tulehu (in Rp/kg) in 1985-1990 
Month 1 Minimum price Maximum price Data available of: 
November 1985 5,700 6,000 28 days 
December 1985 6,000 6,200 30 days 
November-
December 1987 4,600 4,750 5 days 
March 1988 4^00 4,600 13 days 
April 1988 4500 4,200 25 days 
May 1988 3,300 4,200 29 days 
June 1988 2500 3,400 28 days 
July 1988 2500 3,000 27 days 
August 1988 2,000 2500 27 days 
September 1988 1,600 2,200 28 days 
October 1988 1,800 1300 1 day 
February 1988 3500 3300 1 day 
March 1988 3,000 3,100 9 days 
April 1988 3,000 3,100 9 days 
Oktober 1989 5,400 5,400 1 day 
November 1989 5500 6300 9 days 
December 1989 6,000 6,700 26 days 
January 1990 6,300 7,000 28 days 
February 1990 6,600 7300 27 days 
March 1990 6,400 6,400 1 day 
1 The available data have been classified per clove harvest season. 
Source: Notebooks of two professional agricultural traders of Tulehu. 
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Appendix 8.3: An outline of debtors of and their debts (in Rupiah) to a 
professional agricultural trader during one month of the clove harvest season 
in 1987 
Debtor 1 Debt Date of loan 
provision 
Wa Anuria di Air Panas money debt 10,000 23-10-87 
Muradin Kulur debt money 150,000 19-10-87 
La Rine debt money 15,000 undated 
Uceng Ombi debt money 20,000 24-10-87 
Idiris debt money 50,000 undated 
La Minggu got 2 bags of rice (50 kg) 24,000 undated 
La Minggu got 2 bags of rice (50 kg) 25,000 undated 
Han' Apu debt kulur 5,000 07-11-87 
Nus Ririhena Wasu debt money 2500 11-11-87 
Hamin got money 35,000 undated 
Abdul Salam kulur got 8 packs of 30,000 12-11-87 
cigarettes Surya 
undated Abas got money 1,000,000 
Daramuda got money 10,000 undated 
Yopi Wasu debt money 6,000 undated 
Ama Oma debt money 20,000 6-11-87 
Gani got 20 bags of rice 235,000 undated 
Din tutu Poho debt money 250,000 undated 
La Baali got 50 kg of rice 24,000 undated 
La Baali got 25 kg of rice 14,000 17-11-87 
La Badu got 50 kg of rice 24,000 undated 
La Badu got 50 kg of rice 28,000 16-11-87 
La Badu got 50 kg of rice 28,000 14-12-87 
La Badu got money 3,000 19-12-87 
Mama Ima kacamata got 2 bags of rice 24,800 undated 
Marinyo 1 carton of Surya cigarettes 75,600 undated 
La Dinda 2 cartons of Surya cigarettes 151,200 undated 
Muradin got money 150,000 undated 
Ud kulur debt 10 packs of Surya 38,000 undated 
La Budang Oma debt money 50,000 10-11-87 
La Budang Oma debt money 305,000 11-11-87 
Panus Eta debt money 9,000 12-11-87 
Ombeng debt 4,000 14-11-87 
La Dinda got 2 carton of Surya 152,100 14-11-87 
cigarettes 
14-11-87 Tinus Wasu got money 4,600 
Anu Suripatti debt 2,000 14-11-87 
Abdul Sacam Kulur got a carton of 76,000 16-11-87 
Surya cigarettes 
1 Indonesian words have been translated in a rather literal way. 
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Appendix 8.3 (continued) 
Debtor Debt Date of loan 
provision 
La Minggu got 175 kg of rice 
Man got a carton of Surya cigarette 
La Mima got a bag of rice 
Japar Kulur got one bag of rice 
Eta Panas Wasu debt 
Abas got one carton of cigarettes 
Bunas got money 
Cas Wasu got money 



















Source: Pak Asis, Book of Money Debts and Debts in Kind (Buku Utang Hang 
dan Barang from October 23,1987, till February 1988. 
Glossary of Indonesian Words 
adik younger brother or sister 
air water 
ambil to get 
anak child 
arisan savings and credit assocation 
asam tamarind 
atap (thatch of) sago palm leaflets 
bagan large wooden fishing raft 




bawa to bring 
bayar to pay 
becak pedicab, trishaw 
Belanda Dutch 
belanja to shop 
beli to buy 
belimbing carambola fruit 







Camat Head of a Sub-District 
can to search 
cekalang tuna fish 
cengkeh cloves 
cupa a tin 
dasa ten 
dusun tree garden (but also and elsewhere in 
Indonesia: administrative unit of a village) 
gaba sago palm stalk 
gampang easy 
gotong-royong mutual cooperation and support 
haji person who has been to Mecca, religious title 
harga price 
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hari day 
hasil yield, produce 
hidup to live 




imam Islamic official, head of mosque 
jajan sweets 
jual to sell 
kaki lima street vendor 
kampong ward; village 





kenal to know, to get to know 
kenalan acquaintance 
kerja to work 
koli a large canoe 
kretek spices (notably cloves) that give a particular 
flavor to kretek cigarettes 
kuat strong 
lain-lain other(s), etcetera 
laut sea 
lelang auction 
maanu (A) sharecropping arrangement in sago culture 
majelis religious (Islamic) club (of men or women) 
makan to eat 
mampu able 
mas gold 
masohi cooperative work (in buuding sago houses or 
harvesting sago trees) 
modal capital, financial means 
murni pure 
naik haji to go on pugrimage to Mecca 




orang human being 
pak mister 
pakaian cloth, clothes 
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panas hot 
panjar to advance (money) 
pedagang trader 
pembeli buyer 
pendapatan income, wage 





petik to break or peel (clove buds from a twig) 
pinjam to borrow 
pohon tree 
pokok foundation, source 
pondok a small shop 
qurban or korban offering, sacrifice 
raja local-traditional village head 
rumah house 
rupiah (Rp) Indonesian currency (US$1.00 = Rp. 1,760 in 
July 1989; Dfll.00 = Rp. 900 in February 1990) 
sakit ill 
sedang medium-sized 
sendiri self, alone 
sewa to lease (trees, that is, to buy the right to 
harvest trees) 







tanggungan security, guarantee 
terikat tied 
toko shop 
tolong to help 
tukar to change, to exchange 
tumang lump, basket 
ubi jalar sweet potatoe, red potatoe 
ubi kayu cassava 
umum general, public 
uang money 
untung advantage, profit 
usaha effort 
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(A) refers to Ambonese words 
utang debt (of money) 
waning food stall 
wisma dwelling 
zakat (Islamic) religious alms 
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Samenvatting 
Dit proefschrift gaat over verandering van spaar- en kredietpraktijken van 
inwoners van het dorp Tulehu, gelegen in het district Centrale Molukken, op 
het eiland Ambon, Oost-Indonesië. Het boek beschrijft hoe agro-ecologische 
condities en toenemende geldcirculatie deze praktijken meer of minder direct 
hebben beïnvloed gedurende de laatste 20 tot 25 jaar. Het hoofddoel van het 
proefschrift is een bijdrage te leveren aan de politieke en wetenschappelijke 
discussies over rurale financiering in ontwikkelingslanden op basis van een 
actor-structuur perspektief en een veldonderzoek op Ambon waarin dit 
analytisch-methodologisch perspektief is gebruikt Een tweede doel van het 
proefschrift is een bijdrage te leveren aan een betere kennis van sociaal-
economische verandering op ruraal Ambon gedurende de laatste 20 tot 25 
jaar. Het proefschrift is een compilatie van vijf artikelen die eerder zijn 
gepubliceerd in verschillende boeken en een tijdschrift, en twee langere, 
beschrijvende artikelen die niet eerder zijn gepubliceerd. Zij zijn nu zeven 
hoofdstukken van dit boek, afzonderlijk en in samenhang te bestuderen 
vanwege een gemeenschappelijke basis. 
De Kakofonie over Spaar- en Kredietsystemen als 
Ontwikkelingsinstrumenten 
De titel van dit boek verwijst naar deze gemeenschappelijke basis: "People 
That Count", het gaat om mensen, en hun manieren van 'tellen', van vorm en 
betekenis geven aan kapitaalsaccumulatie en krediettransacties. Het boek is 
een kritiek op de politieke en wetenschappelijke discussies over spaar- en 
kredietsystemen als ontwikkelingsinstrumenten. In deze discussies 
participeren werknemers van grote, internationale instellingen zoals de 
Wereld Bank (IBRD), het Internationaal Monetair Fonds (IMF), de Wereld 
Voedsel Organisatie (FAO), de Aziatische Ontwikkelingsbank (ADB), 
Ministeries voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, met-gouvernementele 
instellingen, consultancy bureaus en universiteiten. Discussies vinden plaats 
tijdens werkbesprekingen, seminars, via e-mail netwerken, in collegezalen, 
tijdens veldbezoeken en in wandelgangen naar aanleiding van 
projectbeschrijvingen, evaluatie-rapporten, wetenschappelijk onderzoek, 
boeken, tijdschriften, etc. Vele deelnemers aan deze discussies houden 
onterecht het beeld in stand dat het slechts gaat om fmancieel-technische 
kwesties waarbij gezocht moet worden naar de juiste financiële input, 
technologie of organisatie (zoals een roulerend fonds, een garantie-fonds, 
groepsleningen, een spaarprogram met een aantrekkelijke rente of het 
koppelen van inheemse spaargroepen aan officiële banken) om de positie van 
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slachtoffers van economische 'vooruitgang', sociaal-politieke desintegratie 
en/of ecologische degradatie-processen te kunnen verbeteren. 
Mijn eerste kritiek op deze discussies is dat in veel gevallen de normatief-
politieke dimensies van deze technische kwesties niet expliciet worden 
onderkend of dat 'ontwikkeling' meer of minder impliciet gedefinieerd wordt 
in termen van toename van geldcirculatie, 'efficiënte' financiële 
bemiddelingsstructuren en economische groei. Deze structuren — veel meer 
dan het handelend gedrag van (potentiële) cliënten — staan centraal in de 
meeste discussies over het gebruik van spaar- en kredietprogramma's als 
ontwikkelmgsinstrumenten. 
Mijn tweede punt van kritiek is dan ook dat bij de voortdurende zoektocht 
naar de juiste financiële input, technologie of organisatie het handelen van 
dorpelingen, mannen, vrouwen, allochtonen, autochtonen, etc. onterecht als 
quasi-constante wordt beschouwd. De grote variatie aan voorkeuren en 
behoeftes op het gebied van sparen en krediet (vaak uitmondend in vormen 
van zelf-regulering) wordt niet serieus genomen of ontkend. 
Mijn derde kritiek bouwt hierop voort en stelt dat in de discussies over 
spaar- en kredietsystemen als ontwikkelmgsinstrument te weinig 
systematisch naar 'contexten' van spaar- en kredietrelaties wordt gekeken. 
Deze contexten kunnen relationele, sociaal-ruimtelijke en (andere) 
transactionele contexten zijn, waar spaar- en kredietrelaties onderdeel van 
zijn of in worden 'opgenomen ' zoals: verwantschapsrelat ies, 
vriendschapsbanden, een buurt, een kantoor, koop- en verkooptransacties. 
Ook normatief-cognitieve en gezagsstructuren (zoals complexe systemen van 
rechten op grond en bomen, consumptie-standaarden, morele codes over een 
'recht op bestaan', commerciële ethiek) kunnen context van spaar- en 
kredietrelaties vormen. Tenslotte weerspiegelen agro-ecologische condities, 
fysieke infrastructuur, economische verandering en poütiek-bestuurlijke 
regimes zich in variatie en vormen van spaar- en kredietarrangementen. 
Het is naar mijn idee niet verwonderlijk dat a-contextuele analyse heeft 
geleid tot het instandhouden van nogal simpele classificaties (zoals 
'informele' versus 'formele' financiële instellingen) en statische visies op 
instituties danwel institutionele arrangementen met een financiële 
bemiddelingsfunctie. Mijn vierde bezwaar is dan ook dat hiermee niet alleen 
handelende mensen (dorpelingen, leden van spaar- en kredietassociaties, 
cliënten van banken maar ook bankiers, hun employees en superieuren) niet 
'in beeld komen' maar ook dat directe danwel indirecte relaties tussen 
verschillende financiële intermediaren te gemakkelijk worden ontkend. 
Om de tekortkomingen in discussies over spaar- en kredietsystemen als 
ontwikkelmgsmstrumenten te vermijden, heb ik een actor-structuur 
perspektief gebruikt bij mijn veldonderzoek op Ambon — hierbij geinspireerd 
door de zogenaamde structuratie-theorie van Anthony Giddens (1979) en 
sociaal-wetenschappelijke studies waarin deze theorie meer of minder 
expliciet is gebruikt om eigen analytisch-methodologisch kader te scherpen 
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(cf. Benda-Beckmann 1983b, 1989; Long 1989).1 De structurarie theorie is een 
formele theorie die menselijk handelen op abstract-theoretische wijze 
beschrijft. Het centrale en ogenschijnlijk simpele idee is dat menselijk 
handelen en structuren elkaar veronderstellen: structuren beperken menselijk 
handelen doch zijn echter ook bronnen (van macht, zingeving en kennis) van 
dit handelen. Dit betekent dat handelen van actoren tot instandhouding én 
verandering van structuren leidt Ik wil nu kort aangeven waarom Ambon 
als onderzoeksgebied zo bijzonder interessant is en vervolgens de resultaten 
van mijn onderzoek samenvatten aan de hand van de hoofdstukken van dit 
boek. Hierbij zijn de structuratie-theorie en zijn conceptuele bouwstenen 
(actoren, structuren, sociale systemen, sociale integratie en desintegratie) op 
impliciete danwel speelse wijze gébruikt. 
Onderzoek op Ambon 
Er zijn bijzonder weinig sociaal-wetenschappelijke studies verricht over 
Ambon en de bewoners van dit eiland (Fraassen 1972; Benda-Beckmann 
1990a, 1991, 1992) in de post-koloniale geschiedenis. Geen enkele van deze 
studies heeft rurale financiering als probleemveld of vertrekpunt genomen. 
Studies over rurale spaar- en kredietsystemen in Indonesië hébben zich 
meestal geconcentreerd op (delen van) Java (McLeod 1980 en 1991; Moll 1989 
en 1995). Hierdoor zijn vele interessante plekken buiten Java die worden 
gekenmerkt door dramatische veranderingen of lokaal-specifieke condities 
van financiële landschappen, schaars of niet gedocumenteerd. Eén van die 
plekken is het eiland Ambon, waar een aantal elkaar versterkende processen 
hebben plaatsgevonden gedurende de laatste 20 tot 25 jaar, die hebben te 
maken met geldcirculatie, geldbehoeftes en kredietverstrekking. In het 
algemeen zijn de mogelijkheden om geld te verdienen enorm toegenomen 
terwijl verandering van consumptie-standaarden heeft geleid tot een 
toegenomen behoefte en gebruik van geld. Dorpen en dorpelingen zijn echter 
niet op gelijke wijze betrokken (geweest) in de algehele toename van de 
1. Inzichten uit de structuratie-theorie zijn ook gebruikt door F.J.A. Bouman en ik (1994) als 
redacteuren van Financial Landscapes Reconstructed: The Fine Art of Mapping Development 
(Boulder, Westview Press). De metafoor "financial landscapes" (pp. 3-4), de beschrijving van 
"multiple contracts" en "multiple contexts" van spaar- en krediettransacties (pp. 179-291) 
alsmede de ruimtelijke dimensies van analyses variërend "from village to regional studies" 
(pp. 293-394) zijn hiervan voorbeelden. In feite zijn dit boek en mijn proefschrift op te vatten 
als vruchten van hetzelfde doctoraal project. In Financial Landscapes Reconstructed wordt de 
dynamiek en complexiteit van financiële landschappen geïllustreerd aan de hand van een 
serie onderzoeken (met verschillende nivo's van analyse en op basis van verschillende 
disciplinaire achtergronden) in verschillende landen. Het proefschrift wil een verdiepende 
studie zijn die de dynamiek en complexiteit van het financieel landschap van Ambon 
uiteenzet — met meer etnografisch detail en analyse van verschillende handelingsdomeinen 
vanuit verschillende ruimtelijke kaders. 
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geldcirculatie. Een belangrijke variabele in dit verband is de positie van een 
bepaalde plaats in zich ontwikkelende regionale transport- en 
handelsnetwerken. 
Een andere reden waarom Ambon een bijzonder interessant gebied is om 
de structuratie van spaar- en kredietarrangementen te bestuderen heeft te 
maken met de specifieke agro-ecologische condities, de bodemgesteldheid en 
bossen waar een unieke combinatie van pure zelfvoorzienings- en 
handelsgewassen groeit. Deze condities hebben de percepties en 
mogelijkheden van dorpelingen om bepaalde spaar- en kredietafspraken te 
maken zeer bepaald. In hoge mate verklaren de natuurlijke 'structuren' van 
Ambon ook de onbedoelde gevolgen en verandering van plannen van de 
officiële kredietinstellingen die hebben geprobeerd het lot van de rurale 
bevolking te verbeteren gedurende de laatste 15 jaar. 
Tenslotte telt het kleine eiland Ambon dat niet groter is dan 800 vierkante 
kilometer, verschillende religieuze en etnische groepen en gemeenschappen. 
De meeste Islamitische dorpen bevinden zich op het noordelijk schiereiland 
terwijl de meeste Christelijke dorpen op het zuidelijk schiereiland liggen. Er 
zijn ook Christenen en Islamieten die een animistisch geloof onderhouden 
tijdens vieringen in huis om de voorouders te eren of tijdens andere lieilige 
missies', zoals het doden van een inwoner van een naburig dorp die 
vermeende rechten op bepaalde bomen en grond niet zou hebben 
gerespecteerd. Ook in etnisch opzicht is Ambon en zijn dorpen op te delen in 
naast en/of door elkaar wonende gemeenschappen. Ambonezen wonen in 
één of meer centrale wijken {kampong) met een klein aantal Chinezen, 
Javanen en/of Sumatraanse winkeliers. Een grote etnische minderheid die 
traditioneel aan de rand van een dorpsgebied woont, bestaat uit Butonese 
migranten (afkomstig van het eiland Buton, Zuidoost-Sulawesi). Zij maken 
ongeveer een derde van de totale rurale bevolking van Ambon uit. 
Dorpen en dorpelingen zijn op verschillende wijzen betrokken bij en 
beïnvloed door economische veranderingen, natuurlijke condities en sociaal-
juridische structuren. Om inzichten te verschaffen in de gecombineerde 
effecten van toegenomen geldcirculatie en agro-ecologische condities op het 
maken van spaar- en kredietarrangementen door Ambonezen en migranten, 
die 'structureel' verschillende rechten op grond en bomen genieten om een 
bestaan op te bouwen, heb ik een veldonderzoek gedaan in en vanuit het 
dorp Tulehu in de periode januari tot mei 1989 en de periode juli 1989 tot 
mei 1990. Dit dorp is in hoge mate onderdeel geworden van grotere, 
ruimtelijke processen van commoditisatie en monetarisatie. Tulehu ligt aan 
de noordoostelijke kust van het eiland Ambon en verbindt Ambon stad met 
de eilanden Ceram, Haruku, Saparua en Nusalaut. Het is een Islamitisch 
dorp en telt een handje vol moskeeën, een groot aantal Islamitische klassen 
voor kinderen en bidgroepen voor volwassenen, en een Islamitische faculteit. 
Er zijn drie centraal gelegen, oude buurten (waar ook Sumatraanse, Chinese 
en Javaanse ondernemers wonen en werken), drie Butonese buurten die op 
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enige afstand van de drie centrale buurten zijn gelegen, en twee buurten van 
gemengde Ambonese-Butonese samenstelling die de ruimtes tussen de 
Ambonese en Butonese buurten langzamerhand hebben opgevuld. In het nu 
volgend overzicht van de hoofdstukken die volgen op het inleidend en 
probleemstellend hoofdstuk 1, wordt uiteengezet wat deze ontwikkelingen en 
kenmerken hebben betekend voor spaar- en kredietpraktijken van inwoners 
van Tulehu — meestal voorafgegaan door een aantal methodologische 
kritieken op de discussie over rurale financiering en ontwikkeling. 
Hoofdstuk 2 legt uit waarom de relaties tussen bepaalde agro-ecologische 
condities aan de ene kant, en spaargedrag, krediettransacties en 
zekerheidsstrategieen aan de andere kant, zo weinig zijn besproken in 
beleidsdiscussies over agrarisch krediet en rurale financiële markten. Mijn 
argument is dat dit een gevolg is van een te enge focus van vele deelnemers 
aan deze discussies op institutionele en instrumentele kwesties. Mijn voorstel 
is om 'geïntegreerde benaderingen' te ontwikkelen en te kijken naar de 
invloed van lokaal-specifieke agro-ecologische condities op spaar- en 
kredietgedrag in een dubbele zin, dat wil zeggen, strict genomen en in relatie 
tot (veranderende) sociaal-juridische, institutionele en economische contexten. 
Aan de hand van de casus 'Ambon' worden specifieke antwoorden op deze 
twee-ledige 'agrarische kwestie' van financiële landschappen gegeven. 
De bijzondere combinatie van een sago en kruidnagel cultuur heeft geleid 
tot arbeids- en kredietarrangementen die sterk verschillen van gelijksoortige 
arrangementen in rijstproducerende gebieden en ook, andere boomculturen, 
zoals met rubber- en/of kokosbomen. Sago palmbomen kunnen een 
minimaal bestaan garanderen in termen van voedselzekerheid en behuizing, 
en volwassen exemplaren kunnen elke dag van het jaar geoogst worden. 
Kruidnagelen zijn daarentegen een puur handelsgewas met eens per drie of 
vier jaar een grote oogst, afgewisseld met kleine oogsten. De niet-
gemechaniseerde oogst van sago en kruidnagel door Ambonezen vereist 
samenwerking op een ad-hoc basis, waarbij bredere sociale relaties tussen 
verwanten, buren en vrienden worden gemobiliseerd en gereproduceerd. Als 
gevolg van een enorme toename van de geldcirculatie en veranderingen van 
consumptie-standaarden gedurende de laatste twee decennia, hebben 
Ambonezen minder vaak een beroep gedaan op traditionele vormen van 
samenwerking bij het verzamelen van voedsel en materiaal om huizen te 
bouwen. Tegelijkertijd hebben zich nieuwe typen relaties en vormen van 
samenwerking ontwikkeld, waaronder kredietrelaties tussen Ambonezen en 
Butonezen, spaar- en kredietassociaties onder verschillende etnische en/of 
economische segmenten van de dorpssamenleving (zie hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 
6), en netwerken van officiële kruidnagelopkopers, Chinese winkeliers, 
professionele agrarische handelaren en Butonese migranten (zie hoofdstuk 8). 
Deze processen kunnen gezien worden als voorbeelden van (des)integratie 
van relaties en sociale systemen (Giddens 1979). 
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Hoofdstuk 3 geeft een meer gedetailleerde en 'fotografische' weergave van 
'uitkomsten' van processen van commoditisatie en monetarisatie die het 
leven van inwoners van Tulehu sterk hebben beïnvloed. Verschillende 
manieren van dorpelingen om geld te verkrijgen en te gebruiken in tijden 
van enorm toegenomen geldcirculatie en geldbehoeftes worden beschreven. 
Het hoofdstuk beschrijft hoe de verschillende manieren van verkrijgen en 
gebruiken van geld in verschillende en veranderende sociale relaties worden 
weerspiegeld. Deze manieren bevatten ook verschillende wijzen van sparen, 
krediet opnemen en krediet verlenen. Verschillende casussen uit 
verschillende sociale domeinen geven aan hoe de betekenis van sparen, lenen 
en uitlenen mtdrukking is van de type relatie en transactie waarin dit sparen, 
lenen en uitlenen plaatsvindt. 
Hoofdstuk 4 vat kort samen in welke verschillende economische sub-
sectoren dorpelingen van Tulehu aktief zijn (geworden), waardoor de 
betekenis van sago palmbomen als bronnen van voedselzekerheid en 
behuizing is verminderd en veranderd. Economische verandering in Tulehu 
heeft niet alleen bankdirecteuren overtuigd om een kantoor te openen in dit 
dorp vol bedrijvigheid, maar heeft ook — op directe danwel indirecte wijze — 
tot ontwikkeling van verschillende typen van groepsfinanciering en 
geldbewaarders geleid. Deze typen zijn uitdrukking van en sluiten nauw aan 
bij üliquiditeitsvoorkeuren, verzekeringsbehoeftes en behoeftes aan kleine 
leningen. Drie van de meest aansprekende kenmerken van informele 
financiële systemen zijn hun flexibiliteit, ruimtelijke nabijheid en het feit dat 
deze 'systemen' helemaal zijn opgezet om in behoeftes van hun gebruikers te 
voorzien. 
Om het functioneren van formele financiële programma's te verbeteren 
wordt voorgesteld om deze en andere kenmerken van informele financiële 
systemen te imiteren. De casus van een roterend fonds van een bidgroep van 
vrouwen leert ons echter dat men de betekenis van bestaande, sociale en/of 
economische relaties als basis van (nieuwe) spaar- en kredietaktiviteiten, niet 
dient te onderschatten. De vraag is of financiële technologieën of diensten 
'weggesneden' kunnen worden van deze relaties om ze daarna te 'enten' op 
formeel-bureaucratische structuren. 'Informele financiële systemen' (maar ook 
formele financiële systemen) kunnen niet slechts in termen van technologieën 
of diensten gedefinieerd worden. Financiële systemen zijn sociale systemen 
die in stand worden gehouden door actoren die niet alleen in deze systemen 
deelnemen maar ook in andere sociale systemen, zoals een etnische 
gemeenschap, een voorlichtingsprogram, een kantoor, een religieuze groep, 
een groep van ondernemers. Deze andere systemen beïnvloeden en/of 
omvatten 'financiële systemen' — zoals ook getoond in hoofdstukken 5 en 6. 
Hoofdstukken 5 en 6 zijn 'tweelingen' en geven beiden meer achtergrond 
en details over spaar- en kredietassociaties in Indonesië en Ambon in het 
bijzonder. In deze hoofdstukken wordt hiermee een onderdeel van hoofdstuk 
4 verder uitgediept alsmede het 'andere vormen van samenwerking' van 
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hoofdstuk 7. Hoofdstuk 5 legt uit waarom de recente lofzang op de roterende 
spaar- en kredietassociatie (ROSCAs) met grote voorzichtigheid dient te 
worden opgevat. Het zijn immers niet de zelf-regulerende capaciteiten, de 
spaaraktiviteiten en de organisatie-talenten van de participanten van deze 
associaties die worden toegejuicht maar eerder de ROSCA als een model of 
mechanisme om spaargelden uit rurale gebieden te verzamelen. Om een 
dergelijk reductionistisch perspektief op de betekenis en dynamiek van 
ROSCAs te vermijden, stel ik voor om ROSCAs als produkten en 
producenten van verschillende tijd-ruimtelijke processen van sociale 
transformatie op te vatten, als flexibele vormen van samenwerking die 
sociale relaties in veranderende contexten in stand houden en veranderen. Ik 
benadruk ook dat actor analyse niet 'tussen haakjes' (zie Giddens 1979) gezet 
kan worden bij een institutionele analyse van ROSCAs (zie Ardener 1964). 
Men dient de zelf-regulerende capaciteiten van ROSCAs niet te 
onderschatten: hun deelnemers maken de regels, passen de regels aan en 
vergelijken de (potentiële) betekenis van ROSCAs met die van andere spaar-
en kredietarrangementen. Een beschrijving van de verschillende 
achtergronden en rollen van roterende spaar- en kredietassociaties in Tulehu 
alsmede het relatief belang van deze associaties in vergelijking met andere 
arrangementen voor de Sumatraanse gemeenschap van Tulehu, zijn 
illustraties van mijn argument dat een contextuele analyse van ROSCAs een 
heel interessante methodologie kan zijn om maatschappelijke veranderingen 
te onderzoeken en in het bijzonder veranderingen van financiële 
infrastructuur, financiële behoeftes en rollen van verschillende financiële 
arrangementen. 
Hoofdstuk 6 legt uit dat één van de konsekwenti.es van het gebrek aan een 
actor perspektief bij de analyse en promotie van ROSCAs als een model of 
mechanisme, de produktie is van nogal algemene en simplistische ideeën 
over de betekenis van roterende spaar- en kredietassociaties voor bepaalde 
groepen of categorieën. Waarschijnlijk het meest dramatische voorbeeld in dit 
verband betreft vrouwen of preciesen verschillende klassen of categorieën 
van vrouwen. Mijn casussen van Tulehu tonen aan dat de studie van het 
gebruik van roterende spaar- en kredietassociaties door vrouwen een heel 
boeiende doch inspannende methode is om verandering en continuïteit te 
begrijpen van verschillende sets van relaties - relaties tussen migranten en 
autochtonen, tussen ambtenaren en burgers en tussen kleine ondernemers en 
hun verwanten. 
De eerdere versies van hoofdstukken 7 en 8 waren onderdeel van één 
essay waarvan de eerste helft een meer algemene en historische achtergrond 
vormde voor de tweede helft die zich toespitste op coöperaties en de handel 
in kruidnagelen op Ambon. Hoofdstuk 7 benadrukt dat coöperaties gezien 
zouden moeten worden als historisch- en lokaal-specifieke produkten. Het 
preciseren van de essentie van 'de coöperatie' wordt dan ook als dubieus 
gekwalificeerd en zegt meer over de belangen en ideeën van degenen die 
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hiermee bezig zijn dan over de diverse vormen van samenwerken en de 
praktijken van managers en leden van coöperaties. Ons beperkt begrip van 
coöperaties zou enorm verbeterd kunnen worden als we de strijd van 
verschillende belangengroepen bestuderen die 'coöperaties' gebruiken en 
zien als een bundel van rechten, privileges en bronnen om verschillende 
publieke en private doelen na te streven. 
Hoofdstuk 8 legt uit waarom dorpscoöperaties op de Centrale Molukken er 
niet in zijn geslaagd om hun officiële mandaat te verwezenlijken: de opkoop 
van kruidnagelen van boeren tegen een vaste, hoge prijs. Uitzonderlijk grote 
en standaard krediethoeveelheden die werden verstrekt door de Volksbank 
van Indonesië (BRT) aan dorpscoöperaties en waren bedoeld om 
kruidnagelen van boeren op te kopen, hebben dit falen in de hand gewerkt 
omdat geen rekening werd gehouden met de onregelmatigheid en ruimtelijke 
variatie van kruidnagelproduktie. Ook het gebrek aan vertrouwen van 
boeren in overheidscoöperaties in combinatie met hun pre-oogst 
arrangementen met private opkopers-cum-kredietverschaffers, maakten de 
missie van de coöperatie vrijwel onmogelijk Om kruidnagelen te kunnen 
aanbieden op de veiling van de centrale coöperatie van Ambon stad, gooiden 
vele voorzitters van dorpscoöperaties het op een accoordje met stedelijke 
grootwinkeliers. Deze winkeliers zijn hoofdspelers in regionele 
handelsnetwerken waarin producenten, verschillende directe opkopers en 
grote stedelijke winkeliers met elkaar zijn verbonden. Een aantal 
grootwinkeliers is bereid om eigen kruidnagelen op de veiling te brengen op 
naam van de dorpscoöperatie. 
Het laatste hoofdstuk gaat ook in op de relatie tussen veranderende 
kredietrelaties en 'infrastructurele' condities voor de kruidnagelhandel. Als 
gevolg van een toename van transportfaciliteiten en geldcirculatie in de 
Centrale Molukken gedurende de laatste twee decennia, zijn de 
mogelijkheden om de opkoop van kruidnagel veilig te stellen door het 
verlenen van krediet aan producenten afgenomen. Krediet is niet meer het 
instrument om relaties met leveranciers te controleren en monopolie-winsten 
te realiseren maar een middel om werkrelaties met een beperkt aantal 
mensen, producenten en kleine opkopers, te onderhouden. 
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hoofdstuk 7. Hoofdstuk 5 legt uit waarom de recente lofzang op de roterende 
spaar- en kredietassociatie (ROSCAs) met grote voorzichtigheid dient te 
worden opgevat. Het zijn immers niet de zelf-regulerende capaciteiten, de 
spaaraktiviteiten en de organisatie-talenten van de participanten van deze 
associaties die worden toegejuicht maar eerder de ROSCA als een model of 
mechanisme om spaargelden uit rurale gebieden te verzamelen. Om een 
dergelijk reductionistisch perspektief op de betekenis en dynamiek van 
ROSCAs te vermijden, stel ik voor om ROSCAs als produkten en 
producenten van verschillende tijd-ruimtelijke processen van sociale 
transformatie op te vatten, als flexibele vormen van samenwerking die 
sociale relaties in veranderende contexten in stand houden en veranderen. Ik 
benadruk ook dat actor analyse niet 'tussen haakjes' (zie Giddens 1979) gezet 
kan worden bij een institutionele analyse van ROSCAs (zie Ardener 1964). 
Men dient de zelf-regulerende capaciteiten van ROSCAs niet te 
onderschatten: hun deelnemers maken de regels, passen de regels aan en 
vergelijken de (potentiële) betekenis van ROSCAs met die van andere spaar-
en kredietarrangementen. Een beschrijving van de verschillende 
achtergronden en rollen van roterende spaar- en kredietassociaties in Tulehu 
alsmede het relatief belang van deze associaties in vergeh^king met andere 
arrangementen voor de Sumatraanse gemeenschap van Tulehu, zijn 
illustraties van mijn argument dat een contextuele analyse van ROSCAs een 
heel interessante methodologie kan zijn om maatschappelijke veranderingen 
te onderzoeken en in het bijzonder veranderingen van financiële 
infrastructuur, financiële behoeftes en rollen van verschillende financiële 
arrangementen. 
Hoofdstuk 6 legt uit dat één van de konsekwenties van het gebrek aan een 
actor perspektief bij de analyse en promotie van ROSCAs als een model of 
mechanisme, de produktie is van nogal algemene en simplistische ideeën 
over de betekenis van roterende spaar- en kredietassociaties voor bepaalde 
groepen of categorieën. Waarschijnlijk het meest dramatische voorbeeld in dit 
verband betreft vrouwen of precieser: verschillende klassen of categorieën 
van vrouwen. Mijn casussen van Tulehu tonen aan dat de studie van het 
gebruik van roterende spaar- en kredietassociaties door vrouwen een heel 
boeiende doch inspannende methode is om verandering en continuïteit te 
begrijpen van verschillende sets van relaties — relaties tussen migranten en 
autochtonen, tussen ambtenaren en burgers en tussen kleine ondernemers en 
hun verwanten. 
De eerdere versies van hoofdstukken 7 en 8 waren onderdeel van één 
essay waarvan de eerste helft een meer algemene en historische achtergrond 
vormde voor de tweede helft die zich toespitste op coöperaties en de handel 
in kruidnagelen op Ambon. Hoofdstuk 7 benadrukt dat coöperaties gezien 
zouden moeten worden als historisch- en lokaal-specifieke produkten. Het 
preciseren van de essentie van 'de coöperatie' wordt dan ook als dubieus 
gekwalificeerd en zegt meer over de belangen en ideeën van degenen die 
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hiermee bezig zijn dan over de diverse vormen van samenwerken en de 
praktijken van managers en leden van coöperaties. Ons beperkt begrip van 
coöperaties zou enorm verbeterd kunnen worden als we de strijd van 
verschillende belangengroepen bestuderen die 'coöperaties' gebruiken en 
zien als een bundel van rechten, privileges en bronnen om verschillende 
publieke en private doelen na te streven. 
Hoofdstuk 8 legt uit waarom dorpscoöperaties op de Centrale Molukken er 
niet in zijn geslaagd om hun officiële mandaat te verwezenlijken: de opkoop 
van kruidnagelen van boeren tegen een vaste, hoge prijs. Uitzonderlijk grote 
en standaard krediethoeveelheden die werden verstrekt door de Volksbank 
van Indonesië (BRT) aan dorpscoöperaties en waren bedoeld om 
kruidnagelen van boeren op te kopen, hebben dit falen in de hand gewerkt 
omdat geen rekening werd gehouden met de onregelmatigheid en ruimtelijke 
variatie van kruidnagelproduktie. Ook het gebrek aan vertrouwen van 
boeren in overheidscoöperaties in combinatie met hun pre-oogst 
arrangementen met private opkopers-cum-kredietverschaffers, maakten de 
missie van de coöperatie vrijwel onmogelijk. Om kruidnagelen te kunnen 
aanbieden op de veiling van de centrale coöperatie van Ambon stad, gooiden 
vele voorzitters van dorpscoöperaties het op een accoordje met stedelijke 
grootwinkeliers. Deze winkeliers zijn hoofdspelers in regionele 
handelsnetwerken waarin producenten, verschillende directe opkopers en 
grote stedelijke winkeliers met elkaar zijn verbonden. Een aantal 
grootwinkeliers is bereid om eigen kruidnagelen op de veiling te brengen op 
naam van de dorpscoöperatie. 
Het laatste hoofdstuk gaat ook in op de relatie tussen veranderende 
kredietrelaties en 'mfrastructurele' condities voor de kruidnagelhandeL Als 
gevolg van een toename van transportfaciliteiten en geldcirculatie in de 
Centrale Molukken gedurende de laatste twee decennia, zijn de 
mogelijkheden om de opkoop van kruidnagel veilig te stellen door het 
verlenen van krediet aan producenten afgenomen. Krediet is niet meer het 
instrument om relaties met leveranciers te controleren en monopolie-winsten 
te realiseren maar een middel om werkrelaties met een beperkt aantal 
mensen, producenten en kleine opkopers, te onderhouden. 
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